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Introduction 
Ulrich von Alemann/Detlef Briesen/Lai Quoc Khanh 
This book is the result of an interdisciplinary conference on “the rule of law.” 
Discussions about the topic, especially in the field of development cooperation, 
are legion. But our approach is somehow unique: It is the outcome of the first 
meeting of its kind in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Our workshop took 
place in autumn 2014 at the National University of Vietnam, University of 
Social and Human Sciences, Hanoi (USSH). The conference is thus more than 
only another document of the intensive German-Vietnamese cooperation; it 
also indicates the further development of the legal state which can be observed 
in Vietnam recently: to be able to discuss such an important issue at a univer-
sity is a distinct sign of the deep transformation process which is currently 
occurring in the Southeast Asian country. Another element that makes our 
publication exceptional is that instead of beginning immediately with a highly 
specialized debate on the state of law in Vietnam from the perspective of one 
single academic discipline (which will surely emerge in the coming years), we 
started to discuss numerous facets of the subject “rule of law” arising from a 
multidisciplinary dialogue. For this reason, the participants and speakers, both 
at the conference itself and for this present publication, come from various 
scientific disciplines in Vietnam and Germany: political, historical, social, 
economic and legal sciences (in which in Europe the topic is discussed most 
extensively), but also members of Vietnamese governmental and non-
governmental organizations. 
Our aim for the conference and the conference volume is to open up a dia-
logue about the rule of law between two very different legal cultures, the Ger-
man-European and the Vietnamese, which we must locate in the complex set-
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ting of Southeast or East Asia. As a result of the complexity of the subject 
matter, we have therefore refrained from providing a limiting definition of our 
discourse object “Rechtsstaat.” We have learned to operate cautiously in order 
to avoid the danger of Eurocentrism, as well as too easily dismiss questionable 
circumstances as country-typical. And in general, caution is necessary, as the 
constitutional state, however much we may agree on the goal of its worldwide 
realization, was, on the one hand, always an ideological concept which served 
issues like the competition between the great powers for colonial possessions 
and later for the superpowers to expand their zones of influence. The alleged 
absence of the state of law served only too often to colonize states or to inter-
vene directly in their internal affairs. On the other hand, however, serious vio-
lations of the rule of law cannot be so easily explained in terms of a different 
interpretation of the latter. But by all means different legal traditions have to 
be taken into account. It cannot be ignored that European states such as Ger-
many follow the Roman tradition of law, while a country like Vietnam is his-
torically and contemporarily deeply influenced by the Confucian tradition of 
custom and morale.  
It is true that we have to accept distinct differences between Roman-
European law, and Southeast and East Asian customs and morale, but both 
traditions also contain many common elements. They make it possible to form 
an intersection in the definition of the rule of law which is perfectly consistent 
with today's minimum requirements; in particular the binding of state action 
to law and justice, the exclusion of state arbitrariness, the principle of propor-
tionality of state action, the division of powers and the independence of the 
courts, and also to examine the legality of state action, and thus legal certainty. 
However, the individual contributions to our volume show that this cata-
logue is limited or extended by more criteria, or that individual aspects of the 
rule of law are placed at the center of attention. At the same time, at least three 
aspects are identified which were of considerable importance for the discussions 
during the conference: 
- the exclusion of state arbitrariness and the principle of proportionality of 
state action, 
- legal certainty and equality of all before the law, 
- the enormous international relevance of contemporary trans- and interna-
tional legal systems. 
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From the very beginning, we were less likely to document the already estab-
lished current state of research, since this is more or less non-existent with 
regard to Vietnam, but to initiate research processes in a way which is appro-
priate to the relevance of the topic. The legal state is scientifically only ade-
quately researched if it is addressed from various scientific and socio-political 
angles, also taking into account various perspectives from different legal cul-
tures. 
For this reason, our volume is the result of a twofold approach: the contri-
butions from Vietnam stem mainly from the legal, political and historical 
sciences. They first and foremost document the efforts to improve the connec-
tion with international debates and research topics within the framework of 
the Vietnamese reform process (Doi Moi). Partial aspects of this endeavor then 
lead to those more specific questions which are addressed by the Vietnamese 
authors in this volume. They can be specified here briefly as follows. 
The contributions by Nguyen Thi Hoi, Pham Duc Anh and Vu Thi Phung 
deal with the history of Vietnamese law for the period before the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when the colonization by the European Great Power, 
France began. The authors question the situation in Vietnam prior to coloniza-
tion using criteria such as state arbitrariness and proportionality of state action. 
Since the state in the early modern times, in Europe as well as in Asia, consist-
ed essentially of the ruling monarch and his officials, a discourse on arbitrari-
ness and proportionality always implicitly criticized the ruling monarch. In 
our context, however, perhaps a more important goal of the contributions is 
recognizable: to search for pre-colonial traditions and to make these usable for 
today's societal and political change in Vietnam. 
Especially in Vietnam, the division of powers between legislature, executive 
and judiciary, as defined in most contemporary constitutions, is a decisive 
feature of the rule of law. This view is at least largely accepted in contemporary 
debates with particular emphasis on the independence of the judiciary. The 
contributions by Lai Quoc Khanh and Nguyen Thi Chau Loan therefore focus 
on the division of powers: Either as an attempt to demonstrate its relevance for 
the entire constitutional and societal development of Vietnam or to design 
models for the implementation of a more independent judiciary.  
Another focal point is the problems of corruption and low compliance of 
functionaries in the implementation of legal norms. Such questions are being 
revived in Vietnam today either with reference to the teachings of the found-
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ing father of the nation, Ho Chi Minh, or are more and more addressed in the 
traditional (Confucian) sense as improvements in the education of officials (Lai 
Quoc Khanh/Nguyen Ngoc Anh, Nguyen Anh Cuong, Hoang Thi Kim Que, 
Nguyen Thi Thuy Hang/Phan Duy Anh and Bui Xuan Duc). In addition, a 
number of contributions (from Dinh Xuan Ly, Duong Xuan Ngoc, Phan Xuan 
Son and Vu Cong Giao) deal with the contemporary constitution of Vietnam. 
The two main topics are the problem of whether and to what extent the reform 
process in the country is adequately secured, and whether the reforms provide 
the necessary preconditions to ensure especially economic cooperation with 
Vietnam’s neighboring countries.  
The contributions from Germany are also an outcome of a respective ap-
proximation to the problems of the legal state. They are more generalized and 
are primarily geared to developing discussions for future cooperation. Since the 
authors come from various scientific disciplines, these articles reflect the diver-
sity of today’s debates about the constitutional state. The contributions from 
Germany provide key concepts and theories of the scientific discourse about 
the constitutional state and the development of law, also in transnational and 
international contexts. 
Legal pluralism is such a key concept. Detlef Briesen uses it to describe the 
various forms of discrimination by law in colonial states, a condition which has 
also been felt in Vietnam since the conquest by France, and which has had a 
profound impact until today. Another key concept is that of governing by law. 
Julian Krüper’s contribution is concerned with the question of how the consti-
tutional state can act “constitutionally” in its everyday practice without always 
referring directly to the idealistic provisions of the constitution. Michael 
Baurmann and Liu Mengyue focus their article on “trust”, a category which at 
first sight is a non-legal one. They ask how in an East Asian society with many 
similarities to Vietnam, namely the Chinese society, trust in business relations 
can be established without formal legal guarantees. Justus Haucap follows a 
similar approach and points out the importance of institutional and informa-
tional requirements for modern market economies. The contributions by 
Thomas Schmitz and Ulrich von Alemann discuss the development of transna-
tional and international law – on the one hand, the exemplary creation of 
transnational law by the European Community, on the other hand the increas-
ing role of international organizations in the creation of law. 
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These terms and theories are certainly of some importance for the future 
debate on the constitutional state in Vietnam and elsewhere. During the dis-
cussions at the conference and in the articles in this volume, the enormous gap 
in current research has become more visible. For further research we propose to 
focus on the different periods of modern Vietnamese history and their respec-
tive relation to a state of law. 
- Before the colonization by France, the Nguyen dynasty’s rule in particular 
was predominantly based on concepts of governance and administration 
which originated from contemporary China. The rule of law, as well as the 
entire legal system, were not determined by the formalized European (Ro-
man) law but by the Confucian concept of custom and morale. It was based 
on trust in the moral integrity of the emperor and his mandarins.  
- With the colonization, France established legal pluralism in Indochina, a 
common concept of colonial rule to discriminate the “native subjects”. Con-
sequently, the validity of Confucian-law was increasingly limited to the 
marginalized Vietnamese village population. The French “Etat légale” was 
based on arbitrary decisions. It not only failed to create a system of legal 
certainty and equality but even established systematic discrimination and 
injustice by law. The French colonial authorities destroyed trust in law to 
such a degree that the “Etat légale” can even be understood as an essential 
source of the anti-colonial uprisings since World War I. 
- With the August 1945 revolution, a process of enforcing “socialist legality” 
began, following the model of the Communist Bloc, although the founding 
father of modern Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, distanced himself from these ide-
as, and so Vietnam never developed a theory of socialist legality like the 
contemporary GDR for example. This was also because Vietnam was con-
stantly involved in wars for almost 50 years, from the Japanese occupation 
in 1940 until the end of the Third Indochina War in the early 1990s.  
- Since the beginning of the reform era (Doi Moi) in the mid-1980s, the 
Vietnamese government has been seeking to define the rule of law for Vi-
etnam and to implement reforms. A key impetus for the latter is, in partic-
ular, the need for legal certainty which is required by national as well as in-
ternational investors or must be guaranteed in the context of the planned 
cooperation in ASEAN. The state of law in Vietnam is still in progress  
From these four epochs, fascinating perspectives arise for further comparative 
law research, for which first ideas have been developed here in our volume. 
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This would not have been possible without solving the problem of translating 
complicated legal terms from Vietnamese into English. Therefore, we would 
like to express our very great appreciation to the translators, Dr. Dao Duc 
Thuan, Dr. Lam Minh Chau, and Tran Minh, MA.  
 
 
 
 
I. Traditions 

A Brief History of the Idea of the State of Law  
and Its Basic Indicators 
Nguyen Thi Hoi 
A Brief History of the Idea of the State of Law 
In the history of legal and political ideas of humankind, the idea of legal dom-
inance over a state and society and the notion of a state that rules and controls 
by law and maintains legal observance werecreated at a time as early as the pre-
historical period. The foundation of these ideas is closely tied to the rise of 
popular sovereignty and democracy as opposed to authoritarian and tyrant 
individual rulers as well as anarchy and unlawfulness, and requires the state 
and the society as a whole to depend on law. This is reflected in the ideas of 
well-known Western and Eastern thinkers. 
In the West, the idea of the state of law was founded at an early time and 
reflected in the works of thinkers and political activities of statesmen. This 
becomes more apparent when we take a glimpse at the viewpoints of thinkers 
whose ideas have been famous for many centuries. Solon (c. 638–c. 559 B.C.) 
was a renowned Greek sophist, poet, legislator and political activist at pre-
modern history. In 594 B.C., having been appointed as archon of Athens, So-
lon passed a number of laws to reform state and society. These included a land 
reform to return to farmers their lands previously used as mortgages, a slavery 
reform that gave back bonded slaves their freedom, a class reform to define the 
rights and responsibilities of each class, and a legislation on the founding of a 
People’s Assembly (ecclesia) and a People’s Court (heliala). The introduction of 
these laws confirmed that Solon was well aware of the role of laws in social 
governance and control, as he stated that internal peace was based on a firm 
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state and a legal system.1 He wrote: “Anarchy would generate tons of disasters 
and bring about the extinction of the city. Only the law is able to establish 
order and construct unison.”2 
Heraclitus (c. 530–470 B.C.) – the great Greek materialist philosopher, 
who upheld the law and considered it a means to realize universal harmony, 
also emphasizes the role of written law and its protection and consolidation. 
For him, cities are bound to be founded on a legal basis and the law has to be 
fought for as much as the stability of one’s home city.3 
Socrates (469–399 B.C.), the renowned Greek orator, says that every citizen 
who has settled in a nation is to be bound by a contract by which he maintains 
absolute adherence to the law, however good or bad it is. A society cannot 
function well without efficient laws. The most sacred value is justice, which 
means to live according to the public law.4 
Platon (427–347 B.C.), the prominent ancient Greek philosopher and also 
Socrates’ most loyal student, maintains that the state can exist as long as public 
authorities completely observe the law. He claims to foresee the extinction of 
the state wherever the law is inefficient and inferior to any personal power. In 
contrast, wherever the law is superior to the state and public authorities are 
but its minions, the state and its interests are saved.5 
Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) is the greatest ancient Greek “encyclopédiste” 
who is referred to by Karl Marx as the most influential ancient thinker. Frie-
drich Engels considered him as having the most complete mind among all 
Greek philosophers. Aristotle states that the law clearly reflects the state’s role 
as it helps to confirm and consolidate civil rights. The law is tasked with facili-
tating the process by which individuals learn their rights through their rela-
tionships. However, there is no right to equalize the members of the society; 
differences among the rich and the poor necessarily exist. The law is divided by 
Aristotle into general (natural) law and particular (nationally-bound) laws. The 
general law is superior to particular laws. In every particular law there are also 
first the laws that deal with the establishment and organization of city-states 
                                                     
1 See VNU Press (2009).  
2 See Luu Kien Thanh/Pham Hong Thai (1993), 62.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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and those that are subordinate to the former. The legal totality makes up polit-
ical justice which only exists among free and equal people. Aristotle considers 
legal norms “justice” and to act justly means to follow the laws. Accordingly, 
he deems states whose authorities rule by law and genuinely in the public in-
terest, pure or original states, while those that favor individual will at the ex-
pense of the law and rule only for the sake of individual authorities are corrupt 
or phony. Regarding the state apparatus, he splits it into three sectors or seg-
ments which respectively deal with legislation or decision-making, executive 
or legal enforcement and jurisdiction or legal judgments. He writes: “Now 
there are three things in all states which a careful legislator ought well to con-
sider, which are of great consequence to all, and which properly attended to 
the state must necessarily be happy; and according to the variation of which 
the one will differ from the other. The first of these is the public assembly; the 
second the officers of the state, that is, who they ought to be, and with what 
power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should be appoint-
ed; the third, the judicial department.”6 
In the East the supremacy of the law and the requirement that everyone, in-
cluding the king, his officials and citizens, has to abide by the law is also 
manifested in the works of many ancient thinkers.  
Kautilya (around the 4th century B.C.) was a chancellor of the powerful 
Maurya dynasty which is credited with developing a united, wealthy and influ-
ential ancient India and was a teacher and friend of King Chandra Gupta. He 
proposed a plan for national construction based on a stable and ordered society, 
prosperous economy, formidable army and expanded influence. According to 
him, for a country to prosper it is first and foremost necessary to establish so-
cial order, which requires the first and fundamental role and responsibilities of 
the king and those of his citizens. However, in order to maintain a lasting 
reign the king must rule by law and resolutely adhere to it. He advised the 
king: “However, despite one’s position as ruler of a nation, one is not allowed 
to act according to one’s own will. To mobilize popular support for the cause 
national construction the king is supposed to uphold the law and strictly ad-
here to public norms. To rule a nation without regard to the law means to give 
up one’s throne without any popular coup.”7 
                                                     
6 Ellis (1941), Aristotle, 132. 
7 Thích Mãn Giác (1967), 163.  
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Han Fei (c. 280–233 B.C.) – a prominent representative of the legalistic 
school, states that the rule by law is necessarily a must for his time. He writes:  
“There is no fixed way to rule the people, so it is better to resort to the law. The law 
has to adapt itself to each particular era, and to be efficient it must be guided by that 
particular era (…) a ruling principle of wise men is to adapt the law to historical cir-
cumstances and make the legislation relevant to historical conditions.”8  
He therefore not only emphasizes the state of law but also calls for the objec-
tive adjustment of the law according to each historical era. In addition, he 
requires everyone, not excluding the king and his officials, to respect and up-
hold the law; Han Fei supports the equal distribution of law to everyone. He 
says: “Do whatever is legal and abandon whatever is illegal.”9 Or in another 
version:  
“Thus a lucid king is able to divert his followers from living outside the law, refusing 
to make good deeds within the law and committing illegal acts. The law is what for-
bids individual misdeeds to go beyond legal boundaries (…) the king is without safety 
if the law is unstable, and evil deeds are triumphant without resolute punishments. 
The law refuses to favor the noble born, just as the plumb-line does not yield to curves. 
What is assigned by the law, the wise cannot decline and the brave dare not challenge. 
In applying the law to transgressions, one does not tolerate great ministers; in reward-
ing good conduct, one does not ignore commoners. Therefore, it is nothing but the law 
that is capable of correcting ministers’ wrongdoings, disciplining commoners’ miscon-
ducts, removing chaos, righting the wrong and uniting the people’s lines.”10 
The above viewpoints show that in ancient ideas on the state and law, the state 
of law – which is ruled and controlled through legal means, supports the role 
of the law, respects and adheres to it and considers it an indispensable part of 
social management – is present. In the “dark ages” humankind had to tolerate 
the brutal suppression by authoritative monarchies and religiously-fanatical 
theocracies and live under the domination of feudal regimes – with little or 
nothing related to the state of law.11 In Europe  
“the missionaries transformed political science and jurisprudence into nothing but the 
sciences that served theology, and dominant theological principles were jammed into 
                                                     
8 Lã Trấn Vũ (1964), 283. 
9 Lã Trấn Vũ (1964), 288. 
10 Phan Ngoc (2001), 61 ff. 
11 See Dao Tri Uc (2006).  
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the two former. The teachings of Congregations were at the same time political deter-
minants and religious texts retained as much effect before the court as the law.”12  
Such conditions render democracy, the supreme role of the law and legal com-
pliance, the supreme role of citizens underdeveloped. It was not until the 
emergence of the capitalist mode of production and the introduction and de-
velopment of humanism that the idea of the state of law reemerged, as can be 
seen in different ideas on the state and law by some Western scholars.  
Machiavelli (1469–1527), an Italian politician and thinker says that the 
people are above the prince, since they are better at picking public officials 
than him, “the people are at all times more prudent, determined and rational 
than the king.”13 Machiavelli sides with the people, as he argues that a king 
who can do whatever he wants will become an insane autocrat, and if people 
can do whatever they want, they will only become mad men. Therefore, the 
people are better than the king under a legal system; for if unbounded by the 
law they are likely to commit fewer wrongdoings than the king and are more 
predisposed to redeeming themselves. This is because any citizen who is cor-
rupted, debased and rebellious can easily listen to advice and return to his 
right way; while a tyrant king can be stopped by nothing, and it takes nothing 
other than weapons to let him redo what is wrong.14 
But more importantly, what is significant is that a legal document that re-
flects the state of law was created even prior to the Renaissance, the Magna 
Carta (Great Charter), since it carries the idea of a state that is bounded by the 
law. The Charter was issued in June, 1215, recognized by King John of Eng-
land and improved by Edward I in 1297, and can be considered the first im-
portant legal document which legitimatized the State of England as a sover-
eign state of law. The Charter regulated:  
“No free man is eligible to being captured or imprisoned, being deprived of his rights 
and properties, being turned outlaw or forced to go exile and being stripped of his 
status. The king is in no way permitted to use force against others or to instruct others 
to use force without the legitimate rulings of his counterpart authorities or unless 
proper to the law of his kingdom.”15 
                                                     
12 Truth Publisher (1986), Marx/Engels, 45.  
13 See Pham Huy Chiem (1971), The Prince. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Dao Tri Uc 2006, 116–117. 
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The Charter is said to be one of first written acts in the West that restricted 
the king’s power, making him bounded by the law and forced to restrain from 
committing certain actions against the populace without legitimate rationales. 
These rationales can be found in the decisions of his counterparts or the law.  
In the 17th century, given the strong development of the capitalist relations 
of production, the idea of a state of law is heightened to a new level. The 
thinkers in this area resort to the idea of natural law to request more freedom 
and democracy for the people, affirm civil sovereignty, emphasize the role of 
the law, demand the state to be put under legal supervision and management 
and bounded by the law, and desire the laws to be in line with a human’s natu-
ral rights. They argue that the state and law are not created by God, but rather 
by the conciliation between everyone with respect to a human’s rationality. For 
them, the human being is endowed with certain inherent rights and obliga-
tions by its creator, which are associated with his birth and not dependent or 
given by the state, namely the right to live in freedom and equality, the pur-
suit of happiness and private ownership. On the other hand, the human being 
is obliged to refrain from causing damage to others and his community. The 
resulting demands of the human’s will constitute the norms of natural law. 
“Human law” is supposed to be appropriate to “natural law”, meaning the laws 
created by the state must be in conjunction with a human’s intrinsic and natu-
ral rights. This idea is embedded in the works of such prominent scholars of 
this area as Grotius, John Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau. Locke argues that 
as soon as he signs the contract to create a state, man has transferred the power 
to punish individuals to the state, whose authority is thus a congregation of 
individual power and results from the citizens; state power is limited or re-
stricted by the stipulations of this contract, namely the preservation of free-
dom, property and life of each individual, but also of a society as a whole. To 
be sure, Locke’s concept of state power resulting from citizens’ power is a great 
scientific and political achievement, and is currently reflected in the constitu-
tions of many contemporary states. 
Locke compliments those institutions which are capable of ensuring human 
freedom, and also confirms that the first and foremost prerequisite is the sepa-
ration or partition of powers. For him, in a republican state there are the legis-
lative, executive and federative powers; all these powers are authorized to the 
state by popular will or in other words, the state is granted these powers by the 
people through a clearly defined agreement. Among these three, the legislative 
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power is supposed to be highest as it is charged with creating mandatory piec-
es of legislation for every sector and every member of a society. Subsequent to 
the creation of these pieces, even the legislators are obliged to adhere to them; 
and the king, who holds the supreme executive or law enforcement power, has 
to abide by the law.  
Locke strongly emphasizes the role of the law in state and social activities, 
and thus the respect for and compliance with the law by state bodies and per-
sonnel. Therefore, whatever leads to state disintegration is for him associated 
with a lack of respect for and compliance with the law by everyone, including 
most importantly the state bodies and those who are public authorities. He 
argues that whenever the legislative organs or the king or all of them violate 
the laws by, for instance, transgressing their authorized power or abusing pow-
er, interfering with the life, freedom and property of the people, state disinte-
gration is likely to occur. This once again confirms that Locke is not only the 
author of the idea of state of law but also of the idea of separation of powers.  
Montesquieu (1689–1755), one of the most prominent French enlighteners, 
in his famous work “The Spirit of the Laws”, provides a definition of the law. 
He argues that humans are ruled by different kinds of law: natural law, divine 
law, religious law, international law, political law, civil law, family law, etc. 
Similar to Locke, Montesquieu is particularly concerned about protecting the 
freedom of citizens, as he argues that political freedom and civil safety and 
security can only be achieved with the absence of power abuse. To prevent the 
abuse of power it is necessary to create an appropriate mechanism to exercise 
state power. It is the separation of state power and mutual control between the 
branches of power. According to him, in every administration there are three 
branches of power: legislative power; the power to exercise that which is al-
lowed by international law (executive power) and the power to perform that 
which is allowed by civil law (judicial power). Legislative power is the power 
to create temporary or permanent laws and amend or remove existing laws. 
Executive power is the power to decide matters regarding war and peace, send 
or receive ambassadors, increase common security and prevent possible invasive 
acts. Judicial power is the power to punish criminal acts or settle personal 
disputes between individuals. These three powers are supposed to be separated 
or granted to different actors in order to avoid the abuse or mistreatment of 
power, which ensures the freedom of citizens. For every human is born with 
the lust for power, he who has power is likely to abuse it. Whenever and wher-
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ever centralized power is given to a person or an organization, it is likely that 
it is abused. Montesquieu argues that the separation of state power can guaran-
tee freedom because it prevents authoritarianism and mistreatment of power by 
the state. He also writes: “The freedom of citizens depends primarily on the 
validity of criminal laws. A vulnerable innocent citizen’s security means the 
loss of freedom.”16 Therefore, charging a person as guilty must not merely be 
based on his thoughts, words or poems but on the consideration of his mani-
fested actions. If his words are tied to actions, and his poems contain opposi-
tional motives, then punishment is eligible and regulations must be created to 
protect his innocence if necessary. 
Judging from the ideas of the above thinkers, it can be said that “the state 
of law” is mentioned by no one although its distinct signs are sketched out. In 
the 18th century, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) amended and developed the 
idea of state of law to a higher plane and Kant himself invented the concept of 
“state of law”. For him, the state is an instrument that connects its member in 
a legal framework in order to supervise and ensure freedom and equality for 
every citizen. The state is responsible for addressing social disputes, monitor 
social relationships and making sure society is constantly improved for the sake 
of human interests. The state uses the law to assist every citizen in demonstrat-
ing his strength and maximizing individual labor and originality. Kant argues 
that to speak of the state means to speak of a state of law created by the people 
for the realization of freedom and equality. A person can pursue personal ad-
vancement according to his will if he keeps from violating the law. Every citi-
zen is supposed to adhere to the law while enjoying the right and ability to put 
the state under the law. The state is tasked with protecting the laws and ensur-
ing the reign of the law and freedom. That which promises to bring mutual 
relations between the state and its citizens is the separation of state powers 
which distinguishes between executive and legislative ones.17 Thanks to his 
ideas, Kant is perceived as one of the prominent theorists on the state of law – 
a state that is based on individual autonomy and complies with the law in its 
every activity.  
In conclusion, the idea of state of law has a long history which dates back to 
ancient times and develops alongside the progress of human civilization, re-
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flecting aspirations of a state and an ideal social order which is capable of en-
suring a free life and especially political freedom for everyone.  
The Conception and Basic Characteristics of the State of Law 
The Concept of State of Law 
Since the 19th century, the state of law has no longer just been an idea but has 
evolved into a civilized value of humankind, an ideal state model, an inevitable 
progress of all democratic states around the world, and a good reference model 
for the state shaping and development by contemporary nations. For one, until 
now, “the development of human civilization is for the most part regulated by 
the progress of civil society and state of law”.18 State of law thus continues to 
be a widely researched subject in many countries such as Germany, Russia, the 
US and Vietnam that seek to grasp the characteristics of this model according 
to which they further improve their respective states. But what is the state of 
law? To this question different answers can be proposed, as the state of law is a 
complicated, multi-faceted phenomenon which can be viewed from different 
angles. This is better vindicated in the conceptions of state of law by contem-
porary scholars from different countries. 
A number of German scholars claim that in modern languages there are 
two interchangeable concepts, namely the “state of law” (Rechtsstaat, état de 
droit) and the “rule of law”, depending on each particular language. These two 
in fact share both similar and different points. What they have in common is 
that both “state of law” and „`r`ule of law” originate from some basic principles: 
the universality of legal norms, the public nature of law and the non-retro-
activeness and transparency of legal norms. The difference is that “rule of law” 
is used according to English common law, which puts more emphasis on popu-
lar participation in an organized political progress without specifying the 
state’s role. On the other hand, “state of law” refers to a specific role of a state, 
the state, i.e. its real components. 
Nevertheless, it is argued by some authors that “the rule of law” is not cor-
rectly the equivalent of “nhà nước pháp quyền” in Vietnamese. For one thing, 
“the rule of law“ refers to a society managed and run on the basis of clearly 
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identified rights as indicated by human law and natural law, so that the sub-
jects can exercise their rights at their will to improve happiness without violat-
ing others’ rights; every subject, even the state, has to station itself below the 
law. The “rule of law” is therefore not simply a state of law, although it still 
plays an important part.19 Accordingly, I recommend translating “the rule of 
law” as “chế độ pháp quyền” instead of “chế độ pháp trị” (which may be trans-
lated into English as “rule by law”), as it refers to a higher process compared to 
“state of law”.  
Scholars have different definitions of the state of law. Some authors concep-
tualize state of law as a state that recognizes and respects the supremacy of the 
law, makes clear distinctions between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches which are mutually controlled and managed, ensure that its citizens 
enjoy full legal safety and their basic liberal rights are protected, and fulfill 
international agreements.20 Another definition says that the “state of law regu-
lates both society and itself according to the law, and the state apparatus is 
inferior to the law.”21 Another line of thought says that state of law is not a 
specific kind of state but a state model wherein general and particular charac-
teristics coexist and the concept of state of law must be understood in both 
dimensions: as a general characteristic of the state as a special organ of political 
power, and a particular characteristic of state as part of a triangle made by the 
state-the law-civil-society.22. Other scholars argue that the state of law is a 
form of state as its organization and operations are in contrast with those of 
authoritarian and dictatorial states; in contrast to those of states that are orga-
nized by humanism and also those states that follow legalism.23 
In addition, there are other conceptions of the state of law. Although the 
conceptions of the state of law are different from scholar to scholar, they share 
the following common points when contrasting it with authoritarian and total-
itarian states or non-state of law: 
- First, the state of law is legally founded and its power and operations are 
limited by the law, based on the law and the idea of justice; it must be con-
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trolled by the law; the state is utilized to protect individual freedom and 
protecting civil interests is its raison d’être. 
- Second, the state of law has an advanced legal system which is based on and 
relevant to a human’s natural rights, respects and guarantees the implemen-
tation of human rights, civil rights and freedom, and manages to remove 
authoritarianism, exclusiveness and government’s arbitrariness.  
- Third, this legal system retains its superiority and is applied equally na-
tionwide; every subject, even the state, is obliged to obey the law and pur-
sue justice, respect human rights and individual freedom. State organiza-
tion and operations are completely based on legal regulations in order to 
fulfill these regulations.  
- Fourth, the court of law is independent and its rulings must be in conjunc-
tion with constitutional principles. It is supposed to safeguard the rights of 
the people against the violation of any other subject, including the state, 
and it is followed by all subjects, not excluding state organs.  
The above analysis helps us confirm that state of law is first and foremost a 
state in its fullest sense – an organization that holds political power or a public 
authority endowed with state characteristics. However, it is not a socio-
economic form in the sense of a feudal state or capitalist state, but a state 
whose organizational structure and operations are different from those of au-
thoritarian or dictatorial states in that it is not an instrument of social and 
human suppression but one of social benefaction. It does not tamper with indi-
vidual liberty but serves the public interest, individual freedom and social 
justice. It is organized and run on the basis of civil sovereignty and separation 
of powers, as the state and other social subjects always observe and fulfill the 
law in their behaviors. It is a democratic, just and transparent system that 
reflects the will of the populace, runs on the basis of and with regard to hu-
man’s natural rights, respects human basic rights and mutual responsibility 
between various subjects.  
In conclusion: The state of law is a state that is organized and run on the 
basis of civil sovereignty, the separation of powers and a democratic, transpar-
ent and advanced legal system. It is an instrument for the guarantee of indi-
vidual freedom, social justice and the supremacy of law in state and social ac-
tivities.  
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The Basic Features of the State of Law 
The above definition of the state of law indicates that apart from the general 
features, the state of law also possesses these basic characteristics: 
First, the state of law is organized and functions on the basis of civil sover-
eignty.In authoritarian and dictatorial states, the people are always expected to 
be ruled and suppressed, and can never be said to hold state power but only be 
subject to it. Whereas in the state of law, the entire state power belongs to 
them, as they are its highest and sole holders. The people are believed to par-
ticipate in state activities and supervise the state officials and organs by them-
selves or through their representatives. They make the supreme and ultimate 
decisions on the matters pertaining to national being and sovereignty and oth-
er important state affairs. Therefore, the state has to serve the interests of its 
people, and its every policy is supposed to derive from popular demands and 
interests and serves to meet their appropriate aspirations. The people’s sover-
eignty and various measures to exercise it must be indicated in the Constitu-
tion, which is the state’s fundamental and original piece of legislation. For 
example, the current Vietnamese Constitution emphasizes: the State belongs to 
the People, by the People, for the People; all state power belongs to the People; 
the People exercise their state power through direct democracy or representa-
tive democracy through the National Assembly, People’s Councils and through 
other State organs. The German Constitution also remarks: “All public power 
derives from the people. They perform this power through elections and public 
polls as well as through particular legislative, executive and judicial powers.”24 
Second, in the state of law, human rights and civil rights are respected and 
protected. It can be said that the idea of state of law has its origin from the 
desire and demand to restrain and control state power in order to ensure indi-
vidual freedom. Thus, “Freedom, equality, human dignity and other manifes-
tations of human rights assurance are the lasting features of the state of law.”25 
The relationship between the state of law and its citizens is based on equality, 
which means that either side has its rights and obligations in relation to the 
other. The citizens have both rights and obligations towards the state and vice 
versa. For this reason, civil freedom is at the same time the limitation of state 
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power, civil rights are contrary to state rights and citizens’ range of freedom is 
larger than that of the state. While citizens are allowed to do whatever the law 
does not forbid, state organs and employees are restricted to act within what 
the law allows. In a state of law, the basic and sacred human rights such as the 
right to live, to be free and to pursue happiness are expected to be fulfilled 
because they are acknowledged by the law and ensured; the legitimate rights 
and benefits, honor and dignity of every citizen are guaranteed and protected 
by the state through the law. Theoretically, the state of law has to make sure 
that every individual is equal and free before the law and is provided with 
ample legal conditions to pursue his personal growth with ease, so that every 
individual can make the best use of his intrinsic capacity. The fairness and 
equality among citizens in the state of law are ensured not only in legal terms 
but also in practice, as the state guarantees every necessary material and spir-
itual condition for the citizens to exercise them in practice. In addition, the 
state protects individual freedom from the violation of other actors, including 
the state organs. Citizens have the rights to replace the authorities should they 
violate their legitimate rights and interests, to oppose any arbitrary and illegal 
intervention by the authorities and, at the same time, are obliged to respect 
and follow the law and fulfill their legal tasks with regard to the state and 
other actors. In general, in the state of law, the state-individual relationship is 
directed in a way in which  
“The state is a coalition of the masses under the control of the law; humans can in no 
way be regarded as a means to an end, rather, humans must be an end in itself; every 
individual and a society as a whole have to respect and protect the law; each citizen is 
granted the right and ability to pressure those who hold power to respect and adhere to 
existing laws.”26 
Third, the state of law is a democratic state. The state of law uses law for social 
management and functions both publicly and democratically. The formal man-
ifestation of democracy in the state of law is that state power stems from its 
citizens and is authorized by the citizens to the state; therefore it is restricted 
within the authorized range and by the law. Society is regulated by law and 
citizens are able to participate in social development, in human rights protec-
tion, in economic development and in the assurance of social justice. Democra-
cy and laws are crucial to development and are held in high regard by national 
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decision-makers.27 The state of law has the full capacity to establish, consoli-
date and protect democracy. Through the law, the state acknowledges freedom 
and democracy in every civil sector; acknowledges the intervention in state and 
social management by social organizations and popular unions; regulates the 
authority of state organs to restrict their power and keep them from violating 
civil democracy and freedom. Through the law, the state ensures the imple-
mentation of civil rights, preventing illegal acts and creating punitive 
measures against any actor that violates the legitimate rights and interests of 
its citizens, so that the established democracy is protected.  
Fourth, the state of law has a democratic and transparent legal system 
which reflects the popular will appropriate to national circumstances and holds 
the highest position in public and social life. The law can be said to be indis-
pensable to the creation of a state of law but not every legal system is adequate 
enough to be the law of such a state. Such a legal system has to be democratic, 
transparent and in conjunction with existing conditions of the country such as 
its socio-economic level of development, morality, customs, history and tradi-
tions, culture, psychological features, international and transnational law 
which have been recognized or signed by the state. This legal system has to 
reflect the will of the people, recognize basic human rights, civil sovereignty 
and mutual responsibility among the subjects. The law of a state of law is sup-
posed to have a universal effect on everyone and their behaviors, and is stable 
enough to help the subjects anticipate the consequences of their behaviors or 
the response of the state and other subjects. According to the law, as citizens 
are held responsible before the state, the state also has responsibilities before its 
citizens should it violate their legitimate rights and interests; mutual respon-
sibilities are expected of each subject which is involved in legal relations if it 
violates the interests of other subjects. The democracy of a legal system is re-
flected not only in its regulations but also in the development of the laws 
which is expected to conform to popular will. The legal regulations have to be 
clear and specific and widely and publicly announced so that anyone is able to 
refer to them to protect his rights. Such a legal system must have feasibility 
and is primarily reflected in the acts that are developed by capable legislators, 
among which the constitution is most revered legally. For this reason, the legal 
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systems of former slavery and feudalistic states are impossible to be rendered as 
a state of law as they do not meet the above criteria.  
The state of law implies that its power or strength resides in the law and 
the law’s supremacy is what constitutes a state of law, so the respect of and 
compliance with the law is its intrinsic component. The state-law relationship 
in a state of law is mutual and interactive. Despite being drafted by the state, 
as long as it takes effect, the law returns to bind the state and becomes the 
legal framework for the entire organization and functioning of the state appa-
ratus and also a means to restrain and limit state power. The law regulates the 
establishment, organizational structure, functions, missions and rights of each 
state organ of every kind and level; standardizes the relations between state 
organs and between the internal components of an organ. The organization and 
activities of state apparatus are based on the law and performed within the 
legal framework for legal purposes. The law becomes a conduit through which 
the state conveys its will and fulfills its purposes. All state organs and employ-
ees have to maintain absolute compliance with the law in their behaviors and 
are only allowed to do what it permits. They are kept from applying the law in 
an arbitrary way and instead have to follow the regulated principles and proce-
dures. The state itself should provide necessary institutions and mechanism to 
supervise its compliance such as the constitutional court, judicial independ-
ence, popular supervision and other watchful organizations in the political 
system. Any state organ or employee who violates the law has to deal with 
legal responsibility and has to compensate if any individual interest is dam-
aged. The law not only holds a supreme position in the political realm but also 
in social life. All non-governmental entities and individuals, although permit-
ted to do what the law does not forbid, are obliged to respect and conform to 
the law and face legal responsibility should they violate it. The essential domi-
nation of the law over the state and society is reflected in Locke’s remarks:  
“Even though the government holds all the rights, because these rights only live to 
serve social interest and cannot be used arbitrarily and randomly, they must be imple-
mented through the existing and established acts, so that both sides have their respon-
sibilities and safety within the law and even rulers have to be restricted in an adequate 
range.”28 
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Fifth, the state of law is organized and functions based on the separation of 
powers as a means to check and control power. In other words, the state of law 
is organized and functions in line with the management of state power. Separa-
tion of state power is one of the initial features of the state of law. Its aim is to 
prevent any centralized state power in the hands of an individual or state or-
gan, so that authoritarianism and power abuse can be minimized while state 
power is performed. The separation allows for the restraining and management 
of state power and anticipating the behaviors of the government. In a state of 
law, state power is basically divided into three branches: legislative, executive 
and judicial branches. Each function is primarily transferred to a state organ. 
All these functional organs are established based on the purpose and regula-
tions of the law. The constitution endows each organ with a specific set of 
rights and regulates the mutual relationship between them. As a result, each 
state organ is able to not only maintain its independent and specialized activi-
ties and prevent and restrain other organs so that state power can be limited 
and controlled, but can also coordinate with other organs to form unity within 
the state apparatus. This facilitates the effective performance of each state or-
gan and the entire state apparatus. In the practice of organizing state power, 
legislative power reflects the popular will through the law and is conferred to a 
congress or parliament. Executive power, which embodies the power to exer-
cise the will of an entire nation through the practical application of the pieces 
of legislation, is given to the government. Judicial power, the power to judge 
unconstitutional and unlawful behaviors and to solve civil disputes that threat-
ens justice, civil freedom and social order and safety, is given to the court. The 
law provides a firm mechanism that involves these three branches in mutual 
control and checking while also allowing for coordination among them to 
avoid the abuse of power, maintain the unity of state power and increase the 
performance of the state apparatus.  
Sixth, the state power is closely associated with civil society. The state of 
law must be developed on the basis of a close relationship with civil society. In 
a modern sense, civil society is perceived as a relatively autonomous sector in 
relation to the state, in which social groups and cultural, religious and spiritual 
organizations exist and function to serve different human interests.29 Simply 
put, civil society is composed of non-state and apolitical organizations, and its 
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existence signifies a social sector that is not necessarily dominated by state 
power. As a social value, civil society indicates a society’s innate ability to al-
low its citizens to establish their organizations to fulfill the aspirations of their 
members and realize the general social objectives. As an institution, civil socie-
ty is considered a social entity that exists among the state, families and indi-
viduals.30 Through legal mechanisms, the state regulates the rights and legal 
responsibilities of itself, individuals and non-state organizations so as to ensure 
the existence and functioning of civil society. 
The basic features of the state of law are sketched out above. However, de-
pending on each particular state of law, there are other particular and idiosyn-
cratic signs and features. As historical analysis has shown, the idea of the state 
of law can stem from different socio-economic forms even if it is universally 
used and results in different interpretations and actualizations depending on 
social and class interests, national traditions, cultural level and other factors. A 
prominent division in reality has been the capitalist state of law and socialist 
state of law. The capitalist state of law is currently developed in most of the 
developed and developing capitalist nations. The socialist state of law is in the 
making in Vietnam, a nation that currently advances its society towards social-
ism. This stems from the fact that although the state of law itself is a universal 
idea, there is no absolute model for every state and nation. Rather, depending 
on its historical, political, socio-economic features and level of development, 
each state or nation develops its own state of law model and opts for a particu-
lar method of constructing and running its state of law. However, each par-
ticular state of law is supposed to hold universal features and worldwide values 
of the state of law, and at the same time reflect its particular attributes and the 
idiosyncrasies of its nation and people. For example, the socialist state of law 
not only has the said general features but also other particular attributes such 
as its socialist-based economic relations and its being led by a communist par-
ty. In contrast, the capitalist state of law is built on an economic basis formed 
by capitalist relations of production and is under the leadership of a capitalist 
party or a coalition of capitalist parties.  
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Thoughts and Policies on Governing the People under 
the Ly-Tran and the Early Le Dynasties: Experiences 
and Historical Lessons 
Pham Duc Anh 
Among the factors that constitute the power of a political system, popular 
participation and support always hold an important role. The Vietnamese mo-
narchical political systems are no exception. A study by Vu Minh Gia showed 
that during the period of the 10th–19th centuries, the presence of decentralized 
feudalistic states was occasionally seen (most notably during the “disorder of 
the 12 warlords”), but in general the centralized system was the dominant 
form of government. This system always rested on three pillars: the economic 
power of the state, authoritarian sanctions and popular support.  
In Vietnam, three forms of centralized systems existed, people-oriented, bu-
reaucratic and authoritarian, which reached their peak corresponding with the 
Ly-Tran dynasties (11th–13th centuries), Early Le (15th century) and Nguyen 
dynasty (19th century). The similarity between these is a high degree of cen-
tralization, while their difference lies in the various sources from which the 
above pillars of power stem.1 Being aware of this fact, after gaining independ-
ence from the domination of the Northern aggressors, the self-sufficient courts 
in Vietnam began to establish and continuously consolidate their centralized 
institutions, and simultaneously attempted to develop their social underpin-
nings based on popular support. This resulted from an awareness to ensure the 
survival of the imperial court and monarchy. 
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Within this scope, the article focuses on dissecting the main differences 
that make up the characteristics of two forms of governance in Vietnam during 
the 11th–14th centuries and the 15th century, as reflected in the political view-
points, ideas and policies of each state towards its populace. The Ly and Tran 
dynasties put a particular emphasis on popular power, the construction of a 
centralized system based on a harmonious relationship between villages and 
nation, and the consolidation and support of the populace, all of which forged 
a prosperous and successful dynasty in every aspect, repeatedly defeating the 
invaders, and protecting national independence and sovereignty of the country. 
The Early Le dynasty, although being attentive to the role of the populace, due 
to its excessive consolidation of a centralized, pro-Confucius system and 
strengthening of the bureaucratic and legal system, gradually weakened its 
connection with the populace and lost its support. Two different political 
worldviews and management approaches led to differences in the relationship 
between the authorities and the masses, producing completely opposite results. 
The following presentations somewhat clarify this fact.  
The “People-oriented” Ideas and Policies of the Ly and  
Tran Dynasties 
Compared to the political institutions of the governments in the 10th century 
(Ngo, Dinh and former Le), it is obvious that the Ly and Tran dynasties made 
fundamental, even contrasting shifts in their viewpoints about the role of the 
populace, their ideas of governance, and their closeness to the populace and 
people-centric propensities.  
Historical statistics show that the word “populace/people” (dân) was almost 
absent in various decrees, edicts or proclamations of the emperors prior to the 
Ly dynasty (1009–1225). Policies such as popular reassurance and consolation 
were never implemented, although military suppression happened quite fre-
quently in this era. Historical records also prove that no tax exemption and 
reduction or food relief policies were introduced, although famines, poor har-
vests, natural disasters and foreign aggressions were quite common. The only 
amnesty scheme was released in 989, after Le Dai Hanh king changed the 
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name of the era.2 Normally, the emperors maintained a great distance from the 
populace. They made few policies to improve the wellbeing of the people, and 
even showed no outward tendency to get close to them, except for the plough-
ing (tịch điền) ritual which initially took place in 987 and continued during 
the former Le dynasty. By establishing a centralized system based on compli-
cated military apparatuses and severe penalties, the Dinh and former Le dynas-
ties set themselves against the majority of the population, heightening existing 
socio-political conflicts. The introduction of the Ly dynasty (in 1009) was the 
result of a relatively smooth campaign for political mobilization, receiving the 
support of various social forces, but was also due to the low popular confidence 
in former dynasties.  
Meanwhile, words such as “populace/people” (dân) or “the under heaven” 
(thiên hạ)3 used to refer to the masses, thus reflecting the “people-oriented” 
ideas and actions of the Ly and Tran dynasties, are regularly embedded in offi-
cial historical records.  
Before shifting the capital to Thang Long, King Ly Cong Uan issued the 
Edict on the Capital Rearrangement (Thiên đô chiếu). Apart from other nota-
ble values, this was the first political document composed by a dynasty which 
addressed issues pertaining to civil welfare and livelihood. In this edict, the 
founder of the Ly dynasty emphasized that the capital relocation was “the an-
swer to heaven’s imperative above and the people’s will below”, conveying his 
wish that “his people were prosperous” and “free from adversity”. In addition, 
the edict was based on the consultation of nationwide mandarins and popula-
tion. Such heedfulness of an emperor was unprecedented. In response, the the 
entire population answered: “Your Majesty has made a long-term strategy for 
the under heaven so as to ensure not only the great success of His royal career 
but also the prosperity and abundance of the population. No one dares to deny 
such a favorable deed”.4 
When attempting to form his royal court, Ly Thai To received sincere 
words from Dao Cam Moc which urged him to “answer heaven’s imperative 
                                                     
2 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 226.  
3 In the original Chinese version of Complete History of the Great Viet, the historians 
under the Later Le dynasty primarily used “dân” (民) and “thiên hạ” (天下) to refer to 
the population/people.  
4 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 241. 
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above and the people’s will below” and words of wisdom from Monk Van 
Hanh which told him to “be tolerant and forgiving” to “win the people’s 
hearts” and “direct the whole population”.5 Aside from the Edict on the Capi-
tal Rearrangement, the Ly dynasty issued several edicts to ask for straightfor-
ward opinions (in 1076, 1392), and edicts to ask for ingenious people (in 
1182). 
The decrees and edicts compiled by the kings might have retained some 
remnants of such ideas as “heaven’s imperative”, “emperor’s authority” typical 
of Chinese Confucianism. On not a few occasions did the Ly kings emphasize 
their role as “ruler of the population”, “superior to the populace”, or the Tran 
kings proclaimed themselves as “father of the people” (dân chi phụ mẫu). Yet 
these notions were not baseless and dogmatic as the typical Confucian ideas, 
but were transformed into practical deeds and bore humanistic values. The 
emphasis on and familiarity with the people was a characteristic ruling philos-
ophy and the essence of these political institutions.  
In June lunar 1300, two months before his death, Tran Hung Dao (Tran 
Quoc Tuan) caught a serious illness. Tran Anh Tong king personally returned 
to Hung Dao’s palace in Van Kiep. On Hung Dao’s deathbed, the king sin-
cerely inquired about his health and also asked about his ideas on national 
defense and protection. Tran Hung Dao summarized his experiences and his-
torical lessons on the national struggle against foreign aggressors, in which he 
focused on clarifying that the victory of the Tran dynasty over the Yuan-
Mongolian army was thanks to “consensus between the king and his servants, 
harmony between royal family members, and national solidarity”. His testa-
ment was short yet full of meaning. It was not only a heartfelt and profound 
product of a senior statesman who had spent more than 70 years of his life 
serving the imperial court during its most desperate yet epic period; the amal-
gamation of professional military experiences of a grand general who three 
times took on the responsibility of leading his people in their national struggle 
against a foreign invasion; but it was by and large the political idea and guide-
line of the Tran dynasty. More importantly, Tran Hung Dao released his tes-
tament not only at the time when the victories were fading into the past, but 
also when the popular confidence and support for the imperial court was seem-
ingly diminishing. It was a lesson on winning the popular confidence. 
                                                     
5 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 238. 
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Table 1: “People-oriented” Policies and Actions of the Ly and Tran Dynasties 
  
 
Reign 
Famili-
arity 
with the 
people 
Popular 
assur-
ance 
Tax reduc-
tion, food 
relief 
Am-
nesty, 
official 
pardon 
 
 
To-
tal 
Ly dynasty (1009–1225) 
1. Thai To (1009–1028) 2 2 4 1 9 
2. Thai Tong (1028–1054) 6 5 4 11 26 
3. Thanh Tong (1054–1072) 1 – 2 2 5 
4. Nhan Tong (1072–1127) 12 – 1 5 18 
5. Than Tong (1128–1138) 1 – 1 5 7 
6. Anh Tong (1138–1175) 2 – – 2 4 
7. Cao Tong (1176–1210) 1 – 1 2 4 
 Total: 25 7 13 28 73 
Tran dynasty (1226–1400) 
1. Thai Tong (1226–1258) 1 – – 4 5 
2. Thanh Tong (1258–1278) – – – 2 2 
3. Nhan Tong (1279–1293) – – 3 5 8 
4. Anh Tong (1293–1314) – 2 1 2 5 
5. Minh Tong (1314–1329) 3 – – 1 4 
6. Hien Tong (1329–1341) – – – 2 2 
7. Du Tông (1341–1369) – – 5 3 8 
8. Nghe Tong (1370–1372) 1 1 – 1 3 
9. Due Tong (1373–1377) – – – 1 1 
10
. 
Phe de (1377–1388) – – – 1 1 
11
. 
Thuan Tong (1389–1398) 1 – – 1 2 
12
. 
Thieu De (1398–1400) – – – 1 1 
 Total: 6 3 9 24 42 
Source: Based on statistics of the author in Complete History of the Great Viet 
Indeed, even before Tran Hung Dao gave his advice to “wisely use the energy 
of the people as a sustainable strategy”, the Tran dynasty had been well aware 
of the principle of “people as a central foundation”. Since establishing his im-
perial court, Tran Thai Tong king was especially fond of the words expressed 
by monk Truc Lam: “He who is king must take the aspirations of his people as 
his own and take the heart of his people as his own”. Therefore, a golden 
throne for a king “is nothing more than a rugged pair of shoes which can be 
disposed of whenever.” Later generations of kings were all devoted to the peo-
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ple and respected the entire population. According to history, on an occasion, 
when the first national struggle against the Yuan-Mongolian army (1258) 
reached its climax, the king inquired of his people about the situation of the 
invaders: “Where is the Yuan army?” A fisherman named Hoang Cu Da, a 
former courtier who was sailing along the Red River, impudently answered: “I 
don’t know, go ask those who eat mangos.”6 Responding to such contempt of 
Cu Da, the king not only tolerated him but blamed himself for having treated 
his subordinates unfairly.  
Statistics from official records on the policies and actions that reflect the 
people-oriented governance of the Ly and Tran dynasties (table 1) show that 
the Ly and Tran kings made the most efforts to get close to their people. With 
their populist lifestyle, the Ly kings often left their imperial citadel or visited 
rural areas to watch such activities as fishing, wrestling, cock-fighting, 
ploughing or harvesting, and even personally engaged in ploughing, etc. There 
were in total 25 occasions in which the kings made these efforts, 12 of which 
happened in era of Ly Nhan Tong. Similar behaviors were rare under the previ-
ous and following dynasties. Right in the era of Ly Thai To, the king decided 
to build Long Duc palace (the East palace) outside the Imperial Citadel, where-
in the Prince resided. His purpose was to let the one who would inherit his 
throne live among ordinary people and learn in the process about their life.7 
Tran Thai Tong once said: “I would like to go out to hear the people’s voice 
and assess their opinions, learn about their difficulties”.8 On February lunar 
1022, judging that the construction of an artificial mountain would be too 
difficult for the populace, king Ly Thai To suspended it.9 In May 1371, King 
Tran Nghe Tong issued an edict to  
“construct the palace in a simple and cost-effective way, and hire only royal family 
members and mandarins to build it without bothering the people”.10 
                                                     
6 The story goes: The king once offered mangos to his close servants but forgot about 
Hoang Cu Da. He then held a grudge against him and thus replied in such way. See 
Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 28–29. 
7 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 243. 
8 Institute of Historical Studies (1981), 316. 
9 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 246. 
10 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 155. 
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Under the Ly and Tran dynasties, especially the early Ly dynasty and late Tran 
dynasty, military suppression occurred on a regular basis in many local areas, 
not to mention the aggressions for territorial expansion into the Champa king-
dom in the 11th–14th centuries. However, unlike before, whenever the king 
launched an expedition, he issued a proclamation11 clearly laying out his intent 
to pacify for the sake of peace. On their expedition, the soldiers were forbidden 
to get involved in robbing or harming the populace. After the campaign, the 
court made an edict to reassure and comfort the people. For example in 1028, 
when Ly Thai Tong personally led his army to pacify the Truong Yen Palace 
(now in Ninh Binh), as soon as he reached his destination, he ordered, “Who-
ever robs the villagers will be beheaded.” The soldiers arduously listened to his 
order and dared not to transgress. Upon entering the palace, they were met by 
hundreds of people who paid tribute to them in the form of buffaloes and 
wine. The king issued a decree to comfort the people, creating a jubilant at-
mosphere.12 In a similar vein, after having attacked Hoan district (1031), Ai 
district (1035), Phat The Citadel (1044), Nghe An (1371), or after having 
established Thuan and Hoa districts (1307), the Ly and Tran kings sent their 
emissaries to comfort and console the people.  
The Ly and Tran dynasties emphasized the improvement of the popula-
tion’s wellbeing. As statistics show, the Ly dynasty introduced at least 4 tax 
reduction schemes (for half a year), 3 tax exemption schemes (for 1 to 3 years) 
and 6 food relief schemes for the poor; while the corresponding numbers of the 
Tran dynasty were 3, 1 and 5. Tax reduction and exemption and food relief 
schemes were implemented most frequently under the dynasties of Ly Thai To 
(4), Ly Thai Tong (4), Tran Nhan Tong (3) and Tran Du Tong (5). These poli-
cies were often carried out as soon as the new king ascended his throne or dur-
ing Buddhist festivals. The king decided to issue tax exemptions not only 
when the people faced drought, a bad harvest and famine, but also when they 
achieved a good harvest (as in 1016). When a major cold spell came in 1055, 
King Ly Thanh Tong told his subordinates that:  
“Even in the palace, basking near the fire made of bone char, wearing squirrel fabric, I 
am still cold, let alone the prisoners down in the dungeon who are miserably bound in 
                                                     
11 For example the proclamation on the expedition to Ma Sa cave (Thảo Ma Sa động 
hịch), in 1119.  
12 Complete History of the Great Viet (1993a), 251. 
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chains. Whether they are guilty, they are nevertheless hungry, wearing only rugged 
cloth, being frozen to death, some even dying regretfully. How I pity them. I thereby 
order the warders to provide them with blankets and two meals a day”.13  
The Tran kings also introduced a new way of distributing relief food by in-
volving the rich in this activity (The Edicts in 1358, 1362). Tolerant legisla-
tions clearly reflect the people-oriented guiding principle of the Ly and Tran 
dynasties. Although it was not regulated by any official document, amnesty 
was frequently granted and can be considered a consistent policy of these two 
dynasties. Amnesty was given as soon as the king ascended his throne, changed 
the name of the era or on the occasion of a Buddhist festival. Statistics show 
that, except for Ly Hue Tong and Ly Chieu Hoang, the other 7 kings under 
the Ly dynasty and 12 kings under the Tran dynasty issued at least 1 to 5 de-
crees (Ly Thai Tong) which provide for amnesty.14 Contrary to terrifying tiger 
cages and cauldrons in front of the royal palaces in Hoa Lu capital under the 
Dinh and former Le dynasties, King Ly Thai Tong (1029) decided to build bell 
towers along the sidelines of Thien An royal hall (where he gave audiences) and 
ordered that: “Whenever a citizen would like to complain about a false charge 
against him, he should ring the bell”.15 Also to make it convenient for the 
people, in 1052 the king ordered the construction of a big bell at Long Tri 
palace. These kinds of cases, kings judged directly or handed over to crown 
princes to solve them. People coming to the royal palace where the kings gave 
audiences was a practice which only took place under the Ly and Tran dynas-
ties. In a trial, King Thanh Tong pointed to princess Dong Thien next to him 
and told the warders:  
“I devote as much affection to my daughter as I do to my people. I truly pity those 
who unwittingly commit their crimes, so from now on, let’s alleviate their charges 
whether they are heavy or not”.16  
Brutal punishments imposed in former dynasties were no longer applicable. 
The trials were conducted justly, transparently and legally. From the Ly dynas-
ty to the Tran dynasty, the “people-oriented” propensity was consistent and 
                                                     
13 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 271. 
14 According to our statistics, the Ly dynasty issued totally 20 grand amnesty schemes 
in the following years, the Tran dynasty made 20.  
15 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 254. 
16 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete history of the Great Viet, 273. 
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lasting, but there were still a few shifts. It was the transition from a “people-
centric, people-based” state under the Ly dynasty to a “people are the origin” 
state under the Tran dynasty.17 In particular, since the middle of the 14th cen-
tury, the increasing influence of Chinese Confucianism and the internal bu-
reaucratization led to significant changes in the ideas and policies of the state.  
In commenting and evaluating the “people-oriented” propensity of the Ly 
and Tran dynasties, historians in the Later Le dynasty argued that it was a 
rating scale that measures the quality and intellect of an emperor and the pro-
gressiveness of a dynasty. Several kings are valorized and remembered in his-
torical records for this quality. In the Complete History of the Great Viet, the 
Confucian historians speak highly of such qualities as “easing people’s energy”, 
“love for the people” (by Ly Thai To), “nurturing the whole population” (Ly 
Thai Tong), “lenience”, “true love for the people” (Ly Thanh Tong), “harmony, 
compassion and consolidating the people’s hearts” (Tran Nhan Tong); so as to 
create a “wealthy and abundant population”, “a peaceful land”. Therefore, they 
are “loved by the people”, “followed by the people”, “supported by the people”, 
and considered “good kings”.  
But the Ly and Tran kings are criticized for these very qualities from time 
to time. Two aspects that are discussed most frequently in the historical com-
ments on the Ly and Tran dynasties are their overemphasis on Buddhism and 
excessive lenience in legal decisions. Ngo Si Lien commented on the lifting of 
the death penalty imposed on Grand Preceptor Le Van Thinh by Ly Nhan 
Tong (in 1096): “A servant (criminal) who murdered his own king is spared 
capital punishment; that is an error in criminal law, which stems from the 
king’s belief in Buddhism.”18 Or the “(king) who avails of the occasion of a 
(Buddhist) festival to spare a criminal, does not act rightfully.” “Meanwhile a 
king such as (Ly Nhan Tong) unwisely spares the life of many petty men (…) 
if all petty men are freed of their guilt by mere luck it is not good news for the 
gentlemen.”19 What matters here is the perspective. Perhaps the Confucian 
historians in the Le dynasty failed to acknowledge that the Buddhist tendency 
is only an outward manifestation of the characteristic ruling principles of Ly 
and Tran dynasties, which are harmony and “oneness with the people”.  
                                                     
17 Nguyen Phan Quang (1995), 194, Phan Dang Thanh 1995, 153. 
18 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 283. 
19 Social Science Publisher (1993a), Complete History of the Great Viet, 302.  
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Thanks to their practical guidelines and policies, the Ly and Tran dynasties 
successfully developed a strong unity between their authorities and their popu-
lation, which acted as a source of power for the cause of national construction 
and development in every aspect and demonstrated its capacity most vividly 
during the struggles against foreign invaders for national salvation. Due to the 
distinctiveness of the political systems under these dynasties, especially under 
the Ly dynasty, their forms of governance are deemed by some foreign scholars 
as “not typically centralized enough”, and “the political power of the Ly dynas-
ty was based on traditional consensus and the independence of villages.”20 The 
viewpoints of international scholars are recognized by Vietnamese domestic 
historians as they reveal the transitional character of Vietnamese political sys-
tems during the 11th–14th centuries, which still bore characteristics resembling 
those of the typical Southeast Asian communal democracies and were insuffi-
ciently affected by the Chinese Confucian political model.21 However, the total 
denial of a centralized power structure in these eras is not tenable and requires 
further investigation.22 
Confucianism, Bureaucracy and Civil Policies of the Early Le Dynasty 
The introduction of the Le dynasty (in 1428) was the result of a great war for 
national salvation, of the efforts and contributions of all the masses. More than 
anyone, the Le kings were deeply aware of the role of the people’s confidence. 
Therefore, popular confidence is always regarded as a great strength and a con-
stitutive element that helps to maintain the State’s power. The Le dynasty is 
also one the most politically influential and prestigious eras for the population. 
The viewpoints and guidelines of the Early Le dynasty (1428–1527) and 
their implementation were essentially people-oriented. Many policies were 
created to win the hearts of the people and improve every aspect of their life. 
This is reflected in our collected statistics (table 2). The Le kings, especially 
the five early ones (from the reign of Thai To to Hien Tong ) released a large 
number of decrees and edicts (now commonly referred to as edicts) related to 
                                                     
20 Taylor (1990), 139. 
21 Polyakov (1996); Momoki Shiro (2011). 
22 See Pham Duc Anh (2011).  
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the people. Among them at least 27 edicts were issued by Le Thanh Tong. In 
terms of the average number of edicts per year, King Thai Tong (1434–1442) 
produced 16 edicts within 8 years, which was the highest number (approxi-
mately 2 edicts annually). More importantly, this period was when the Le dyn-
asty was in turbulence. It strived to strengthen its authority while at the same 
time seeking to secure a foothold among the people. Since the beginning of the 
16th century (after the period of Le Hien Tong), previous constructive policies 
of the state towards its people had almost ceased.  
Table 2: The Policies towards the People of the Early Le Dynasty 
No. Reign 
Self-
corrective 
and dis-
ciplining 
edicts  
Tax reduc-
tion-food 
relief 
Amnesty-
Official 
pardon Total 
1. Thai To (1428–1433) 2 2 3 7 
2. Thai Tong (1434–1442) 7 3 6 16 
3. Nhan Tong (1443–1459) 9 3 4 16 
4. Thanh Tong (1460–1497) 10 5 12 27 
5. Hien Tong (1498–1504) 4 1 3 8 
6. Tuc Tong (1504) – – 1 1 
7. Uy Muc (1505–1509) – – 1 1 
8. Tuong Duc (1510–1516) – – 2 2 
9. Chieu Tong (1516–1522) – – 3 3 
10. Cung Hoang (1522–
1527) 
1 – 2 3 
Total: 33 14 37 84 
Source: Based on statistics of the author in Complete History of the Great Viet 
The civil policies established by the Early Le dynasty primarily focused on the 
practical demands such as tax exemption and reduction, food relief distribution 
for the poor and amnesty and official pardon. In April 1428, the state intro-
duced two important policies: removing all taxes previously imposed on land 
plots, gold and silver, lagoons, berry plantations and reducing taxes imposed 
on the “locations plundered by invaders” (the Ming army).23  
                                                     
23 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 239.  
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Later, tax exemption and reduction schemes were regularly set up as soon as 
a new king ascended the throne, especially when famine and bad harvests oc-
curred. Apart from the general keywords such as “nationwide amnesty”, “tax 
exemption”, “tax cutback” or “tax reduction”, official historical records also 
kept in-depth statistics on the tax reduction policies, including both land and 
head taxes, introduced by the imperial court. Accordingly, farmers who owned 
berry plantations in the army were granted 5 sào (1.800m2) of cultivable lands 
and ordinary farmers were given 4 sào (1.440m2) of berry farms to ensure their 
livelihood and were exempted from tax for their whole life. Male and female 
widows were provided with 3 sào (1.080m2) of land and exempted from tax.24 
On 1488, the king issued an edict:  
“From now on, the scholars who have been educated, know how to write, have good 
conduct, passed their exam or were exempted from it will be freed from half of the 
amount of tax and corvée.”25  
By 1501, the state had regularized the duration of corvée and the amount of 
head tax. The handicapped that were unable to work were exempted from both 
corvée and head tax, while those that could earn a livelihood were exempted 
from half of the amount of their head tax.26 The food relief policy was main-
tained on a regular basis, especially when famine happened. Besides, in this era 
the state itself allowed its people to borrow paddy which had to be paid back 
when they successfully harvested their rice (the edicts issued in 1437, 1448, 
and 1497).27 
The above statistics show that the decisions to provide for a “grand” amnes-
ty and “amnesty” for the prisoners were frequently mentioned in official histor-
ical records, in which the density of these decisions was even higher than those 
during the Ly and Tran dynasties (37 decisions in total). In particular, under 
the Le Thanh Tong reign, at least 12 decisions were recorded. These decisions 
were made on such occasions as the coronation of a king and the changes of an 
era name, but unlike before no decision was made when natural disasters hap-
pened, and fewer decisions were made at the same time as the Buddhist festi-
                                                     
24 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 331. 
25 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 504. 
26 Social Science Publisher (1993c), Complete History of the Great Viet, 27. 
27 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 347, 362, 
523. 
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vals.28 The number of prisoners benefiting from each amnesty decision often 
amounted to a few hundreds.29 As for the unsolved cases, the kings issued 
many edicts that provided for commutation and even acquittal.30 It should be 
further noted that “grand” amnesties were maintained until the beginning of 
the 16th century. Subsequently, the policy possibly only retained a ceremonial 
significance and primarily served as a tool to legitimize the king’s throne.  
However, the ideas of the Early Le dynasties for their population and their 
practical manifestations were different from those held by the Ly and Tran 
dynasties. The differences are as follows. 
The king “received his heavenly imperative” that asked him to care for and 
rule over the whole population. On the other hand, the root of royal power 
originates from within the people. In The Royal Poem about the way of the 
king (Ngự chế quân đạo thi), Le Thanh Tong stated that the “way of a king” is 
to “devote his love to the people and his respect to heaven.” Or in an edict, it 
was declared that “A king is made by heaven to care for his people, and thus he 
is supposed to answer heaven’s imperative by loving his people”.31 A Le king 
“cannot sleep well for he worries for his people/He dares not to postpone a task 
bestowed by heaven” (Personal statement-Tự thuật), and always wishes that 
“everyone lives in abundance and tranquillity towards a prosperous nation.”32 
A devoted king first and foremost “creates a role model by improving his ethi-
cal conduct and improves agricultural productivity to ensure the people’s live-
lihood.”33  
The masses and ordinary citizens therefore were responsible for honoring 
the king and adhering to his orders. It should be noted that the first edict 
given by the Le dynasty (dated January 1428)  
                                                     
28 Except for one occasion in which Le Thanh Tong offer amnesty to 50 prisoners dur-
ing the Vu lan Buddhist festival. Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete Histo-
ry of the Great Viet, 318.  
29 In 1434, 225 prisoners were granted amnesty on one occasion. See Social Science 
Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 315.  
30 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 362, 402. 
31 Social Science Publisher (1993c), Complete History of the Great Viet, 98. 
32 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 412. 
33 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 497. 
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“orders the ministries (…) to establish legislations to govern the army and the people, 
so that commanders know how to manage their army, officials at localities know how 
to govern their people, and the nation as a whole knows that the laws exist.” Because 
“chaos will ensue if there are no laws”, “the laws are established so that (…) the whole 
population knows what are good and bad behaviors. They should advocate good con-
duct while avoiding mischiefs and violating the laws.”34 A year after his coronation, in 
March 1461, Le Thanh Tong issued a decree: “In farming (…) every citizen should 
devote himself to increasing his livelihood and ensuring his basic needs, without re-
sorting to shortcuts, petty businesses or hooliganism. Whoever owns lands but dis-
plays sluggishness will be given due punishment by the authorities.”35 
The mandarins– parents of the people – were required to love and care for the 
people as much as possible. Le Thai Tong once issued a decree: “To be a serv-
ant essentially requires two conditions. He must be respectful to his king and 
affectionate towards his people. With full loyalty he loves his king; with genu-
ine faithfulness he loves his people.”36 On another occasion Le Nhan Tong 
propagated: “The mandarins, who are currently in service must motivate their 
people to work hard and conduct fair trials. In combating theft they must be 
resolute and shun irresponsibility and idleness.”37 Three requirements were 
introduced into the examination system for mandarins at local areas under the 
Le Thanh Tong dynasty: 1. they had to love their people, 2. they had to earn 
popular trust and affection, 3. they had to prevent the people from abandoning 
their local areas.38 As for mandarins in remote and bordering areas, whoever 
“knows how to nurture his people and peacefully govern them while still man-
aging to collect enough taxes, within 6 years, will be transferred to a better 
position”, and if he failed, he would have to wait 6 years until re-
examination.39 In 1498, Le Hien Tong announced a decree: “(The mandarins) 
who abuse their power and are haughty to the people, who pursue their own 
                                                     
34 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 291. 
35 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 393. 
36 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 310. 
37 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 381. 
38 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 447. 
39 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 433. 
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interests at the expense of people’s wellbeing, whether they are caught red 
handed or not (…) shall be categorized as unqualified.”40 
Therefore, whenever political disorder or a natural disaster happened or the 
people suffered from bad harvests, the kings issued an edict in which he 
blamed himself and disciplined his servants (see table 2 above). He repeatedly 
questioned his conscience in the edicts:  
“Am I possibly not devoted enough to receive heaven’s blessing, or so insufficiently 
committed to the cause of my ancestors, so inadequately accommodating to the popu-
lation that I end up in this situation? Am I so incapable of utilizing talented people or 
my servants are so incompetent that I end up being like this? Is it because bribery has 
become so widespread and concubines have abused their power so much that I end up 
in this situation? Or is it because I have mishandled public properties through over-
spending and extravagance? Or is it because the generals and vassals do not care about 
their people and have sunk into corrupting habits? Or because the generals at different 
levels only care about possessions without regard for their duty as public servants?”41 
The nature of the relationship between the State and its population changed, 
mostly due to changes in the former. The main causes are the influence of Con-
fucian ideology and the resulting bureaucratization and administratization 
within the political system.  
For one thing, Confucianism absolutized the role and power of the king. 
Within the Eastern and Vietnamese monarchies, the emperor/king holds 
enormous authority. The king is the originator of the law. Every imperative 
from the king in the form of a decree or an edict has the highest legal value. 
The laws are compiled and distributed primarily according to the will of the 
king and first and foremost serve his rights. Only the king is permitted to 
amend or dispense the laws. The “king’s order” itself is “national laws”. The 
king is also head of the national administrative system, who directly leads the 
government. The king holds supreme rights in the appointment, evaluation or 
punishment of the entire system of mandarins. As far as private law is con-
cerned, the king is held as the supreme judge, who makes the decisive judg-
ments in all kinds of legal cases and unitarily changes the (even already made) 
rulings or offers amnesty. The emperor as well as everything that belongs to 
him is sacred and inviolable. Legislations made by the Le dynasty prohibited 
                                                     
40 Social Science Publisher (1993c), Complete History of the Great Viet, 12. 
41 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 370. 
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any idea and action that might have damaged the emperor’s reputation and 
status. Such crimes as profanity, blasphemy or sedition, and mutiny were 
deemed serious deserving the highest charges. Through different administra-
tive layers, the emperor maintained his authority and deeply intervened into 
every segment from the political, socio-economic, and ideological to the cul-
tural sector. 42  
The era when “As brothers, people from the four corners of the nation 
joined one another to hoist the bamboo flags/Soldiers of all ranks like fathers 
and sons drank mixed drinks from river water” (Proclamation of victory/ Bình 
Ngô đại cáo) began to recede into the past. Of the same fate was the image of 
10 arduous years struggling against the Ming army when  
“Upon entering the palace, the king and his army were met by hundreds of people who 
paid tribute to them in the form of buffaloes and wine (…) As the local people crowd-
ed the palace as if they had been going to public fairs, the king issued a decree to com-
fort them, creating a jubilant atmosphere.” Instead, to take just one example: As soon 
as the king’s envoy entered Lam Kinh (Thanh Hoa), the men and women started to 
perform rí ren singing at the gateway. In this custom, men and women formed two 
opposite lines and started singing, and occasionally they hooked their legs and necks 
together in the shape of flowers, which looked very ugly nevertheless. Counsellor Dong 
Hanh Phat told Field Marshal (Trinh) Kha that: “This is an irreverent custom, which 
aims to satirize the king’s envoy”. The custom was immediately banned by Kha.”43  
And the paradox showed itself. The more it claimed to care for the people and 
take them under its protection, the more the imperial court became bureaucra-
tized and distant from them. Nguyen Trai’s earlier sincere advice and also a 
warning: “May his Majesty care for his people so that no complaint can be 
heard at any commune or village” came to light.  
From the court’s viewpoint, the king’s edicts revealed that power abuse and 
haughtiness and the oppression of the people became more and more persis-
                                                     
42 In the Criminal Codes of the National Imperial Court (Quốc triều hình luật), espe-
cially in the two chapters Protection of the imperial palace (Vệ cấm) and Forbidden 
behaviors (Vi chế) there are dozens of stipulations directly related to the king vener-
ated and revered position (see stipulations 51, 52, 57, 63, 110, 111, 122, 123, 125, 
127, 132). 
43 Social Science Publisher (1993b), Complete History of the Great Viet, 358–359. 
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tent.44 From the people’s perspective, though little was mentioned by histori-
cal records, in reality: “The people made complaints after complaints”, “the 
people were distressed by delays in the legal procedures” (1465), “the people 
showed great resentment” (1481), “the people dared not to make any suspi-
cious move” (1509), “the people became desperate due to magnified taxes and 
fees” (1522).  
Though being quickly anticipated, bureaucratization and disconnection 
with the people not only persisted but increasingly became intensified. Such 
was a natural consequence and a side effect, or a “sickness” or “social evil” that 
originated from the very administrative system of this dynasty.  
Some Concluding Remarks 
State apparatuses under the Ly-Tran dynasties (11th–14th centuries) were estab-
lished as soon as national independence had been firmly secured, resulting 
from the objective demands for centralized authority, territorial integrity and 
the adaptation of foreign ruling models. A prominent trait underpinning the 
                                                     
44 This situation is reflected in the royal edicts (in the Complete History of the Great 
Viet). In 1429: “I (…) assign you (the officials) with important military and civil 
tasks. Yet you only sit idly and disregard your tasks, disappointing the trust put on 
you by the imperial court, and being apathetic towards your soldiers and people”. In 
1435: “Many officials ignore the royal regulations. Those in charge of the national 
treasury and imperial documents are ineffective or haughty, and willfully delay their 
decisions with regard to tax collection or exemption, causing distress for the people. 
Those in charge of military services have no compassion for the people as they bor-
row items from the people without showing proper care to them, blaming them for 
the broken or lost items that are otherwise useful. Those in charge of civil services 
only care for their self interest while ignoring the people, excuse the rich while ar-
resting the poor, buy expensive limber to build houses, make unfair judgments, 
cause inner divisions, feed on bribery, show slackness while being gluttonous.” In 
1471: “Those of you, who are responsible for an entire area, have to dutifully take 
care of your people. (Yet) you are willfully ignorant of your humanistic task granted 
by the court which is to care for the people, and only show interest in such minor 
businesses as disciplining the people or arranging records.” In 1481: “(Mandarins) 
dispose of their responsibilities, ignore the people’s hardships, and sit lazily without 
devising any policy, thus leaving the people deprived.” 
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political institution of these dynasties is the reliance of state power on popular 
support and on the harmonious and tight relationship between villages and 
nation. On the other hand, “people-oriented” had always been the crucial tenet 
of these reigns, which was actualized in their policies. These positive ruling 
ideas and policies constituted strong socio-political structures and firm politi-
cal institutions, which helped the Ly and Tran dynasties persevere for four 
centuries and became the main reason why these dynasties were “celebrated for 
their civilization” and successfully united their military and civil policies as 
well as repeatedly defeated the invaders, protecting the national independence 
and sovereignty of the country. Under the Ly and Tran dynasties, the strength 
of the whole people was highly promoted because the interests of the monarchy 
were always tied to national sovereignty and the rights of citizens. 
In establishing its monarchy after having emerged victorious from a great 
war for national liberation, which was achieved with the pains and blood of 
countless people, the Le dynasty became all the more aware of the profound 
lesson about the power of popular support. Also thanks to leading all the peo-
ple to defeat the Ming army and regaining national independence, the Le dyn-
asty had huge political prestige with its population. This allowed the Le reign 
to consolidate and strengthen the centralized institutions which brought no 
little success for the country. However, the Early Le dynasty only lasted for a 
century (1428–1527) and the heyday of centralized monarchical institutions 
actually only lasted about three decades under the reign of the talented king, 
Le Thanh Tong (1460–1497). Political institutions and the state apparatus of 
the Early Le dynasty revealed themselves as very restrictive and inadequate. 
More importantly, those institutions were not built on a solid social founda-
tion. By prioritizing the consolidation of its centralized, pro-Confucius system 
and overly focusing on the development of its bureaucratic and legal system, 
the Early Le dynasty slowly disintegrated the strong cohesion between villages 
and nation and lost its credibility among the people. It was the consequence, 
the flipside or the cost incurred by a centralized and bureaucratic governance 
system.  
Under centralized monarchies, there is almost no possibility of creating a 
democratic or egalitarian system. However, the fact remains that the Ly, Tran, 
Le and other Vietnamese feudal dynasties put a strong emphasis on the popula-
tion and on constructing their foothold based on the confidence, backing and 
support of the people. It is basically a survival aspect of their sovereignty and 
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system. The idea of “people as a central foundation”, although changing in 
terms of its contents and outward manifestation, nevertheless retains an ever-
lasting value. In other words, that is traditional political thought and a legacy 
of Vietnam. Since the construction of the Revolutionary government (in 1945), 
especially from Innovation (Đổi mới, 1986) to nowadays, “taking the people as 
the basis” as well as “promoting the people’s self-mastery” has become a guid-
ing principle and motto of the Vietnamese government – a government of, by 
and for the people. However, in view of the achievements and the challenges 
that lie ahead, especially in the context of the strong development of a market 
economy and international integration, Vietnam’s government needs to seri-
ously evaluate experiences and historical lessons. So the Vietnamese state must 
today represent the rights and interests of the people and highly promote the 
people's sovereignty. The basis of the rule of law is the establishment of a de-
mocracy which recognizes and ensures the implementation of the people's 
power in the most profound and intrinsic way.45 By this, Vietnam could con-
tinue to promote the precious values and traditions of its nation as well as set 
up an important social platform for reforming and perfecting the political 
system and state apparatus of today. 
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Some Signs of a State of Law in Vietnam in the  
Monarchical Time  
Vu Thi Phung 
Introduction 
In recent years, researchers and managers have had long-running discussions 
about the issue of a state of law in Vietnam. Some argue that a state of law has 
never existed in Vietnam, thus one has to be built. Others hold that in Vi-
etnam there has been a state of law already, but one that has not been fully 
developed. There is also an extreme opinion that “state of law” is an ideal mod-
el that only few countries can achieve, and therefore the fact that there is no 
state of law, or only an imperfect one, in Vietnam is understandable. In the 
academic debate on the history of states and laws in Vietnam, researchers have 
regularly discussed whether a state of law has ever existed in Vietnam. In this 
paper, on the basis of available sources, we would like to contribute some 
thoughts on the above issue. Due to the scarcity of materials, the scope of our 
study is limited to the monarchical period (from the 10th century to the mid-
19th century). To help clarify the issue, we propose three basic questions based 
on the available literature and theoretical debates about state of law: 
- During the monarchical time in Vietnam, did Vietnamese states recognise 
the importance of the law and did they actually compile and promulgate 
laws? How were laws established in this period? 
- If Vietnamese states did pay attention to the law, how did laws in the mo-
narchical time regulate the relationship between the state and citizens, and 
the issue of human rights? 
- How were laws implemented in reality? 
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The Awareness of Monarchical States of the Law 
Our research results show that, during Vietnam’s feudal era, states already 
recognised the role of laws in governing and managing the country. Building 
on available materials, researchers today agree that before the Ly dynasty, in 
Vietnam there were no written laws, and laws only existed in the forms of 
conventions and customs. From the Ly dynasty onwards, one of the most im-
portant progresses of this time was that leaders of dynasties realized that in 
order to maintain social stability and order, to make people observe laws and 
regulations, and to punish those who violated the law, there had to be written 
laws. Therefore, monarchical states made several achievements in the field of 
legislation, especially in issuing written laws. First of all was Ly dynasty’s Roy-
al Code (Bo luat Hinh thu) (1042) and then Tran dynasty’s Royal Code (Bo 
luat Hinh thu) (1341), Le dynasty’s Royal Penal Code (Quoc trieu hinh luat) 
(also called Hong Duc Code – 1483), Nguyen dynasty’s Hoang Viet Code (also 
called Gia Long Code – 1815) and thousands of legal documents in the forms 
of royal proclamations, decrees, ordinances, edicts, etc. The reason for the issu-
ance of the Royal Code by the Ly dynasty was mentioned in Dai viet Su ky 
toan thu (Complete Annals of Dai Viet):  
“Previously, the legal procedures for suing and trial in our country were complicated; 
the officials responsible for legal matters were too finicky about rules and too rigid and 
harsh in the implementation of laws to the extent that many people were mistreated 
and became victim of injustice. The king felt pity for them, thus he ordered the Head 
of the Cabinet office to adjust laws to keep up with the situation, to divide laws into 
sections and specific regulations and combine them all in a single text, the Royal Code, 
which is intelligible to everyone.”1 
The materials show that the Ly dynasty’s emperors realized the necessity to 
have written laws in order for the people to know how to adjust behaviours, for 
the state to have the means to investigate and supervise officials. In the context 
of a period 1000 years ago, these thoughts on the importance of issuing writ-
ten laws, as a basis for the enforcement of laws, was an important progress in 
legal thinking. Inheriting the above thoughts, succeeding dynasties highly 
valued and appreciated the role of laws. In 1428, when giving order to officials 
to compile laws to promulgate, Le Thai To points out clearly that:  
                                                     
1 Social Sciences Publisher (1998), Dai Viet su ky toan thu, 263. 
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“from the past to present, the governing of the country has always relied on laws, or 
else the society has been in chaos. Therefore, we follow our precedents to issue laws to 
tell commanders, officials and the people what is right and wrong, what to do and 
what to avoid so as they will not violate the law.”2 
By the time of the Nguyen dynasty, in the preface of Hoang Viet Code, King 
Gia Long wrote:  
“Everyone living in the society has infinite desires, and without laws to prevent their 
illegal conducts, it will be impossible to educate them so that they understand ethics. 
Therefore, as our ancestors have said, laws are the critical tools for good governance.”3  
In order for the code to be effectively implemented, King Gia Long stated 
that:  
“Authorized officials have to follow these rules and consider them the guiding model 
about laws.” 4 
These statements and declarations of Vietnamese emperors, the heads of state 
(as recorded by state historians in ancient historical works) show that laws had 
a certain role in Vietnamese society during the monarchical time. This was 
demonstrated through the fact that monarchical states compiled and issued 
many written codes and several other legal documents. However, another issue 
that needs to be taken into consideration is how monarchical states organized 
the compilation of laws. Based on the records in Dai Viet su ky toan thu, the 
compilation and issuance of Ly dynasty’s Royal Code is described as follows:  
“The king felt pity for them (those who suffered injustice), thus he ordered the Head of 
the Cabinet office to adjust laws to keep up with the situation, to divide laws into 
sections and specific regulations and combine them all in a single text, the Royal 
Code.”5  
The position of the Head of the Cabinet Office (Trung Thu) mentioned above 
might refer to the head of the organization that managed the entire adminis-
trative matters of the court.6 
                                                     
2 Social Sciences Publisher (1998), Dai Viet su ky toan thu, 263. 
3 Culture-Information Publisher (1994), Hoang viet luat le, 1, 3. 
4 Culture-Information Publisher (1994), Hoang viet luat le, 1, 3. 
5 Social Sciences Publisher (1998), Dai Viet su ky toan thu, 263.  
6 In the Nguyen and Ming dynasties (China), Trung Thu was a position that played an 
important role in the royal court, also referred to as the prime minister. 
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Also according to historical records, many basic legal documents of the Le 
dynasty stated clearly the name of law-drafting officials (for example: the Legal 
Code complied by Nguyen Trai (1440–1442); Royal Laws and Orders com-
piled by Phan Phu Tien (1440–1442); Thien Nam du ha tap compiled by 
Than Nhan Trung, Quach Dinh Bao, Do Nhuan, Dao Cu and Dam Van Le 
(1483). Only Hong Duc Code (during Le Thanh Tong’s reign) did not state 
the name of law-drafting officials because this code was compiled based on 
legal regulations issued by previous kings. Hoang Viet Code (Nguyen dynasty) 
was compiled by Northern Citadel Governor Nguyen Van Thanh. 
It can be seen that most monarchical states assigned the compilation of laws 
to officials holding important positions. These were knowledgeable and gifted 
people, thus they were entrusted with important duties by kings. However, 
based on the above documents, we did not find any record reflecting that ordi-
nary people were involved in the compilation of laws at the time, nor did we 
find any materials about drafts of laws being sent to those affected by the laws 
for review and feedback. Therefore, it can be concluded that, laws in the mo-
narchical time were mostly compiled by court officials following orders from 
kings, who were also the final reviewers of drafts of laws and the ones that gave 
approval for the laws to be promulgated. There was no involvement of the 
people in this process. Thus one question is whether this method of law-
making was democratic and objective. 
Some Notable Regulations in Laws in the Monarchical Time 
An examination of the contents of laws in the monarchical time (in general 
codes and specific legal documents) shows that scales and types of issues gov-
erned and mentioned in these laws were massive, diverse and complex. For 
convenience, we would like to summarize the contents of legal normative regu-
lations in the monarchical period based on the following issues. 
Firstly, based on the current method of classification, the contents of laws 
in the monarchical time governed social relationships in fundamental legal 
fields namely: Administrative law, Criminal law, Civil law, and Marriage and 
Family law, Prosecution law. For example: both Quoc Trieu hinh luat (the 
Hong Duc laws-Le dynasty) and Hoang viet Luat le (The Gia Long laws – 
Nguyen dynasty) had regulations on the organization of state agencies and 
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officials’ duties; types of crime, types of punishment and principles to deter-
mine crimes and sanctions; rights of ownership of land and property; rights of 
inheritance; marriage and divorce, relationships between family members; 
procedures and order of investigation processes, and rules about detaining and 
interrogating, etc.7 
Secondly, laws in the monarchical time also specified the power of the king, 
the authorities and responsibilities of officials and the duties of the people. For 
example: Among crimes, the ones considered most serious by monarchical 
states were the Ten Crimes,8 including ten most serious crimes that violated 
the king’s power, the existence and rule of the feudal state, the survival of the 
nation, and the most important social relationships according to Confucian 
ideals at the time (king-subject, father-child, husband-wife). Criminals were 
sentenced to the toughest punishment (death). Even if they were among the 
“Eight Cases of Remission”, they were not granted remission and they could 
not compensate for their crimes by money. In the chapter “Royal Guards”, the 
laws ruled that behaviors violating the royal citadel and palaces; violating the 
king’s life and property; violating national security and border (for example: 
people without authorization were not allowed to be inside the royal palace out 
of official working hours; not allowed to tease others, to be arrogant or to spon-
taneously talk to imperial maids; not allowed to sell territory and land to for-
eigners; not allowed to reveal national secrets, etc.). Those committing these 
crimes were often sentenced to high punishments (penal servitude, banish-
ment, and execution). Officials would be severely punished if they committed 
crimes such as: taking bribes, contravening the king’s orders intentionally, 
                                                     
7 For particular regulations, see Vu Thi Phung (1990): History of Vietnamese States 
and Laws. Reprinted 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008. Hanoi. 
8 Ten Crimes includes: Mưu phản  (high treason, attempt to overthrow the sovereign 
or harm the country and society); Mưu đại nghịch (destroy royal shrines, temples 
and palaces); Mưu bạn (betrayal and cooperation with the enemy); Ác nghịch (kill 
grandparents, parents and relatives); Bất đạo (kill many people at the same time), 
Đại bất kính (steal ritual items in shrines and royal tombs, fake royal seals and do 
harm to the king’s health and prestige), Bất hiếu (denounce, insult grandparents and 
parents, or refuse to mourn deceased grandparents and parents); Bất mục (kill rela-
tives, wives beating or denouncing husbands); Bất nghĩa (ordinary people killing of-
ficials, students killing teachers) and Nội loạn (have sexual intercourse with relatives 
and concubines of father and grandfather). 
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being irresponsible at work, using power to harass people, etc. (punishments 
for these crimes ranged from whipping, caning, to death depending on the 
seriousness of the crimes committed). As for the ordinary people, the crimes to 
be punished included: robbery; murder; fighting with and injuring others; 
insulting and calumniating others; cheating and faking papers, royal seals and 
job titles for personal benefit; adultery, rape; disseminating false rumors, en-
gaging in superstitious activities, etc. 
Thirdly, containing detailed and specific regulations covering many fields, 
laws during the monarchical era basically and firstly served the purpose of 
securing the power of the feudal state. Regulations in laws as well as in other 
documents focused on protecting the absolute ruling power of the feudal land-
lord class, of which the king was the highest representative (thus all behaviors 
violating the power, life and honor of the king were always sentenced to the 
most severe punishments). Laws also focused on safeguarding the privileges of 
the king and the royal family; of officials, patricians and the landlord class 
(politically and economically). Laws also protected the foundations for the state 
to exist and develop, including: the ideological foundation (mainly Confucian-
ism); the economic foundation (laws protected the right of the state as the 
supreme owner of land and the only entity with the right to collect taxes; pro-
tected the private ownership of land and property, especially the private own-
ership of the landlord class; protected the means of production and the supply 
of labor); the social foundation (laws protected class order, the interests of up-
per classes and the inequality inside and outside the family). For example: both 
Hong Duc code and Gia Long code had regulations about the “Eight Cases of 
Remission”.9 According to this regulation, when people included in this sys-
tem committed serious crimes (except for the Ten Crimes), judges could only 
identify their crimes and proposed their punishments to the king to decide; if 
the punishment was from banishment downwards, it would be decreased by 
one level. Besides, laws also specified the remission of the punishment of de-
scendants of people with great contributions to the country, or wives of man-
                                                     
9 Eight Cases of Remission include: close relatives of the King and the Queen, the 
Queen mother (nghi than); people who serve the king for a long time or those who 
served previous kings (nghi co); people of great morality (nghi hien); people with 
great talent (nghi nang); people with great contributions to the country (nghi cong); 
officials from third rank  upwards (nghi quy); industrious officials (nghi can); previ-
ous kings’ descendants (nghi tan). 
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darins based on their husbands’ official position, etc. Among the people who 
could redeem their guilt by money were relatives of the king and the queen.  
Fourthly, although focusing on safeguarding privileges of the king, aristo-
crats and officials, laws in the monarchical era still had regulations about the 
rights of ordinary people. For example: Among the subjects that were granted 
privileges and allowed to redeem guilt by money, old people above 90 and 
children under 7 were cleared of charges even if they committed crimes that 
would lead to death sentence; old people above 70, children under 15 and dis-
abled people were granted privileges and considered for less severe punish-
ments. Laws also had regulations on the grant of exemption from legal pro-
ceedings or remission to people who committed minor crimes but had given 
themselves up; on the reward for people denouncing crimes or punishments for 
people covering up for criminals. There are some regulations that prevented 
officials and village nobles from exploiting and harassing the people. Especial-
ly, to a certain extent, Quoc trieu hinh luat had some regulations to protect 
women’s rights (to inherit, to propose for divorce) and ethnic minorities (to 
deal with disputes in their communities based on their own laws, to use their 
own languages in trials), etc. 
About Disseminating and Implementing Laws in the Monarchical Era 
Disseminating Laws 
In order for laws to be implemented, the most important issue is to dissemi-
nate and communicate the contents of laws to officials, who would implement 
laws, and the people. However, in feudal societies, this was not a simple task 
because at that time there was not the possibility to print and make copies of 
laws like today; and only a small proportion of the population was literate. In 
order to disseminate laws, feudal states applied the following methods: 
Firstly, after issuing important legal documents, the state appointed court 
officials to make (by hand) three copies of any document (Giap copy, At copy, 
Binh copy).10 Giap copy (also called the original copy) was stored at the king’s 
                                                     
10 Therefore, in Vietnam there is an idiom, “After three copies are made, the original 
will be lost” to indicate that in the past, it was impossible to avoid mistakes when 
copying documents.  
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archives; At copy (copied from the original) was sent to and stored at the rele-
vant department (the central organization responsible for the implementation 
and monitoring of the implementation of that law); Binh copy (also a copy of 
the original) was sent to local regions to implement. However, that process of 
copying documents cost a lot of time and effort, and could not guarantee abso-
lute accuracy in comparison with the original document. Therefore, laws dis-
seminated in this way only reached a small portion of officials. In order to solve 
this problem, later dynasties (especially the Nguyen dynasty) engraved im-
portant documents on wood (so called wood blocks) then used the wood blocks 
to print on paper. This method also cost great efforts to engrave Sino scripts on 
wood blocks (each block was equivalent to a page). The advantage, however, 
was that the document could be printed into many copies and the accuracy 
could be guaranteed.11 
Secondly, as for the ordinary people, in the situation that many people were 
illiterate, feudal governments also had some methods to disseminate laws 
which were quite effective and appropriate. Ancient historical works recorded 
methods to copy the king’s orders or some particular regulations of the state 
and local government. These copied would then be put on public display at 
crowded places. When seeing those announcements, people usually gathered, 
literate people read and explained to illiterate ones, then they discussed with 
each other to clearly understand the regulations and to observe them willingly. 
However, this method had a limitation: the law in question could not reach all 
citizens because not everyone came to crowded places and when they listened 
to explanations, each person understood them in a different way. Therefore, in 
order to solve the above problem, feudal governments used the method of oral-
ly disseminating laws through “village criers”.12 However, this method made 
Vietnamese people passive in studying laws, which forced the government to 
“bring” laws to their home because they thought “no announcements, no wor-
                                                     
11 At the moment, the National Archives IV in Da Lat have stored thousands of wood 
blocks of this kind, including the important wood block collection used to print 
Hoang Viet code of the Nguyen dynasty. 
12 A village crier was a special civil servant serving village officials especially in the 
Northern delta region. Besides handling trivial chores such as making tea, cleaning 
the communal house, laying mats, carrying trays, when village officials gathered for 
discussion, the village crier had the duty to go to everyone’s home to announce regu-
lations of the central or local government for the people to know and implement.  
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ries”. That mentality and habit have posed a difficulty to the disseminating, 
communicating and implementing of laws amongst a large part of the popula-
tion nowadays. 
Implementing Laws 
As mentioned above, although feudal states used many methods to disseminate 
laws, the implementation of law did not meet the expectations of state authori-
ties. In reality, for many reasons, the problems of corrupt officials and people 
disobeying the law were observed in all dynasties. In this situation, in order to 
guarantee the enforcement of laws, the main method of Vietnamese states was 
to stipulate sanctions and strictly implement them. 
Regarding Officials 
Having clarified officials’ roles in implementing laws, the state issued and 
applied several methods to inspect and supervise officials’ implementation of 
laws in places where they were in charge. According to ancient historical 
works, when seeing that officials lacked credibility and integrity, and misused 
laws to harm people, King Le Hien Tong (in 1449) straightforwardly criticized 
and expressed a tough attitude toward these corrupt acts through his words in 
the following royal ordinance: 
“Our state uses the strength of people to determine the laws of the nation; the guards 
inside and outside the palace are responsible for implementing regulations, all kinds of 
services have to be considered for awards. It is clearly stated that corrupt officials 
should be punished and honest people should be rewarded. Sanctions are ready at all 
times to prevent briberies. Thus it is hard to understand why authorized officials do 
not follow state regulations. Few care more about the nation than their personal gain, 
while many ignore their responsibilities and duties. Many keep committing evils that 
we have tried to eliminate, such as letting the rich go and only arresting the poor and 
misappropriating state money. Some pursue their own benefit at the expense of others, 
some submerge themselves in wine and girls while ignoring their duties, some abuse 
their position to exploit others, some cover up for others and ignore state laws, some 
only think about conspiracies and torture without mercy for the poor (…) That is why 
I issue new regulations to eliminate these evil old habits. Those who observe these new 
rules will be forgiven; those who fail to do so will be strictly punished. Whether you 
will face disasters or fortune is up to you. Choose wisely.” 
In codes as well as other legal documents by the king, the following behaviors 
of officials were forbidden: 
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- Must not be greedy and plunder people’s assets.  
- Judges have to be fair and must not take bribes to make wrong judgements, 
which can lead to injustice. 
- When travelling abroad, must not buy goods without reporting. 
- Officials must not take bribes; if they do they will be punished, depending 
on the amount they take. 
- Tax collectors must not misappropriate tax payment. 
- Must not abuse public work for personal purpose. 
- Must not take bribe or favor relatives to promote people without morality 
and talent. 
All the officials committing the above behaviors were punished by laws. For 
example: taking bribes was considered the most typical act of corruption, 
which was regulated both in Hong Duc Laws and Gia Long Laws. In order to 
deal with this behavior, laws had regulations to punish those who accepted 
bribes (usually officials) and those who bribed (usually ordinary people and 
subordinates). The level of punishment depended on the amount of bribes. 
During the monarchical time, regular examinations of officials was an effec-
tive method to prevent corrupt behaviors and enhance the enforcement of laws 
because through these examinations, the government collected a lot of infor-
mation about officials and took timely actions to deal with corrupt officials. 
On the other hand, pressured by the investigations, officials had to adjust their 
behaviors to avoid making mistakes. This method, therefore, was a mechanism 
of active prevention of corruption. 
Regarding the Masses 
In order for the masses to observe laws, illegal behaviors were severely pun-
ished to set examples for others as well as to show the rigorousness of the law. 
This is shown through notes in ancient historical works, according to which 
any behavior that did not follow the orders of the king and the government 
was considered crimes of “violating majesty” or “internal upheaval”. Once 
accused of these crimes, no one can avoid being punished, from light punish-
ments such as the whip or cane, to more severe punishments namely banish-
ment, decapitation, or extermination of three generations of kinship. These 
sanctions were considered effective because they made the people afraid and 
made them follow the laws. However, because people’s intellectual standard at 
that time was low, punishments by the state were usually combined with pun-
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ishments by village communities through regulations in village conventions 
(also known as village regulations). 
Several Inequalities in Implementing Laws 
Basically, feudal states’ laws usually focused on protecting the interests of the 
governing, oppressing and exploiting classes. Therefore, although officials’ 
illegal behaviors were strictly punished, in reality, there were many injustices 
in the enforcement of laws in the monarchical period. Ordinary people were 
punished more severely than officials for the same violations. Additionally, 
several officials exploited this discrimination to distort cases, to force people to 
admit crimes they did not commit, and to punish many people unjustly. This 
sparked anger amongst the people. For example: Dai Viet su ky toan thu rec-
orded the case of Do Thien Thu (younger brother of Do Khac Chung – a high-
ranking mandarin in the court), who was involved in a lawsuit with another. 
While he was absolutely wrong, local officials kept delaying the prosecution. 
Consequently, the other person intercepted the king’s chariot to report the 
case. After the king ordered an investigation, it was concluded that Do Thien 
Thu was really wrong. 
Therefore, in order to reduce people’s dissatisfaction, some dynasties ap-
plied several methods for the people to report urgent matters to the king. Dai 
Viet su ky toan thu recorded two events: 
- In March 1052, under the reign of King Ly Thai Tong, the king ordered 
the casting of a large bell, located in the Dragon Pond, and allowed people 
to ring it should they want to report any injustice they had suffered. 
- In 1158, King Ly Anh Tong, following the model of the Song dynasty 
(China), put a bronze chest in the middle of royal palace, and anyone who 
had anything to report or denounce could put a letter into it.13 
Conclusion 
Through the above materials and research, we conclude that: Based on the 
criteria of a state of law, we can argue that in Vietnam in the monarchical peri-
                                                     
13 Some argue that nowadays state agencies also use this method in the form of sugges-
tion boxes for people to express their needs and suggestions. 
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od some signs of a state of law already existed. Those included the fact that the 
state, upon recognition of the role of the law, organized the compilation and 
promulgation of general codes and other specific legal documents for the peo-
ple to know and observe, and for officials to implement. Vietnamese feudal 
states also had many methods to disseminate and communicate laws to the 
subjects, using many different forms which were suitable to the specific con-
text of different areas and the level of awareness of the masses. Vietnamese 
feudal states also strictly punished illegal behaviors. Those methods partly 
enabled the implementation of laws. Thanks to that, many dynasties were able 
to maintain social order, mobilize armed forces to fight against foreign in-
vaders and maintain power for hundreds of years.  
However, the above signs still have not provided sufficient evidence to af-
firm the existence of a state of law in the monarchical time because many basic 
and important factors were missing. Those included the process of compiling 
laws (without the people’s involvement and discussion); laws were issued most-
ly for the king and the state to impose on and control the people, instead of 
being a “contract” between the state and citizens; laws still expressed inequali-
ty between officials and ordinary people; there were still many shortcomings in 
the implementation of laws, especially officials’ abuse of power to violate regu-
lations in laws; human and people’s rights, although noticed, still received 
limited attention; punishments still depended on social hierarchy, corruption 
was still rampant, and the implementation of laws was still arbitrary. Those 
limits significantly undermined the legitimacy of many dynasties. Some dynas-
ties even lost their power because of that reason.  
Those were historical lessons for us to consider, finding and applying effec-
tive methods to build and improve the state of law in Vietnam at the moment 
and in the future. 
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The French “État legale” in Vietnam.  
Between Legal Pluralism and Police State 
Detlef Briesen 
The following article examines the effects of the French “État legale” in its 
colonies in Southeast Asia. This question at least implicitly plays an important 
role in the other contributions collected here. Since French law is an integral 
part of the continental-European legal tradition, it is also being studied here 
with the respective categories. Obviously I am not pursuing a Euro-centric 
perspective, but I am primarily interesting in describing one of the starting 
points for the contemporary Vietnamese debate on the rule of law: the abol-
ishment of the Confucian system of law and order by virtue, and its replace-
ment by a rather arbitrary French “État légale” from 1858–1954. Other toe-
holds, which are not discussed in my article, are developments after 1945, 
1954, and 1986 in particular.  
France and the Law in its Colonial Empire 
A constitutional state is a state in which constitutional powers are legally 
bound, which is particularly limited in its actions by law to secure the freedom 
of the individual. Judging from today's prevailing opinion in Germany the 
state of law (rule of law or more accurately “Rechtsstaat”) includes other ele-
ments in addition to the rule of law: 
- legal guarantee of fundamental human rights, 
- legal guarantee of coexistence of the people in the same personal freedom, 
- securing material justice, 
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- ensuring legal certainty (certitudo and securitas), 
- institutional moderation of government activity by the separation of pow-
ers, the prohibition of excess and the principle of proportionality, 
- laws binding all government activity by a primacy of law, 
- salvo of a legal authorization for all incriminating state acts, 
- verifiability of state acts through independent courts, in particular on 
whether government action which engages the rights of an individual, is 
legitimate and appropriate.1 
In French law, there is today, under the influence of the German tradition, a 
similar schema of categories that indicate whether a country is to be regarded 
as a “Rechtsstaat” or not. This has led to the loan translation of the German 
term into “État de droit” in French. Originally, the term “État légale” was 
more common in France. It designated a state in which control had been com-
pletely taken over by a civil society and its expression of political will, the 
parliament. This found its expression in a common understanding that laws are 
the central tool for the control of the state by the parliament. Consequently, 
only by means of laws adopted by parliament was it possible to interfere legit-
imately in society, politics, economy etc. French legal thought focused origi-
nally on the creation and enforcement of laws.2 The rule of law in an extended 
interpretation is in contrast a relatively recent historical achievement. In coun-
tries like France or Germany it was fully established only in the decades after 
World War II. When it comes to the specific character of the French rule in 
Vietnam 1858–1946, so far two factors must always be taken into account. 
First: The enforcement of a fully developed “Rechtsstaat” beyond the mere 
binding of governmental activity to laws was also in France itself a protracted 
process. Much more was required than just the famous Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (“Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du 
Citoyen”), which was announced by the French National Assembly on 26 Au-
gust 1789. During the 100 years of French colonial rule over Vietnam, the 
state of law had severe deficits, was controversial and even endangered in 
France itself. The Second Empire was an authoritarian state, during the Third 
Republic the state of law was seriously threatened by attempts of restoration, 
political justice, martial law, first and foremost during the World Wars, and 
                                                     
1 Zippelius (1999), 296 ff.; Stern (1984), 781 ff. 
2 Ridder (2010), 179. 
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by another authoritarian government, the State of Vichy. Even the Fourth and 
Fifth Republic were shaken to their foundations by the anti-colonial liberation 
wars in Indochina and Algeria, and the associated substantial violations of 
human and civil rights. 
Second: The fact that the rule of law was a contentious issue in France itself, 
was in addition to the strong anti-democratic forces caused by the dual charac-
ter which the country had from the mid-19th to mid-20th century: France was 
from 1871 until 1940 one of the few democratic republics in Europe, but at 
the same time it possessed a colonial empire. The latter was actually the largest 
in the world but for the British, and provided France with resources to com-
pete with the strongest power of continental Europe until 1945, Germany. To 
keep control over its empire was therefore the fundament of its status as a 
Great Power. This implied another iron necessity: All colonialized people in 
Asia, Africa, America and Oceania could not be provided with the same human 
and civil rights and particularly not with full legal equality and freedom as the 
French from the motherland. 
The limited extend of the rule of law in the colonies therefore had a logic 
that was established on the one hand by the role of France in the system of 
Great Powers and its capabilities to conquer a country like Vietnam so easily. 
On the other hand, there were fiscal reasons. Colonization could cause political 
problems in France, so it had to be at least cost-neutral for the French taxpayer. 
To achieve this, the colonies and protectorates had in turn to be profitable, 
that is, they had to yield profits for France. This restricted certain forms of 
development, especially political participation and a full development of a 
“Rechtsstaat”. The French empire overseas was therefore characterized by legal 
pluralism, and inevitably applied to political and economic oppression and 
exploitation.3 
The Law in Vietnam before Colonization 
To understand the French encroachment on Vietnam, it is essential to have an 
idea about the preceding Empire of Vietnam and its law. Seen from the per-
spective of European constitutional theory, the Empire of Vietnam was a state 
                                                     
3 Brocheux/Hémery (2011), 71. 
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of law in the limited sense. Its constitutional structure was based on a complex 
network of multiple actors legitimized by written law, customs and rites. It 
consisted of the emperor and his mandarins, the village communities and the 
extended family groups. 
The Emperor and his Mandarins 
The reign of Emperor and his elite, the mandarins, was ritually-morally legit-
imized by a “heavenly mandate”. The objective of the latter was to achieve an 
ideal society which guaranteed peace, order, harmony, social satisfaction and 
material prosperity. While such socio-political objectives are universal in prin-
ciple, the means to achieve to them were of pure Confucian origin: “virtue”, 
“knowledge”, “righteous path”, including the idea of “governing by virtue”.4 
Virtue was also the central category of political theory, and it was nothing but 
an expression of a cosmological moral law called “Tao”. It was the common 
regulator of cosmic and social order and thus extended to the subunits of the 
latter or the entire hierarchy of the cosmos, society, family and individual.  
Law in the Empire of Vietnam had therefore a cosmological source, and in 
daily practice it was mainly a product of moral action. This raised the question 
of how the ruling classes could ensure order in society from their Confucian 
view, namely through harmonious moral action itself, also known as “Li”.5 It 
went far beyond the right ceremonial-ritual behavior and was a collective for-
mula for harmonious action in the sense of equilibrium in all actions. Emper-
ors and mandarins had thus to act as role models in moral action, in the hope 
that a positive impact on the people would arise therefrom. They also had to 
behave in accordance with the three basic social commitments and the five 
cardinal virtues, and were confronted with specific obligations arising from the 
respective social position too. Writers, farmers, artisans and merchants each 
had to follow specific ethical imperatives and to provide full dedication in the 
service of the community.6  
At the top of this ethical-ritual-oriented system of rule of law or virtue was 
the emperor. French observers usually interpreted his role primarily as that of 
                                                     
4 Vu The Quyen (1977), 44.  
5 Wilhelm (1967), Li Gi, 35 ff. 
6 Wilhelm (1967), Li Gi, 56. 
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an “idole sacrée“,7 who would formally remain in power in order not to unnec-
essarily provoke the population. However, the French missed a crucial compo-
nent, because the sacral legitimation also implied a political mandate. An em-
peror who failed could be forced by his subjects to resign or even commit sui-
cide. However, since this meant a considerable effort, it was enough, as a rule, 
when an Emperor kept the “imperial attitude” and operated its function as a 
“ritually-sacred object” without mistakes.8 This became increasingly impossi-
ble under the conditions of the colonial state. 
Below the Emperor there was a ruling class in pre-colonial Vietnam, the 
mandarins, whose authority was based on the success in the imperial examina-
tion system and thus acquired Confucian knowledge. Since mandarins lived 
among the illiterate population, the rise of an education contender to a higher 
degree was witnessed by the masses. Extensive ceremonies were also held to 
honor mandarins when reaching a new status.9 Their training not only consist-
ed of technical skills such as reading and writing and a general knowledge 
about Confucian theory, but of acquiring correct thinking as it was understood 
as a precondition for right action when in office.  
The mandarin bureaucracy consisted only of a very limited number of men. 
Figures from the colonial era-until the 1930s when the mandarins remained 
under the protectorate treaties in office in Tonkin and Annam confirm such a 
view: In 1896, a total of 418 mandarins with 858 assistants administered the 
first and second class managed prefectures in Tonkin, not more than one ad-
ministrator per 4,000 to 5,000 residents.10 Mandarins were ordered by a hier-
archy of ranks, of certain positions at the imperial court, which corresponded 
to the respective organizational level of provinces, sub-provinces and cantons.11 
Mandarins governed in principle by the ancient Chinese system of undivided 
state authority, particularly the administrators of lower units were in their 
prelacies in charge of “everything.”12 Nevertheless, there was a certain division 
of public tasks among them: revenue collection, public works, recruitment of 
                                                     
7 Harmand (1885), 36. 
8 Vu The Quyen (1977), 27. 
9 Texier (1962), 349 ff. 
10 Brocheux/Hémery (2011), 88. 
11 Blazy (2012), 58. 
12 Brocheux/Hémery (2011), 88. 
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soldiers, monitoring of the population, and jurisdiction.13 The latter was a 
main task of mandarins and differed significantly from judicature in contem-
porary European countries like France. 
The entire law was characterized by the fact that the essential elements of 
contemporary European jurisdiction, especially the division between private, 
penal, and public law were non-existent as well as that codes of procedure were 
lacking. The Vietnamese judiciary was dominated by the Confucian principle 
of morality and harmony, court disputes were seen as an expression of the fail-
ure of the peaceful social order, even as immorality. One central attempt was, 
therefore, to engage as few persons as possible in a court hearing, which all in 
all rather resembled an administrative act: There was no litigation, no litigant, 
no lawyers etc. Only few persons were involved even in an important legal 
dispute, the mandarin, the defendant or his deputy, and sometimes witnesses. 
The only guarantee against arbitrary justice was the moral integrity of the 
mandarin judge who had to face severe penalties in case of failures or corrup-
tion.14 In addition, there was no division into public, private and criminal law, 
because the underlying code, the Gia Long, was written exclusively as a moral-
izing criminal code. Some other sources of law were characterized by the same 
idea: the King, a collection of five books on metaphysics, history, ethics and 
literature, the Statutes of the Emperor, in which, inter alia, the administrative 
structures had been established, and finally the Lê Code. It retained some sig-
nificance despite the Codification of Gia Long Code. The latter had been in-
troduced in 1812 by the homonymous Emperor and was basically a copy of the 
penal code of the Chinese Qing Dynasty. Committed to the same legal think-
ing the Gia Long Code defined standards for criminal law (penalties, definition 
of crimes, exceptions for the privileged etc.) as well as other legal regulations 
including management of granaries, commercial law, civil status, sacred posi-
tion of the Emperor, sacrifices, military, and public works. 
Court cases were dealt with at the various stages of mandarins’ hierarchy. It 
consisted of three stages. If a party to the conflict did not want to bow to the 
verdict of the notables, it could petition to a low-ranking mandarin. His deci-
sion was not based necessarily on a court hearing. In the case of a crime or of-
fense mostly local notables who were responsible for law and order at the local 
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level addressed directly to the mandarin. He had full authority over all forms 
of punishment. On the provincial level, there was a sort of Court of Appeal 
chaired by the provincial judge. It was the last resort for cases in which cor-
poral punishment was imposed. The third stage of case-law was the Court of 
Appeal in imperial Hue. It was primarily responsible for severe cases of moral 
failure in which the highest forms of punishment, detention, exile and death 
penalty, had been imposed. In addition, at Hue special courts met for cases, 
which involved high-ranking mandarins, infamous rebels or similarly serious 
cases. Another court dealt with matters which concerned the imperial family. 
For the military, there was a different jurisdiction anyway.15 
The Village Community 
The village community was largely autonomous in imperial Vietnam, and its 
dual autonomy as an administrative and social unit was a result of a long his-
torical process, which is not be reproduced in detail here. Originally the villag-
es were supervised strictly by an imperial mandarin, who was also in charge of 
tax collection. Since the introduction of population and cadastral registers the 
payment of taxes came more and more under the control of the local Council of 
Elders.16 With general revision of the civil register under the Emperor Le 
Thanh Tong, the amount to be paid by the respective village became depend-
ent on the number of taxable inhabitants. Since then villages simply gave low-
er population figures to reduce their tax burden. The revision led consequently 
to a tedious and permanent conflict between the central government and mu-
nicipalities about the real population figures. Since the tax reform by Le 
Huyen Tong (1662–1671) the villages had to apply only a fixed amount that 
was calculated on the basis of the last census.  
This compromise had benefits for both sides; especially for the peasantry in 
the villages. The Council of the Elders now apportioned the lump-sum taxa-
tion for the entire municipality to the male patriarchs. This created a signifi-
cant local autonomy with extensive executive powers. The withdrawal of the 
state on the issue of taxation was only the first step towards a far-reaching self-
government of the municipalities in Vietnam. Finally, it included the inde-
pendent organization of local government and the autonomous mobilization of 
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16 Nguyen Huu Khang (1946), 41 ff. 
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resources (taxes, fees and charges) for tackling common tasks. Municipalities 
had their own common law system which was partly oral, partly written down, 
and deeply influenced by traditional values and local experiences. Local com-
mon law was based on general ethical and moral principles and on codified 
conventions on administrative, judicial, fiscal, police and other matters.17 
The community was nevertheless not completely autonomous, but inte-
grated into the authoritarian and centralist imperial government which con-
trolled military, justice and religion. In addition, village and imperial state 
were connected by the common, above-described culture of “social harmony”. 
An important task of the village community was therefore to ensure peace and 
order internally and externally. This commandment was so strong that it could 
lead to collective punishment against entire communities in case of subordina-
tion.18 Communities had therefore regulatory functions. They were responsible 
for protecting their members from external enemies, bandits and robbers. In-
ternally they were supervised by a municipal police. The municipality was also 
responsible for fending off magical powers that could either produce harmful 
weather phenomena or bring disorder into the “social harmony” of the village 
community.19 In addition villages were providers of mutual solidarity.20 In 
order to meet the variety of tasks, the village council was also organized by 
function. There were lower dignitaries for archive, finance, public security, 
construction and dissemination of news, higher dignitaries for external con-
tacts, and the interpretation of the imperial edicts.21 A central position was 
occupied by the ly truong (mayor) of the village, but the entire political and 
social structure of it was far from being simply hierarchically organized.22 
The Family 
The third pillar of the Vietnamese society was the family. It was on one hand a 
social interaction system, which was structured by the idea of an “order” that 
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22 Papin (2002), 49–52. 
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produced family roles and a hierarchy of authority. Secondly, the family was 
based on the absolute nature of the paternal power, which was bound to the 
general authoritarian structure of the society, based on authority and order (Vu 
1977, 110). The family hierarchy was formally determined by Confucian prin-
ciples, the “three chains” of family role relationships, better subordination and 
the corresponding values: between father and son (piety), husband and wife 
(modesty), and older and younger brother (obedience) (Silvestre 1889, 124). 
Added to this was ritualized role behavior that was based on rules of conduct, 
which should guarantee the functioning of the role relationships and make 
them visible.  
This family order was also viewed as a prerequisite for the harmonious soci-
ety. Only those who knew how to perpetuate order in family life were suitable 
for a state office. At the same time the order inside of the family was not a 
private but a public affair. Violations of the fundamental value of filial piety, 
for example, were among the ten most serious crimes and punishable by 
death.23 Here it becomes visible how tightly moral and ethical principles were 
linked to law.24 However, law was only part of a comprehensive strategy to 
enforce morality within the entire society. Especially the educated men had to 
set good examples of right conduct, and the Confucian concept of virtue was 
also spread among the illiterate people by memorized poems and stories. The 
patriarch was held responsible for morality and order in his family, and in 
severe cases of misconduct even three generations of a wrongdoer faced execu-
tion. In order to fulfill this collective commitment, the family was equipped 
with great autonomy and substantial rights. The head of the family was al-
lowed to take all major decisions, including the assets, he even had power over 
the lives of his family members as the kin’s judge. Their main obligation was 
the submission to the paternal authority. Specifically violations of this duty 
were severely punished.  
On the whole, the legislation in Vietnam’s villages, families and in the en-
tire country at the time prior to colonization was not designed to protect the 
rights of the individual; it was primarily a system to ensure harmony in family, 
village and society.25 
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France and the Legal Tradition in Vietnam 
Below we deal first with the question of which elements of Vietnam’s tradi-
tional legal system were preserved or altered by the French. In another section, 
we try to determine which new forms of state power and societal organization 
were introduced through law by the colonial regime. Generally speaking, for 
the majority of the Vietnamese population, farmers in villages and family 
groups, colonial rule only changed their legal status slowly and slightly. In 
that perspective, the French rule was characterized by a legal pluralism not 
uncommon in the European overseas empires until their collapse during or as a 
result of World War II.26 By contrast, the Vietnamese elites were ousted. The 
sacred position of Emperor became increasingly undermined, and the power of 
the mandarins was limited by the French administration, or better the manda-
rins were assimilated into the colonial power structure.  
Village and Family Clan during the Colonial Period 
Model for the persistence of the regulations for the mass of Vietnamese were 
those decisions that had been made already in 1864 for Cochinchina27 and for 
Tonkin after 1890.28 Thus, Annamite civil and commercial law was applied 
continuously during the colonial period, insofar as it concerned the relations of 
the Vietnamese among themselves or with other Asians. The French comments 
specified repeatedly the sources of colonial law for non-Europeans in Indochi-
na, especially the Gia Long Code. In contrast not only the French but all Euro-
peans were subject to France’s law; so were the legal relations between them on 
the one hand and the “indigènes” on the other hand. From this principle, there 
were only few exceptions. The “code civile” for example could also be applied 
to cases which concerned “sujets” when French law as “raison écrite” helped to 
overcome the shortcomings of Annamite, traditional law. This was exercised in 
the case of legal innovations unknown to the traditional law, for example in-
surance contracts.29 
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During the colonial period most regulations of striking importance for “in-
digènes” or “sujets” remained effective which were based on the traditions of 
family and municipality law, or on written law, the Gia Long Code in particu-
lar. These included the ancestral cult, marriage, adoption and inheritance law, 
and the provisions relating to that part of assets which were scheduled to 
maintain the ancestral cult. The enormous authority of the family’s patriarch 
was only touched in so far, as that with a Précis of 1883 the “pouvoirs 
publiques” received a general permission to monitor it.30 Primarily, even the 
provisions on land ownership, land and civil registers were left untouched, but 
beginning in Cochinchina in 1871 records were no longer kept in Chinese 
characters, but in French. A risk for the farmers, however, was the legally un-
clear situation of their land ownership. The cadastral was not performed cor-
rectly to colonization, as mentioned above. Property titles were often based on 
privileges or on claims to the communal land. As French citizens increasingly 
acquired land in the context of “mise en valeur” in what now is Vietnam, this 
led to ambiguity, arbitrary interpretation of law, and to considerable conflicts 
between colonial administrations, French colonists and natives.31 
The most important changes in villages and family clans were of a fiscal na-
ture. These reforms were introduced when Paul Doumer reorganized Indochina 
under the aim to make it finance its colonial status itself.32 France had primari-
ly taken over the Empire’s tax system.33 It was based on a poll tax for male 
adults, taxes on land ownership and an obligation to work-called Corvée. This 
system was, as shown above, inefficient because the registers used for this pur-
pose had not been properly maintained since the 17th century. With the De-
cree of 1/2 June 1897 Doumer introduced a new form of taxation in Tonkin, 
which was transferred a year later to Annam. New civil registers and cadasters 
were its fundament.34 Previously unregistered male adults were taxed by 0.40 
piastres per year, registered by 2.5 per year. Two thirds of the Corvée now 
could be replaced by additional tax payments. Real estate tax was also re-
formed by introducing four types of rice fields and six different land classes. To 
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fight tax fraud, a personal tax card was introduced in 1884 in Cochinchina, 
1897 in Tonkin and 1913 in Annam. All male “sujets“were obliged to carry 
their tax cards permanently hence they also served as identity cards: 
“The individual, in the modern sense of the term, appeared in Indochina in the form of 
a taxpayer.”35 
While one should not overestimate individualization on such a basis for the 
rural population, measures like these joined with other colonial transfor-
mations according to the model of “western” lifestyles, especially in the cities 
of Vietnam. Thus, traditional paternalism was called more and more into ques-
tion at least in urban contexts, though the actual thrust of the modernization 
movement in Vietnam became the anti-colonial liberation struggle.36 
The Disempowerment of Vietnamese Elites 
The colonial rule made great use of the strict paternalism in Vietnam, especial-
ly since the French acted hardly less authoritarian than the traditional ruling 
classes. In recognition of the authoritarian structures only few interventions in 
the traditional law system took place during the colonial period. Added to this 
was the experience that the violation of religious feelings and moral values only 
provoked unnecessary problems (Girault 1922, 488). Therefore, for purposive-
rational reasons, it seemed obvious to utilize the traditional authorities to ad-
minister the colony. The debate was mainly on what forms of traditional dom-
ination colonial rule should primarily rely on, and which of its components 
should be developed further to the benefit of the colonial power. Again the 
starting point was experience in Cochinchina. While replacing the old “man-
darinat” by a group of French and French trained officials, the colonial admin-
istration encountered severe problems. These were to be avoided in Annam and 
Tonkin.  
Since 1874 a treaty between France and the Empire of Vietnam regulated 
the status of both as French protectorates. The treaty text itself, however, did 
not include the term protectorate, but the non-binding “protection“. The court 
in Hue stuck to its narrow interpretation to protect the country’s remaining 
sovereignty (Vu 1977, 139). The French Government, however, had in 1880 
laid the groundwork for a future policy in Vietnam. According to the Frey-
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cinet-plan, the political goal was to subject it to the direct sovereignty of 
France. But France was initially hesitant when it came to an early realization of 
this goal by military intervention. This was less due to the military weakness 
of the government in Hue, but rather to two other factors: Firstly, until 1880 
it was still unclear which value France could gain from colonies in Indochina. 
Secondly, France initially was not interested in a further military confrontation 
with China, which also had significant interests in Vietnam. 
French policies in Indochina became clearer after the outbreak of the Fran-
co-Chinese War, and a following series of rebellions in Vietnam. Harmand 
Convention (1883) and Patenôtre Treaty (1884) established three different 
legal statuses for Cochinchina (direct French possession), Tonkin (control by 
French resident) and Annam (relative independent administration).37 Since the 
Patenôtre Treaty in particular France dealt more carefully with the existing 
institutions, and implemented a strategy which was based on the idea of an 
intermediate-term co-operation with the traditional elites in securing its colo-
nial interests. In the long-term Emperors and mandarins were to be ousted.38 
Colonial rule therefore led to a gradual degradation of imperial authority. 
France firstly reduced it through rigid interpretation of the protectorate’s sta-
tus, in a second step the Emperor was also damaged as a sacred symbol. Provi-
sions of the Gia Long Code about imperial privileges were simply ignored, and 
its sanctions were at least mitigated.39 The French were so successful in de-
stroying the power and sacral function of the emperorthat already in 1920s 
that he served as a nation-wide symbol of collaboration, decay and corruption.  
Since the Patenôtre Treaty the mandarins’ position of power was curtailed 
systematically. In Annam the “Resident général” took over all functions that 
had previously been in the hands of the high mandarins: Secret State, Regency 
and Privy Council. Furthermore, he monitored the content of decrees and 
edicts, and controlled public works, finance, army and the various ministries.40 
The competencies of the “Resident supérieur” in Tonkin were even more ex-
tended because he also supervised common people and mandarins, and created 
his own system of indigenous office-holders. Later, under de Lanessan, France 
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partly revised its strict control over the administration, and re-strengthened 
the position of the traditional mandarins in Tonkin. 
Nevertheless, there was no going back to the old order any more, which 
was secured by a deep transformation of the educational system. Classical Con-
fucian thought had been one of the quintessential fundaments of governance in 
countries like Vietnam, because its acquisition by imperial exams was directly 
linked with a career within the imperial mandarinat. The abolition of the tra-
ditional civil service exam, and its replacement by the governmental French 
“école” therefore formed a deep, not only educational incision, which was com-
pleted in the different parts of Vietnam at a different time. In Cochinchina, 
there had been no examinations since the withdrawal of the imperial manda-
rins in 1868; in Tonkin, the exams were abolished in 1906, and in Annam 
1919. The transition from a Vietnamese-Chinese to a European-French educa-
tion system was carried out slowly and in several stages until the 1930s. Espe-
cially in an initial stage France was primarily interested in teaching the French 
language to a limited number of local experts and translators. Educational 
reform grew in importance when France changed its colonial policies from 
“assimilation” to various forms of “association”. Since then the French influ-
ence in education became even more ambivalent.  
Vietnam under the Nguyen Dynasty had been decisively influenced by the 
model of the Qing dynasty and Chinese culture. Vietnamese was a language 
that was rarely written even in the Nom script. With the Latin letters of 
“Quoc Ngu” the French therefore presented a medium for the dissemination of 
the vernacular language, that was for both, the colonial administration and the 
Vietnamese population, on the one hand of great advantage. The Vietnamese 
language transformed from a spoken language to a written one. French officials 
at least could read written Vietnamese without being forced to learn hundreds 
of Chinese characters. On the other hand the proliferation of “Quoc Ngu” 
posed for the colonial power a serious disadvantage as it hampered the success-
ful dissemination of the colonialists’ language. The educational reform even 
promoted the emergence of a “national culture“, in particular a literature in 
Vietnamese.41 Even though France tried to improve its co-operation with the 
mandarins after 1890,42 in total, the French law of education had adverse ef-
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fects. It produced new academic elite, with European knowledge and equipped 
with a new means of communication, Vietnamese as a written language.  
The Creation of the Colonial State and Its Ambivalences 
The starting point for the creation of the colonial state had been military con-
quest and force, but the latter was transformed more and more by non-military 
regulations until the end of the colonial era. Compared to the mother country a 
different law was effective in the French overseas empire, the so-called colonial 
law.43 All possessions, colonies as well as protectorates, were French territories, 
and under the same French state power as was the motherland. As such, all the 
inhabitants of French overseas territories were French nationals. Legally, how-
ever, there were four classifications which determined their legal status. French 
law distinguished between full citizens, called “citoyens”, “étrangers” from 
other European countries, “indigènes” or “sujets”, indigenous persons from the 
respective colonies, and “étrangers assimilés à l’indigènes”, in Indochina for 
example persons from other Asian countries. “Indigènes” or “sujets” had only 
limited legal rights. Only a “citoyen” was under the Code civile and had there-
fore full citizenship, particularly the “droits politiques”, especially active and 
passive suffrage.44 “Citoyens” took part in the French parliamentary elections, 
even if they resided in the colonies. A “sujet”, however, was a citizen in the 
colonies, for whom not the Code civile but his “statut indigène” was effec-
tive.45 If we consider the continuing validity of the local laws for the Vietnam-
ese, this meant a serious discrimination for them. A “sujet” could ascend by 
four stages to “citoyen”; but this status could it be withdrawn again. Amongst 
other things France tried on the creation of the French Union to reform the 
personal law after the Second World War, but it was too late already, as the 
colonial empire disappeared in the following two decades.46 
Metropolitan France knew four sources of law: the Constitution, laws, de-
crees and orders of the head of state ministers, prefects or mayors, decrees and 
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orders served for implementation of laws, and legislation on the basis of special 
authorization. In the colonies the entire legislation of the mother country was 
in force, if not opposed by other regulations (such as provisions of protectorate 
treaties). Once French authority had been implemented, laws from the mother-
land were only effective in the possessions if they were explicitly introduced by 
decree of the governor. This provided the colonial administration with an 
enormous power over its sujets. The latter was even increased by the peculiari-
ties of French administrative law, which guided the proceedings of the “ad-
ministration publique” in France and in its colonial empire. Even today French 
administrative law has a praetorian character as it is not codified, and is based 
on the jurisprudence of the “Conseil d’État”,47 and complex discussions about 
individual decisions. It is more about enabling the proper functioning of the 
administration in its principal activity of serving the public, rather than the 
control of the administration or even the protection of citizen’s rights.48 Par-
ticularly before World War II French administrative law caused considerable 
legal uncertainty that could be even arbitrary in a colonial context.49 
The Colonial Ministry had precedence in the control of protectorates and 
colonies, and it also maintained a “Conseil coloniale” for advice on draft laws 
and decrees. However, the ministries of justice, home, postal, and foreign af-
fairs possessed important competences too. For the entire colonial administra-
tion there was a General Inspectorate and (in 1920) inspections of Health, 
Public Works and information. The administration in the various French pos-
sessions was headed by a governor, whose field of responsibility was defined in 
the older colonies by a statute. In more recent acquisitionsthe governor was 
directly subordinated to the authority of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The 
governor had extensive competences, which included the right to legislate, to 
manage the colonial administration, and to supervise jurisdiction. He could 
communicate diplomatically with neighboring countries. In addition, the 
governor had the supreme command of the French troops and the right of in-
spection. In some colonies, there were also colonial entities, such as the adviso-
ry “Conseil privé”, and a “Conseil général”, or a “Délégation financières” if 
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French from the motherland controlled the colonies’ budget through elected or 
corporative assemblies.  
The administrative organization for the control of Indochina was created in 
1887 with the Union Indochinoise. It consisted originally of the colony 
Cochinchina and the protectorates Annam, Tonkin and the Kingdom of the 
Khmer. In 1893 Laos was incorporated, and in 1900, finally, Guangzhouwan 
in southern China. Union Indochinoise was a culturally and economically very 
inhomogeneous political union. However, the full establishment of an Indo-
chinese state was the work of Paul Doumer.50 Doumer reorganized French 
Indochina as a powerful political-administrative structure with a dual function: 
“to integrate all the Indochinese political structures into the French state-
controlled system and to neutralize the former Vietnamese, Khmer, and Lao 
states, as well as the political structures of the montagnards, and to convert 
them into subordinate apparatuses that could be used to control the colonized 
populations.”51  
The political-administrative structures of the Indochinese Union were de-
signed along the lines of British control in India. The concept of association 
replaced assimilation.52 Union Indochinoise was headed by a “Gouverneur 
général” based in Hanoi,53 but in practice, however, the different parts of the 
Union were controlled by various, rather independent sub-administrations – 
the Governor of Cochinchina, and High Residents in Tonkin, Laos, Annam 
and Cambodia. There was a Governor-General but no General-Government. 
Therefore, the colonial rule was not homogeneous, but marked by deep con-
flicts, such as between the Governor of Cochinchina on the one hand and the 
High Resident in Hanoi on the other. There were also conflicts that involved 
the motherland, as between the Indochinese merchants, French industrialists 
and Catholic missionaries. Perhaps precisely because the administration was 
lacking uniformity there was an enormous presence of French officers in Indo-
china, at least if we compare it with the model-giving British India. The num-
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bers of French made the administration of the Union and its parts a costly 
affair.54 
The direct presence of the French in Vietnam contributed to a substantial 
disempowerment of the traditional ruling elites. We should avoid drawing too 
dark a picture of French Colonial rule in Indochina,55 but we cannot overlook 
how limited France’s attempts were until the 1930s to introduce reforms or 
even political participation. Several reasons can be cited. The French colonial 
administration stood from the beginning in the tradition of supposedly insur-
mountable Indochinese authoritarianism. From this point of view to compro-
mise with the subjects was nothing but weakness in the eyes of the colonial-
ized. The rigidity in which France exercised its power in Indochina was also 
caused by the enormous competences of the administration, which was not 
controlled by the colonial “sujets” but from the distant capital Paris, by the 
French parliament, ministries and the press. Their Indochina policy was not 
consistent, but mirrored complex political conflicts and constellations of inter-
ests that were negotiated by parties and business associations. Aside from these 
specific interests all the French who were involved in governing Vietnam were 
influenced by Orientalism: Political left as well as right idealized the Indochi-
nese societies as traditionalist, immobile and dominated by small-scale social 
structures. Accordingly, the real “mission civilisatrice” of the French in Indo-
china was primarily to preserve its valuable traditions and cultural treasures,56 
and only secondly, if even at all, open it up to a cautious modernization.  
The French Police State 
Modernization mainly was limited to changes in the apparatus for surveillance 
and in penal law. France not only kept the significant authoritarian structures 
in Vietnam unchanged, but preserved them by a modernization of Vietnam’s 
police units. A Garde indigène – in Cochinchina Garde civile – was founded 
and given the task to monitor the villages. Especially to combat the growing 
anti-colonial movement or other types of unrest since the outbreak of World 
War I, courthouses, and prisons were built, and police units were created to 
prevent and combat anti-colonial movements and revolts: the Sûreté générale 
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Indochinoise was established in 1917, the Police spéciale de Sûreté in 1922.57 
In both cases the number of personnel was limited, but infamously effective 
due to the fact that colonial police forces in general were above the law. French 
rule in Vietnam was based on violence; brutality and electric torture during 
interrogations were on the agenda particularly since in the 1930s. During 
rebellions, squad teams traversed the riot areas and carried out summary execu-
tions. Because of colonial racism and the lack of an indigenous tradition of the 
prison sentence until 1954, no prison in Indochina served the concept to reha-
bilitate the inmates.58 Under often terrible conditions political and “normal” 
prisoners were detained in provincial jails, penitentiaries and in total 9 penal 
colonies in Vietnam. Per capita, the rate of the prison population in Indochina 
was significantly higher than in France. Political prisoners were also deported 
to French Guyana. Forced labor, which was forbidden by law theoretically, was 
just as common as corporal punishment; mortality among the prisoners was 
high. In particular, the penal colonies were notorious for bloody revolts and 
violent attempts at liberation. 
Political participation by elected provincial or municipal assemblies existed 
only in Cochinchina and in some major cities. Evidently French “citoyens” 
were overrepresented but even the expression of their political will was increas-
ingly restricted by colonial administration after the turn of the century. At 
least the limited political participation of missionaries, officials, planters and 
businessmen could be compensated by a free press. This was not the case for 
the “indigenous” population of Vietnam: The French press law of 1881 only 
applied in Cochinchina and for publications in French. In December 1898 the 
Gouverneur général introduced by decree pre-censorship for publications in 
Vietnamese and Chinese. The censorship of the press was even tightened in the 
protectorates with the Decree of October 1927: Since then the editors of news-
papers had to obtain a license, make a deposit, and to subject their products to 
pre-censorship. Only periodicals in French and issued by a “citoyen” were ex-
empt from these provisions. Finally, the decree of August 30, 1930 abolished 
the obligation for press products both in Vietnamese and French to be censored 
before publication.59 
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The character of a French police state becomes more obvious if we take a 
closer look at criminal justice. During the conquest, martial law had been 
applied by the French army in Cochinchina. Thereafter, by the decree of July 
1864, two different systems of penal law were established; “citoyens” and “su-
jets” were treated separately. For the former, the “Code pénale” was intro-
duced, for latter the indigenous criminal code, Gia Long, was reinstated. It 
extended – with a few exceptions when sujets” had to appear before the French 
courts – in principle over all “indigènes” and other Asians in the colony.60 The 
validity of indigenous law was abolished again by the decree of March 16, 
1880. Since then, with few exceptions, the “code pénale” was in effect for 
Cochinchina, and French judges also conducted the proceedings of Annamites’ 
and other Asians’ cases according to it. .But some provisions of the criminal 
law of the Empire of Vietnam remained in force. For this, the Code pénale was 
supplemented by certain provisions and became a penal code particularly for 
Cochinchina. Since the 1880s, the entire organization of jurisdiction in the 
extreme south of Vietnam followed the model of the mother country. It estab-
lished a court of appeal at Saigon and in total seven first-instance criminal 
courts in Cochinchina. While this system suffered from staff shortages, it nev-
ertheless improved jurisdiction for the French “sujets”, since many cases now 
were excluded from the traditional moralism and strict punitive approach of 
the Gia Long code. It also had provisions of criminal procedural law. Only 
since then was a due process guaranteed to all defendants in Cochinchina.61 
The reforms in Cochinchina laid the fundament for a growing influence of 
the French criminal law and penal system in all three parts of Vietnam until 
1954. French laws and prisons became the rule for French or other non-Asians 
in Indochina. This influence was slowly extended over the “sujets” and Asian 
nationals from Cochinchina over Tonkin to Annam. Penitentiaries, prisons, 
and juvenile detention centers under the supervision of the French authorities 
were established, where also for political reasons convicted “indigènes” did 
their time. The traditional penal system in Vietnam had known no prison 
sentences, but only lighter and heavier forms of corporal punishment, forced 
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labor, exile and various forms of capital punishment. Therefore imprisonment 
was an innovation in Vietnam.62 
In Tonkin and Annam a tripartite judicial system had been created by an 
agreement from March 15, 1874. Originally cases in which only Europeans 
were involved were treated by the French High Residents, cases which con-
cerned Europeans and Annamites were processed by common French and An-
namite courts, acts which concerned only Vietnamese, only by the mandarins. 
Since that time, the jurisdiction was extended more and more by the French 
authorities.63 
Labor Law  
Thus, different legal areas show that France not only used law in a repressive 
way to defend its power in Indochina. Sometimes it also tried – but at the 
same time always in its own interest – to eliminate internationally indicted 
grievances. This was the case for labor law which was an important issue in all 
European colonies because it was directly linked with the problem whether a 
possession was profitable for the colonial power or not.64 Theoretically in Vi-
etnam a sufficient indigenous workforce was available for its “mise en val-
eur”.65 The general problem in Indochina was rather that those areas that 
should be developed economically for the benefit of the colonial power were 
not congruent with the traditional economic and settlement areas of the Viet-
namese majority population.66 While Kinh were predominantly farmers and 
lived mainly in the Tonkin Delta and on the coast of Annam, the colonial in-
terests targeted rather the development/exploitation of the highlands of Ton-
kin, Cochinchina, Southern Annam and the southern Mekong Delta. The re-
cruitment of workers in these areas faced mainly three difficulties: the work in 
mines and on plantations meant for the Kinh farmers a significant change. 
They were also linked with their farmland or their place of residence for reli-
gious and economic reasons. Only the locals could operate ancestor worship 
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and had access to a share of the common lands.67 The Kinh population had not 
without reason shunned the highlands and the Mekong Delta as settlement 
areas for centuries, because living there was in fact a substantial health risk. 
However, high morbidity and mortality were explained by the presence of evil 
supernatural causes. In fact, both were alarmingly high on the plantations and 
in the mines.68 
All this meant that by the end of the 19th century only people from the ru-
ral underclasses volunteered to work on plantations and in coal mines. The 
recruitment was carried out by private companies, and for those who signed 
contracts with them significant protection by labor law existed. In order to 
prevent social unrest and problems (and to make taking up work for larger 
masses of Vietnamese more attractive), the colonial power passed two decrees 
in March 1910 and in November 1918. Since then labor contracts had to be 
registered with the authorities, the contract duration was set at maximum 
three years, working, living and conditions for returning home had to be de-
termined by the contract. In theory, the colonial authorities had since that 
time the right to control whether the promised conditions had actually been 
complied with or not.69 However, these tentative steps to regulate labor stood 
in conflict with a massive interest of the colonial power – the smooth operation 
of the plantations in particular. Therefore, in colonial Indochina even labor law 
remained penalized. Since 1899 breaching workers had to expect up to five 
days in prison and fines between 1 and 15 francs. These penalties were even 
increased in 1918. Since then absence from the workplace was punished with 
prison terms of between six days and three months, and fines between 16 and 
20 francs.70 Nevertheless, these measures proved inadequate; they protected 
neither the rights of workers, because the colonial administration did not suc-
ceed in actually enforcing its control rights, nor did it really satisfy the inter-
ests of the employers, as the high absence rate did not decrease significantly.71 
Especially after the First World War a practice of recruiting labor spread 
that hardly could be called voluntary: Employment agencies negotiated direct-
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ly with the village councils. They were even bribed for an opportunity the 
recruitment agencies offered to them: to get rid of unwanted or poor commu-
nity members, and send these “en masse” (Montaigut 1929, 40 ff.) to the plan-
tations, and coal mines. Basically, this kind of “voluntary” recruitment hardly 
differed from forced labor. The option to work in the plantations and mining 
areas remained unattractive. Workers, who had been dismissed from the con-
tracts and returned to their homeland, came back in a worse health condition 
and just as poor as before. When the abuses became increasingly evident, the 
French authorities undertook in 1927 a new attempt to ensure by legal 
measures occupational health and safety. This time, however, specific provi-
sions were taken: “Inspection général du travail” was created, and rules for the 
recruitment of workers and their taxation adopted. Especially “pécule” was 
introduced, a system of compulsory saving by means of “Livret du travail“ to 
which equally employees and employers had to contribute.72 Nevertheless, the 
late 1920s saw such severe collective action that further (unsuccessful) reforms 
were introduced by the colonial authorities in 1929, 1930 and 1932.73 
Summing up these decrees, it cannot be denied that the colonial ad-
ministration’s will existed to remedy the social ills and to abolish the de facto 
forced labor. In the 1930s, however, the differences between what the colonial 
administration was willing and able to realize and an emerging labor move-
ment were already so large that the deficiencies created a powerful strike 
movement. It formed an important part of the anti-colonial resistance.74 
Summary 
It is possible to point out that the main character of France’s colonial rule in 
Vietnam and other parts of Indochina was that of a “rule of law“. Since the 
military subjugation of the Indochinese territories and the separation of mili-
tary and civilian administration, the French apparatus had always tried to base 
its decrees, regulations and thus actions on law from the motherland. This 
rather formal interpretation must not obscure our view of how limited this 
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approach was, however, and how deeply it was linked with the deficiencies of 
the constitutional state in France itself, and with the general lack of political 
participation in the French colonial empire. We also have to take into account 
that the societal order prior to colonization was rather influenced by the con-
cept of Confucian morality and not of Roman law.  
Colonies are states in the making. The colonial power abolished an ancient 
law system, that of the Empire of Vietnam and attempted to replace it by the 
French one. The plan was to implement a political-legal system in Vietnam, 
which should meet the standards defined by France (and its interests). The 
main dispute among the colonialists was how long this process should take, 
and whether it was to be guided by the principles of assimilation or associa-
tion. Anyhow, colonization was connected with a significant transformation of 
law, first and foremost the disempowerment and de-privileging of the ancient 
elites, the imperial family and the mandarins. To a far lesser extent the legal 
traditions of the Vietnamese village were severed. France applied a top-down 
approach to change the society of its possession. All intrusions were blatant 
breaches of law as it was understood in the Confucian interpretation: as a moral 
all-encompassing cosmological order. Vietnam therefore lost more than only a 
couple of legal regulations. By the abolishment of its moral-legal tradition it 
was deprived of its idea of a harmonious society, whatever it may have looked 
like in reality.  
France replaced Confucian morality by a contemporary interpretation of the 
constitutional state, which, as mentioned above, was characterized by severe 
deficits and rather arbitrary. Though French rule in Indochina was liberal 
compared with other colonial regimes (in India for example neither the provi-
sions of habeas corpus nor the freedom of the press were contemporarily se-
cured) it was based primarily on military conquest and strict police control. 
France established a police state, which would not have been possible to such 
an extent in the mother country. Like in most other European colonies in gen-
eral, central provisions of the constitutional state were not guaranteed to the 
majority of Vietnam’s population, not in the present-day interpretation of 
“Rechtsstaat” but even not in the contemporary, rather progressive peculiari-
ties of the French “État légale”. Like other colonies the different parts of Indo-
china therefore were subjected to a hybrid legal framework, which in the view 
of the colonizers compromised with their backwardness. In addition, interven-
tions in the originally existing legal-moral order were based on purpose. Colo-
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nies are not only states in the making but they are colonies, areas where the 
freedom of the individual is not always the most important dictum the state is 
acting on.  
Regarding the overall balance of the French État de droit in Vietnam, it 
was mainly an uncompleted attempt at nation-building following the Europe-
an model, and deeply influenced by French global ambitions of power and 
economic interests. This process changed the Vietnamese society greatly, but 
rather in terms of the destruction of an old order than in establishing a new 
legal order. The Confucian unity of morals, ethics, law and order was delegiti-
mized especially at the top of society. Therefore the legal changes regarding 
the sacred position of the Emperor and the educational reforms were of utmost 
importance as the latter led to the gradual replacement of mandarins by new 
elites, which were westernized. Below this level, a colonial vacuum was creat-
ed; the lower social strata were in theory at the colonial administration’s dispo-
sition, though in practice the real impact of French governance was limited. 
The same was true for the substance of change France actually reached by 1954 
in Indochina. France destroyed more than it created, and the main changes 
occurred in areas which were essential for the colonial regime to maintain its 
control over Vietnam: labor and educational law and criminal justice. 
The outcome of the “État légale” in Vietnam, Indochina, and generally in 
the French overseas empire was modest at best, and deeply influenced by a 
legal pluralism which left written and unwritten law, customs, and moral-legal 
provisions of Vietnamese families and villages generally untouched. But the 
consequences for the development after 1954 must be seriously taken into 
consideration – combined with other central elements of historical develop-
ment of rule of law since 1945, 1954, and 1986. Today Vietnam is confronted 
with the question whether to further develop its constitutional state following 
the European or German model of “Rechtsstaat”. Another option of growing 
importance is the modernization of the Confucian tradition which is intensive-
ly debated on an international level today. Perhaps Vietnam like other South 
East and East Asian countries can reach similar success in further developing 
its rule of law by adopting concepts of moral virtue again.75 
                                                     
75 See Bell/Chaibong (2003); Holz/Wegmann (2005). 
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II. Theoretical Reflections 

Separation of Powers in Pre-modern Western Political 
Thought and the Building of the State of Law  
in Vietnam 
Lai Quoc Khanh 
Among the signs of a state of law, there is one that is widely recognized by 
researchers in the world, which is that the power of the government is operated 
according to the principle of separation of powers as an internal control meth-
od to avoid the abuse/manipulation of power. In the organization of governing 
systems in many countries, the separation of powers principle has been applied 
in different ways. The birth of the separation of powers principle and the fact 
that this concept is used widely in the political life of humankind is a proof of 
its value.  
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (amended in 2013)1 
states that the Vietnamese state is a socialist state of law, of the people, by the 
people and for the people. All the power of the state belongs to the people 
based on the alliance between the working class, the peasantry and the intellec-
tuals. State power is united, and at the same time is entrusted to state agencies 
that collaborate with and monitor one another in the implementation of legis-
lative, executive and judicial powers. Thus, technically, the Vietnamese state is 
not constructed based on the separation of powers principle. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be denied that the useful values of the separation of powers principle 
have been applied in organizing and exercising Vietnamese state power, there-
by establishing the principle of “division, collaboration and mutual monitor-
                                                     
1 From now on Constitution of Vietnam. 
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ing amongst state agencies in implementing legislative, executive and judicial 
powers.” This is a new point, a step forward in Vietnamese political and con-
stitutional thinking, which overcomes the old thinking that rigidly regards 
the separation of powers principle as a distinctive feature of Western capitalist-
ruled states. 
In order to understand the values underlying the separation of powers prin-
ciple, and through which to understand more clearly the values of the Viet-
namese constitution (2013) and utilize these values more in the future, we 
started to research the separation of powers principle in pre-modern Western 
political thought by studying three representatives: John Locke, Charles-Louis 
de Secondat de Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
During the Dark Middle Age, the progressive political thoughts that were 
established in the period of Ancient Greece including the separation of powers 
principle associated with the reputation of thinkers such as Solon (c. 638–558 
B.C.), Cleisthenes (c. 570–508 B.C.), Ephialtes (5th century B.C.), Pericles 
(495–429 B.C.), etc., and especially Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), re-emerged and 
developed together with the establishment of the pre-modern mode of capital-
ist production and became ideological guidelines for Western European bour-
geois revolutions. The separation of powers principle has been developed and 
improved by outstanding thinkers namely John Locke, Charles-Louis de Sec-
ondat de Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and has become the theory 
underlying the organization and building of modern states. 
Locke’s Thoughts on the Separation of Powers 
John Locke (1632–1704) is the author of a series of classic works in the history 
of philosophical and political thoughts of humankind such as “An Essay con-
cerning Humane Understanding”, “Two Treatises of Government”, “A Letter 
Concerning Toleration”, “Some Thoughts Concerning Education”, etc. 
If “The First Treatise of Government” was written with the purpose of crit-
icizing the patriarchal perspective on government of authors at the time, then 
the “Second Treatise of Government” is the work by which Locke developed 
his view about the state. In this writing, Locke’s thinking on the separation of 
powers was strongly expressed. Locke claimed that in a republic state there are 
three main types of powers: legislative, executive and federative. In these three 
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types, the legislative power is the first and basic power of every nation state, so 
the legislative body holds supreme power. Locke wrote: “The legislative body 
holds not only the supreme power of a nation community, but also the sacred 
and non-transferable power once the community puts it into that position.”2 
The law is only effective, supreme, and forces all members to follow it once it 
is approved by the legislative body. The “recognition” of the legislative body 
represents the “recognition” of the society. However, originating from the 
popular thoughts at his time, i.e. the thoughts on natural rights and the social 
contract, Locke pointed out that, as an authorized body, the legislative body is 
bound by the following principles:  
- It does not and cannot hold arbitrary power, meaning that its power cannot 
be higher than that of the subject that has granted power to it – the citi-
zens. In other words the “natural rights” that human beings receive when 
joining the community is the supreme power that controls everybody, in-
cluding the legislators. 
- The legislative agency has to act properly according to rules that are “trans-
parent and approved” which reflect human beings’ natural rights. 
- These transparent and approved rules have to protect people’s rights, espe-
cially property rights. 
- The legislative body cannot transfer the power of law-making to anybody 
else because it is power assigned by the citizens. 
However, because laws “can be made in a short period of time, it is unnecessary 
for the legislative agency to be present and to have tasks to perform at all 
times.”3 Simultaneously, to avoid the trend that legislators “monopolize pow-
er” to serve personal purposes, legislative power “has to be assigned to many 
people gathering at the right time (…) Upon finishing that duty, they will 
dismiss and themselves will be subject to the laws that they make.”4 In order 
to satisfy the demand of enforcing the law in the long run, “there must be a 
power that always is present to observe the enforcement of already-made laws 
by means of violence”, so legislative and executive power have to be separated, 
and the executive body has to be present at all times. 
                                                     
2 Locke (2007), 183. 
3 Locke (2007), 199. 
4 Locke (2007), 200 
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Beside legislative and executive powers, there is another power that can be 
considered natural, said Locke, which is federative power. Federative power 
means “the right to war and peace, to form union and alliance, to make other 
agreements, with individuals and communities outside the national communi-
ty.”5 Executive and federative powers have to be distinctive; however they still 
have a close connection because they both “need the force of the society to be 
enforced.”6 
Not only contributing to specifying the factors that constitute state power, 
the distinction between key types of state power as well as the allocation of 
these powers to different official authorities, Locke also thoroughly discussed 
the relationship between the types of power and these agencies. Locke always 
argued that supreme power belongs to the people. At first, this point is true in 
the case of the organization with the supreme power, the legislative body. He 
wrote: “among the people lies a supreme power to terminate or change the 
legislative body, when they realize that the legislative body acts in ways that 
run counter to its assigned missions.”7 This is the “supreme power” of the peo-
ple to “save themselves” when the authorized organization plots and acts in 
ways detrimental to their benefit. Regarding the relationship between the 
legislative and executive bodies, Locked argued that the legislative body holds 
the supreme state power, and other powers, held by any member or group in 
the society, have to originate from it and depend on it.  
Executive and federative powers have to depend on legislative power. Ac-
cording to Locke, executive power cannot be put elsewhere rather than on a 
person that is also a member of the legislative body (the king), and because the 
legislative body assigns the right to implement laws that they make to execu-
tive officials, they still have the power to take it back if they see a reason to do 
so, even to punish any weak operation that contradicts the law. The same prin-
ciple applies to federative power. The right to assemble and perform their ac-
tivities are set by the constitution. They themselves have the power to post-
pone meetings and their own activities. Although dependent, executive power 
is independent in some way and can also influence legislative power. This in-
fluence is manifested through the mechanism of summoning and dissolving 
                                                     
5 Locke (2007), 201. 
6 Locke (2007), 202. 
7 Locke (2007), 203. 
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the legislative body. Locke put the right to summon and dissolve the legisla-
tive body beyond constitutionally stipulated meetings into the hand of the 
legislative body, in situations when there is a need to hold a new election be-
tween two constitutionally stipulated meetings, when emergency cases of the 
society require amendments of existing laws or the issuance of new laws, etc. 
The act of assigning the power to assemble and dissolve the legislative body to 
the executive body is also a form of authorization by citizens. If legislators use 
this power to hinder legitimate activities this is a declaration of war against 
the people, and the people will use their supreme power to take back all the 
state’s power, even by means of violence. The executive body also has another 
power over the legislative agency, which is the power to decide the number of 
representatives of the people in different regions and their privileges of action. 
Privileges of action as well as other rights of the executive body all originate 
from the principle of “Salus populi suprema lex” (the happiness of the people is 
the supreme power), and is very necessary because in reality, there are things 
that the law cannot or should not prescribe, and also due to the inability of the 
legislative body to be always present, as well as the “delay” of legislative activi-
ties in comparison with the rapid pace of social life. In order to prevent the 
privileges of action from doing harm to the people, it is necessary to under-
stand that this is the power assigned by the people to executive officials, and 
therefore the citizens have the right to limit it, and executives cannot have so 
many privileges of action anyhow.  
Therefore, it can be seen that Locke has made immense progress in the 
thinking about the separation of powers. His opinion of the division of power, 
the interdependence of different types of power and state agencies as men-
tioned above is the profoundly practical materialization of simple ideas about 
the separation of powers since the period of ancient Greece. The most special 
point in Locke’s thought on the separation of powers is that he is consistent in 
the idea that the supreme power should always belong to the people, and all 
the methods to govern and operate state apparatuses are to be aimed at guaran-
teeing the people’s benefit. However, it is obvious that Locke faced a difficulty 
in answering a practical question that he himself created: Who will judge 
whether an authorized power is used properly? His answer is that the people 
cannot find a secular judge and thus they have to “pray to heaven”. This opin-
ion expresses the incompleteness of Locke’s thought on the separation of pow-
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ers as he did not give enough attention to judicial power and “secular” judicial 
organizations. 
Montesquieu‘s Thoughts on the Separation of Powers  
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu (1689–1755) wrote a number of works in-
cluding the three most popular ones namely “Persian Letters”, “Considerations 
on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline” and “The 
Spirit of the Laws”. The writing that made him one of the most preeminent 
political thinkers of humankind – “The Spirit of the Laws” – was published in 
1784, after 20 years of diligent research as its author admitted. Setting up the 
research topic as “the spirit of the laws”, Montesquieu proposed an opinion 
that the existence of the law is indispensable and universal:  
“The law, in the broadest meaning, is indispensable relationships that are inherent in 
the nature of things or events. According to this meaning, everything has its own 
laws.”8  
Therefore, humankind has its own laws. He argued that, humankind has two 
main kinds of law, political and civil. “In a society, in order to maintain disci-
pline, it is necessary to point out the relationship between the administrator 
and the administered. That is political law. The regulation of relationships 
between citizens is civil law.”9 Political and civil laws, according to Montes-
quieu, are the particular application of “human reasoning” in specific cases. 
Political laws create a governing system, and civil laws help maintaining it. 
Nevertheless, the reason for the existence of both political and civil laws is to 
guarantee people’s political freedom. Montesquieu wrote:  
“Political freedom (…) only exists if there is no abuse of power. However, the experi-
ence of all times point out that, those who are granted power tend to abuse that power 
and seek to maximize that power for their own use (…) In order to avoid this behavior, 
a natural necessity is that power has to be controlled by power. One government like 
that can be established if no one is forced to do things that the law does not oblige him 
to do, and no one is prevented from doing things that the law permits”10  
                                                     
8 Montesquieu (1996), 39. 
9 Montesquieu (1996), 44. 
10 Montesquieu (1996), 75. 
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This is a really important quote from Montesquieu because it shows that he is 
more progressive than Locke and preceding thinkers on the separation of pow-
ers. It was not until Montesquieu’s opinion that the core of the separation of 
powers principle, i.e. “power has to be hindered by power,” was established. 
Before him, the main focus was just on the allocation of political power to 
different state organizations and the relationship between the powers and these 
organizations, without showing the nature of that relationship. 
Discussing the types of state power, Montesquieu stated that in each nation 
there are three types of power: “Legislative power, executive power to imple-
ment rules that are compatible with international laws and executive power to 
implement civil law.”11 He explained further that the second type is “national 
executive power” and the third one is “judicial power”.12 It can be seen that 
Montesquieu clearly defined the division of political power into three types 
that are legislative power, executive power and judicial power. This is one of 
his contributions.  
Montesquieu affirms clearly that the three types of power above have to be 
assigned to different governing organizations of the state. It is because:  
“When legislative and executive powers are both assigned to one person or one Senate, 
there is no such thing as freedom; because there is a danger that the person himself or 
the Senate itself issues authoritarian laws to implement in an authoritarian way. There 
is no such thing as freedom if judicial power is not separated from legislative and exec-
utive powers. If judicial and legislative powers join together, the holder of these pow-
ers will dictate the right to live and freedom of the citizens; the judge will issue laws. 
If judicial power and executive power join together, the judge will have the power of a 
suppressor. If one person or an organization of officials or of aristocrats, or of the people 
holds all the above powers, then everything will vanish.”13  
Montesquieu took the examples of European, Turkish and Italian politics to 
justify the above opinion. His general comment after comparing those regimes 
was: If the three types of power join together, this will lead to autocracy. 
Regarding judicial power, Montesquieu stated that it should not be as-
signed to a permanent senate, “but it should be assigned to the people elected 
by the citizens each time in a year, prescribed by laws, who set up a court and 
                                                     
11 Montesquieu (1996), 100. 
12 Montesquieu (1996), 100. 
13 Montesquieu (1996), 100–101. 
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work as long as required.”14 In this way, the judges have the same position as 
the accused, so the accused will not think that he is in the hands of those that 
are able and willing to do harm to him. The purpose of the above mechanism 
is to reduce the permanent fear of the people towards judging power. Thus, 
Montesquieu held that judging power should not be assigned to an organiza-
tion or a fixed position, but a judging “mechanism” should be created. Addi-
tionally, when the accused have a dispute with the law, they have to be able to 
choose their judges, or to decline the assigned judges. However, to avoid an-
other extreme as well as to avoid rendering the people helpless before judging 
mechanisms, Montesquieu thought that the court should not be fixed, but 
sentences should be recorded, and laws should contain only particular articles 
(legal precedents). 
About legislative and executive powers, Montesquieu argued that it is pos-
sible to “assign these types of power to permanent organizations and officials, 
because these powers should not be given to an individual. Legislative power 
expresses the collective will of a nation and executive power exercises that col-
lective will.”15 
With the idea of a free state as a state where citizens control themselves, 
Montesquieu stated that the people “must have legislative power” and imple-
menti this power by “assigning to the representatives all the tasks that indi-
viduals cannot do by themselves.”16 This idea shows that Montesquieu already 
paid attention to the techniques of legislative work rather than only discussing 
abstract democratic notions. He considered that the people are the supreme 
holder of power, but within political work, not every task can be done by eve-
ryone. According to Montesquieu, the people’s representatives have to be elect-
ed by regions, not the whole country. The function of the legislative body is 
not solving particular problems, but “creating laws, and considering how these 
laws are implemented.”17 As to the structure of the legislative body, Montes-
quieu proposed a model with two sections: one includes representatives of 
aristocrats (Senate) and the other consists of people’s representatives (House). 
                                                     
14 Montesquieu (1996), 102. 
15 Montesquieu (1996), 102–103. 
16 Montesquieu (1996), 104. 
17 Montesquieu (1996), 105. 
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In order for the senate not to fall into the habit of focusing on their own inter-
ests without considering the people’s will, he thought that there should be a 
supreme law stating that the senate should only have the function of prevent-
ing, not the function of making rules and regulations. According to Montes-
quieu, executive power should be assigned to a king, because executive power 
always requires immediate actions which should be conducted by one person 
rather than many. 
Highlighting the importance of the separation of powers, Montesquieu op-
posed the idea that executive power should belong to some members or the 
whole parliament. He also agreed with Locke that the executive body should 
have the right to summon or set the date and time of parliamentary meetings. 
Moreover, the executive body also has the right to prevent the legislative 
body’s plans, in order to reduce the risk that the legislative body becomes au-
tocratic. Obviously, the executive body has limited power, which means it can 
only solve temporary issues and cannot be involved in legislative work, “cannot 
argue about works”, “cannot propose petitions”. The legislative body, although 
it does not hold the power of preventing executive power and judging execu-
tive officials, has the right to “consider how established laws have been imple-
mented”, which, in modern parlance, means it has supervisory power. Judicial 
power should not combine with any part of legislative power, but with three 
exceptions:  
- Aristocrats are judged by a legislative body including aristocrats only, be-
cause “big men are often objects of envy”. 
- Laws are mechanical, sometimes even blind and severe; therefore the aristo-
crats in the legislative body should use their power, for the laws’ benefit, to 
reduce the harshness when issuing a sentence. 
- In order to prevent aristocrats from covering for each other, the people’s 
legislative body has the right to report to the aristocrats in the legislative 
body.  
State power is associated with violent instruments, thus in order to protect the 
people from being repressed, Montesquieu proposed that the army had to be 
close to the people and dependent on the executive body, not the legislative 
one. 
Thus, after examining some basic opinions of Montesquieu about organiza-
tional forms and operational methods of state apparatuses, we can say that he 
made a great contribution to the establishment of the separation of powers 
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principle. Montesquieu’s thoughts on the separation of powers not only inher-
ited but also developed previously incomplete ideas about the separation of 
powers. Furthermore, because he focused on summarizing practical experience 
and at the same time was influenced by experimental methods, Montesquieu’s 
thoughts on the separation of powers are profoundly practical and have great 
potential to be applied.  
Rousseau’s Thoughts on the Separation of Powers  
The writing that expresses Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712–1778) distinctive 
thoughts on the separation of powers and other political ideas is “The Social 
Contract, or Principles of Political Right”, published in 1762. “The Social 
Contract” serves the purpose of “looking in the civil order to see whether there 
is any strong, reasonable rule that can treat human beings as human beings”, 
and “whether there is any law that matches its true nature”.  
Rousseau wanted to use his work to “connect what the law allows to which 
interests that should be promoted, which prevents justice and interests from 
being separated.”18 In order to do this, Rousseau divided his book into four 
parts (four books), in which part 1 discussed the transition of human society 
from natural status to civil status, about common will, and about the estab-
lishment of “social conventions”; part 2 mainly discussed legislative issues; 
part 3 focused on executive issues and part 4 discussed judicial issues and other 
guarantees of democracy.It is essential to pay attention to the core argument in 
part 1 of Rousseau’s book:  
“No one naturally has power on others. And strength alone does not create power; 
therefore only conventions can be the base for all reasonable power between people.”19  
The establishment of conventions marks the transition of humankind from 
natural to civil status. With conventions, people lose the natural freedom and 
the limited rights to do what they want; but on the other hand people regain 
civil liberty and the right to own things that they have. With this transition, 
people give up the freedom that is limited by the individual’s ability in ex-
change for much more freedom defined by the community’s common will. 
                                                     
18 Rousseau (1992), 28. 
19 Rousseau (1992), 35. 
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When all members of society join the conventions, common will and public 
power are established. The state is the manifestation of that common will and 
power.  
Public power is formed because the people join the conventions, thus the 
people are the holders of public power and public power cannot be divided 
either mechanically or casually like magic tricks. The people’s common will 
also needs to be guaranteed; and when a common will is the true common will, 
then it is always good.20 Rousseau wrote: “If the people are informed properly, 
when they discuss problems, although there is no private interaction, or they 
have many minor differences in their opinions, the discussion still leads to the 
common will, the result is always good.” He argued that all the plots of private 
individuals to turn private will into common will, even if that was able to 
cover everything, in reality still destroy the common will. However, only con-
ventions and common will are not enough. Rousseau thought that:  
“With social conventions, we make the political body exist and give it a life. We have 
to use the legislative activity to give the political body movement and will.”21 
But what are laws? According to Rousseau, laws are regulations of the com-
mon will and the citizens who follow laws have to be the ones who make the 
laws. That is the common principle, but in order to have harmony between the 
common and the private, between the body and the parts, there is a need for 
lawmakers. The law is the manifestation of the common will, so “legislation is 
the pinnacle of the perfection that collective strength can achieve”, and legisla-
tors, in all aspects, have to be “the outstanding persons in the country.”22 
Rousseau discussed the characteristics of lawmakers among which knowledge 
is of great importance, and the knowledge of lawmakers has to be outstanding, 
“to see clearly people’s desires without giving preference to a certain desire.”23 
Rousseau also indicated that the purpose of the legal system is freedom and 
equality. He also distinguished four types of law,; “political law” that governs 
the relationship between the common and the private, “civil law” that governs 
the relationship among individuals, “criminal law” that governs the relation-
ship between the citizens and the law, and “customary law” or “people’s opin-
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ions” that are not engraved on rocks or bronze but in people’s minds, and 
which creates the nation’s true constitution. 
In part 2 Rousseau discusses the government or the executive body. If the 
legislative body is the highest organ of state power, then the government, 
according to Rousseau, is the intermediary body between the people and that 
highest organ. The legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to 
it alone, while the executive power cannot belong to the generality. Members 
of the executive body cannot be involved in legislation. The function of the 
executive body is to implement tasks assigned by the legislative body, and the 
legislative body is able to take back, edit, and limit the power of the executive 
body. The existence of the executive body is essential, because if the legislative 
agency wants to perform an executive function, or the people do not follow the 
law (because there is no executive authority and the legislative body does not 
have an executive function), the country will be in chaos. Rousseau argued that 
there are three forms of government,  
- democratic (the legislative body assigns the duty of managing the govern-
ment to the people or the majority of people),  
- aristocratic (the government is controlled by a small group), and  
- monarchical (there is only one supreme judge).  
There is also the mixedtype of government. Each form of government suits a 
specific type of nation. There is no absolutely good form or government. A 
good government is the government that educates the population, and vice 
versa. In order to prevent the government from seizing absolute power, the 
officials are only civil servants. The people are able to promote or dismiss 
them, and they have no choice but to follow. The people implement the above 
power through the people’s conference (or congress).  
Regarding the judicial body, Rousseau thought that this is a special organi-
zation which is not part of any other section; it “puts each section in the right 
position, serves as the connection and intermediary factor between the gov-
ernment and the people, or between the government and the highest organ of 
state power, or between all those three parties when necessary.”24 It is “the 
most sacred organization” and most highly appreciated because it protects the 
law. The function of the judicial court is to announce public opinion, not to 
judge public opinion. “If the court deviates from that function, all of its deci-
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sions will become absurd and will have no effect.”25 The judicial body has to be 
separated from other organs of state power. “The judicial body will exceed its 
authority once it takes possession of executive power, which it is supposed to 
monitor. The judicial body also misuses its power if it issues laws, which it 
supposes to protect.”26 In order to prevent the judicial body from being cor-
rupted, there is a need to determine a proper duration for it. This duration 
should not be too long so that the abuse of judicial power cannot take shape. 
With the above opinions, Rousseau made distinctive contributions to the 
thoughts on the separation of powers. While Locke focused on the sovereignty 
of the people without discussing enough about the structure or the state sys-
tem based on the spirit of separation of powers, and Montesquieu discussed in 
depth the structure of the state system without really focusing on the matter 
that the supreme holder of power is the people; Rousseau broke through both 
of the above limits by interpreting strength, right, power, conventions, and 
the manifestation of the position of the people as the holder of power in the 
structure of separation of powers. Rousseau’s thinking on the separation of 
powers is profoundly dialectical. He himself did make the separation of powers 
concept a comprehensive theory. 
Conclusion 
It can be seen that the thoughts on the separation of powers of John Locke, 
Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau – three 
outstanding representatives of modern Western political thinkers – contain 
many profound values. Pervading all their thoughts is a noble goal: to protect 
human rights, to protect the supreme sovereignty of the people. That goal is 
manifested differently in the works of each of these thinkers, in rules to organ-
ize the state system and principles to operate state power. In this aspect, the 
common spirit that emerges – which is also a value that needs to be researched 
and applied – is to guarantee that the state system and state power are truly 
the people’s tools to prevent the abuse of state power, or to prevent one part of 
state power from gaining the ability to control and govern other powers unrea-
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sonably. All of those do harm to the people and prevent them from being the 
supreme holder of all power in the society. It is evident that this is the opinion 
of using power to control power – the principle to internally control state 
power. Obviously, there are historical limits in these thinkers’ opinions, and 
especially if we approach from the standpoint of Marxist politics, the inability 
to realize relations of interests, especially class interests, a key form of interest 
that plays a basic role in all political relationships, the substantiality and feasi-
bility of the separation of powers principle is lacking a solid base, both in theo-
retical and practical terms. 
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Rousseau’s Thoughts on the Division and Control  
of State Power. A Comparison with Montesquieu’s 
Model 
Nguyen Thi Chau Loan 
Rousseau’s thoughts on the methods to organize, divide and control state pow-
er are not only the core of his conception of the state of law but also an indis-
pensable part of Rousseau’s political philosophy. This paper focuses on analyz-
ing methods to organize and divide different types of state power such as legis-
lative, executive and judicial powers based on Rousseau’s state of law model 
which aims at the effective implementation of the common will, supreme sov-
ereignty and social contract of the people in order to guarantee human beings’ 
natural rights. In particular this paper interprets the similarities and differ-
ences between two models to control and divide power: Rousseau’s model and 
Montesquieu’s separation of powers model to avoid and prevent the threat of 
misusing state power. I argue that Rousseau’s thoughts have more potential to 
be applied in establishing the state of law of the people, by the people and for 
the people in Vietnam today. 
According to Rousseau, supreme power is united and cannot be split. How-
ever, in order for supreme power to be implemented effectively and coherently, 
it has to be distributed via its three indispensable constituents. They are legis-
lative, executive and judicial powers. 
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Methods to Organize and Divide State Power 
Legislative Power 
According to Rousseau, legislative power is the basic part of supreme power. 
Indeed, legislative power is the ability to compose, approve and issue laws and 
codes based on social contracts which reflect the common will of all citizens. 
The question is: Who will be the legislators in a nation? Who will compose 
and create common codes relevant to everyone? 
First of all, according to Rousseau, neither the masses nor individuals are 
able to be legislators with the ability to compose, approve and issue laws. The 
masses always have desires, but they cannot realize these desires all the time. 
On the contrary, even if individuals realize these benefits in principle, they 
tend to deny them. Rousseau thought that, in all relationships, the legislators 
in a nation are outstanding persons. 
Secondly, in the fields of legislation and laws, there are numerous abstract 
thoughts which are unable to be explained in ordinary language to ordinary 
people; especially there are issues which are too general and surpass “the level 
of knowledge of ordinary people who are only interested in issues relating to 
their own immediate benefits and have difficulty in realizing benefits that the 
right rules bring about by revoking their personal rights.”1 Therefore, the 
language of legislators, according to Rousseau, is not the ordinary language 
that can be understood by normal people.2 
Legislators have a “supreme” and special position and hold a kind of power 
which is different from normal power. By answering the question “Who is the 
legislator in the nation?” Rousseau concluded: “Legislators, in all aspects are 
outstanding persons in the nation; because of not only their innate talent but 
also the way their talent is used.”3 
Duty and means of legislators: Legislators have to perform duties that ex-
ceed the ability of an ordinary human being. Meanwhile, legislators have no 
necessary power to accomplish that task, because legislative power only be-
longs to the people. The only means that legislators can use is persuasion.4 
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The legislative body: The legislative body is the supreme organ of state 
power which performs its mission and exercises its authority through laws. 
Rousseau wrote: “the supreme organ of state power has no power but legisla-
tive power so it only operated by laws. Laws are the proper behavior of com-
mon will; so supreme power can have an impact only when citizens gather.”5 
He said that there should be regular and extraordinary meetings. The best 
choice is meetings that include all of the people to determine the common will 
and desires of each nation. Rousseau also raised another method, which is to 
“let the government set up headquarters at one city after another and respec-
tively reunite the citizens to study around that city.”6 However, we think that 
this ideal choice and similar methods in reality are infeasible and create diffi-
culty for the legislative body. Nevertheless, this thought of Rousseau laid the 
basis for the idea of direct democracy already. 
According to Rousseau, the duty of the legislative body is to issue a consti-
tution and a legal system and codes for the nation. The legislative body will 
propose the establishment of a government to implement executive function. 
He thought that because legislative power only belongs to the people, the 
people themselves have the right to solve problems about the form of govern-
ment. At the same time, the legislative body has the duty to propose methods 
to select judges, and court officials for judicial organizations. Therefore, Rous-
seau put legislative power in the highest position which controls other types of 
power, because legislative power is the most direct expression of people’s will – 
the supreme power. People’s sovereignty is expressed through people’s legisla-
tive power. In his dialogue with Montesquieu, Rousseau stated thatpolitical 
freedom only emerges in a country where the people have direct legislative 
power. He said that freedom is expressed in the way the citizens are protected 
by laws and can approve and issue laws on their own. He wrote:  
“All laws that are not directly approved by the people are valueless and cannot be 
called laws.”7  
Engaging in politics is not only the citizens’ right but the citizen’s obligation. 
Legislative authority has the responsibility to reflect people’s common will, 
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and not the personal opinions of parliament members or of the people’s repre-
sentatives. 
Executive Power 
Rousseau defined executive power as:  
“The true name of executive power according to law is government or the supreme 
governing body. The person or organization that is assigned that governing duty is 
called head of state or the supreme judge.”8  
Rousseau distinguished clearly between legislative and executive powers. 
While legislative power belongs and only belongs to the people, executive 
power cannot belong to the common folk like legislative power or supreme 
power:  
“Executive power only relates to particular clauses, does not belong to the authority of 
basic law or the highest organ of state power; and all of its conducts have to be laws.”9 
Rousseau defined and analyzed the government as the executive body. He 
thought that “the government is an intermediary mechanism between citizens 
and the highest organ of state power in order for two parties to be correlative, 
to implement laws, to maintain civil as well as political freedom. Members of 
this structure are called supreme judges or kings which mean governors. This 
whole intermediary body is named government”.10 Therefore, the government 
plays an intermediary role; it functions as a medium between the highest organ 
of state power and the citizens; it can be defined as the tool of people’s legisla-
tive and supreme power. Rousseau analyzed the triangle of the relationship 
between three levels, between the highest organ of state power, the govern-
ment and the people and stated that the relationship is not created by accident 
but is rather the indispensable outcome of the nature of the political body. 
Each part of that triangle has its own function. The function of the highest 
organ of state power, the legislative body, is to legislate and enact laws. The 
function of the government is to execute the law and govern directly. The 
function of the people or citizens is to follow the law. Those functions are de-
fined clearly. The unclear definition or improper implementation of functions 
runs the risks of autocracy or anarchy. Rousseau wrote:  
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“If the highest organ of state power (that naturally performs the legislative function) 
wants to govern directly; or the supreme judge (that naturally performs the executive 
function) wants to issue laws; or citizens do not want to follow, the state will be in 
chaos immediately; strength and will do not interact harmoniously; the nation will be 
in the situations of either autocracy or anarchy.”11 
Rousseau anticipated and warned about the possibility of conflict between 
parts of that triangle of relationship. The strongest will of the government has 
to be the common will and has to be the law, the foundation of the govern-
ment’s public strength. However, if the government acts autocratically with its 
own will which is stronger than the will of the highest organ of state power by 
using the force it controls, there will be a huge threat: at that moment, in a 
nation there are “two highest organs of state power, one in law and one in real-
ity”.12 The result is that “social union will collapse, the political body will 
die.”13 
In case of conflict between executive and legislative bodies, Rousseau’s so-
lution is “to be always prepared to sacrifice the government for the people, not 
to sacrifice the people for the government.”14 The executive body is established 
on the basis of law, not contract. The government established by the legislative 
body has the duty to follow and implement laws. The people assigned with 
executive power are not owners of the people but servants. The people and the 
highest organ of state power are able to promote or dismiss them. The legisla-
tive or the highest organ of state power can issue, edit government election law 
as well as change the executive system at any time.15 However, Rousseau 
warned that each time the form of the government is changed, there will be 
dangers and it should only be changed once it cannot be harmonious with 
common benefit. He emphasized the relative freedom of the government as the 
executive body in comparison with the legislative body.  
“Although the government is established for a specific purpose, it still has a certain 
independence, depending on its establishment method.”16  
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The principles for constructing and classifying types of government: One of 
the most basic principles in establishing government structure proposed by 
Rousseau is: “The more officials, the weaker the government”. Interpreting 
this principle, he analyzed three different kinds of will in an official’s mind:  
“The first one is his personal will aiming for his own benefits. The second one is all 
officials’ will relating to the government’s success: it can be considered to be the col-
lective will of the government as well as the private will of one section (the govern-
ment) in the whole nation. The third one is the nation’s will or supreme will which is 
the common will of a nation as a whole and of the government as a part.”17 
However, according to Rousseau, in arranging the order of priority of those 
three kinds of will, there is a difference between natural order and the demand 
of social order. According to natural order, “each government official first of all 
is himself, then an official and finally a citizen.”18 In other words, according to 
natural order, each official normally prioritizes personal will, then govern-
ment’s will and lastly common will. It is vice versa in the case of social order. 
In the best legislative regime, personal will has to be zero; collective will of the 
government has to depend strongly on the supreme common will as the stand-
ard for all other types of will. Therefore, if the government is controlled by one 
person, personal and government’s will are totally identical and of a very high 
intensity, thus the most active government according to Rousseau is that of 
one person.  
Rousseau affirmed the necessity of forming a compact government, mostly 
in the case of a big country in order for the number of supreme officials to be 
inversely proportional to the number of the population. “The ratio between 
officials and government has to be inversely proportional to the ratio between 
citizens and the highest organ of state power, so the bigger the nation, the 
stricter and more compact the government, or the more the people, the less the 
governors.’’ 
Judicial Power 
Judicial power is the power to judge based on law in order to punish and pre-
vent illegal behaviors, protect the laws and the legislative power. The judicial 
body is a special, independent body that “does not involve in the work of any 
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other body”, and has the duty to implement judicial power, and protect peo-
ple’s common will. According to Rousseau, the judicial body  
“puts each section into its right position, serves as the connection and intermediary 
factor between the government and the people or between the government and the 
highest organ of state power, or between all those three parties when necessary.”19 
The function of the judicial body is to protect the law and the legislative pow-
er. There are times when the judicial body protects supreme power – the legis-
lative body in the relationship with the government, there are other times 
when it protects the government in the relationship with the people, but it can 
also maintain the balance among the above parties.20 According to Rousseau, 
the judicial body  
“must not have even a little bit of legislative or executive power. But because of this, 
the judicial body has the highest power because it does nothing but can prevent every-
thing. It is the holiest and most highly appreciated organization because it protects the 
law” and “law is issued by the highest organ of state power and approved by the gov-
ernment.”21  
An independent, cleverly harmonized judicial body will be a strong basis for a 
healthy political body. This is the basic principle of a state of law, which has 
important suggestive value to the structuring of a state of law in Vietnam in 
general and to the judicial reform in Vietnam at the moment. Rousseau also 
distinguished clearly between judicial, legislative and executive functions. He 
also mentioned the ability of the judicial body to abuse power and its immeas-
urable consequence.  
“The judicial body will abuse power once it controls executive power which it is sup-
posed to monitor. The judicial body will also misuse power if it issues laws which it is 
supposed to protect.”22  
In order to avoid the usurpation by the judicial body, according to Rousseau, 
the only way is to prevent it from holding a permanent position and its dura-
tion has to be fixed by law. The duration should be enough, not too long for 
the abuse of power to take shape. This method is effective because a new judi-
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cial official elected based on law has to work based on law, not on his prece-
dents. 
When discussing the judicial body’s function, Rousseau argued thatlaws 
manifest the people’s common will, and judicial official positions express pub-
lic judgment. Public opinions are a kind of law that the judicial body has to 
follow. He thought that a judicial court is not the one judging public opinion, 
but in reality is the one manifesting public opinion. If a court deviates from 
that function, all of its judgement will be partial and will have no effect. The 
ability of judicial officials is expressed in the ability to anticipate and control 
public opinion: “Who can anticipate public opinion can anticipate honor. Who 
can anticipate honor can control the rule of public opinion.”23 Additionally, 
judicial officials have to maintain tradition and prevent public opinion from 
corrupting, maintain straightforwardness and uprightness by smart methods. 
Even when necessary, they guide public opinion if it is not appropriate. 
One of the most important things that Rousseau wanted to emphasize in 
his political philosophy is the indispensability of distinguishing clearly be-
tween different types of political powers in a nation: legislative, executive and 
judicial powers. The consideration of these types of power is an important part 
of his political thought to which he paid particular attention. 
The Differentiation and Control of State Power 
The Similarities and Differences between Rousseau’s and Montesquieu’s Opin-
ions about Power Separation 
Rousseau’s and Montesquieu’s political philosophy theories had a profound 
impact on the development of modern states especially through the works 
“Social Contracts” and “The Spirit of the Laws”. These theories later strongly 
influenced different models of the state of law that are opposed to one another. 
The comparison of the similarities and differences of these two power separa-
tion models is necessary and has suggestive values to the structuring of the 
state of law in Vietnam at the moment.  
We can see the basic similarities between Rousseau’s theory about supreme 
sovereignty or people’s sovereignty and Montesquieu’s theory about the bal-
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ance among different types of power. These two thinkers have similar views 
about the nature of state power: that the state is obliged to guarantee citizens’ 
political freedom by differentiating types of constitutional power such as the 
legislative, executive and judicial. At the same time, we can also perceive dif-
ferences between Rousseau and Montesquieu especially relating to how these 
legislative, executive and judicial components of power should be separated. 
First of all, Rousseau’s and Montesquieu’s political philosophy derive from 
very different philosophical and anthropological traditions. The fundament of 
Rousseau’s political philosophy is the strong belief in the righteousness of the 
people’s common will; the people’s voice is “the voice of the God” on earth. If 
the people’s voice is regularly heard and disseminated more directly and freely, 
and if governors and citizens follow it, then the state is structured well, and 
political freedom is secured.. In contrast, due to his skeptical view of human 
nature, Montesquieu’s political philosophy is designed to control the repre-
sentatives of power, the ones who are considered to have the tendency to mis-
use it and thereby limit citizens’ freedom.24 
Secondly, Rousseau and Montesquieu built on different principles in divid-
ing supreme power. According to Rousseau, all of the supreme power in a state 
belongs to the people; the people implement their power directly or indirectly 
through their “public servants”; people’s sovereignty is associated with legisla-
tive power and the legislative body; this body’s power is directly limited by 
certain rules that have to be followed. According to Montesquieu, there is no 
part in a state that is associated with supreme sovereignty and power like that, 
but there are some parts assigned with different functions of supreme power, so 
as to ensure that no part or body can have limitless power, and the power of 
each part (each body) is the restraining, limiting and controlling factor of the 
power of other parts (bodies). Montesquieu wrote:  
“A governing authority that implements laws and at the same time considers itself to 
be the legislator can destroy the nation by their wrong assumption of the common 
will. And if they hold the judging power, they can crush each citizen at will.”25  
While Rousseau, believing in the people’s common will, stated that guarantee-
ing the people’s unlimited power in the state means guaranteeing the suprem-
acy of the codes that are fair and stable, Montesquieu considered unlimited 
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power, no matter to whom it belongs , always has the potential to create unac-
ceptable evil even in a well-ordered state. The advantage of state organization, 
according to Montesquieu, does not depend on who the power belongs to, but 
on the practicalities of the conditions controlling and limiting that power. 
However, both Montesquieu and Rousseau distinguished between legislative 
and executive powers and assigned those types of power to different sections  
or bodies.26 
Thirdly, Rousseau and Montesquieu have different opinions on the position 
of legislative and executive powers. Considering the absolute supremacy of the 
people’s common will to be the origin of codes, Rousseau held that the legisla-
tive power that belongs to the people and is associated with the parliament or 
congress is the supreme power. He thought that executive power associated 
with the government only has the function to depend on or follow legislative 
power. The implementation of that function, he said, is assigned to organiza-
tions based on laws established by the people’s sovereignty. These organiza-
tions acquire their authority from the people’s sovereignty and implement it 
under the supervision of this sovereignty. In contrast, Montesquieu stated that 
supreme power is expressed not only in legislative power but also in executive 
power, that both legislative and executive powers are equal. He thought that 
legislative and executive powers are implemented freely and independently of 
each other. Legislative and executive powers control as well as limit each other 
by their authority. With Montesquieu, executive power associated with the 
government does not have the function to depend on or follow legislative pow-
er which is discharged by the legislative body.27 
Fourthly, Montesquieu and Rousseau have different ideas about the para-
digm of the nature and the organization of legislative and executive power and 
their relationship. In Rousseau’s state model, executive power is assigned to 
executive agencies, subordinates are selected by the people from their repre-
sentatives for a certain duration; these executive organizations, whether they 
are rulers, or a minority of aristocrats, or the democratic majority in any form, 
in reality, are just considered people’s public servants who exercise their power 
based on people’s desires. These organizations have to follow the people’s 
common will and implement their authority as long as they still follow the 
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people’s will. As to the people themselves, they can change governors and even 
the mode of governance if governors do not follow people’s common will. In 
Montesquieu’s state model, supreme executive power is discharged by an inde-
pendent organization that is more than only an executive agency of the su-
preme legislative. In a constitutional monarchy for example, monarchs do not 
receive their authority from a legislative assembly but govern as an independ-
ent constitutional body. While Rousseau acknowledged that a government is 
only legal if it is is selected by the people through their parliamentary repre-
sentatives, Montesquieu stated that the selection of executive officials from 
legislators (parliament) violates the basic requirement of state structure which 
requires power separation in order to guarantee citizens’ political freedom. If 
executive and legislative powers unite, they are not separated, which therefore 
threatens citizens’ political freedom.28 Thus, in Montesquieu state model, the 
people who join the government and implement executive power are not al-
lowed to be parliament members. 
Fifthly, Montesquieu and Rousseau have different concepts of power con-
trol. According to Rousseau, legislative power does not need to be controlled; 
it cannot endanger political freedom because as the manifestation of common 
will that judges things based on common benefit, the legislative power always 
guarantees fairness. According to Rousseau, threats to political freedom come 
mostly from executive power. Its representatives tend to misuse power for their 
personal benefit and can do harm to common benefit. Therefore, it is essential 
to restrict executive power by a series of regulations to ensure its compliance 
with the law. 
According to Montesquieu, any types of powers, even legislative and execu-
tive powers, can pose a threat to political freedom, thus it is essential to restrict 
both types of power. He thought that basically the executive power is restrict-
ed while legislative power is left uncontrolled, thus the latter needs to be re-
stricted more. Regarding the relationship between the legislative and executive 
powers, unlike Rousseau who stated that, the legislator is the owner who holds 
the higher authority while the executor is just a person that implements, i.e. a 
people’s public servant, Montesquieu stated that legislative and executive pow-
ers are the same and equal, that supreme power is expressed through both 
types of power at the same level. Unlike Rousseau who set criteria to force 
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executive power to follow legislative power, Montesquieu put those types of 
power together, on the one hand to guarantee independence and self-control, 
and on the other hand to maintain the ability of the two to restrict and limit 
each other. Montesquieu wrote:  
“If one person or an organization of officials, or aristocrats, or the people hold all the 
above types of power, everything will be gone.”29 
The Differentiation of Types of Political Power and the Prevention of  
Power Abuse by Legislative and Executive Bodies 
It can be said that Rousseau inherited several basic concepts of Montesquieu’s 
thinking on power separation. For example, when discussing the necessity to 
separate legislative and executive powers, Montesquieu wrote:  
“Executive power has to use its preventing function to participate in legislative activi-
ty, or else its preponderance will be withdrawn. On the contrary, if legislators partici-
pate in executive activities, executive power will be terminated.”30  
Similarly, Rousseau emphasized the necessity to separate legislative, executive 
and judicial which cannot be assigned to one person or organization. He 
warned about the risk of losing everything if all those powers are held by one 
person or organization, whether aristocrats or common people. However, un-
like Montesquieu, Rousseau did not consider privileges for prosperous or fa-
mous persons. He did not discuss the establishment of a first chamber of par-
liament for these groups (for example a senate), but focused on a single-
chamber system consisting of a house of representatives only.31 Discussing the 
relationship between legislators, executive and judicial officials, Rousseau 
made a simple comparison:  
“A legislator is the inventor of a machine; the king is the mechanic who sets up and 
operates the machine (…) A legislator cannot be a supreme judge or a king.”32 The 
king or emperor defined by Rousseau is just an executive official, not an autocratic 
king who holds all legislative, executive and judicial powers. A legislator or a parlia-
ment member cannot simultaneously be the king who directly governs as well as the 
judicial official who directly judges at trials. Similar to Montesquieu, Rousseau did not 
                                                     
29 Montesquieu (2006), 106. 
30 Montesquieu (2006), 117. 
31 Rousseau (2004), 250–251. 
32 Rousseau (2004), 100–101. 
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accept the situation of a soccer player who is also the referee and the one who randomly 
changes soccer rules.33 
Among legislative, executive and judicial powers, Rousseau considered “legis-
lative power the supreme form of perfection that collective strength can 
achieve.”34 When discussing the legislative power, Rousseau considered it “a 
special and noble function which does not resemble a particular person’s func-
tion”35 and stated that the employment of legislators means the establishment 
of a republic. The differentiation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, 
according to Rousseau, is essential. Explaining the reason for this differentia-
tion, he wrote:  
“Because those who give orders to humans cannot give orders to law. And who give 
orders to law should not give order to humans. Otherwise, the law which is the tool to 
control desires will be the tool to maintain inequality and the situation that personal 
opinions undermine the pureness of the work will be unavoidable.”36 
The differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers is a use-
ful tool to avoid the influence of subjective factors and personal benefits in the 
name of the common will on the implementation and protection of the law.37 
According to Rousseau, executive officials or those who implement laws 
“should not have legislative power and the people, even if they want, cannot 
assign legislative authority to executive officials.”38 But the important thing is: 
“They never believe that personal will itself matches common will. They can 
only believe so after putting personal will into a free vote of the people.”39 This 
can be considered a valuable contribution by Rousseau to the idea of direct 
democracy. Considering legislative, executive and judicial powers to be the 
core of of the state structure, Rousseau always puts people’s power as the su-
preme power in the highest position which controls other powers. No one 
stands higher than this power. Legislative power is the most direct expression 
                                                     
33 Fetscher (1989), 151–159. 
34 Rousseau (2004), 100. 
35 Rousseau (2004), 101. 
36 Rousseau (2004), 101. 
37 Fetscher (1989), 151–158. 
38 Rousseau (2004), 102. 
39 Rousseau (2004), 102. 
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of the people’s will and the supreme power. People’s sovereignty is expressed 
in the people’s legislative power. This is Rousseau’s contribution to the estab-
lishment and development of a model of the state of law, which is also funda-
mental for the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 
1946.  
The legislative body has the responsibility to reflect the people’s common 
will, not the personal will of parliament members or people’s representatives. 
Similar to the executive body the legislative body answers to the people, the 
true holder of a nation’s supreme power. In particular, Rousseau analyzed the 
necessity to dismiss the government in two cases. The first case is when the 
head of the government does not govern based on law, but infringes on the 
power of the highest organ of state power and destroys social contracts. In this 
case, the people are confronted by a master and dictator; and therefore the peo-
ple can revert to their natural free right. The second case is when cabinet 
members usurp the power separately, thus every supreme judge becomes a 
prime minister; the government and the nation are divided and disintegrated. 
Rousseau considered the situation of a disintegrating nation as well as of a 
government abusing power to be anarchical.40 In order to prevent the abuse 
and usurpation of power by the government, it is essential to hold people’s 
conference (congress) periodically. Two problems must be discussed then:  
“Are the people satisfied with the current government? (…) Are the people satisfied 
with the administration work performed by the assigned people?”41 
Rousseau considered the institution of a periodical people’s conference as an 
essential tool to control political mechanisms, and government – and a time of 
real fear for cabinet ministers and secretaries. It can be said that this is a pro-
gressive, democratic thought which strongly influenced the political develop-
ment in revolutionary France. The idea was later institutionalized in many 
Western constitutions by the mechanism of the vote of no confidence. This 
vote of no confidence can be organized to express collective distrust in the 
government as a whole or in a particular member of it. Reasons for distrust, 
according to Rousseau, may be violations of laws or power abuse by the gov-
ernment or its inefficient work.42 
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Summary 
Rousseau proposed a type of a state of law as an institution that guarantees the 
natural rights of human beings by organizing, dividing, demarcating and con-
trolling state powers into three branches, legislative, executive and judicial. In 
this model, Rousseau was guided by the principle that in a state the power 
must belong to the citizens, rather than being defined by “the law of the 
strong”. He thought that legislative power is the main factor ruling all other 
powers such as the executive and judicial. Rousseau affirmed the indispensabil-
ity of having a clear differentiation between legislation, executive and judici-
ary. Executive power only has the function to follow legislative power. The 
judicial power has the function to judge and protect the law and the legislative 
power. Rousseau proposed solutions to prevent the possibility of power abuse 
by executive and judicial bodies, especially the possibility that the government 
abuses or seizes power and does not follow common will, supreme power and 
social contracts of the entire people. 
Rousseau’s thoughts about the methods of organizing, dividing and con-
trolling state power have important value in the structuring of the socialist 
state of law of the people, by the people and for the people in Vietnam at the 
moment, especially in the the fight against corruption, sectoral interests and 
moral degradation in a large number of party members, based on the spirit of 
the Resolution of Plenum IV and V of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s 
Central Executive Committee. 
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Ruling with Law.On the Significance of Rules of  
Organization and Procedure 
Julian Krüper 
Terminology first1 
Legal work is linguistic work; legal problems are therefore more often than not 
terminological in nature. This is true not only for the detailed norms and pro-
visions of criminal law, tax law or civil law, but for public law too. Among the 
various sources and forms of public law – federal, state and local, constitution, 
statutes and ordinances – constitutional law naturally reigns supreme. Its su-
preme nature does not protect the constitution from terminological ambiva-
lence though, in fact, the opposite is true. In order to perform its functions as 
the paramount law of the land, the constitution necessarily ought to strive for a 
certain amount of linguistic flexibility and vagueness. Of course, this leaves 
any analysis or application of constitutional law with the somewhat ominous 
task of interpreting and inferencing the actual wording of constitutional provi-
sions. Among the many ambivalences of constitutional vagueness is what in 
Anglo-American constitutional thought is referred to as the “rule of law”. 
Although rich in philosophical, historical and legal overtones, pinpointing its 
                                                     
1 This contribution remains in the form of my original lecture. I therefore make scarce 
use of references, mostly where they serve to verify quotations. Important input 
stems from the works of the German scholar Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann on consti-
tutional and particularly administrative law. Arguments drawing upon democratic 
and constitutional theory are inspired by works of the German constitutional scholar 
Martin Morlok. 
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essence is challenging. The same is true for the German term Rechtsstaat  
(Art. 20 § 1, 28 § 1 of the German constitution (GG), which – in a literal 
translation – reads “state of law”. It has literal siblings in French (État de 
droit) and Italian (stato di diritto) that basically lean on the legal tradition of 
the German term, that in essence stems from 19th century constitutional 
thought.2 Among many others, Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt 
contributed ground-breaking philosophical thoughts, Lorenz von Stein and 
Robert von Mohl contributed legal explications of the concept. How to distin-
guish the Anglo-American concept of rule of law from the continental tradi-
tion of Rechtsstaat is, in the words of Gustavo Gozzi, “una disputa senza fine”.3  
In this contribution, I will therefore not focus on that particular debate 
with its at times rather subtle differentiations. Instead I would like to address 
some broader aspects of the matter, therein applying a more generalized con-
cept of Rechtsstaat. It aims at outlining some fundamental aspects, some of 
which I think are overlooked in their significance for a political system that 
aims to be constitutional and “lawful” in nature. Therefore I will somewhat 
arbitrarily use Rechtsstaat and rule of law synonymously.  
Key Aspects of Rule of Law and Rechtsstaat  
Both concepts obviously showcase “law” as the central aspect of the political 
and maybe even the social system they are applied to. Law in both concepts 
serves different purposes. It serves as binding mechanism for any yielding of 
public authority. In this sense law constitutes and apportions competencies 
and capacities to public institutions and organizations. For example: Lately, 
disputes on what intelligence agencies may or may not do nationally or inter-
nationally have been on the agenda in the United States, Great Britain, Ger-
many and France. May the American National Security Agency (NSA) spy on 
government officials of allied states (or do they even reciprocate?). Obviously, 
the constitutional super-subject of separation of powers heavily relies on legal 
provisions either of constitutional or statutory nature.  
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But of course, there is more to law. At the same time it serves as a means of 
orientation for public action of any nature. This is particularly true for consti-
tutional provisions that influence the application of statutory law, be it public 
or private. In this context, fundamental rights and freedoms are of utmost 
importance because not only do they guide and limit the legislative branch, 
but the executive and judicial branch as well. 
Both rule of law and Rechtsstaat in their traditional sense come with a 
twist that on a terminological level is all but obvious. “Law” in both contexts 
claims a somewhat exclusive position. Not only does it bind public authority 
by forbidding any arbitrariness in yielding its power. It also limits ideological 
usurpation of the law, be it of religious, political or other nature. It therefore 
does not come as a surprise that for example the former socialist German Dem-
ocratic Republic (GDR) strongly kept its constitutional scholars from drawing 
upon the bourgeois concept of Rechtsstaat. Instead, they came up with what 
became known as “sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit” (socialist lawfulness).4 Public 
authority was not only to abide by the laws but also by the will of the party 
and its officials. Deviating from the law and its basic values in order to fulfil 
political requirements was expected of everyone applying the law. 
In the Neighborhood: Constitutional Affinities of the Rule of Law 
The anti-ideological bias of the traditional concepts of rule of law and 
Rechtsstaat of course reveal their own ideological roots. They are, as constitu-
tional concepts, not neutral in the sense that they can be used to describe any 
system that runs along the lines of written legal provisions. Instead, they are 
constitutional concepts of liberal political systems which dominate the western 
hemisphere. At the core of those systems lies an unwavering, almost radical 
belief in the individual and his freedoms, in his prerogative of choice how to 
conduct his life, how sociable or introvert his acts, which beliefs are held and 
which purpose of life is chosen. We find that idea enshrined in various consti-
tutional and quasi-constitutional provisions, among them the American Decla-
ration of Independence and the German constitution. The American Declara-
tion of Independence dates from 1776 and famously declares: “We hold these 
                                                     
4 Mollnau (1999), 59 ff.; Stolleis (2009).  
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truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. In a simpler, more legalistic way, Art. 1 
§ 1 GG prescribes:  
“Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Ver-
pflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt (Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority).” 
Western constitutionalism therefore puts emphasis on the constitutional rank 
of human rights. Interpretation of human rights-provisions is a chief concern 
of constitutional scholarship and constitutional practice alike. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that public debates of Rechtsstaat and rule of law often con-
centrate on human rights, their legal guarantees and their efficacy in day-to-
day state practice. And of course, human rights are at the core of any political 
system that considers itself a Rechtsstaat. The individualistic approach is often 
related to the constitutional concept of democracy, basically claiming that 
violations of human rights are in essence undemocratic. The conceptual back-
ground of the assumption is rather exacting and is rarely made explicit in pub-
lic debates. It basically relies on the philosophical concept of constitutional 
contractualism according to which the guarantee and efficacy of human rights 
are a prerequisite of one’s entering into the social contract. Whereas this as-
sumption is equally true for any form of government that draws upon the con-
tractual motive, it is particularly important to a democracy. It serves to pre-
vent – as John Stuart Mill in his reflections “On Liberty” put it – a “tyranny of 
the majority”. That is to say, that any true democratic form of government 
needs to put in effect a working means of protecting the individual’s freedoms 
or it cannot be called democratic.5 
It becomes clear that democracy and the rule of law are intimately inter-
twined in terms of the guarantee of human rights. Yet, their specific perspec-
tives differ. The significance of human rights in respect to the democratic idea 
is of a more institutional nature whereas the perspective of rule of law is more 
of an individual nature, focusing on the actual efficacy of human rights-
guarantees. To put it differently: Whereas the democratic approach asks if 
human rights are guaranteed, the Rechtsstaat-approach asks how they are 
guaranteed. This brings us back to the fundamental assumptions of the rule of 
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law and to its conceptual presuppositions. From German constitutional schol-
arship stems the distinction of two dimensions of a Rechtsstaat, one being 
more formal and the other being more substantive or – in German – “materi-
ell” (the term “materiell” refers to the content, the essence, the subject matter 
of a norm, to what the rule is about). 
In it is reflected a development of legal thought that occurred between the 
19th and 20th century: The dominating perspective of legal thought in the 19th 
and the early 20th century was legal positivism. Positivism did not very much 
care about the objectives of a legal system, of what the law was used to achieve. 
In positivistic thinking, law was legitimate as long as it originated from the 
power constitutionally authorized to make law (i.e. the monarch or parlia-
ment). All public authority, namely the executive and the judicial branch, had 
to do was to enact the will of the legislator. This of course raises the question 
of how to provide for means and measures for those branches to effectively 
enact the legislative program. Given the case of Germany, the experience of the 
formally legal Nazi Dictatorship, but also other historical events of the 20th 
century led to a decline in positivistic thinking. Substantive perspectives 
gained ground – and for good reasons. The international scope and depth of 
the human rights-debates is only comprehensible against the back-drop of the 
historic experiences of the 20th century.  
Yet, along with the popularity of more substantive views goes an undenia-
ble neglect of the more formal aspects of the rule of law, which are particularly 
interesting for countries in transition to a system of rule of law. So, what needs 
to be kept in mind is that running a state by the rule of law has to distinguish 
between the outcome of public decision making (i.e. in the form of laws, exec-
utive orders or judicial decisions) and the way the decision was made. Whereas 
the outcome-perspective raises substantive questions i.e. on how individual 
rights are affected, the formal perspective focuses on aspects of the decision 
making. Now, what are those formal aspects? 
Dull but Decisive? Organization and Procedure  
Three Aspects to Consider 
When concentrating on the more formal aspects of a Rechtsstaat, three aspects 
come into sight, in descending levels of abstraction: questions of legitimacy of 
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law (as dealt with above regarding positivism), the distinction between consti-
tutional and statutory law and the means of organization and procedure. 
The positivist approach basically provides a scheme of legal legitimacy: Not 
what the law is about matters, but whether or not it was given by the legiti-
mate body. And although we have since come further in our idea of legal legit-
imacy, the initial idea of positivism is of course still correct. Therefore, what 
can be said today is that law is legitimate as far as it originates from a constitu-
tionally authorized legislator (often, though by far not exclusively, parliament) 
and stays within the constitutional limits (mostly, but not exclusively human 
rights as granted by the constitution in question).  
This scheme works well as long as we operate on the basis of a highly sim-
plistic understanding of what law is. When we perceive laws as rules void of 
linguistic ambivalence and discretionary elements, we need not worry about 
their proper application. Yet, any law is full of both, voluntarily and involun-
tarily. This makes the application of law a treacherous business, full of possi-
bilities to undermine the will of the legislator (or the will of the law itself, 
depending on one’s methodological perspective) or even consciously deviating 
from it. This affects a fundamental objective of law in general that lies within 
the idea of law’s generality: Equality of application. Law as we understand it is 
only legitimate if its application fulfils standards of equality. The law itself 
must provide that those standards are met. 
Another aspect needs to be considered: Simply put, we like public action to 
be right. That is to say that we expect a certain level of rationality in whatever 
the state decides to do. The sources of rationality are twofold: They comprise 
the law itself as the normative standard of rationality; the law says what’s right 
and what’s not. Yet, the law’s normative claim is not independent, it does not 
exist in itself, but naturally relates and relies on certain facts, which have to be 
considered, which are sometimes contested and ultimately need to be proven 
by the parties involved, be they private or public.  
All this shifts the general focus away from the provisions of the constitution 
because its provisions conventionally do not deal with details of public power-
yielding. Instead, what comes into sight are statutory rules made by parlia-
ment as the key legislator. Those statutory rules of course have to address an 
abundance of different forms and contexts in which public power is yielded. 
They have to address both administrative as well as judicial action. They need 
to be adequate in the sense that they need to meet the above mentioned stand-
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ards. At the same time, they need to provide for a sufficient level of effective-
ness of public actions. Of course, our desire is to achieve just and factually 
adequate decisions, but in due time and form.  
Altogether, questions arise as to how to organize public authority and how 
to equip public authority with procedures and forms of public action that pro-
vide for the meeting of those standards. This, of course, is a highly demanding 
task to complete and confronts any legislator with challenges that might seem 
insurmountable. Given the example of Germany, legal scholarship and legal 
practice have worked decades to develop a somewhat coherent system of rules 
of organization and procedure. And yet, debates on how to reform and develop 
namely administrative law have been on the agenda for over twenty years now. 
European unification puts additional pressure on the structures and institu-
tions developed. I will for reasons of efficiency concentrate on aspects of execu-
tive administrative law. 
Specialization as an Organizational Principle 
A key aspect of public authority in a Rechtsstaat is the fashion in which it is 
organized. Organization in this sense pertains to executive structures along the 
lines of specialization and hierarchy. If rationality is a desirable aspect of public 
decision making, specialization obviously serves this purpose: By limiting an 
agency’s competencies to certain areas of the law (for example education, wel-
fare, and public safety) public officials can develop expertise not only in respect 
to the laws to be applied, but a factual expertise, too. The importance of a 
proper assessment of facts can hardly be overestimated in the application of any 
law. Experienced judges or agency officials often can assess the legal gravitas of 
a case based on the way and which facts are presented by the parties.  
In addition, specialization in the sense of exclusive administrative compe-
tencies furthers the cause of separation of powers within the executive branch 
of government because it limits the access of public officials to a closely de-
fined area of the law. At the same time, expertise not only heightens the stand-
ards of rationality, but also serves the purpose of equal application of the law, 
because a smaller number of people deal with certain fields of law. Sub-legal 
standards and guidelines of interpretation and application of legal provisions 
can develop, practically “legalizing” informal expertise gathered by public 
officials in a certain field of law.  
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Hierarchy and Oversight as Organizational Principles 
Another important feature of organizing public authority is different hierar-
chic levels. In Germany, administrative structure on the level of the federal 
states usually is threefold. Many of the executive branch’s tasks are fulfilled on 
the local level or the “county”-level (the so called Kreise). The highest level is 
usually a minister (secretary) of the state government. The intermediary level, 
mostly called Bezirksregierungen (which loosely translates to district govern-
ment) mostly serves as a secondary administrative level, in some cases though 
as the primary administrative agency. 
Closely tied to the idea of hierarchic organizational patterns are of course 
mechanisms of review and supervision/oversight. Seemingly similar, the differ-
ence is that review is instigated by the private individual raising objections for 
example against a license permitting the erection and operation of an industri-
al plant (so called Widerspruchsverfahren). Although measures of administra-
tive review have in recent years been abolished in some German federal states 
in favor of immediate judicial review, administrative review remains a vital 
part of the German administrative system. Supervision/oversight (Aufsicht), in 
contrast, is not (formally) initiated by the private individual, but by the supe-
rior administrative level.6 German administrative law differentiates two forms 
of supervision, depending on different levels of intensity. Legal supervision 
(Rechtsaufsicht) is limited to merely rebuke violations of the law but needs to 
refrain from rebuking aspects of expediency of an administrative decision. In 
contrast, the so called Fachaufsicht (technical supervision) is free to act also 
upon its own ideas of expediency.  
Independent Agencies 
Exceptions to the rule of review and supervision are independent agencies that 
do not answer to a superior administrative level. The German national bank 
(Bundesbank) is an example of a (constitutionally) independent body (Art. 88 
GG). The same is true for the European Central Bank. Two motives for inde-
pendent administrative bodies, lately advanced by European Union law,7 arise. 
The more prone administrative functions are to political interference, the more 
important are mechanisms securing the administrative process. Secondly, the 
                                                     
6 Kahl (2000); Pieper (2006).  
7 Kröger/Pilniok (2016).  
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closer an administrative body serves the usage and expression of fundamental 
freedoms, the more independent its actions need to be (such as: broadcasting 
institutions, data protection agencies). Yet, independent agencies need to be 
the exception to the rule of effective administrative supervision. Not only do 
they raise questions in terms of the rule of law, but the democratic legitimacy 
of independent agencies is at stake, too.8 
Rules of Procedure 
Organizational aspects aside, rules of procedure play a prominent part safe-
guarding administrative decision making. “Rules of procedure” in this context 
serve as an umbrella-term. It includes all rules pertaining to administrative 
procedure in particular, to the parties involved and to administrative forms of 
action. 
Legitimacy by Procedure 
Rules of procedure are of utmost importance to any administrative system 
under the rule of law. Procedural provisions mainly serve to produce legitima-
cy of administrative decisions.9 Often, administrative law does not determine 
legal consequences in detail but instead establishes discretionary decisions to 
be made by the respective administrative body. This results in legal uncertain-
ty. Given the situation of several options available, procedural measures (for 
example of inclusion of parties affected by the decision) help to raise acceptance 
of a decision even if the outcome is not favorable for the affected party. Proce-
dure therefore serves to change a situation of uncertainty into a situation of 
acceptable certainty.  
Types and Objectives of Procedural Rules 
Administrative procedures are structured and measured actions to obtain and 
process information.10 Depending on the scope and the impact of the respective 
administrative decision (for example: licensing an industrial plant vs. issuing a 
driver’s license), the preceding procedure needs to be adjusted accordingly: 
Whereas issuing a driver’s license usually depends on fairly simple and easy-to-
                                                     
8 Hoffmann-Riem (2010).  
9 Luhmann (2005).  
10 Schmidt-Aßmann (2006), 305. 
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prove prerequisites, licensing an industrial plant is by far more complex. This 
of course must lead to more complex procedures involving various stakeholders 
and the interests they represent. Also, the complexity of matters regulated rises 
and shapes the decision to be made. 
Generally speaking, different types of administrative procedures can be dis-
tinguished:11  
- Procedures serving purposes of (quasi-judicial) review of administrative 
decisions (supervision/oversight). 
- Procedures enabling administrative decision-making in individual cases 
(any form of licensing private actions, granting subsidies or ordering an in-
dividual to fulfil certain legal duties, for example). 
- Procedures of a more complex nature, spatial planning for example. Namely 
the latter pose taxing objectives because usually complex nettings of differ-
ent interests need to be examined and evaluated. Not only does that require 
comprehensive obtaining of information but also normative standards on 
how to process the information. Therefore, representation of interest, evalu-
ation of interests and due processing of interests are the core objectives of 
any administrative procedure. 
Depending on the complexity of the matter at hand, procedural provisions can 
be more or less strict, granting or restricting the administration’s leeway in 
determining the necessary steps to be taken. Generally speaking, a high degree 
of formality is to be attained with any significant increase in the number of 
persons involved, the number and rank of legally protected interests and, gen-
erally speaking, the more complex the subject matter is. Complicated matters, 
for example, ask for mandatory hearings, documentation and probably publica-
tion of assertions made, deadlines for participatory actions need to be set and 
administrative decision-making needs to be coordinated with measures of judi-
cial review. Of course, procedure is not a means in itself but serves to enable 
binding administrative decisions; procedure has therefore to be related to spe-
cific forms of administrative action (Handlungsformen).  
Forms of Action 
Each branch of government acts in particular forms. The legislative branch 
passes laws, the judicial branch hands down verdicts (procedural actions such 
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as subpoenas or interlocutory judgements aside). The executive branch is pre-
occupied with applying the law in numerous fields. The executive licenses 
businesses, it issues driver’s licenses, it sets up development plans for cities, 
counties or entire countries, it supervises schools and universities, and it runs 
museums and public transportation and engages in other businesses. It takes 
action in individual cases (driver’s license, licensing a business) as well as regu-
lating a plurality of cases, for example in passing ordinances. Those forms of 
actions the executive branch takes differ in scope and impact.  
It is a key objective of administrative law to supply the executive branch 
with adequate forms of action. Not only to fulfil the executive’s tasks, but to 
secure that any form of action recognizes and respects different legal interests 
involved. Administrative forms of action are therefore inextricably linked to 
procedural law; they form the decisive part of the administrative process. Ad-
ministrative law-making therefore needs to identify typical administrative 
decisions, frame them legally and set up a procedural framework they are 
linked with. Legally framing procedure and forms of action serves the purpose 
of rationalizing administrative action. If recurring decisions take the same 
form and are reached by same or similar procedural actions, they enable the 
administrative bodies to find solutions to the problems at hand. At the same 
time, they become easier to control, either by means of supervision or judicial 
review.  
Rules and Procedure in Transitioning Countries 
As could be seen, rules of organization and procedure are a worthwhile topic of 
any state following the idea of rule of law. Rules of organization and procedure 
serve very important purposes not only in terms of legitimacy and rationality 
of public action, but also in terms of its efficiency. For countries transitioning 
to the rule of law, rules of organization and procedure are essential and – from 
a political point of view – the foremost task to concentrate on. 
Conclusion 
Although the rationale of legitimacy by procedure is not entirely free of ideo-
logical overtones, it comes relatively free of the highly individualistic ideals 
the western concept of human rights abides by. Rules of organization and pro-
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cedure aim at rational public decision making under complex circumstances, 
they are chiefly instrumental to the aims and objectives of substantive law 
(materielles Recht). At the same time, they are essential to any system of law 
that aims to fight despotism and arbitrariness in day-to-day legal work. There-
fore, calling for a systematic development of rational procedures is – within 
reason – compatible with different ideological outlooks on law and its func-
tions. Rules of organization and procedure can help to improve public decision 
making, largely, though not entirely independent of the contents of those deci-
sions. Besides, the logics of modern bureaucratic states might not differ that 
much on the local, hands-on level, even if the ideological presumptions of the 
political system at large are different: Acceptability, reasonability and finally 
feasibility of administrative decision making are wished for anywhere in the 
world. At the same time, fighting for a broad guarantee of classical human 
rights serves little to no purpose if the administrative (and judicial!) structures 
to effectively implement those rights are not in place.  
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The Rule of Law and the Emergence of Market  
Exchange: A New Institutional Economic Perspective 
Justus Haucap 
Markets, where buyers and sellers can exchange goods and services, are key to 
the division of labor, specialisation, the realisation of economies of scale and 
scope and, therefore, economic prosperity, growth and development. The bet-
ter markets work the easier it is to reap the benefits of specialisation and the 
gains from trade and voluntary exchange. For the emergence of market ex-
change, in turn, stable and secure property rights are crucial. These rights 
should be defined as clearly as possible and be as stable and secure as possible, 
in order to foster investment and to incentivize the careful and diligent treat-
ment of assets. Hence, the rule of law and secure property rights go hand in 
hand with the emergence of markets, gains from trade and economic growth 
and prosperity. 
Introduction 
The emergence of modern law has been a prerequisite for the development of 
modern markets, in which buyers and sellers can trade on a more or less anon-
ymous basis, without taking undue advantage of one another. While historical-
ly trade has often been organized through non-market forms, as Karl Polanyi 
(1944) has famously pointed-out, we have seen a development from (1) cere-
monial gift exchange over (2) simple barter trade to (3) personalized trading 
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relationships and (4) anonymous markets.1 This development has not only been 
facilitated by technological progress, but – to a large degree – by institutional 
change, i.e. the development of law and property rights. As Douglass North 
has pointed out in his discussion of Karl Polanyi:  
“An essential pre-condition for price-making markets is the existence of well-defined 
and enforced property rights over the good or service to be exchanged (…) The costs of 
defining and enforcing property rights – transaction costs – lead to non-price alloca-
tion of many goods and services today.”2 
In his theory of institutional change, North (1981) has analyzed how markets 
develop, depending on the size of societies and the costs of transport (which 
allows trade over long distances). More precisely, North (1981) has argued that 
exchange can take place without formal institutions such as property rights, as 
long as societies are of small size (families, tribes, villages…). In these socie-
ties, trade is guided and structured by informal rules. If, however, trade occurs 
over longer distances, institutions must be found to protect against what econ-
omists call opportunism, i.e. fraud and deceit. Institutions such as norms, 
measures and weights as well as money as a medium of exchange have basically 
developed in order to lower the costs of market exchange. Finally, urbanization 
and globalization require further institutional developments to facilitate trade 
(protection of property rights, international arbitration, diverse screening and 
signaling mechanisms). Coase has argued in a similar fashion:  
“When the facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very 
different interests (...) the establishment of a private legal system would be very diffi-
cult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system 
of the State.”3 
In this paper, we elaborate on the interdependence between property rights, 
the rule of law and the development of market-based exchange that facilitates 
the division of labor and according productivity gains which, in turn, foster 
economic growth and prosperity. For that purpose, we first elaborate on the 
role of markets in the economics literature in section 2. As we will see, eco-
nomic theory has only perfunctorily dealt with the question of how markets 
emerge and how they are organised, even though markets play a major role in 
                                                     
1 See Salisbury (1968), 122. 
2 North (1977), 710. 
3 Coase (1988a), 10. 
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most economic systems. In section 3, the historical development how trade was 
organized over time is outlined in a very brief manner, before section 4 analyz-
es the institutional and informational requirements for modern markets to 
work. Section 5 then explains how the rule of law facilitates market exchange, 
before section 6 summarises and concludes. 
Markets in the Economics Literature 
In neoclassical economics exchange is simply assumed to take place if there are 
benefits from trade to be realised. The question of how markets are actually 
organised has usually been neglected. Instead, two fictions have, by and large, 
been used to model the exchange process in the simple world of zero transac-
tion costs. Either a (costlessly working) Walrasian auctioneer is supposed to 
postulate prices until demand equals supply, or individuals bargain about how 
to split the gains from trade and exchange goods along a so-called contract 
curve in an Edgeworth box. 
However, as Ronald Coase has made clear, an “elaborate analysis of individ-
uals exchanging nuts for apples on the edge of the forest”4 is inappropriate to 
approach real world markets, since it completely ignores the social institutions 
facilitating exchange. While traditional, neoclassical economics basically de-
termines the gains from trade and their distribution, it fails to show how much 
trade there is of which goods. The preconditions that facilitate trade are com-
pletely neglected. Put differently, the market is just assumed to be “there”. In 
contrast to neoclassical economics, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
does not take an economy’s institutional structure for granted, but aims at 
explaining why certain institutions such as a particular market exist. 
Drawing upon the analysis of Coase (1937), a major focus of the NIE has 
been placed on the so called theory of the firm which explains under which 
conditions transactions are organised within firms, or more generally, within 
hierarchies and not carried out as price intermediated market transactions. The 
primary focus of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as developed by Oliver 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996) has been on the explanation of hierarchies 
within markets in terms of relative efficiency. From a transaction cost perspec-
                                                     
4 Coase (1988a), 8. 
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tive markets and hierarchies can be simply viewed as alternative governance 
structures to organise economic transactions. 
Markets and hierarchies are not only seen as alternative governance modes 
though, but markets are typically viewed as the “natural” form of economic 
organization. Only if the costs of using the price mechanism exceed the costs of 
internal organization, transactions are moved from the market to the firm. In 
these cases, “market failure” can be overcome by other explicit or implicit con-
tractual arrangements. As Oliver Williamson has admitted, “only as market-
mediated contracts break down are the transactions in question removed from 
markets and organized internally. The presumption that ‘in the beginning 
there were markets’ informs this perspective.”5 Similarly, Coase found that in 
the absence of transaction costs “the firm has no purpose”.6 
Accounting for the fact that carrying out and organising transactions is a 
costly activity in itself, neither the use of markets nor the organisation of firms 
is costless. In general, to facilitate transactions three kinds of transaction costs 
are involved: 
- information and search costs such as advertising costs or the cost of compar-
ing prices, 
- bargaining and contract negotiation costs, and 
- monitoring and contract enforcement costs.7 
One of the main hypotheses of the NIE, and the TCE framework in particular, 
is that in competitive environments transactions are organised in the most 
efficient way that minimises the transaction costs for a given transaction. Put 
differently, competition will lead to the emergence of the most efficient mode 
of organisation for every transaction. From this perspective, the crucial differ-
ence between markets and hierarchies consists in the way transactions are gov-
erned: Within firms the residual decision rights have been transferred to the 
firm’s owner or manager, so that transactions are based on authority and com-
mand, whereas on markets property rights are voluntarily transferred, and 
transactions are price intermediated. Again, from a transaction cost perspective 
markets and hierarchies are basically viewed as different governance structures 
to solve the same problem – how to organise exchange. 
                                                     
5 Williamson (1985), 87. 
6 Coase (1988b), 34. 
7 See Williamson (1989). 
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In addition to these two polar governance structures there exists a wide 
range of hybrid modes of organisations as, for example, franchise contracts.8 
Moreover, reasonably complex forms of governance, such as networks of rela-
tional contracts, may evolve to overcome coordination and cooperation prob-
lems. Ostrom (2010) has spoken about “polycentric governance of complex 
economic systems”. In this context, a major hypothesis of institutional eco-
nomic analysis is that because of “the filter of competition” only those contrac-
tual arrangements prevail that economise on transaction costs,9 or, as Oliver 
Williamson has put it, “the economic institutions of capitalism have the main 
purpose and effect of economising on transaction costs.”10 In this sense Coase 
has explained that “markets are institutions to facilitate exchange, that is, they 
exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions.”11 
From an anthropological or historical perspective, however, the view that 
markets are the “natural” mode of economic organization is rather flawed. In 
primitive societies exchange has been organized in network structures, if not 
hierarchies, and exchange relations have been highly personalized.12 Impersonal 
spot markets, on the contrary, are a rather recent phenomenon.13 One of the 
few economists who acknowledges this fact is Douglass North who wrote: “All 
of the modern neoclassical literature discusses the firm as a substitute for the 
market. For the economic historian this perspective is useful; its usefulness is 
limited, however, because it ignores a crucial fact of history: Hierarchical or-
ganization forms and contractual arrangements in exchange predate the price-
making market.”14 
In contrast to Williamson one might therefore say that “in the beginning 
there were hierarchies” and, with respect to Coase, that in the absence of posi-
tive transaction costs the market has no purpose. Nevertheless, in economic 
theory the evolution of markets has not caught much attention: While the 
                                                     
8 See Klein (1980), Dnes (1996) and Menard (1995). 
9 See Alchian (1950). 
10 Williamson (1985), 17. 
11 Coase (1988a), 7. 
12 See Landa (1994). 
13 Salisbury (1968). 
14 North (1981), 41. 
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institutional economics literature claims to analyse the emergence of different 
institutions and their relative efficiency, surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to the development of markets and the conditions that enable markets to 
evolve.15 After all, one can hardly disagree with Coase who notes that “in mod-
ern economic theory the market itself has an even more shadowy role than the 
firm”.16 Similarly, Spulber noted that  
“firms establish and operate most markets by setting prices, carrying out transactions, 
forming and monitoring contracts, and producing and distributing information. Firms 
create and manage markets by acting as intermediaries between buyers and sellers.”17 
And furthermore, “just as producing and services consumes resources, so does the 
establishment and operation of markets to allocate those goods and services. (...) The 
market institutions that provide intermediation have not been given the attention they 
deserve.”  
In fact, the rise of many online platforms vividly demonstrates this fact: Firms 
organize and manage markets, markets are not simply “there”. 
The tendency to neglect market emergence and development in economic 
theory might be partially due to the influential work of Hayek who used the 
market as the standard example for a spontaneously emerging order (Hayek, 
1944, 1960). From an anthropological or historical point of view, however, 
this perspective is misleading, and quite the opposite seems to be true. Neither 
do markets arise spontaneously nor are they simply “there”. To explain their 
emergence is part of the challenge posed by Karl Polanyi (1944, 1957) as ex-
pressed by North (1977). How can the emergence of market-based exchange 
by explained and how can other forms of exchange such as reciprocity and dis-
tribution be explained by economic theory? 
A very, very brief History of Trade 
In fact, price-making markets in which the identity of the trading partners is 
irrelevant are a rather modern phenomenon. In early human history as well as 
in primitive societies exchange usually first took the form of ceremonial gift 
                                                     
15 See North (1994). 
16 Coase (1988a), 7; also see North (1977). 
17 Spulber (1996), 135–136. 
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giving. As Polanyi noted, “over millennia trade between empires was carried 
out as gift trade.”18 Publicly presented gifts constituted trade in so far as the 
gifts were expected to be reciprocated. In his famous Essai sur le don, Marcel 
Mauss (1925/1967) has stressed the reciprocal nature of gifts. In primitive 
societies virtually every exchange and contract took the form of a gift, which 
is, according to Mauss, only voluntary in theory, but obligatory in practice.19 
By the presentation of a gift an obligation to return a countergift was created. 
As Mauss furthermore explained, although the presentations commonly take 
the form of generous gifts, the transactions were “based on obligation and eco-
nomic self-interest.”20 What is also quite interesting to notice, is that exchange 
in primitive societies hardly ever occurred on an individual basis, but almost 
always between collective groups such as tribes, clans or families. 
In this context, the institution that has probably caught the most wide-
spread attention among economic anthropologists is the Kula Ring of Papua 
New Guinea. Since its detailed description by Malinowski it serves as the clas-
sical example of ceremonial gift exchange in the anthropological literature. 
The Kula Ring is a system of gift exchanges between several tribal societies 
that live on the different islands in the Western Pacific. Malinowski describes 
the trading system between these “stateless” societies as follows:  
“The Kula trade consists in a series of ... periodic overseas expeditions which link to-
gether the various islands groups, and annually bring back big quantities of vaygu’a 
and of subsidiary trade from one district to another. The trade is used up, but the 
vaygu’a - the armshells and the necklaces - go round and round the ring.”21  
The so-called vaygu’a are two different valuable goods, necklaces and arm-
bands, that permanently circulate in opposite directions. Their exchange is 
highly ceremonial and strictly regulated by a detailed set of rules. The basic 
purpose of the Kula exchange is not the ceremonial gift giving per se, but 
rather to facilitate peaceful commercial trade of useful commodities. Aside 
from the ceremonial gift exchange commercial goods are exchanged by mem-
bers of different tribes through a chain of intermediaries. Each Kula partner is 
not only involved in the ceremonial gift exchange, but also in commercial 
                                                     
18 Polanyi (1957), 262. 
19 Mauss (1925/1967), 1. 
20 Mauss (1925/1967), 1. 
21 Malinowski (1922/1953), 103. 
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trade with local residents and even with strangers “with whom an indirect 
exchange is carried on through the intermediation of the local men.”22 The 
Kula trade does not take place in the form of spot transactions, but is based on 
the principle of delayed reciprocity. As Landa has explained:  
“No Kula valuables are carried on overseas Kula expeditions; the visiting Kula partner 
visits his host to receive gifts and not to give them.”23 
Similarly, Mauss argued:  
“The rule is to set out with nothing to exchange or even to give in return for food (...) 
On these visits one is recipient only, and it is when the visiting tribes the following 
year become the hosts that gifts are repaid with interest.”24 The fact that the gifts 
received are usually even returned with interest payments, lead Mauss to the conclu-
sion that “economic evolution has not gone from barter to sale and from cash to credit. 
Barter arose from the system of gifts given and received on credit (...) Likewise pur-
chase and sale - both direct sale and credit sale - and the loan, derive from the same 
source.”25 
After all, the Kula exchange is not an anonymous exchange between atomized 
agents as it appears in neoclassical economics. Rather trading partners have to 
be member of the Kula ring, entry to which is strictly limited. As Belshaw 
explained  
“to enter the Kula ring a man must have the knowledge of the appropriate etiquette 
(...) Knowledge of the etiquette is attained through general socialization, but much of 
the magic is idiosyncratic and must be learned specifically (...) The exchanges are ac-
companied by forms of words and ceremonial acts all of which reinforce the notions of 
honorable gift-giving and mutual dependence between persons who, in most instances, 
would be strangers in other circumstances.”26 
The ritual aspects of the Kula exchange can be seen as “institutional ways of 
establishing individual and group identity in a world characterized by uncer-
tainty and high information costs”.27 Moreover, the ring structure of the Kula 
system as well as the fact that two different ceremonial goods flow in different 
                                                     
22 Malinowski (1922/1953), 363. 
23 Landa (1994), 148. 
24 Mauss (1925/1967), 20. 
25 Mauss (1954), 35. 
26 Belshaw (1965), 12. 
27 Landa (1994), 144. 
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directions can also be explained by transaction cost considerations. As Landa 
argued, “the Kula Ring is an institutional arrangement that emerged primarily 
in order to economize on transaction costs of intertribal commercial exchange 
in stateless societies. (...) In a society that lacks that institutions for protecting 
life, property, and contracts, an institution like the Kula Ring may be inter-
preted as a club-like arrangement for economizing on costs of transacting 
across tribal boundaries.”28 In a similar way, Ziegler (1990) traced the struc-
ture of the Kula system back to advantages of peaceful commercial trade. Ac-
cording to his analysis, the ceremonial gift exchange acts as an efficient and 
reliable signalling mechanism to facilitate commercial trade and to maintain 
the social order.29  
One might think that the Kula Ring is a rather singular phenomenon. 
However, quite on the contrary trade via mutual gift exchange has been the 
rule rather than the exception in primitive societies. To give another example, 
let us follow Mauss:  
“A relationship analogous to the Kula is that of the Wasi. This sets up regular and 
obligatory exchanges between partners, between agricultural tribes on the one hand 
and maritime tribes on the other. The agricultural partner places produce in front of 
the house of his fisherman associate. The latter, after a great fishing expedition, makes 
return with interest, giving his partner in the agricultural village the product of  
his catch.”30 
It is quite obvious that these mutual gifts are based on gains from specializa-
tion and differences in availability. There exist a broad range of other exchange 
facilitating institutions such as the Kwakiutl Potlatch in the American 
Northwest, the Manus of the Great Admiralty Islands, the Tolowa-Tututni of 
California, or the Pokot of Kenya to name only a few. Descriptions and anal-
yses of these exchange facilitating gift ceremonies can be found in Mauss 
(1925/1967), Polanyi, Arensberg & Pearson (1957), Belshaw (1965) or Sahlins 
(1965). All these institutions share some common features as Belshaw  
demonstrated:  
“Although the details vary considerably from culture to culture, the main variables are 
remarkably constant. These include emphasis on relationships between individuals 
                                                     
28 Landa (1994), 143. 
29 See also Posner (1980). 
30 Mauss (1925/1967), 27. 
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which are also seen as relationships between groups. (...) A very high proportion of 
social contacts between adults is accompanied by gift-giving.”31 
To summarize, in early human history and in archaic societies trade has usually 
taken the form of gift exchange and was based on the principle of delayed reci-
procity. Exchange relations in these societies have been highly personalized 
and very stable. As Malinowski (1922/1953) reports, Kula relations were even 
passed on to heirs, so the reputation of a so called “Big Man” in the Kula Ring 
did not die with him. That way the last period problem of finite games is 
avoided, and the Kula gift exchange becomes an infinitely often repeated 
game. Furthermore, as Ziegler (1990) pointed out, trust played an essential 
role in Kula relations. 
In a similar way, Geertz (1978, 1979) has analysed the institutional struc-
ture of the Moroccan bazaar economy. At a first glance, the bazaar might ap-
pear to come close to the classic spot transaction of the ideal market. However, 
as Geertz points out even on the bazaar continuing relations build the domi-
nant pattern. Posner (1980), therefore, compared the bazaar economy directly 
to primitive societies as he argued: “In primitive societies if you trade repeat-
edly with the same man he becomes your blood brother and you owe him the 
same duty of generous and fair dealing that you would owe a kinsman. This 
‘barter friendship’ resembles the pairing of buyers and sellers in bazaars that 
Geertz noted. It is a way of bringing reciprocity into the exchange process and 
thereby increasing the likelihood that promises will be honoured despite the 
absence of a public enforcement authority.” 
Fafchamps (2002) made a similar observation referring to empirical evi-
dence of manufacturing and trading firms from Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. 
Personalized exchange is the rule in markets based on trust and reputation; 
commercial relationships between economic agents are long lasting. As Faf-
champs (2002) has explained, trust and reputation basically replace court based 
enforcement mechanisms in these societies. Therefore, as in the case of the 
Kula Ring, trade cannot be anonymous, but is based on mutual trust and the 
sharing of information among traders. The identity of the trading partners is of 
major importance. However, if screening devices are costly, some agents are 
                                                     
31 Belshaw (1965), 35.  
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excluded from the market, and the “business then becomes monopolized by a 
social network, possibly sharing the same ethnic or religious affiliation”.32  
Quite interestingly, the role of labels and identities for building trust has 
been also stressed by Landa (1994) to explain the dramatic success of ethnically 
homogeneous trading groups in many developing countries today, especially in 
South East Asia. She argued that ethnically homogeneous groups of middle-
men are “a low cost clublike institutional arrangements (...) which emerged to 
economize on contract enforcement and information costs in an environment 
where the legal infrastructure was not well developed.” These networks serve as 
an alternative to contract law or hierarchical structures. In these societies, eth-
nicity serves as a labelling device to signal credibility and to shape one’s  
expectations.33 
Furthermore, as Greif (1994) has shown, cultural beliefs may have a signifi-
cant impact on the overall economic outcome. In his comparative study of the 
Maghribi traders of the eleventh century and the Genoese traders of the twelfth 
century, Greif argues that the “collectivistic culture” of the Maghribi traders is 
an impediment to economic development while the individualistic culture of 
the Genoese fosters the development of markets and thereby also economic 
development. In a similar way, economists as Kuran (1997) and anthropolo-
gists as Ensminger (1997) have pointed to the labelling value of Islam in Afri-
ca. Membership of a certain religion shapes trading partners’ expectation about 
each other’s behavior, or to put it differently, certain religious beliefs are con-
nected with certain ethical codes of conduct, so traders know what to expect. 
As Kuran (1997) has argued, mutual trust between traders of the same religion 
is higher since they both have subscribed to the same religious beliefs. Hence, 
fewer safeguards are required and, accordingly, transaction costs are lower.  
Viewed from this angle, it is not very surprising that in history trade has 
often been in the hands of specific ethnic groups or even families such as the 
Lombard and Genoese merchants in medieval Europe, Jews in the Mediterra-
nean, Armenian in the Middle East, or Chinese in Singapore today, Asians in 
East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa.34 After all, ethnicity and religion might 
                                                     
32 Fafchamps (2002), 4. 
33 Landa (1994). 
34 See Fafchamps (2000). 
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play a more important role for the emergence of markets and economic devel-
opment than has been recognized so far.  
However, market conditions have changed in the course of world history as 
the population has increased, products have become more complex and com-
munication and transport easier. As Salisbury argued, in this course trade can 
be characterized by a “sequence of ceremonial gifts, intercommunity barter, 
trading partnerships, and market place trade.”35 In a similar way, Belshaw 
(1965) distinguished between “traditional exchange” and “modern markets.” 
While market exchange is rather connected with standardized spot transac-
tions and legal enforcement mechanisms, traditional exchange is based on 
principle of reciprocity and mutual trust. This view is certainly influenced by 
Polanyi (1944), The Great Transformation, in which he understands economic 
and cultural development as a shift from an economy embedded in social rela-
tions to one of impersonal markets. 
The historical sequence from ceremonial gift exchange over simple barter 
trade to personalized trading relationships to anonymous markets, as character-
ized by Salisbury (1968), has partly been explained by Coase as follows:  
“When the facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very 
different interests (...) the establishment of a private legal system would be very diffi-
cult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system 
of the State.”36  
Moreover, North (1981) in his theory of institutional change outlined the 
following sequence:  
- As long as societies are of small size (families, tribes, villages…) exchange 
can take place without formal institutions such as property rights, trade is 
guided and structured by informal rules, 
- If trade occurs over longer distances, institutions must be found to protect 
against opportunism (such as norms, measures and weights as well as mon-
ey as a medium of exchange), 
- Urbanization and globalization require further institutional developments 
to facilitate trade (protection of property rights, international arbitration, 
diverse screening and signaling mechanisms). 
                                                     
35 Salisbury (1968), 122. 
36 Coase (1988a), 10. 
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The underlying principle behind this mechanism might be explained as fol-
lows: As the population size increases and transportation becomes easier, it 
becomes more difficult to keep track of every member of a society. The proba-
bility to meet the same trader again decreases, so that incentives for opportun-
istic behavior increase. Therefore, over the course of history different enforce-
ment mechanisms and exchange facilitating institutions arose. As Coase noted, 
in the medieval ages the provision of markets became an entrepreneurial activi-
ty: “In the medieval period in England, fairs and markets were organized by 
individuals under a franchise from the King. They not only provided the phys-
ical facilities for the fair or market but were also responsible for security (im-
portant in such unsettled times with a relatively weak government) and ad-
ministered a court for settling disputes (the court of piepowder).”37 These mar-
ket institutions, which usually consist of physical facilities such as the market 
place and an enforcement mechanism that might be called the market order, 
have to be built and maintained. 
Exactly in this sense, Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) have discussed 
the institution of the medieval law merchant the role of whom was to provide 
information to make self-enforcing agreements feasible. Similarly, Greif, 
Milgrom and Weingast (1994) have analyzed medieval merchant guilds as 
exchange facilitating institutions that economize on transaction costs under 
conditions of legal uncertainty. As Gambetta (1993) has argued, from a histor-
ical point of view even the rise of the Sicilian Mafia can be explained on trans-
action cost grounds. According to Gambetta (1993), the Mafia historically 
basically provided an enforcement mechanism to facilitate trade. 
Fafchamps in his paper on “spontaneous” market emergence has summa-
rized all this nicely as follows:  
“To simplify a bit, early markets can be described as a two-tier system, with a core of 
sophisticated firms and traders and a fringe of small enterprises. Fringe agents operate 
on a purely cash-and-carry basis, largely in an anonymous fashion, and leave no room 
to breach of contract.38  
                                                     
37 Coase (1988a), 8. 
38 Fafchamps (2002); see Fafchamps/Minten (2001); for Vietnam in particular: McMil-
lan/Woodruff (1999a), (1999b). 
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Core agents are in long-term relationships with each other. They offer supplier 
credit and warranty and place orders.39 The widespread existence of long term 
relationships between manufacturers and their suppliers and clients has, for 
instance, been noted in developed and developing economies alike.40 Research 
by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, and economists 
has shown that reliance on interpersonal relations at early stages of market 
development is nearly universal.41  
Hence, the emergence of markets and market economies does not necessari-
ly require efficient and costlessly working court based enforcement mecha-
nisms as is often suggested or assumed in economic theory. In the absence of a 
state that enforces property rights with coercive power other institutions 
might arise to facilitate exchange. It is important to notice, however, that in 
the absence of court based enforcement systems, markets cannot function as 
anonymous gatherings, but identity of the trading partners becomes highly 
relevant. As Coleman (1991) explained, social mechanisms such as gossip 
might serve a valuable function in these markets.  
Having now documented that markets can even work in the absence of 
well-defined property rights and the rule of law (as also black markets vividly 
demonstrate), it is also clear that well-defined property rights and the rule of 
law greatly simplify trade and market exchange, thereby simplifying both 
further specialization and credit-based relationships. In fact, the emergence of 
many platform markets in the digital economy is rather similar to the organi-
zation of historical markets in the medieval age. The provision of standard laws 
and enforcement mechanisms has greatly simplified exchange so that more 
transactions can actually take place and resources that were used to safeguard 
transactions can be saved. 
  
                                                     
39 See Fafchamps (1997). 
40 E.g. Lorenz (1988); Aoki (1988); Dore (1987); Fukuyama (1995); Stone/Levy/ 
Paredes (1992). 
41 E.g. Hopkins (1973); Greif (1993); North (1990); Meillassoux (1971); Amselle 
(1977); Jones (1959); Bauer (1954); Sahlins (1972). 
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Modern Markets and their Institutional and Informational  
Requirements 
In modern societies, business relations are usually based on explicit contracts 
which can be enforced by the state. With the development of the legal system 
and court based enforcement mechanisms trade in large, anonymous markets 
has become possible in principle.42 Indeed, standard economic theory normally 
assumes that in modern societies all trade takes the form of spot transactions 
and impersonal exchange. Examples often used to illustrate the point are 
commodity and stock exchanges. It is important to notice, however, that anon-
ymous price-making markets demand strong institutional and informational 
requirements. 
The Role of the Institutional Environment 
Regarding institutional requirements, only the development of the modern 
legal system has made possible the wide-spread emergence of price-making 
markets. Key to the emergence of modern markets are well-defined, stable and 
secure property rights, which are protected either by private order or by the 
Government or the state. According to the economic property rights theory, a 
property right in an asset consists of: 
- the right to use the asset,  
- the right to change its form and substance,  
- the right to appropriate the returns from the asset, and  
- the right to transfer (sell) all rights in the asset.43 
Exchange can most easily occur if it is clearly defined who holds the property 
right in an asset in the above sense.44 If there are no clearly defined property 
rights (including the right to use and to transfer an asset), markets are not 
likely to come into existence. Lack of clearly defined property rights does not 
                                                     
42 One may therefore argue that traditional (private) enforcement mechanisms, trust 
and reciprocity have become less important in modern markets when compared to 
traditional forms of exchange (see Belshaw, 1965). This is quite different in less de-
veloped peasant societies though. See Ensminger (1992); and Fafchamps (2000), 
(2001), for further description and analysis. 
43 See Furubotn/Pejovich (1972). 
44 See Coase (1960). 
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necessarily mean that markets will not emerge at all (see black markets), but it 
is much more difficult to create them and to ensure they work properly. 
Since it is costly to invest into the creation of a market, understood as the 
market facilities plus a market order and its enforcement, it is important that 
property rights are stable and secure and can be enforced through the courts or 
some other institution. If property rights are not stable and can be redefined 
relatively easily through other means (from theft or outright expropriation to 
Government regulation, which usually limits the right to use and/or change an 
asset), people will be less interested in trading these assets under uncertain 
conditions. Put differently, if people do not know what exactly it is they buy 
they will be less inclined to buy that particular asset. Also, it may be easier for 
them to lobby the Government to redefine property rights rather than buying 
the asset themselves and than change its use or form. If it is less costly for in-
dividuals to get the Government to redefine property rights rather than buy-
ing the asset themselves, it is risky to invest into the creation of a market.  
Hence, for markets to work best, property rights should be defined as clear-
ly as possible and be as stable and secure as possible. For the latter point, a 
judgement has to be made about how likely it is that the Government will 
intervene and redefine property rights. This in turn is dependent on a number 
of factors. First of all, one can ask whether private property rights are protected 
through a jurisdiction’s constitution as it is the case in the US or Germany or 
through other legal means or not at all. The question is: How easy is it for the 
Government or other parties to limit or restrict private property rights?  
Secondly, property rights are less likely to be guaranteed and stable if a giv-
en property rights allocation is not socially sustainable and acceptable for a 
majority of society. In this case, if a property rights allocation is not socially 
acceptable for a majority of voters, it is unlikely that this particular property 
rights allocation is politically sustainable either. Instead, the Government will 
have every incentive to redefine property rights through political/legal means. 
For example, the extent and type of taxation will typically also depend on de-
mographic features of the electorate.45 
Similar problems often occur with environmental issues when property 
rights in nature/natural resources are involved. While for example a market for 
water abstraction rights cannot exist without well defined property rights in 
                                                     
45 See, Scheuer/Wolitzky (2016). 
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the respective water resource, a market for water rights may not be acceptable 
for a majority of voters and therefore not politically viable even though eco-
nomic theory would predict a market for water rights to be an efficient mode 
of organisation. Another case are school vouchers where a market solution is 
predicted to be efficient from an economic perspective, but does not appear to 
be politically acceptable in many parts of the world. Hence, part from econom-
ic efficiency the political sustainability of any allocation of property rights 
needs to be considered.46 
Information and Transaction Costs 
While stable and well defined property rights are key to the creation and 
smooth working of markets, they alone do not suffice to make markets work 
best (as opposed to other mechanisms of exchange such as social networks or 
hierarchies). Put differently, the existence of secure property rights is only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for markets to come into existence. In 
fact, price-making markets not only require well-defined and enforceable prop-
erty rights, but in addition “it must be possible to measure the dimensions of a 
good or service” (North 1981, 42).  
Information Issues 
For purely price intermediated trade to take place it is not sufficient that prop-
erty rights are well defined, but there are also strong informational require-
ments for the functioning of the price mechanism. Already Stigler (1961) in 
his seminal article on the economics of information has pointed out that in-
formation is not for free and that potential buyers have to invest in gathering 
information to find out where they can buy what at which price. Similarly, 
sellers have to find out what it is that buyers actually demand. This infor-
mation gathering and processing takes up time and other resources. Price-
making markets can only work smoothly if this information is easily and wide-
ly accessible for both potential buyers and potential sellers.47 
  
                                                     
46 See Dixit (1996); Williamson (1996); Acemoglu/Robinson (2013). 
47 A more formal model which looks at buyers’ and sellers’ incentives to invest into 
information gathering has been provided by Gould (1980). 
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Quality Uncertainty 
What is as crucial for the working of a market as information about a product’s 
price and place etc is, in many cases, information about product quality, which 
can be much more difficult to convey. George Akerlof has demonstrated this 
quite plastically in his seminal paper on the “Market for Lemons” (Akerlof, 
1970), where he shows that trading on the market for used cars may break 
down because buyers have inferior information about the quality of a used car 
than sellers. If buyers lack trust in sellers’ promises, markets are very difficult 
to establish. This is because with lack of trust buyers will “deduct” a risk pre-
mium from the price they are willing to pay. Knowing this, owners of used 
cars will be less inclined to put a “good” used car on the market, which again 
leads to a deterioration of the average quality of used cars traded on the market 
which again confirms’ buyers’ suspicions that only “lemons” are offered. 
For many products price is only one among many factors that buyers con-
sider before making their purchase decision. Apart from the price, a product’s 
quality (in the broadest sense of the word) and associated services are often as 
important as the product’s price. However, for many goods and services buyers 
cannot evaluate the product’s true quality ex ante, or it is rather costly for 
them to do so. Here the economics literature distinguishes between search 
qualities, experience qualities and credence qualities.48  
Search qualities are those characteristics of a good that buyers can easily de-
termine before purchase such as colour or size. In contrast, experience qualities 
are characteristics that buyers only learn after purchase, e.g. a good’s durability 
or actual taste. That is, these qualities can only be determined though experi-
ence, but not through simple inspection. Credence qualities are finally those 
qualities which are even costly to determine after purchase. Examples are the 
quality of a car repair or medical services where most buyers do not know even 
after purchase whether they received the quality and extent of treatment that 
was best for them. Hence, information problems are severest for goods where 
credence qualities are important while informational aspects are the least im-
portant for search goods where most information can be gained through simple 
inspection.  
                                                     
48 The distinction between search and experience qualities has been introduced by 
Nelson (1970). Darby/Karni (1973) later added the credence good category. 
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For credence and experience goods trust between buyers and sellers is deci-
sive for a successful trading relationship. Hence, it is much more difficult to 
establish anonymous markets for experience or credence goods where sellers 
and buyers remain anonymous. In fact, most organised markets concentrate in 
the trade of highly standardised search goods where buyers and sellers have 
high degrees of certainty about the goods’ quality.  
Information and measurement costs can be reduced, however, through 
standardisation and classification procedures.49 Through means of standardisa-
tion and classification experience qualities can be transformed into search qual-
ities, at least to some degree. Reference standards make it easier to “measure” 
product quality, thereby reducing information costs. Also, if the numbers of 
traders is relatively small, training buyers and sellers may help overcoming the 
informational problems associated with quality uncertainty if training enables 
market participants to judge quality more accurately before purchase. 
In general, however, it is least complicated to establish markets for search 
goods where quality is easy to determine and to describe. For experience goods, 
other trust building mechanisms have to be used such as guarantees, invest-
ment in branding,50 or external reference systems (such as the reputation and 
information exchange systems on most online platforms where buyers and 
sellers can exchange information about their experience with other buyers and 
sellers).  
When do Markets Work Best? 
According to economic theory transactions are, all other things equal, organ-
ised in a way to minimise the sum of transaction and production costs. Hence, 
anonymous markets are usually replaced by other contractual arrangements as 
the contractual hazards that arise from asset specificity, uncertainty and low 
frequency of transaction increase. This is reflected in the work of North who 
writes: “Small numbers involved in exchange, the possibility of opportunism, 
and uncertainty as a result of a lack of well-defined property rights or an ina-
bility to forecast changes in conditions over the life of an exchange agreement 
all result in alternative contractual arrangements designed to reduce the at-
                                                     
49 See Barzel (1982), (1985). 
50 See Klein/Leffler (1981). 
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tendant transaction or production costs.”51 However, given that it is costly to 
organise markets, the perspective can also be turned around: Price-making 
markets (using standardised contracts) do not evolve as long as the strong in-
stitutional and informational requirements are not met. Highly personalised 
exchange relations will prevail instead. 
Not surprisingly, the strong informational and institutional conditions 
necessary for impersonal exchange are almost only met in highly organised 
markets such as stock or commodity exchanges or some auctions. As 
Telser/Higinbotham explain, “in an organised market the participants trade a 
standardised contract such that each unit of the contract is a perfect substitute 
for any other unit. The identities of the parties in any mutually agreeable 
transaction do not affect the terms of exchange. The organised market itself or 
some other institution deliberately creates a homogeneous good that can be 
traded anonymously by the participants or their agents.”52 
Stock or commodity exchanges as well as auctions are usually explicitly or-
ganised by a club of traders or a firm which usually owns the physical facilities 
within which trade takes place. Moreover, the dimensions of the transactions 
such as the trading place and time are usually regulated by an underlying mar-
ket constitution. Goods as well as traders have to be admitted to the exchange, 
and entry to the market is limited. Through these measures measurement costs 
and credibility problems can be reduced. A high degree of product standardisa-
tion and classification allows traders to use standardised contracts and proce-
dures and reduces measurement and bargaining costs. Hence, key for anony-
mous, impersonal exchange is a high degree of product standardisation or clas-
sification which allows the use of highly standardised contracts. In organised 
markets, traders usually also have to pay a fee to use the market facilities. Since 
entry is limited and traders pay for the use of the market, organised markets 
can also be regarded as clubs. The exclusion of traders from the stock market 
serves to prevent free riding on the information costly generated in the  
market.53 
As long as there are relatively few traders the market can still be explicitly 
and centrally organised as, for example, the New York Diamond Dealers’ Club 
                                                     
51 North (1981), 42. 
52 Telser/Higinbotham (1977), 997. 
53 For a further analysis see Telser & Higinbotham (1977) and Telser (1981). 
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the organisation of which has been analysed by Bernstein (1992, 1996). Ac-
cording to her analysis the sophisticated rules and codes of conduct of the dia-
mond industry guarantee that trade is organised in a transaction cost efficient 
manner. Disputes are hardly ever settled by courts, but rather by market arbi-
tration. Furthermore, reputation plays an enormous role in the diamond indus-
try and serves as a bond to guarantee contractual performance. However, as 
Coase explains, 
“when the facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very 
different interests (...) the establishment of a private legal system would be very diffi-
cult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system 
of the State.”54  
Unfortunately, there is no clear indicator or rule of thumb what constitutes 
large numbers and small numbers or high and low transaction costs. One of 
the few academic economists who have specialised in the analysis of organised 
markets, Dennis Carlton, points out in his analysis of organised futures mar-
kets, that while it is possible  
“to identify some important characteristics that make a commodity suitable for a fu-
tures market, it is extremely difficult to predict which futures markets will  
succeed.”55 
Finally, even in markets for highly standardised and measurable goods rela-
tionships between traders seem to play an important role. As Baker (1984) 
reports in his empirical study of floor trading of stock options, price volatility 
strongly increased with the number of trading groups. Granovetter (1992) 
explains these findings on grounds of the number of relations the average trad-
er can sustain, relatively to the total number of traders. With a growing num-
ber of traders the market becomes more fragmented, the information flow 
becomes slower, and convergence to a single equilibrium more problematic. 
                                                     
54 See Coase (1988a), 10. Nevertheless, court enforcement of contracts is rather an 
exception than the rule as Macaulay (1963) has observed. In a similar way, Bernstein 
(1996) argues that explicit contracts rather serve as a benchmark for the case that a 
relationship breaks down than as an agreement of how to proceed while the contrac-
tual relationship is still continuing. 
55 Carlton (1981), 244. 
164 
The Rule of Law Facilitates Market Exchange 
As mentioned above, when property rights are well-defined, safe and secure, 
modern markets can most easily emerge. The extent of a given property right 
depends on (a) the contracts that have been concluded, and (b) the institutional 
environment that is in place. The institutional environment encompasses the 
definition and enforcement of property rights, which determine the transac-
tions costs of and the gains from doing business. 
A fundamental problem with the definition and enforcement of property 
rights is what has been called the “paradox of the strong state” by Barry 
Weingast (1995):  
“The fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is this: A government 
strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to 
confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” 
The problem, then, is how to empower government to subdue predators with-
out letting it become an instrument of predation itself. How can one design an 
institutional environment that gives government the power to protect property 
rights while at the same time prevents government from using this power to 
curb property rights? How is it possible to simultaneously empower and con-
strain government? How can this paradox be solved?  
Given that government has the ability to do good (enforce property rights) 
and bad (destroy property rights), how do we give government agents the in-
centive to do good and avoid bad? One solution proposed by constitutional 
political economists are constitutional constraints. Federalism, separation of 
powers, and the rule of law can structure government power in such a way as to 
limit how that power can be used. Another option can lie in the signature of 
international treaties and entry into international organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which implies a commitment to free trade. 
More generally speaking, the law and regulations surrounding business ac-
tivities should pursue, broad speaking, two objectives. On the one hand, con-
sumers need protection against any producers’ market power, but on the other 
hand investors also need to be protected against expropriation (hold-up) 
through the Government. Accordingly, regulation may be interpreted as an 
implicit contract between producers and consumers, which is administered by 
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an (impartial) regulatory authority.56 Every regulatory system is – necessarily – 
compromised with two types or errors, though. Firstly, regulation or govern-
ment intervention can occur even though it is not necessary or beneficial (type-
I- error), while, secondly, regulation or government intervention may not be in 
place even though it would have been beneficial (type-II-error). To find the 
optimal balance between these two errors is the difficult task of designing 
good regulatory systems to govern market exchange. 
An optimal regulatory system should aim at achieving a balance between 
the following five objectives: (1) preventing the abuse of market power (alloca-
tive efficiency), (2) ensuring cost minimising production (productive efficien-
cy), (3) facilitating optimal investment over time (dynamic efficiency), (4) 
inducing minimal transactions costs (transactions costs efficiency), and (5) 
providing minimal incentives for lobbying and unproductive rent-seeking 
(political efficiency). Of course, trade-offs are unavoidable, and in addition 
there are different political objectives for different industries. In order to facili-
tate investment, however, investor protection is necessary. The problem is 
especially difficult to solve if (i) investments are highly location specific, and 
(ii) investors are foreigners (who do not vote) and are easier to expropriate from 
a political-economy perspective. 
Potential solutions include the international rule of law, the signature of in-
ternational investment protection treaties and accepting “global governance” 
mechanisms. After all, the division of labor (which is responsible for our eco-
nomic well-being) is limited by the extent of the market, as Adam Smith has 
said long ago, but the extent of the market is also limited by the extent of the 
law, as George Stigler has added. Hence, the extent of the law also affects eco-
nomic growth and prosperity. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Summarising the analysis above, whether markets work better than other 
forms of exchange depends on the institutional environment, informational 
aspects and the dimensions of the transaction. In general, an organised market 
can only flourish if the transaction costs of exchange are lower on the market 
                                                     
56 See Goldberg (1976). 
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than they would be under any other mode of organisation. If transactions costs 
are lower within a different mode of organisation, e.g. within long-term bilat-
eral contracts, the market is unlikely to survive.  
First of all, for markets to emerge property rights in the asset to be traded 
have to be well defined and should be as stable and secure as possible. How 
stable property rights are is not only a strictly legal question (whether property 
rights are legally protected and enforceable), but usually also a political ques-
tion. If a property rights allocation is not acceptable to larger parts of society 
for whatever reason, the Government faces incentives to restrict or redefine 
property rights. The risk of (creeping) expropriation makes it more difficult to 
set up and operate organised markets. For example, before investing into the 
establishment of a market for tradable water rights, there needs to be some 
degree of certainty that these property rights will not be redefined and the 
market shut. Whether the creation of a market for some good or service is 
socially acceptable and therefore politically viable obviously depends on the 
particular circumstances. The key questions are whether property rights are 
well defined and expected to remain stable and whether the establishment of a 
market for the good or service is likely to be politically viable. 
A fundamental problem with the definition and enforcement of property 
rights is what has been called the “paradox of the strong state” (Weingast, 
1995):  
“The fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is this: A government 
strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to 
confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” 
The problem, then, is how to empower government to subdue predators with-
out letting it become an instrument of predation itself. How can one design an 
institutional environment that gives government the power to protect property 
rights while at the same time prevents government from using this power to 
curb property rights? Given that government has the ability to do good (en-
force property rights) and bad (destroy property rights), how do we give gov-
ernment agents the incentive to do good and avoid bad?  
One solution proposed by constitutional political economists are constitu-
tional constraints. Federalism, separation of powers, and the rule of law can 
structure government power in such a way as to limit how that power can be 
used. Another option can lie in the signature of international treaties and entry 
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into international organizations such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which implies a commitment to free trade. 
More generally speaking, the law and regulations surrounding business ac-
tivities should pursue, broad speaking, two objectives. On the one hand, con-
sumers need protection against any producers’ market power, but on the other 
hand investors also need to be protected against expropriation (hold-up) 
through the Government. Accordingly, regulation may be interpreted as an 
implicit contract between producers and consumers, which is administered by 
an (impartial) regulatory authority.57 Every regulatory system is – necessarily – 
compromised with two types or errors, though. Firstly, regulation or govern-
ment intervention can occur even though it is not necessary or beneficial (type-
I- error), while, secondly, regulation or government intervention may not be in 
place even though it would have been beneficial (type-II-error). To find the 
optimal balance between these two errors is the difficult task of designing 
good regulatory systems to govern market exchange. 
An optimal regulatory system should aim at achieving a balance between 
the following five objectives: 
- preventing the abuse of market power (allocative efficiency),  
- ensuring cost minimising production (productive efficiency),  
- facilitating optimal investment over time (dynamic efficiency),  
- inducing minimal transactions costs (transactions costs efficiency), and 
- providing minimal incentives for lobbying and unproductive rent-seeking 
(political efficiency).  
Of course, trade-offs are unavoidable, and in addition there are different politi-
cal objectives for different industries. 
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The Rule of Law in the Global Development  
of Constitutionalism 
Thomas Schmitz 
Introduction: a Heterogeneous Legal Terminology 
The legal terminology applicable to our topic is heterogeneous. The German 
law uses the term “Rechtsstaat” [state based on the rule of law] for a concept 
with a long tradition that nowadays emanates from the Constitution.1 The 
French doctrine has adopted the corresponding term “État de droit” for a ra-
ther new concept, which is based, however, on long-known unwritten “general 
principles of law”.2 European Union law uses the analogous term “communau-
té de droit”.3 Meanwhile, in the Common Law tradition, the term “rule of law” 
is prevalent. It also prevails in the international and comparative legal dis-
course. This term is preferable in our context because it describes more accu-
rately what is meant. However, the rule of law in the more vague and open 
sense of the international discourse should not be confused with the well-
defined concept of rule of law in English or American law.  
The fundamental idea of the rule of law is to overcome arbitrariness by 
moderating public power and reliably adjusting it to legal rules. “Rechtsstaat” 
or “rule of law” basically means that the law governs all activities in the state. 
                                                     
1 Schmidt-Aßmann (2004), § 26 no. 10 ff. 
2 Chevallier (2014); Schmitz (1989), 27 ff. (in particular 37 ff.). 
3 European Court of Justice, case 294/83, Les Verts, no. 23 (German translation: 
“Rechtsgemeinschaft”; English translation: “community based on the rule of law”). 
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Everyone, including every institution and power in the state is subject to the 
law. No one stands above the law; no cause is more important than the law. 
Thus, the rule of law is an antithesis to totalitarianism.  
Originally, the concept was limited to this formal understanding. However, 
in the second half of the 20th century, it evolved from the narrow formal to a 
comprehensive material concept that includes numerous material (substantial) 
principles of law.4 All these principles serve the implementation of the rule of 
law and ensure a fair balancing of conflicting interests within the law.  
The rule of law is only one of several basic elements of the model of the 
“freiheitlich-demokratischer Rechtsstaat” [free and democratic state based on 
the rule of law], which is the prevalent model in contemporary Europe. It must 
not be confused with other basic elements, such as democracy and the protec-
tion of human rights, which are not part of it but complementing it. They are 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing but still separate principles. Unfortunate-
ly, in Hanoi this is not always the case, even not within the German-
Vietnamese Rule of Law Dialogue. This sometimes causes misunderstandings. 
Different Manifestations of the Same Fundamental Idea in Europe 
“Rechtsstaat”, “État de droit” and “rule of law” are different manifestations of 
the same fundamental idea. The German concept emerged in the 18th and 19th 
centuries as a liberal antonym to the absolutist concept of the “Polizeistaat” 
[police state] but also roots in the pre-liberal German public law doctrine. It 
was accomplished under the rule of the Basic Law after 1949.5 In France, the 
term “État de droit” was not regularly employed until the eighties of the 20th 
century but many elements were developed since the 19th century in the form 
of unwritten “general principles of law” discovered in a long tradition of juris-
prudence by the French Conseil d’État.6 Some of them had already influenced 
the development of German administrative law via the famous scholar Otto 
                                                     
4 See, for illustration, my overview on the many elements of the "Rechtsstaatsprinzip" 
in German constitutional law, www.thomas-schmitz-hanoi.vn/Downloads/Schmitz-
_Rechtsstaatsprinzip-en.pdf. 
5 See on the development of this concept Tiedemann (2014), 171 ff. 
6 Schmitz (1989), 29 ff. 
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Mayer7 at the end of the 19th century. In the late 20th century, the German 
concept was more developed and more comprehensive. However, this was part-
ly because corresponding elements existing in the French law were not always 
linked to the concept of “État de droit”. Concerning the “rule of law” in Eng-
lish law, there was a more substantial difference. The English concept focused 
on formal aspects and procedural fairness and was more reluctant to recognize 
material (substantial) principles, which would lead to a judicial review not just 
of the making but also of the contents of the decisions of public authorities.  
Under the influence of the emerging European Community/Union law, 
which had its own, autonomous concept of “communauté de droit”, and with 
the feedback from new modern constitutional states which had adopted and 
merged the three different concepts, these concepts converged. This is one 
aspect of the so-called “Europeanisation of law”. EU law enjoys primacy over 
national law. Whenever implementing or applying EU law or encroaching on 
the rights of EU citizen, the member states must comply with the rule of law 
requirements of this legal order. Thus, the law of all member states came un-
der pressure to conform with the numerous “general principles of European 
Union law”, which have been discovered and developed by the European Court 
of Justice in Luxembourg in many decades of evaluative comparison of laws 
[“wertende Rechtsvergleichung”]. These principles are the most up-to-date 
incarnation of the rule of law in the 21st century.8 They also represent the 
common legal heritage of the rule of law in Europe. The development of these 
principles and the harmonization of the different rule of law concepts in the 
European countries have also been stimulated by the jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg when enforcing the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
  
                                                     
7 See in particular Mayer (1886); Mayer (1895). Both publications transferring ele-
ments from French administrative law to German administrative law doctrine.  
8 For a comprehensive presentation and analysis see Tridimas (2007); see also Le-
naerts/van Nuffel (2012), marginal numbers 22–039 ff. 
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The Triumph of the Rule of Law in Europe 
The triumph of the rule of law started in the seventies when Greece, Portugal 
and Spain put an end to dictatorship and enacted free and democratic constitu-
tions that stressed the commitment to the rule of law.9 Portugal and Spain also 
established constitutional courts that developed the constitutional concept of 
“Estado de direito”/“Estado de Derecho” by the way of constitutional interpre-
tation. A strong cooperation with West-European, in particular German con-
stitutionalists facilitated this development. 
The triumph of the rule of law was as its zenith in the nineties, when most 
East European states, after the end of Soviet rule, established and developed 
their up-to-date free, democratic and rule of law based constitutional orders. 
This process was one of the greatest success stories in modern constitutional-
ism, since these states changed from law-negating totalitarianism to state of 
the art rule of law and constitutionalism within a decade. 15 years after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, eight East European states, three of them former Soviet 
Republics, were able to join the European Union, which requires its member 
states to meet the most modern standards of the rule of law. This process was 
encouraged and promoted by the Council of Europe via a high-profile expert 
commission, the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy 
through Law).  
One of the purposes of the Council of Europe is to promote the rule of law. 
The Venice Commission was established in 1990. It is supported by the mem-
ber states of the Council of Europe and a number of other interested states. It 
consists of university professors of constitutional and public international law, 
judges of supreme and constitutional courts, experienced members of parlia-
ments and some civil servants. Its members are designated for four years by the 
states, but act in their individual capacity. The Commission has a permanent 
secretariat in Strasbourg and is holding plenary sessions four times a year in 
Venice (Italy).10  
                                                     
9 See Art. 25 of the Constitution of Greece of 1975, Art. 2 of the Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic of 1976, Art. 1 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. 
10 See on the contribution of the Venice Commission to the development of constitu-
tionalism in East Europe Rülke (2003); Hoffmann-Riem (2014). For detailed infor-
mation www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events. See also the list of articles on the Com-
mission, www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Articles. 
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The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe's advisory body and the 
most prominent think tank on constitutional matters in Europe. It shares and 
promotes the standards and best practices adopted within the member states of 
the Council of Europe. In 500 expert opinions on issues in more than 50 coun-
tries, 80 scientific studies and reports on topical issues, 250 seminars and con-
ferences with dozens of courts and universities and the training of 3.000 civil 
servants in human rights and administrative law, the Commission has provid-
ed an impressive amount of sophisticated advice and training to its member 
states. In particular, it cooperates with the national constitutional courts. The 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has referred to Venice Com-
mission opinions in more than 50 cases.11 The Venice Commission also cooper-
ates with interested non-European partners, for example within the EU-
Central Asia Rule of Law Initiative.12 
A second factor contributing to the triumph of the rule of law was the in-
troduction of constitutional courts in the new East European constitutional 
states. Most states adopted the German model of a separate and independent 
constitutional court with the status of a constitutional institution and the ju-
risdiction of constitutional review.13 This model had been invented in Austria 
but first realized with great success in Germany. As before in Germany, Portu-
gal and Spain, the constitutional courts in East Europe developed the national 
constitutional law by interpreting the new constitutions and their clauses on 
the rule of law. Often it would need a whole book to describe what the consti-
tutional court extracted by the way of interpretation from a small number of 
short constitutional clauses with some indefinite constitutional terms. Sup-
ported by the work of the Venice Commission, they kept in mind the 
achievements of constitutional jurisprudence and theory in the most developed 
constitutional states. They often adopted – but sometimes also criticized – the 
doctrines developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court. In some 
cases, a minority of judges would criticize the majority of judges in a dissen-
ting vote for misunderstanding some inspiring ideas of the German Court.  
                                                     
11 All data provided by the Venice Commission on its website, www.venice.coe.int/-
WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation. 
12 See for details the website of the Venice Commission, www.venice.coe.int/Web-
Forms/pages/?p=03_CARoLInitiative. 
13 See for details Starck (2007).  
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Without independent constitutional courts or supreme courts exercising 
their function, the rule of law can hardly be ensured in practice in a state, since 
without authoritative constitutional interpretation the constitutional dogmatic 
of the rule of law cannot unfold and there is a lack of orientation for the legis-
lator and the ordinary courts. This is even more evident in the field of public 
international law where the rule of law is a binding principle too but usually 
cannot be enforced in practice. The current case of Russia, which has turned 
back to reject the rule of law in domestic as in international affairs, illustrates 
this problem. There are fears that China may follow this example. The idea of a 
“global constitutionalism”14 is unrealistic as long as conflicts like in Ukraine or 
the Eastern Sea are not solved by legal experts in courts or arbitration panels 
but by the way of violence or confrontation. 
The Spreading of the Idea of Rule of Law in the Wake of  
Globalization and Development 
In the wake of globalization and development, the general idea of the rule of 
law has become popular in many countries with emerging economies.15 In 
particular intellectuals and the emerging new middle classes but also govern-
ment think tanks and highly qualified superior officials looking for a way to 
secure a sustainable development, are open-minded about it. A long-term sus-
tainable growth of the national economy is impossible without the legal secu-
rity and certainty provided by the rule of law – in particular in times of inter-
national economic integration.16 The WTO necessarily promotes the rule of 
law because it is depending on it. The ambitious project of the ASEAN Eco-
nomic Community cannot be realized without the rule of law. Furthermore, 
the contribution of the civil society to a sound development of the country, 
which is more and more accepted and appreciated by responsible governments, 
requires certain reliable legal conditions. Finally, the rule of law is essential for 
                                                     
14 Peters (2009) with further references. 
15 For an overview see Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2009): See in particular the analysis 
of Grote, 174 ff. 
16 See the special lecture on this topic at this conference. See also Ewing-
Chow/Losari/Slade (2014).  
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an effective protection of human rights. At the same time it is helpful for the 
rebutting of unjustified allegations of human rights violations utilized as 
means of anti-government propaganda. Following strictly the rule of law may 
lead to a higher degree of rationality in the political process.  
Thus, like many other countries in the world,15 some East and Southeast 
Asian countries have anchored their commitment to the rule of law in their 
national constitutions (see Art. 1 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia of 1945, Art. 78 (6) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 
of 2007, Art. 5 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China of 1982). 
Some countries refer to certain elements of the rule of law in their constitution 
(see, for example, Art. 6 and 10 of the Constitution of the Lao People's Demo-
cratic Republic of 2003). Others have adopted the rule of law as an important 
concept of legal policy. They are supported by the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, NGOs, the EU and Western governments. Strengthening 
the rule of law is an integral element of modern development cooperation. For 
example, German institutions and NGOs are involved in a “Rule of Law Dia-
logue” with Vietnam. 
ASEAN, as an international organization, is also committed to the rule of 
law. The ASEAN Charter defines the strengthening of the rule of law as one of 
the purposes of ASEAN (Art. 1 no. 7). It obliges not only the organization but 
also its member states to act in accordance with the principle of adherence to 
the rule of law (Art. 2 (2) lit. h). The ASEAN Secretariat even describes the 
rule of law as a fundamental feature of ASEAN on its website.17 
However, the adoption of the fundamental idea of the rule of law has also 
brought misunderstandings and distortions.18 There is no common sense or 
awareness of the various formal and material requirements of the rule of law. 
Continental and Common Law doctrines are mingled. Furthermore, the mix-
ing-up with complementing and interacting but separate elements of the mod-
ern constitutional state such as separation of powers, democracy and human 
rights threatens to dilute its contours and to relativize it. Therefore, it would 
be helpful to have a second, global “Venice Commission” in order to facilitate 
orientation, work out a clear distinction between the Western model of a “free 
and democratic constitutional state” and other types of constitutional states 
                                                     
17 ASEAN Sectretariat (2013).  
18 See the country reports at the wiki of the Freie Universität Berlin (2013).  
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and to provide sophisticated advice to developing constitutional states that 
may want to adopt some but not all doctrines of European constitutionalism. 
In ASEAN, the judicial development of law by an ASEAN geo-regional court 
would be helpful to build up an ASEAN rule of law doctrine. 
The Rule of Law in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of  
Vietnam of 2013 
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam of 2013 emphasizes in 
several articles the primacy of the Constitution and the law. Art. 2 (1) defines 
Vietnam as a “state ruled by law” or “law-governed state” [“nhà nước pháp 
quyền”]. According to Art. 8 (1), it shall be “organized and operate in accord-
ance with the Constitution and law” and “manage society by the Constitution 
and law.” This can be understood as a general commitment to constitutional-
ism (unlike in the Soviet Union, other former European socialist states and 
perhaps China, the constitution is taken seriously) and to the rule of law. This 
commitment is underlined when Art. 4 (3) emphasizes that even the “organi-
zations and members of the Communist Party of Vietnam shall operate within 
the framework of the Constitution and the law.” So even the Communist Par-
ty, although it is the “force leading the state and society” (Art. 4 (1) does not 
stand above the law. This was a very important issue in the broad public con-
stitutional reform debate in 2013. Finally, Art. 14 stresses that the human and 
citizens' rights shall be respected and protected in accordance with the law and 
only subject to limitations prescribed by a law.  
However, Art. 2 (1) defines Vietnam more precisely as a “socialist state 
ruled by law” [“nhà nước pháp quyền xã hội chủ nghĩa”]. This does not refer to 
the ancient communist principle of socialist legality, which limited the law to 
the function to serve the building-up of socialism19 and is incompatible with 
the rule of law. However, it neither refers to the classical, European concepts of 
the rule of law. The Vietnamese constitution of 2013 is not a free and demo-
cratic constitution in the sense of European constitutional theory but a modern 
example of the socialist type of constitution. Its commitment to the rule of law 
must be understood in this sense. For example, with regard to the fundamental 
                                                     
19 Kühn (2011), 118 ff. with further references. 
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constitutional principle of democratic centralism (Art. 8 (1), separation of 
powers cannot be part of the rule of law in Vietnam. Consequently, Art. 2 (3) 
provides that the state agencies “coordinate and control one another” but does 
not refer to the concept of separation of powers and instead stipulates that the 
“state power is unified.” 
It will be the task and challenge for the Vietnamese scholars of constitu-
tional law, the courts and the lawmakers to elaborate the special “socialist” 
features of the Vietnamese “socialist rule of law” without compromising or 
diluting the general idea. For example, there may be a greater focus on social 
justice, social coherence and public interests, some limited differences in the 
protection of legitimate interests and a stronger acceptance of the state exercis-
ing influence on the society. There may also be some special material (substan-
tial) principles of law. With regard to Art. 2 (3) a specific system of checks and 
balances must be developed, which ensures that the state institutions control 
one another effectively but which does not yet amount to a real separation of 
powers. Thus, the global development of constitutionalism may lead to the 
emergence of a new variant of the concept of the rule of law. We, the European 
constitutionalists, are looking forward to studying it.  
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Rule of Law and Global Governance 
Ulrich von Alemann 
History of the “Rechtsstaat” 
The idea of the “Rechtsstaat” is very old. It was a common topic of debate in 
19th century Germany. It is linked to statehood and is primarily supposed to 
control the administrative actions of the state with proper legislation – rule of 
law versus arbitrary rule of feudal authority.1 Especially in Germany the nor-
mative doctrine of “Rechtsstaat” is older than the idea of democracy itself; in 
fact, it is older than the constitutional monarchies in, for example, Great Brit-
ain, France, or Scandinavia. In the absolute monarchy of France at the begin-
ning of the 17th century King Louis XIV proclaimed: “L’État, c’est moi!” The 
Prussian King Frederick II the Great, on the other hand, saw himself as an 
enlightened monarch and designated himself: “Ich bin der erste Diener des 
Staates! (I am the first servant of the state!)” 
This fits a wide spread story whose validity is questionable but which tells 
us a lot about the “Rechtsstaat”. Frederick the Great, in his castle in Potsdam 
near Berlin, had been annoyed by the rattling of a mill and had someone in-
form the miller about this. The miller then answered that “there are still judg-
es in Berlin.” The story tells us: even the King of Prussia was subject to law. 
Until today, this has been a common saying in Germany. At around the same 
time, the Prussian-German philosopher Immanuel Kant had demanded a law 
of nations in his 1795 publication “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, 
                                                     
1 Dose (1999).  
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which was built upon the idea of a “universally peaceful alliance of nations”2. 
The Ideals of Kant stated that all human actions, including the actions of the 
state, should ultimately be subject to legal principles. Today, in spite of a lot 
of progress, we are still a long way away from this vision. 
But even more than 150 years earlier an international “rule of law” had 
German roots. This originated in the “Peace of Westphalia” of 1648. It ended 
the Thirty Years’ War between the two Christian denominations, namely 
Catholic and Protestant. It was the first international congress ever in which 
all of the big European powers were represented. They arrived at a peace treaty 
and basically founded the preface to the law of nations in this process. It was a 
long way and took some 300 years to the “The Hague Conventions” at the end 
of the 19th century, when a legal containment of war and neutrality were codi-
fied. This effort was continued in the League of Nations of 1919 but ultimate-
ly failed during the 1930ies. It was not until the foundation of the United 
Nations in 1945 that a basic ground for international regimes was established. 
This encompassed not only organizations aimed at security and peace but also 
organizations concerned with health (WHO), labor (ILO) or culture 
(UNESCO) and many more. 
The Concepts of “Rule of Law”, “Law of Nations” and “Global Governance” 
Originally the term “Rechtsstaat” defined a characteristic of the German 
“Sonderweg (unique path)” in the development of a democratic constitutional 
state. Rule of law binds every governmental authority to constitution, legisla-
tion, and law. The sovereign does not stand above the law. Initially, this was 
seen in a way that the law was often only perceived formally. It was essential 
that a law existed, even if the content and goal of this law might have been 
dubious. This view has since been abolished in Germany after the misuse by 
National Socialism. The fascists during the 1930s actually presented them-
selves in part as guarantors of a “Rechtsstaat”, which itself passed race laws 
(Nuremberg laws) that can only be considered violations of human rights. 
These laws were used to implement inhuman governance. Nowadays, the rule 
of law is seen everywhere as a concept that enforces natural justice regarding, 
for example, inalienable human dignity and human rights.  
                                                     
2 Hoeffe (1995).  
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Authority entails, especially in a democratic rule of law, a monopoly on the 
use of force. This means that only the state is authorized to use force internally 
(police, courts, legal system) and externally (military), which has to be subject 
to judicial examination. The state’s monopoly on the use of force can only be 
justified by the effective comprehension of the constitutions in liberal democ-
racies if the state exercises force lawfully and legitimately. These aspects point 
to the extraordinary role of the constitutional foundation of democratic author-
ity and the normative expectation towards the state, to continuously gain the 
acceptance of its subjects. This German concept of “Rechtsstaat” was initially 
hardly comparable to the English definition of “rule of law”. Today, the two 
concepts have become closer in meaning. In this respect, rule of law is a key to 
worldwide modern political theory, also in the development and foundation of 
young democracies. 
The general law of nations encompassed all laws that governed the relation-
ships of nations. Initially these nations were seen as international legal person-
alities that could not suffer any external authority over themselves. Noninter-
ference in the internal politics of each nation was seen as a golden rule of clas-
sical diplomacy and law of nations. The world of states was anarchic and only 
voluntary contractual agreements were acknowledged. During a long historical 
process, which led to the foundation of the United Nations, this anarchy has 
been converted into a highly complicated legal framework. Today, we are still 
in the midst of this process. There is a change from the traditional law of na-
tions to modern international law. 
The players of the classical law of nations were the states and their repre-
sentatives, namely the diplomats. This also changed some time ago. In today’s 
United-Nations’ conferences diplomats have been reduced to a minority since 
representatives of international organizations, corporations, unions, NGOs, 
scientists etc. make up the majority of delegates. This process has changed 
government to governance, even global governance and has advanced far. We 
will come back to this later. 
Dimensions of the Rule of Law  
So what is the rule of law? What are its criteria and scale? Can the rule of law 
be measured? There are an exceedingly large amount of criteria and scales for 
the rule of law historically and in the present days. We will focus on the pre-
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sent day. To do this I can extract four frameworks from recent publications 
which indicate definitions of the rule of law. 
Table 3: Four Frameworks for the Rule of Law 
 World Justice Report 
(2010) 
Freedom House 
(2010) 
Map of freedom in 
the world (2009) 
Deficiencies of 
rule of law in 
failing states 
(2011) 
1 The government and its 
officials and agents are 
accountable under law 
Independent 
judiciary 
Is there an independ-
ent judiciary? 
No real politi-
cal participa-
tion of the 
electorate 
2 The laws are clear, 
publicized, stable and 
fair, and protect funda-
mental rights, in-
cluding the security of 
persons and property 
Primacy of rule 
of law in civil 
and criminal 
matters 
Does the rule of law 
prevail in civil and 
criminal matters? 
Are police under 
direct “civilian 
control” 
No existence 
and guarantee 
of human 
rights 
3 The process by which 
the laws are enacted, 
administered and en-
forced is accessible, fair 
and efficient 
Accountability 
of security forces 
and military to 
civilian authori-
ties 
Is there protection 
from political terror, 
unjustified impris-
onment, exile, or 
torture, whether by 
groups that support 
or oppose the sys-
tem? Is there free-
dom from war and 
insurgencies? 
No independ-
ence of the 
judiciary and 
frequent vigi-
lantism 
4 Access to justice is 
provided by competent, 
independent, and ethi-
cal adjudicators, attor-
neys or representatives, 
and judicial officers 
who are of sufficient 
number, have adequate 
resources, and reflect 
the makeup of commu-
nities they serve 
Protection of 
property rights 
Do laws, policies, 
and practices guaran-
tee equal treatment 
of various segments 
of the population?  
Notorious and 
widespread 
corruption and 
clientelism 
Source: Schulze-Fielitz (2011), 10. 
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This already is highly elaborate and does not need any further differentiation. 
The table points out the diversity of definitions. This is not a deficit, but ra-
ther the nature of the issue: There cannot be a universally binding definition of 
rule of law, for all time periods, regions and issues. Sometimes only a dichoto-
my exists between a weak rule of law, which especially emphasizes contractual 
security in international legal relations and a strong version, which particularly 
includes human rights. In general, the debate about rule of law is a dynamic 
and continuously differentiating process, which I will discuss in the next part 
of this text. 
Dynamics of the Rule of Law 
The classical old law of nations was applied, as we have seen, from the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 until the Vienna Congress in 1815. The sovereign states 
were the only players, public agents were non-existent. It was a soft law since 
no regulating instance stood above the nations. It was an anarchic law in which 
the strong could usurp the ius ad bellum, the right to war. Since the end of the 
19th century, a rapid and dynamic advancement has been taking place from the 
conventions of The Hague and Geneva to the League of Nations in 1919 up to 
the United Nations in 1945. And since then advancements have picked up in 
speed. In light of the general globalization, international jurisdiction has in-
creased exponentially. This has led to an increase in the amount of contracts 
based on the law of nations by a factor of four.3 Nevertheless, this also is con-
nected to an isolation of the source of the law, jurisdiction. In the past, this has 
always been the nations themselves through internal jurisdiction or externally 
through inter-country contracts. Nowadays, jurisdiction has become independ-
ent of individual nations. International organizations create laws in a way never 
before witnessed.  
“The increasing development of international organizations and international law and 
its forms of implementation has raised the significance of the law of nations to a new 
level never before seen in human history.”4 
                                                     
3 Schulze-Fielitz (2011), 10. 
4 Schulze-Fielitz (2011), 10. 
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In this respect, we are witnesses to a new process of international rule of law. 
Not only has the number of contracts increased but also the number of judicial 
instances. There is now a “judicalization” of the law of nations which leads to 
an increase in politically independent international courts and arbitration in-
stances. By now there are supposed to be a total of 125 such instances. 
At the moment, a big German research project at Humboldt University 
Berlin is investigating “The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?” The 
research agenda is as following:  
“The Research Group examines the role of international law in a changing global or-
der. Can we, under the current significantly changing conditions, still observe an in-
creasing juridification of international relations based on a universal understanding of 
values, or are we, to the contrary, rather facing a tendency towards an informalization 
or a reformalization of international law, or even an erosion of international legal 
norms? Would it be appropriate to revisit classical elements of international law in 
order to react to structural changes, which may give rise to a more polycentric or non-
polar world order? Or are we simply observing a slump in the development towards an 
international rule of law based on a universal understanding of values?”5 
We can thus come to an intermediary conclusion: The internationalization of 
law is increasing more and more dynamically with respect to the amount of 
international contracts and the amount of international dispute settlement 
institutions. Let us now look at the regional level in Europe. 
European Experience of the Rule of Law 
Europe is the world’s leading region when it comes to integration and net-
working of international law. This is the case in two distinct but mutually 
overlapping institutions: The European Union and the Council of Europe.  
The Council of Europe is far less known worldwide and is often confused 
with the European Union; despite it is a completely independent and self-
contained institution. The Council of Europe was founded on May 5th, 1949 
with the contract of London and today encompasses 47 European nations 
which represent 820 Million citizens. The Council of Europe is not a state-like 
structure, like the European Union, but rather a European international organ-
ization, a forum for debate and general questions concerning Europe. The 
                                                     
5http://www.jura.fu-berlin.de/fachbereich/einrichtungen/oeffentliches-recht/lehrende/-
kriegerh/KFG/index.html, 21.02.2016 
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Council of Europe far surpasses the core of Europe, the Western- and Central-
European area, and encompasses Russia and the former soviet states. 
The most important treaty brought forth by the Council of Europe is the 
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. This has led to the European 
Court of Human Rights being its most important institution. Every person in 
Europe can call upon the European Court of Human Rights and claim that his 
rights were violated according to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Since its reform in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights has grown in 
influence and has passed multiple judgments that have impacted the legal 
order of individual nations. These court judgments can in fact not be enforced 
by any European executive authority, but they have considerable political and 
lasting effects. 
Subject to the rule of law to an even higher degree is the European Union, 
founded with the Treaties of Rome in 1957, with initially five member na-
tions, but which has continuously expanded and deepened through various 
treaties. At the moment the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, is in effect. 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the rule of law is an explicitly accen-
tuated foundation of the Union (Art. 6 Abs. 1, now Art. 2 EUV): 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democra-
cy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of per-
sons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a 
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equal-
ity between women and men prevail” (Art. 2 EU-Treaty). 
The rule of law is also an explicit condition for entry into the EU. Even though 
the Treaty of Lisbon does not further differentiate the principles of the rule of 
law, multiple rules of the European Community Law include fundamentals of 
the rule of law. This is the case in, for example: 
- the legality of administration, 
- legal principles based on basic rights, 
- the right to effective legal protection, 
- the right to a fair trial based on the rule of law, public liability for legisla-
tive injustice, 
- or in the sense of general elementary laws, like the elementary law of com-
mensurability, legal certainty, legitimate expectation, the legal principle 
that measures should not have retroactive effects, or the prohibition of dou-
ble jeopardy. 
192 
The ascertainment of all these principles is guarded by the European Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg, which has grown into a mighty guardian of the Euro-
pean treaties. But more core elements of the rule of law can be identified: 
- the existence of basic- and human rights, 
- the separation of powers, 
- the independence of courts, 
- the binding of all state authority in the constitution (Normenhierarchie), 
- reservation of the law. 
All these principles show a mutual learning process which is aimed at making 
rule of law a central benchmark in the European constitutional discourse.6 In 
spite of all this general juridification and standardization of the rule of law in 
Europe, distinct differences in the ways that the rule of law is individually 
accentuated are evident. Thus different traditions in the rule of law are still 
continuing to grow, like the British Common Law in contrast to the continen-
tal codified law. This difference in the rule of law partly refers to important 
basic principles, whether a constitutional jurisdiction exists in the nation or 
not. In Germany the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
is viewed as the “summit of the rule of law” (Klaus Stern). This is not the case 
in other countries. All in all, the principle of the rule of law plays a smaller 
part in European Law in contrast to its paramount importance in the German 
constitution (“Grundgesetz”) and in German law in general. 
Global Governance 
The function of the rule of law as a central benchmark for the existence and 
function of statehood in an international comparison becomes even more heter-
ogeneous than in Europe. Rule of law is not constitutionalized on a global 
level, not even in the UN-Charter. In addition to that, no international defini-
tion or even term for it can be expected in an international linguistic usage. 
Nevertheless, a “grand coalition” of World Bank, human rights organizations 
and national and international security experts exists which all “sing the prais-
es of the rule of law together”.7 The UN puts its emphasis on the rule of law 
particularly on the obligation to the law, separation of powers, effective legal 
protection through independent courts, and the protection of human rights.  
                                                     
6 Schulze-Fielitz (2011), 3. 
7 Schuppert cited by Schulze-Fielitz (2011), 4. 
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The current globalization processes imply an increase and compression of 
cross-border interactions which involve almost all social classes, nations, organ-
izations, group of players, and individuals in a complex system of mutual de-
pendencies. The scope of actions of individuals, the scope of national politics, 
“Lebenswelten” (lifeworlds), social classification patterns, and deep structures 
of societies are undergoing lasting changes.8 Local, regional, and national glob-
al spheres are constantly shrinking and connecting to each other in new ways. 
The process of globalization poses problems which far surpass classical foreign 
politics. In addition to that, it poses new requirements for national politics. 
Thus the development of a global rule of law and an international culture of 
cooperation is now needed more than ever. 
The idea of rule of law is one of the great achievements of modern democra-
cies. Global governance is only possible with a strong global rule of law. The 
long-term stability of global societies, democracy, freedom, and solidarity can 
only be sustained through a cooperation-encouraging set of rules, in other 
words, institutional and legal containment of power is needed. The formation 
of global rules has to incorporate the differing effects of globalization and 
combine them with generally accepted principles, norms, and rules with spe-
cial provisions for specific groups of nations. The founders of the UN already 
pursued the goal of a worldwide rule of law but could only achieve it in incipi-
ent stages. For example they created the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague in 1945. However, nations could decide if they wanted to adhere to the 
court’s rulings (Germany declared its submission in 2008). In 2002 the Inter-
national Criminal Court was also established in The Hague. It has, however, 
not been recognized by some nations to this day (e.g. USA, China, India, Rus-
sia, Israel and Turkey). Vietnam, however, has joined. 
Conclusion: Cultural Diversities of the Rule of Law? 
Today, the rule of law has become a dynamic process which far surpasses the 
UN Charter and the UN-sub-organizations. For instance, it encompasses mari-
time law, diplomatic- and consulate law, space law, and trade law (WTO). 
Initially, the law of nations was only applied between sovereign nations. To-
                                                     
8 Messner/Gu/Humphrey (2008).  
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day, multiple networks of interconnected agents exist: Diplomats of nations, 
international organizations, corporations and civil society. This new situation 
is called “global governance”. However, this process also experiences a lot of 
set-backs, contradictions, and inconsistencies. It is evident regularly in region-
al and global conflicts, even today. Thus, enforcement of international rule of 
law still constitutes a big challenge. 
There are two understandings of the rule of law which vary in sophistica-
tion: Weaker doctrines (weak law: without connections to notions of democra-
cy and justice, more commonly accepted in international law) and stronger 
doctrines (strong law: e.g. validity of human rights, more commonly accepted 
in the western hemisphere). The ASEAN-States have incorporated a strength-
ening of the rule of law since 20.11.2007 onwards (ASEAN-Charter). In Islam-
ic constitutions the concept of rule of law has not prevailed and is sometimes 
even rejected completely. Most nations, however, are convinced that democracy 
cannot exist without the rule of law, but that the rule of law can exist without 
democracy. It is disputed whether the basis of the rule of a constitutional de-
mocracy has to be a market-based system with decentralized policymakers. But 
surely it is true that a market-based economy cannot exist without a funda-
mental rule of law, especially with regards to the freedom of contract and law 
of contract. 
Finally, we can sum up by saying that the increasing development of inter-
national organizations and of international law and its forms of implementa-
tion has elevated the meaning of the law of nations to a level never seen before 
in human history. The juridification in the process of globalization, however, is 
subject to a multitude of set-backs, contradictions, and inconsistencies. There 
is a dramatic increase in juridification but no standardization. 
Many questions thus remain unanswered: Do all involved nations under-
stand the juridified rules in the same way? Does a hegemonic claim of Europe-
an judicial values through the suppression of deviating traditions exist? In how 
far is legal thinking dependent on culture? Is there another rule of law, apart 
from the one coined by western culture? These are all questions that are still 
open and should be discussed further in a global forum. 
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IV. Contemporary Debates 

State Reformation and Improvement – towards  
a Vietnamese State of Law  
Bui Xuan Duc 
Awareness and Improvement towards a Vietnamese State of Law 
Adjusted awareness of the position and role of the state and of the Vietnamese 
Socialist state of law under new conditions is especially important. Our under-
standing of the state of law and of its development was made clear by the Party 
at the 2nd Plenum of the 7th Executive Committee (November 1991), and then 
was mentioned in successive speeches by the General Secretary of the Executive 
Committee Do Muoi at the 11th Plenum of the 8th National Assembly and the 
National Congress of judicial officials (August 10th 1992) in which he stated: 
“The development of a state of law is one of the central tasks in reforming the 
political system”.1 The statement was officially confirmed at the 8th National 
Congress of the Party (under article 3 on state construction and improvement):  
“state construction and improvement must be performed on the basis of these points: 
(…) – Consolidate the legal system and develop a Vietnamese Socialist state of law.”2 
The construction of a socialist state of law in our country is also proposed and 
made clear. Document of the 3rd Plenum of the 8th Executive Committee (June 
1997) confirms:  
                                                     
1 Do Muoi (1993), 143–149. 
2 Vietnamese Communist Party (1996), 44–45.  
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“Construction of a socialist state of law is a new mission (…) there are various tasks 
and experiences to be gained. But we are slowly developing our viewpoints and princi-
ples on the construction of a socialist state of law.”3  
Up to now, the Party Documents have proposed three main features of a 
Vietnamese socialist state of law:  
- The state of law must ensure all civil rights. Its legislature, executive and 
judiciary must be of the people. 
- Close supervision between the branches of power must be ensured to avoid 
abuse and exploitation of civil power. 
- Human rights must be protected; the state is to serve popular sovereignty.  
- The state of law must foster and generate substantive legal awareness 
among all public organs, organizations and individuals so that they abide 
by the constitution and law. 
These viewpoints on the construction of a state of law are in conjunction with 
the general criteria in the world now. First of all, it is necessary to develop a 
strong mechanism that serves popular power, sufficient task allocation between 
power branches to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; and close supervision of 
state authorities to avoid abuse and exploitation of state power.4 Democratic 
centralism must be followed and socialist legislation must be consolidated. 
Also, society must be regulated by the law and moral education must be pro-
moted. According to legal theory and practice, a state of law has four main 
features: 
- (1) The state of law upholds and is regulated by the law and has appropriate 
mechanisms to ensure the supremacy of law. 
                                                     
3 In many countries, a state of law is said to consist of the following elements: the state 
is legally bound, performs and ensures individual rights and freedom, applies the 
separation of powers and devise mechanisms to control power enforcement among 
different power branches. 
4 See the first documents such as: Document of the 2nd Congress of the 7th Central 
Executive Committee (November 1991); speech by General Secretary of the Central 
Executive Committee at the 11th Plenum of the 8th National Assembly and in the 
National congress of judicial officials (August 10th 1992); Document of the 8th Na-
tional People’s Congress of the Party (1997), Document of the 9th National People’s 
Congress of the Party (2001).  
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The first basic feature of a state of law is the supremacy of the law. Law is the 
basis for the organization and implementation of public power, which means 
that every policy and “command” of the state must be based on and serve the 
law, and all state-individual relations are also maintained by it. The state of 
law carries out its activities primarily on the basis of legislation and strictly 
follows it. This state makes clear and acknowledges that all state organs and 
public officials are bounded by the law, which means that their activities are 
based on their authorities and responsibilities as regulated by the law.  
- (2) The state of law ensures individual freedom and makes sure that the 
state and its citizens are equal in terms of their rights and responsibilities. 
Freedom, democracy and human legitimate interests must be protected by 
the state through legal measures. 
The state of law must facilitate the protection of individual rights and freedom 
against the abuse of public authority. In civilized societies, the state is primari-
ly and of necessity concerned with protecting human interests and rights. A 
state of law seeks to protect human freedom and respect the law and human 
rights. In legal terms, it means civil and public liberty is recognized and state 
interventions are minimized, and the state is subject to the law and thus has to 
adhere to it.  
In a state of law, personal liberty, rights, interests, honor and dignity are 
protected, ensured and infrangible. Also, reciprocity between the state as the 
holder of political power and individuals who partake in its execution is em-
phasized. This reciprocity is based on the following principles: 
- Individuals have the upper hand in their reciprocal relations with the state. 
This means that a state of law is supposed to serve individual interests. Its 
goal is to serve social and individual rights. State organs hold responsibili-
ties (obligations) in relation to the people. They cannot ask the people to 
beg for these rights. 
- Civil rights and liberties must be applied in realistic conditions. 
- The supremacy of the law must be respected in the regulation of state-
individual relations, and random, harmful or arbitrary decisions in policy-
making and law enforcement must be minimized. Binding regulations are 
created to govern these relations.  
- Administrative procedures to ensure civil rights are simplified. 
- The state is supposed to serve the individual. 
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- The state and its organs are liable for their violation of the law. To this end, 
judicial bodies and independence must be respected. Only courts can make 
decisions on legal disputes.  
- (3) In a state of law, state power is properly managed, the separation of 
powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary is clearly demarcat-
ed based on a checks and balances system to stabilize state power as a whole 
and produce popular power. 
In the past, outdated thinking led Vietnam to disregard the separation of pow-
ers in favor of a centralized power, in which the National Assembly was en-
dowed with absolute power. Other organs were not independent but were only 
part of the National Assembly and tasked with fulfilling its ongoing work, and 
at the same time were put under its supervision and management. The past 
showed that this method of organization was highly deficient. Since the 1992 
Constitution, separation of powers has been included and introduced as a prin-
ciple to ensure power coordination and distribution among the legislature, 
executive and judiciary. 
- (4) The state of law must ensure efficient review of the constitutionality and 
legality of public organs through such institutions as constitutional and 
administrative courts.  
The state of law creates a review system to check the constitutionality of legal 
documents made by the legislature and the legality of decisions and documents 
made by the executive. This system is responsible for monitoring all three 
power branches, namely the legislature, executive and judiciary. The constitu-
tional bodies (constitutional council, constitutional court) are even superior to 
the legislature. Constitutional review is highly developed and functional in 
countries where the state of law is taken as a basis for development goals. In 
general, the basic features of a state of law are supremacy of the law, the assur-
ance and protection of human rights and the separation and balance of powers 
and responsibilities.  
Before the Renovation Policy (1986), our Party never used the concept 
“state of law”, but the features and requirements of such a state had been rec-
ognized and clarified in its documents such as the 1946 Constitution, 1959 
Constitution and 1980 Constitution and other specific legal documents. Since 
the introduction of the Renovation Policy (1986), Vietnam has commenced 
the construction of a state of law by specifying its requirements and features, 
studying and investigating vital institutions that enforce the state to obey the 
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law and respect democracy, that promote social administration based on the 
law, which eventually leads to a state of law of the people, by the people and 
for the people. Especially after the 5th Party Congress, ideas on the state of law 
have been regularly included in the Party’s documents,5 reflecting an ever more 
inclusive, rational and complete understanding of the state of law in human 
history and Marxist-Leninist and Ho Chi Minh’s viewpoints on the construc-
tion of a socialist state of law under the Party’s leadership. 
The construction of a socialist state of law in our country is also proposed 
and made clear in various documents. The document of the 3rd Plenum of the 
8th Executive Committee (June 1997) confirms:  
“Construction of a socialist state of law is a new mission (…) there are various tasks 
and experiences have to be gained. But we are slowly developing our viewpoints and 
principles on the construction of a socialist state of law.”  
Up to now, the Party Documents have proposed three main features of a Viet-
namese socialist state of law:  
- The state of law must ensure all the civil rights. Its legislature, executive 
and judiciary must be of the people. 
- Close supervision between the branches of power must be ensured to avoid 
abuse and exploitation of civil power. 
- Human rights must be protected; the state is to serve popular sovereignty.  
- The state of law must foster and generate substantive legal awareness 
among all public organs, organizations and individuals so that they abide 
by the Constitution and law. 
These viewpoints on the construction of a state of law are in conjunction with 
the general criteria in the world now. First of all, it is necessary to develop a 
strong mechanism that serves popular power, sufficient task allocation between 
power branches to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; and close supervision of 
state authorities to avoid abuse and exploitation of state power.6 Democratic 
centralism must be followed and socialist legislation must be consolidated. 
Also, society should be regulated by the law and moral education should be 
promoted.  
                                                     
5 See National Politics Publisher (1997), 36–40.  
6 Vietnamese Communist Party (2006), 127. 
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State Reforms towards a Socialist State of Law in Recent Years 
The State’s Position and Role in the Political System 
The amended constitution 2013 defines the role and position of our state as 
follows:  
“The state guarantees and promotes the people's right to mastery; facilitates the goal of 
prosperous people and a strong, democratic, just and civilized country, in which all 
people enjoy an abundant, free and happy life and are given conditions for their com-
prehensive development; and severely punish any act that goes against the interests of 
the motherland and its people” (Article 3). The role of our state is twofold: an instru-
ment to promote the people’s mastery and lead them to a free, abundant and happy life 
and a guardian of the country that protects it against any act that infringes on the 
fatherland and people’s interests. This is a democratic and socialist state of law. It 
serves the working class along with workers and nations in the world. The state creates 
democracy among the people but is also vigilant of their enemies and any force that 
may threaten the fatherland.” 
Utilization of the Separation and Balance of Powers in Managing State Power 
In developing a state of law, in recent years our country has been conducting 
state reforms based on the criteria of state of law, including the  
principle:  
“The state power is unified and delegated to state agencies which coordinate with and 
control one another in the exercise of the legislative, executive and judicial powers” 
(Document of the 11th Congress, 2011).  
Since 1986, driven by the goal of constructing a Vietnamese socialist state of 
law, the organization and performance of state apparatus have seen fundamen-
tal changes in both quality and quantity. The organization and performance of 
each state body is consolidated and improved to fulfill the requirements and 
demands of comprehensive national renovation and international integration. 
The state is organized in accordance with the development of a socialist market 
economy and state of law under the Party’s leadership. The separation and 
coordination between state powers become more and more systematic, specific 
and consistent. The National Assembly is regarded as the highest state body 
which is given constitutional and legislative powers, decides on important 
issues for the country, and conducts the supreme oversight over the activities 
of the state. Its organization is perfected while its activities are improved and 
renewed. The government is the highest administrative body of the Socialist 
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Republic of Vietnam, and is the executive body of the National Assembly. The 
government manages the overall performance of political, economic, cultural, 
social, security tasks and foreign affairs of the state. Its organization and appa-
ratus are gradually arranged and amended towards a more simple and effective 
performance by a focus on inclusive and important issues of the country. The 
judiciary and its court system are also enhanced. The organization and perfor-
mance of judicial bodies see positive changes. Local authorities are also re-
formed to become less bureaucratic and formal to adapt to local circumstances 
at different levels. Most of the public servants and cadres are trained and im-
proved in both political consciousness and professional skills so that they are 
able to complete their assignments; some of them have become mature enough 
to handle challenges and difficulties in the process of state reforms; their ac-
tiveness and dutifulness have increased; most of them uphold political stand-
ards and become intimate with the masses; and they are conscious about fol-
lowing the law and general principles.  
It can be said that the separation, coordination and control of state power in 
Vietnam in recent years have contributed to effective state’s activities; im-
proved the quality of supervision and self-supervision of administrative bodies, 
the control of the supreme procuration and supervision of state organs by Na-
tional Assembly and people’s councils and regular assessments of state organs, 
public servants and state employees by subsidiary bodies of the Fatherland’s 
Front and the people.  
Reforms of the State Organizational Structure  
The position of National Assembly as the highest representative body of the 
people and the highest state body of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is em-
phasized. The principles of people-based state power, democratic leadership 
and people’s creative power are adhered to. State power is unified and delegat-
ed to state agencies which coordinate with and control one another in the exer-
cise of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The organization of the 
National Assembly is increasingly reformed for better performance. Its perma-
nent members increase and their quality also improves. The Ethnic Council 
and Committees are upgraded. The National Assembly’s Party and Unions 
have improved their leadership. The legislative has increased in both quality 
and quantity. Legislative procedures are increasingly revamped towards more 
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efficiency, better and faster law-making, more unity and synchronicity to bet-
ter adapt to the state of law. 
The administrative system and bodies are organized and divided more thor-
oughly than other state organs. The role and functions of government, minis-
tries and people’s committees in the whole administrative system are rede-
fined; and administrative bodies are rearranged to ensure more efficiency, sim-
plicity and less bureaucracy. The organizational structure and membership of 
the government are also reformed. Ministries with similar functions are com-
bined into multi-sector and multi-area departments. State agencies are reor-
ganized so that no agency has to be involved in state management. In 1992, 
the government consisted of 23 ministries, ministerial-level agencies and 25 
government-attached agencies with one prime minister, five deputy prime 
ministers, 25 Ministers; in 2002 there were 26 ministries and ministerial-level 
agencies and 13 government-attached agencies with one prime minister, three 
deputy prime ministers, 26 ministers and heads of ministerial-level agencies. 
Ministries’ tasks are relocated. Local authorities have been restructured accord-
ing to administrative units by removing the people’s councils at some levels 
and reducing the number of departments, offices, committees and people’s 
committees at different levels (from 40 to 25 at the provincial level and from 
20 to 10 at the district level). Responsibilities of individuals and groups work-
ing for administrative bodies are clearly defined on a collegial basis. Public 
services and public officials are retrained to be more specialized. 
The organizational structure of the people’s court, people’s public procura-
tion and public auditing groups are gradually improved and consolidated ac-
cording to judicial requirements and their performance also increases. The 
quantity and quality of cadres, public officials and employees in the political 
system increases and they are better trained for state management and public 
services. Other policies such as wages, retirement benefits, insurance and privi-
leges are regularly changed.  
Shortcomings, Weaknesses and Remaining Problems 
An important requirement in state reforms at central level (National Assem-
bly, President, Government and judicial organs) is to follow the new principle 
of “unity of power” as demonstrated in the 11th National Congress of the Party 
Resolution: “state power is unified and delegated to state agencies which coor-
dinate with and control one another in the exercise of the legislative, executive 
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and judicial powers” and as included in the mission of constructing a state of 
law. However, even after changes were added to the Amended Constitution 
2013, the coordination, delegation and control between state agencies in the 
exercise of the legislative, executive and judicial powers are still limited with-
out necessary “radical” changes to realize the above principle; in particular, 
mutual control, checking and supervision between power branches are not 
sufficient to help avoid power abuse. The unity of state power is currently 
limited to the National Assembly and People’s Councils, while the power of 
other agencies is not significant and mutual control between different agencies 
is inadequate (if not absent). The organizational structure of local authorities is 
still generic and stereotypical without specific partition according to adminis-
trative units (rural, urban, basic, intermediary levels) and self-governing and 
self-responsible authorities are not clearly defined.  
The functions and organizational structure of the National Assembly’s 
agencies and government-attached ministries and departments are not clearly 
marked so that they can fulfil their role and power. The functions and respon-
sibilities of judicial bodies, especially the People’s Public Procuration, are not 
fully made clear. The organization and membership of people’s court and peo-
ple’s procuration are not relevant to judicial reforms. Urban and rural authori-
ties are not clearly differentiated. A number of cadres and public officials and 
employees are not responsible and enthusiastic enough. The shrinking of polit-
ical, ideological and moral standards among a large number of cadres and party 
members is serious and unsettling.  
Many agencies still retain excess and overload personnel with too many 
nodes and intermediaries. The goal of personnel reduction is underperformed. 
Many cadres, public officials and employees are not ready to complete their 
new missions, especially in assessing theoretical and practical events based on 
which to give recommendation and feedback to central organs on strategic 
issues in socio-economy, security, politics and foreign affairs.  
Administrative and judicial reforms drag on yet produce limited results, 
especially judicial reforms. Many cadres and public officials today are limited 
and deficient in many ways: their professional skills are not sufficient, especial-
ly foreign languages and IT skills, as well as knowledge of science and technol-
ogy; their pro-activeness, receptiveness, and self-discipline are still low; their 
management and governing skills are not ample; some of them are even in-
volved in corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement, and display biased 
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and irresponsible attitudes in performing public services, causing indignation 
among the people.  
The relations between party and state are blurred. Therefore, it is necessary 
to identify the influence of the ruling party on state organs and emphasize the 
supremacy of the law to avoid arbitrary intervention of the Party into the af-
fairs of state organs, overlapping responsibilities and disrespect for the law.  
The construction and perfection of the legal system still lacks legal con-
sciousness. Although various reforms in the legislature have been made after 
30 years of renovation, the Vietnamese legal system is currently outdated and 
falls short of itself. Thus, it is necessary to change our legal thinking to cope 
with such issues as defining a proper legal model; studying and synthesizing 
domestic and foreign experiences in the construction and execution of legal 
institutions to gain valuable experiences of our own; amend legal procedures; 
and change our thinking on law-making by focusing more on regulations of 
smaller governing scope. 
Although party and state have promulgated useful measures to combat cor-
ruption and abuse of power, these problems remain serious and relatively wide-
spread. From an objective viewpoint, this reality results from the negative 
aspects of the market economy. On the other hand, the Party and State them-
selves are partly responsible for it by not being aware of the flipside of a social-
ist-driven market economy, and by not providing cadres and party members 
with necessary ideological training to respond to this situation. It is also 
caused by irresolute personnel management and slow realization of effective 
punitive measures, policies and mechanisms against officials who commit cor-
ruption. A number of public officers, including managers and leaders, are not 
committed to self-improvement on a regular and conscious basis, distance 
themselves from the masses and fail to rally other members in the political 
system and society into anti-corruption and anti-extravagance efforts.  
Continue to Reform and Improve the State Apparatus and Develop a 
Vietnamese Socialist State of Law  
The Conclusion no 64-KL/TW (February 28th 2013) of the 7th Congress of 11th 
Central Committee on some issues such as reforming and improving the polit-
ical system from central to grassroots levels stated that: the reformation and 
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improvement of political system must go hand in hand with improving the 
party’s leadership towards efficient and effective state management, and pro-
moting the people’s mastery. Political and social stability must be maintained 
to serve national development in a new era. Political organizations must be 
renewed and improved in accordance with economic restructuring. In addition, 
this has to go in line with the renewal of the party’s leadership in a single-
party system, the construction of a socialist state of law, a socialist-oriented 
market economy and international integration. State reformation and im-
provement must be associated with improving the functionality and profes-
sional skills of public officials and cadres. The relationship between collective 
leadership and individual responsibility must be identified, and power must go 
hand in hand with responsibility.  
The development of a socialist state of the people, by the people, for the 
people is crucial to modernizing the state and fundamental to promoting the 
people’s mastery and ensuring that power belongs to them. The development 
of a Vietnamese state of law is the continuation of developing a Socialist State 
under new circumstances. The Vietnamese state of law is a state of the people, 
by the people and for the people led by the Communist Party. State power 
belongs to the people and rests on the coalition between working class, farmers 
and intellectuals. The state of Vietnam helps foster a happy life and compre-
hensive and free development of human, protects human legitimate rights and 
interests, and commits to international treaties on human rights to which Vi-
etnam is a member. 
The role of the state is emphasized under the new political system. To effec-
tively perform its role within the new political system, the state has to be nec-
essarily revamped in every aspect. This urgent renovation is driven by many 
factors, both subjective and objective, and most basic among which is the need 
for a simple yet dynamic state apparatus that is able to quickly respond to 
external events and social requirements, and ensure that development goals are 
rightly and aptly pursued. More importantly, under the current situation of 
Vietnam’s revolutionary path, an appropriate state model must be found so 
that: one the one hand, such a state is a useful and pertinent instrument that 
not only fulfils its assigned tasks and functions but also strengthens state order 
and organization; on the other hand, it can ensure a democratic and energetic 
society – in which freedom, equality, fraternity and human rights become 
actualized. The more society is democratic, the more social relations, especially 
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political and power relations, become more complicated and less apparent, thus 
requiring strong organization and management and strict order imposed by 
the state. Freedom and democracy must be realized, respected and protected, 
and once their safety (security) is ascertained, no one (individuals or state or-
gans) will dare to violate and threaten them.  
The execution of state power must be fixed and direct democracy extended. 
The organization and enforcement of state power have to be performed in a 
democratic way, so that the state apparatus can be flexible, dynamic and rele-
vant to everyday activities of civil society. Currently, the abuse of power and 
bureaucratization are not resolutely combated. In addition, irresponsible man-
agement, disregard for the law and state power, provincialism, sectarianism, 
petty individualism, disorganization and partisan “democracy” are immanent 
and likely to emerge given the right conditions.  
To stabilize state-civil relations, necessary legal safeguards must be estab-
lished so that citizens are not left out of (marginalized) state power relations. 
To this end, we must make sure that the state as represented by state organs is 
established on the basis of free will, through rational election of state officials 
in a democratic and objective manner. With regards to the state of law and 
civil society, liberal election is one of the most important instruments in mak-
ing sure that the people’s will is embedded in state power. Elections (especially 
self-nomination and nomination – liberal, direct and public election contest) 
must bring voters and candidates closer. Mutual understanding between the 
voters and candidates empowers the former to make their right choice and 
encourage the latter to fulfill their responsibilities, obligations and expecta-
tions in relation to voters. What is required now is to reform the current elec-
tion system so that election becomes an important political occasion, where 
citizens are aware of their mastery to choose rightful candidates, and where 
capable nominees engage in fair competition.  
State reforms must abide by the principle of unity of power, in which state 
power is delegated to state agencies which coordinate with and control one 
another in the exercise of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The 
organization of central state apparatus must be improved so that the position, 
functions, tasks and rights of each agency is properly and attentively assigned 
according to the principle of unity of power, in which state power is delegated 
to state agencies which coordinate with and control one another in the exercise 
of the legislative, executive and judicial powers as designated by the Document 
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of the 11th National Congress. The boundaries between the legislature, execu-
tive and judiciary must be clearly defined and so are their direct equivalents: 
National Assembly – the legislature, government – the executive, courts – the 
judiciary. The president is the head of state that links all three branches of 
power which coordinate and control one another at the same time. Regulations 
on the position and role of the National Assembly and the Government of 
Vietnam should be reworked.  
Power control between state organs must be established and conducted 
more efficiently through specialized constitutional review. In constructing a 
state of law, to ensure that the state and society function within legal bounda-
ries, the Constitution should be regarded as a vital document based on which 
the constitutionality of all other acts and legal documents is judged. In addi-
tion, the constitution should have a direct impact on the regulation of social 
relations, which means that it should be directly cited to establish civil rights 
and responsibilities. It has been often said that legal documents are the realiza-
tion of the Constitution of Vietnam and sub-legal documents are the actualiza-
tion of the laws. But the question remains: does the actualization of the consti-
tution and the laws commit to constitutionality and legality? Similarly, do 
executive and judicial agencies enforce the law according to the constitution 
and the law? To make sure that the state does not fall into formalism, one of 
the important requirements is to protect the constitution and review the con-
stitutionality of state agencies from the National Assembly to lower organs. 
This can be done through specialized constitutional review as stated in the 
“Resolution of the 10th Party Congress” (2006):  
“The establishment of a system to address unconstitutional acts within the legislature, 
executive and judiciary.”7  
State reforms should focus on the following goals: 
- (1) The role of National Assembly should be promoted and reformed. As 
the highest representative organ of the people, the highest state power or-
gan, and fully responsible for constitutional making and legislation, the 
National Assembly should focus on the following three functions: legisla-
tion, deciding on important issues of the country, particularly on the basic 
principles of state organization and activities (including the appointment 
                                                     
7 Vietnam Communist Party (2006), 127.  
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and dismissal of heads of senior state agencies), and supreme oversight over 
the activities of the state. 
- (2) How to help other state organs maintain power control over the Nation-
al Assembly which has been long defined as the “highest state power body” 
is what concerns us both theoretically and practically. Power control (pri-
marily manifested in constitutional review) over not only the executive or 
judiciary as in the current Vietnamese political system, but also over the 
legislature and eventually all three power branches, must be carried out 
within constitutional boundaries. 
- (3) However, the National Assembly’s activities, first and foremost law – 
making, while not entirely constitutional (if not highly likely to be uncon-
stitutional), are not put under the supervision of any state organ but are 
self-regulated by itself, thus are probably not objective and appropriate. 
But to assign the supervision of any organ over the National Assembly 
would derail its position as “the highest state power body”. This is precisely 
the obstacle to the recent ideas of establishing constitutional bodies (such as 
Constitutional Council, Constitutional Court) for constitutional review of 
the National Assembly. If the constitution is emphasized and its protection 
is highlighted through constitutional review, it will be imperative to re-
solve this dilemma, namely the position of the National Assembly in rela-
tion to other state organs. As long as the National Assembly is still the 
highest state power organ that can intervene into constitutional, legislative, 
executive, judicial and supervisory activities, mutual power control and 
genuine constitutional review are still wishful thinking. 
- (4) The judiciary must be given more independence so that it is less de-
pendent on administrative bodies and more relevant to the law. A devel-
oped and efficient judicial system indicates a civilized and democratic state. 
This is one of the essential conditions for the protection of human rights 
and civil liberty and interests. A strong judiciary also contributes to a sta-
ble legal order and state control. As a component of the state of law and ac-
cording to the principle of “mutual delegation, coordination and control 
between state organs” introduced by the Communist Party, the People’s 
Court must become a truly independent, neutral and impartial institution 
in protecting the rights of relevant parties. The court should assume all ju-
dicial responsibilities previously performed by other institutions in a trial-
and-error manner (such as providing administrative sanctions and duties; 
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interpreting the law or legal documents to be handled to it), and extend its 
scope of jurisdiction. It must be an efficient mechanism that controls and 
restricts the legislative and executive through constitutional and legal initi-
atives. If this is realized, the one-sided supervision over judicial activities 
and organs by state power bodies as of now will be replaced by “mutual 
control” and management through public litigation and trials.  
- (5) The People’s Public Procuration, from a body that “oversees legal ob-
servance by all organs of the Council of Ministers, state authorities at local 
level, employees of public organs and citizens” (Constitution 1959) to a 
body that “oversees legal observance by ministries and other organs of the 
Council of Ministers, local authorities, social organizations and people’s 
armed services, public employees and citizens, and launches public prosecu-
tion” (Constitution 1980) to one that “exercises prosecution right and su-
pervises judicial activities” (amended and revised Constitution 1992), will 
be transformed into a Public Prosecution Office and given more responsi-
bilities in the mentioned areas. This is a great step that reflects our Com-
munist Party’s new thinking in political and state reconstruction in general 
and in judicial renovation in particular, driven by socio-economic objectives 
in a new context such as the state of law, international integration and more 
efficient and effective state’s performance. This is a rational and positive 
move in the long run. First, it liberates the public procuration from admin-
istrative functions (as supervisor of legal compliance and initiator of uni-
form and consistent legal observance) and helps it focus more on prosecu-
tion – which currently needs more improvement and attention. Second, this 
step is a requirement for state reformation and the state of law according to 
the principle of mutual control and coordination between legislative, execu-
tive and judicial powers. And finally, experiences of countries around the 
world, especially developed countries, show that such a transition is inevi-
table.  
- (6) Local authorities need reforming to become more diversified, more self-
governing and autonomous. The trial removal of people’s councils at dis-
trict and provincial levels must be completed as soon as possible. The insti-
tutionalization of local agencies (People’s Council, People’s Committee, 
Administrative Committee, Mayor (if any) at all levels, especially at com-
munal, ward and town levels must be implemented in conjunction with 
new requirements, situation and tasks. Anti-corruption and the prevention 
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of abuse of power to purify the state apparatus are decisive in improving the 
effect and efficiency of state management.  
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The Issue of the Rule of Law in Vietnam in the  
Constitution of 2013  
Dinh Xuan Ly 
The Vietnamese Constitution of 20131 is the basic law with the highest legal 
value of contemporary Vietnam. As a political-legal document it contains the 
following provisions: legal provisions on socio-political systems; state regime 
and the fundamental principles of organization and operation of the state appa-
ratus; the legal status of the people, the fundamental rights and duties of citi-
zens, economics and, culture as well as the relations between Vietnam and the 
international community.  
The basis and objectives of Constitution formulation, implementation and 
protection of the Constitution of 2013 were recorded in the Preamble: “Insti-
tutionalizing the Platform for national construction during the transition to 
socialism and inheriting the Constitution of 1946, the Constitution of 1959, 
the Constitution of 1980 and 1992, the People of Vietnam have drafted, im-
plemented and protected this Constitution for the sake of the well-being of the 
people, a strong country, democracy, equality and civilization.”2 Therefore, to 
thoroughly understand the rule of law issues in Vietnam in the Constitution of 
2013, it is necessary to learn the viewpoints and policies of the Communist 
                                                     
1 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 2013 (hereafter referred 
to as the Constitution of 2013) ratified by the National Assembly of the SRV of 
XIII, 6th session on 28 November 2013; and President of the SRV signed the an-
nouncement order on 08 December 2013. 
2 National Political Publishing House (2014), 8. 
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Party of Vietnam (CPV), since the Constitution of 1946 is directly related to 
the rule of law in Vietnam.3  
The Rule of Law’s Provisions in the Constitution of 2013  
Regarding the State Regime  
Clause 1, Article 2 of the Constitution of 2013, stipulates that  
“the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a state of the People, by the People 
and for the People.”4  
This provision has clearly defined the nature of the rule of law in Vietnam to 
be a state of socialist rule of law, with government of the People, by the Peo-
ple, for the People.  
Looking back at the history of Vietnam’s Constitution since the August 
Revolution in 1945, the process of mobilization of state institutions in Vi-
etnam was as follows: the Constitution of The Democratic Republic of Vi-
etnam in 1946 stipulated that the country of Vietnam was a “democratic re-
public” (Article 1); the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 
1959 defined it as a “democratic state of the People” (Article 2); the Constitu-
tion of the SRV in 1980 stipulated, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (Arti-
cle 2); the Constitution of the SRV in 1992 stipulated the “State of the people, 
by the people, for the people” (Article 2); In 2001, Article 2 of the Constitu-
                                                     
3 From 1946 to the present (2014), Vietnam has promulgated five constitutions and 
named the Constitution of The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1946 (hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution of 1946); Constitution of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam in 1959 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution of 1959); Constitution of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1980 (referred to as the 1980 Constitution); 
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1992 (referred to as the 1992 
Constitution); and in 2001, the 1992 Constitution was amended and supplemented, 
but not renamed the Constitution (referred to as the amended Constitution in 2001); 
and Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 2013 (referred to as the 
Constitution of 2013) 
4 National Political Publishing House (2014), 8. 
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tion of 1992, amended and supplemented by the provisions, “SRV is the so-
cialist rule of law state of the people, by the people, for the people.”5 
From the above study, it is shown that: In legal terms, the rule of law in 
Vietnam was stipulated in the Constitution of 1992 (already amended and 
supplemented by Resolution No. 51/2001/QH 10 dated 25 December 2001 of 
the National Assembly). And this provision is repeated in Clause 1, Article 2 
of the Constitution of 2013.  
When discussing the perception of rule of law of the CPV, some have 
opined that until the Convention of National Representatives in midterm VII 
(1994), the CPV “mainly considered the rule of law as a product of capitalism 
and acquired and inherited this perception.”6 But the fact is that a month after 
the Seventh Convention of the National Congress Party, the issue of building 
the rule of law was officially mentioned by the General Secretary of the CPV, 
Do Muoi in his speech at the 9th session of the National Assembly term VIII 
(dated 27 July1991) as follows:  
“The National Congress should have focused on the implementation of two basic re-
quirements: Firstly, building the rule of law, the state has the capacity to formulate a 
synchronous legal system to meet the new requirements of socio-economic develop-
ment and manage all aspects of social civilization and progress; the legal system is the 
basis of ensuring the guidelines and policies of the Party and State that are implement-
ed effectively, is a key factor in making the social relations become healthier and 
stronger. Secondly, to ensure the practical power and effectiveness of the National 
Congress that is defined by Constitutional provisions.”7  
More than two years later, at the midterm VII Convention of National Dele-
gates (January 1994), CPV proposed the policy of “continuing to build and 
gradually perfect the rule of law in Vietnam. That is the state of the people, by 
the people, for the people, managing all aspects of social life by the law.”8 
Therefore, it can be said that the issue of building the rule of law in Vietnam 
                                                     
5 All quotations are taken from the paragraph: the Declaration of Independence in 
1945 and the Constitution of Vietnam (1946, 1959, 1980, and 1992), National Po-
litical Publishing House (2006), 12, 31, 69, 125, 199. 
6 VNU. University of Social Sciences and Humanities. Faculty of Philosophy (2012), 
536. 
7 Vietnam Communist Party (1994), 56. 
8 Vietnam Communist Party (2007), 340. 
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has been formally laid out and directed by the CPV, as the ruling political 
party, since the second half of 1991.  
The issue of building a socialist rule of law state in Vietnam continued to 
be thoroughly implemented through the National Congress Conventions of 
CPV and the Convention of the Party Central Committee. The policy of the 
Ninth National Congress Convention (April 2001) was to “build the socialist 
rule of law under the leadership of the Party”.9 The Tenth National Congress 
Convention (April 2006) advocated “continuing to build and perfect the so-
cialist rule of law state.”10 By the Eleventh Party Congress Convention (Janu-
ary 2011), the Party urged to “continue to promote constructing and complet-
ing the socialist rule of law.”11 And, the program for national construction in 
the transition to socialism (Supplement, developed in 2011), defined: “our 
country is the state socialism of the People, by the People, for the People.”12 
Construction of state socialism of the people, by the people, for the people is 
one of the eight basic guidelines to build Vietnam to become a modern indus-
trial country under socialist orientation.13 The view of the supplement pro-
gram, developed in 2011 and the Eleventh Party Congress Convention has 
been thoroughly defined and institutionalized in the Constitution of 2013.  
Regarding the Subjectivity of State Power 
Clause 2, Article 2 of the Constitution of 2013, stipulates that:  
“the SRV is owned by the people; all state power belongs to the people but the founda-
tion is the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and the intelli 
gentsia.”14 
Stipulating that “all state power belongs to the people” reflects the political-
legal status of people of Vietnam as the subject of state power in state socialist 
rule of law in Vietnam. The Constitution of 2013 stipulates that people per-
form state power by direct democracy, representative democracy through the 
                                                     
9 Communist Party of Vietnam (2001), 131. 
10 Communist Party of Vietnam (2006), 126.  
11 Communist Party of Vietnam (2001), 246.  
12 Communist Party of Vietnam (2011), 85.  
13 Communist Party of Vietnam (2011), 72. 
14 National Political Publishing House (2014), 8. 
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National Assembly, People's Councils and through other agencies of the state 
(Article 6). Among them, “the state guarantees and promote ownership rights 
of the people; recognizes, respects, protects and guarantees human rights, citi-
zenship rights; implements the objectives of prosperous people, a strong coun-
try, democracy, justice, civilization, and all people have an abundant life, liber-
ty, happiness and favorable conditions for a comprehensive development (Arti-
cle 3)”; “The state agencies, officials and public servants have to respect the 
people, devotedly serve the people, in close contact with people, listen to their 
opinions and be subject to the supervision of the people; We struggle against 
corruption, wastefulness and all manifestations of bureaucracy, arrogance, au-
thoritarianism” (Clause 2, Article 8); Vietnam Fatherland Front is considered 
as representative to protect the legitimate rights and interests, the legitimacy 
of the people (Article 9). The above provisions create the constitutional basis 
for the continuation of institutionalizing the relevant laws of the state power 
belonging to the people.  
In fact, although under different interpretations, the Constitution of Vi-
etnam since the August Revolution of 1945, specified “all state power belongs 
to the people”, for instance; the Constitution of 1946 stipulates that “All au-
thority in the country of Vietnam belongs to the people, regardless of race, sex, 
wealth, class, religion" (Article 1); “People have the right to approve the Con-
stitution and the relations to the destiny of the country” (Article 21); Consti-
tution of 1959, stipulates that “All power in the State of Vietnam Democratic 
Republic belongs to the people” (Article 4); Constitution of 1980, stipulates 
that “All power belongs to the people” (Article 6); The Constitution of 1992 
stipulates “the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a State of the peo-
ple, by the people and for the people. All State power belongs to the people 
that the foundation is working class allied with the peasantry and intellectual 
classes” (Article 2).15 However, to the Constitution in 2013, has specified new 
mechanisms for people to exercise their state power.  
In the reform era (since 1986), the viewpoint of the CPV on the subjectivi-
ty of state power belonging to the people and associated with the policy of 
building a law-governed state socialism in Vietnam has been proposed since 
                                                     
15 All quotations are taken from the paragraph: the Declaration of Independence in 
1945 and the Constitution of Vietnam (1946, 1959, 1980, and 1992). National Po-
litical Publishing House (2006), 12, 31, 70, 125. 
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the beginning of the 1990s , with the requirement “to secure power and effec-
tiveness in the practice of Congress, regulated by Constitutional provisions”. 
The actual power of the Parliament is the indirect power of people through 
national members of parliament who are elected. The Ninth Party Congress 
affirmed “our country is the main tool for the implementation of the people's 
sovereignty, the rule of law of the people, by the people, for the people”;16 the 
Tenth Party Congress (April /2006), which set out requirements “to develop 
operational mechanisms of socialist rule of law, ensuring the principles of all 
state power belonging to the people”;17 the Eleventh Party Congress (1/2011) 
emphasized the policy of building and perfecting state socialist rule of law, 
ensuring our State is of the people, by the people and for the people.18 Supple-
mentary Program developed in 2011, determined “all State power belongs to 
the people that its foundation is the alliance between the working class and the 
peasantry and the intelligentsia led by the CPV.”19 The view of the CPV on the 
subjectivity of state power in legitimate state socialism in Vietnam has been 
institutionalized by the 2013 Constitution.  
The Issue of Decentralization among State Authorities  
Clause 3, Article 2 of the Constitution of 2013 stipulates  
“State power is unified with the assignment, coordination and control among state 
agencies in the implementing of the legislative, executive and justice rights.”20 
Earlier, the Constitution of the SRV in 1992 (Amended and supplemented in 
2001), has stipulated “state power is unified with the assignment and coordi-
nation among state agencies in the implementing of the legislative, executive 
and judiciary rights” (Article 2).21 In Clause 3, Article 2, of the Constitution of 
2013, the word “control” has been added which means “controlling the pow-
er”. The stipulation of the principle of “controlling the power” in the Consti-
                                                     
16 Communist Party of Vietnam (2001), 131. 
17 Communist Party of Vietnam (2006), 126. 
18 Communist Party of Vietnam (2011), 246. 
19 Communist Party of Vietnam (2011), 85. 
20 National Political Publishing House (2014), 9. 
21 Declaration of Independence of 1945 and the Constitution of Vietnam (1946, 1959, 
1980, 1992), National Political Publishing House (2006), 199. 
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tution is progress in the constitutional history of Vietnam, this is the first time 
“controlling the power” has become a constitutional principle of the rule of 
law, the mechanism for the legislature, executive, and judiciary to enforce the 
effective, efficient functions, duties and powers under the Constitution and 
laws, avoiding misuse and abusing of power. The Constitution of 2013, speci-
fies the competence of the power branches, the rule of law in socialism in Vi-
etnam, such as the National Assembly exercises the constitutional functions, 
and decides important issues of the country, and exercises supreme control over 
the activities of the state (Article 69); the government is the supreme state 
administration agency of the SRV performing executive power, the executive 
agency of the National Assembly (Article 94); People’s Court is the judicial 
agency of the SRV implementing judicial right (Article 102). Thus, the Con-
stitution of 2013 had the clear assignment (decentralization) between the pow-
er branches of the state socialist rule of law in Vietnam:  
“It is an important basis for relevant agencies to work together more rhythmically. 
Also, a power control mechanism has been identified, in which people’s rights as own-
er of all state power is enhanced; the forms of democracy are expanding. The oversight 
role and social criticism of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and its member organizations 
are confirmed.”22 
The fact is that the views of the CPV on assignment (decentralization) between 
the power branches of the socialist rule of law are recorded in the Party Pro-
gram of 1991. The Vietnamese State unified three rights: legislative, executive 
and judicial rights with clear assignment of these rights; the viewpoint of the 
Eighth Party Congress was: state power is unified with the assignment and 
coordination among government agencies in the implementation of legislative, 
executive and judiciary rights.23 This is also the viewpoint of decentralization 
of the Ninth Party Congress. The Tenth Party Congress (April 2006) also con-
tinued to advocate the policy of “state power is unified with the assignment 
and coordination among agencies in exercising the legislative, executive and 
judiciary right.” The Eleventh Party Congress stipulates that the “principle of 
state power is unified, with the assignment, coordination and control among 
agencies in the implementation of legislative, executive and judiciary rights.”24  
                                                     
22 Hoang The Lien (2014). 
23 Communist Party of Vietnam (1996), 45. 
24 Communist Party of Vietnam (2011), 247. 
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The Supplementary Program developed in 2011, determined that: “state 
power is unified; with the assignment, coordination and control among rele-
vant agencies in the implementation of the legislative, executive and judiciary 
rights.”25 The viewpoint of the Party on decentralization among the power 
branches in the rule of law in Vietnam in the Supplementary Program, devel-
oped in 2011, has been institutionalized in the Constitution of 2013.  
Regarding the Position of the Law toward Vietnamese State and Society 
Clause 1, Article 8 of the Constitution of 2013, stipulates that: “the State is 
organized and operated under the Constitution and law, social management 
defined by the Constitution and laws, implemented the principle of democrat-
ic centralization”; Clause 3, Article 9, stipulates “Vietnam Fatherland Front 
and its member organizations and other civil societies operate in the frame-
work of the Constitution and law”. In relations with the world community, 
Article 12 stipulates that the SRV comply with the United Nations Charter 
and international treaties in which the SRV is a member; contribute to the 
cause of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress in the 
world.26 Earlier, the Constitution of the SRV in 1980 had stipulated: State 
                                                     
25 Communist Party of Vietnam (2011), 85.   
26 The Constitution of 1946 does not contain provisions on relations of Vietnam with 
the international community; Constitution of 1959 did not also set out specific 
rules, but the Preamble has written that: strengthening solidarity with the socialist 
faction  and the peace-loving people in the world; the Constitution of 1980 stipu-
lates that: Strengthen friendship and cooperation in all aspects with the socialist 
countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; friend-
ly relations with neighboring countries, with peoples struggling for national inde-
pendence and social progress; policy implementation peaceful coexistence between 
countries with different socio-political systems; actively support and contribute to 
the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, hegemony, neo-racism, for peace, na-
tional independence, democracy and socialism (Article 14); the Constitution of 
1992, which regulates the relations of Vietnam with the international community, 
essentially the same as the 1980 Constitution, but in which there are noteworthy 
changes, such as: 1) emphasizing the implementation of a policy of peace, friendship, 
expand exchanges and cooperation with all countries in the world, irrespective of the 
political regime and different societies; 2) not directly mentioning imperialism, co-
lonialism, hegemony etc.; 3) not declaring socialism as a common and global target. 
In 2001, the Constitution kept the above mentioned content. 
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management in accordance with law and unceasingly strengthening socialist 
legality. All State agencies, social organizations, government employees, staff 
of social organizations and all citizens must strictly abide by the Constitution 
and laws, to resolutely prevent and fight against the crime, violation of the 
constitution and the law (Article 12). The basic contents above were inherited 
in the 1992 Constitution. 
In comparison with the 1980 Constitution and the 1992 Constitution, it 
shows that the provisions of the Constitution in 2013 strongly reflected the 
high appreciation of the legal system, and legislation became the basic charac-
teristic of the rule of law in Vietnam. This can be considered a development of 
political thought.  
State Legislative Jurisdiction in the Constitution of 2013  
Since 2013, the Communist Party Congress of Vietnam term VI (December 
1986), has set out the policy: “heightening the position and role of National 
Assembly and people’s Councils at all levels, enabling the elected bodies to 
comply with the functions, duties and powers under the Constitution’s stipula-
tion. Strengthen the socialist legal and social management by law;”27 the Sev-
enth Party Congress (June 1991) states guiding viewpoints: “the important 
condition for promoting democracy is to build and complete a system of laws 
and strengthen socialist legislation, improve the intellectual level, the level of 
legal understanding and awareness of law-abiding of the people;”28 the 
8th Party Congress (June 1996) advocated “strengthening socialist legislation, 
building the rule of law in Vietnam, society managed by law, and emphasis 
on education, improve morality;”29 the 9th Party Congress: “State managing 
the society by law. All agencies, organizations, officials, public servants and all 
citizens are obliged to abide by the constitution and the law;”30 the 10th Party 
Congress (April 2006), proposed the policy of “perfecting the legal system, 
increasing specificity, feasibility of the provisions in the legislation documents. 
Preparing, compiling the checking mechanism, monitoring the constitutional-
                                                     
27 Communist Party of Vietnam (1987), 226. 
28 Communist Party of Vietnam (1987), 90–91. 
29 Communist Party of Vietnam (1996), 129. 
30 Communist Party of Vietnam (2001), 132. 
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ity and legality of the activities and decisions of public authorities;”31 the Elev-
enth Party Congress (February 2011), which proposed the requirements on 
“improving the capacity management and administration of the State under 
the law, to strengthen socialist legality and discipline;”32 the supplementary 
program, developed in 2011, determines: “the State shall enact laws; organize 
and manage the society by law and constantly strengthen the socialist legali-
ty.”33 Thus, in the period of innovation, strengthening of the legal issues and 
the management of the State under the constitution and laws, were deeply 
concerned by CPV with the policies strongly reaffirmed their determination to 
implement the “organization and management of society by law.” 
On the Issue of Human and Civil Rights  
Clause 1, Article 14 stipulates that: In the RSV, human rights, the political, 
civil, economic, cultural, social rights of citizens have been recognized, re-
spected, protected and guaranteed by the Constitution and laws; everyone is 
equal before the law. No one is discriminated in political, civil, economic, 
cultural and social life (Clause 1, Clause 2, and Article 16).  
In addition, the 2013 Constitution also specified the human rights and civ-
il rights in specific areas, such as the right to life, human life is protected by 
law (Article 19); everyone has the right to inviolability of the body and pro-
tected by law on the health, honor and dignity (Article 20); the right to invio-
lability of private life (Article 21); citizens have the right to have a legal resi-
dence (Article 22); everyone has the right to freedom of belief and religion, to 
follow or not follow a religion (Article 24; citizens have freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, access right to information, assembly, association and 
demonstration (Article 25); men and women are equal in all aspects (Article 
26); citizens have the right to participate in managing state and society (Arti-
cle 28); ); everyone has ownership right of lawful income (Article 32); right to 
guarantee social security (Article 34); citizens have the right to work, to choose 
care, employment and workplace (Article 35); the right to marry and divorce 
(Article 36); rights to enjoy and access to cultural values, rights to participate 
                                                     
31 Communist Party of Vietnam (2006), 126–127. 
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in cultural life, to use cultural facilities (Article 41), right to determine the 
ethnicity (Article 42), the right to live in healthy environment (Article 43). 
Overall, the Constitution of 2013 has amended and supplemented provi-
sions on human rights, fundamental rights and duties of citizens; confirmed 
and clarified the principles of human rights; clarified the content of human 
rights, fundamental rights and duties of citizens in political, civil, economic, 
social, cultural affairs and the responsibility of the state and society in respect-
ing, guaranteeing and protecting human rights; presented more clearly as the 
responsibility of the State in ensuring the implementation of human rights and 
civil rights. The provisions of human rights is consistent with international 
treaties to which Vietnam is a member, expressed the clearer awareness of hu-
man rights and affirmed a strong commitment of Vietnam in implementing 
human rights.  
Some Emerging Issues  
The Concept of the Rule of Law and the Socialist Rule of Law  
It is a fact that there are many different interpretations of the rule of law. The 
report titled “Organizational structure and operation of socialist rule law state 
of the People, by the People, for the People in Vietnam in the period of indus-
trialization and modernization”, code KX04-02, provides comments: “The 
concept of “the rule of law” is used very differently. We can say for sure that 
documents such as the US Constitution, the French Declaration on human and 
civil rights, the American Declaration of Human Rights do not use the con-
cept of the rule of law. The Germans have the concept “Rechtsstaat” and the 
French use the term “État de Droit”, the Russians “Pravavoe gosudarstvo”. All 
these three concepts of the Europeans can be generalized as “The government 
must be bound by law.”34 
Meanwhile, researchers in Vietnam launched various conceptions of the rule 
of law according to the following three trends. The first tendency, the rule of 
law concept is a model of a state. This trend considered the rule of law state as  
“a type of state that is built on the basis of democratic opposition to the authoritarian 
state (…) The rule of law state does not just mean that the state is ruled by law. Many 
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totalitarian states in history were ruled by law (…) If the principle of dictatorship and 
of a tyranny state is that the people have to obey the state then the principle of the rule 
of law is a state that is obedient to the citizens. The first condition of the rule of law is 
to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens by the clear provisions of the law. In 
the rule of law state, the law is the measure (norm) of freedom (…) This includes two 
sides closely related to each other: the law guarantees the rights and freedoms of citi-
zens – every state organ and citizen has to obey the law. The rule of law, therefore, is 
built on the principles of democracy. The bodies of state power ( legislative, executive 
and judicial) are elected freely with direct participation of all citizens to be able to 
adequately represent their will. Historical experience shows how these powers should 
be organized so that each power has real independence. All those appointed to bodies 
of state power must bear full responsibility before the citizens. The rule of law is the 
state model most likely to combat a monopolistic and bureaucratic power apparatus.”35 
The second trend is based on the perception of the rule of law state as a method 
to organize and operate the society on the basis of these rights. 
“These rights are assigned and organized so that abuses cannot occur and the demo-
cratic freedoms of the people are protected. The Constitution is the most important 
tool to define and delimit the rights. The Constitution is regarded as the soul of the 
rule of law.”36 
The third trend, the perception of the rule of law not as a state model but as 
common values, and the expression of a democratic development level. This 
trend sees the rule of law state as an organization of democracy; a state and 
social organizations based on democracy. The rule of law as a method of organ-
izing and implementing a state regime and society is built not only in capital-
ism, but also in a socialist regime.37  
                                                     
35 Nguyen Khac Vien (1994), 207–208. 
36 Nguyen Dang Dung (2007), 28. 
37 This opinion  expresses that: The common values of the rule of law  are presented  in 
different forms and depend on the political-legal standpoint, academic viewpoint of 
each person, but in reality,  emphasize the following values: 1) the rule of law is the  
fundamental pattern of democracy. Accordingly, democracy is both  the essence  and 
prerequisite for building the rule of law; 2) a legitimate state apparatus is organized 
and operated on the basis of the principles of organization of power in a democratic 
manner; 3) a judicial regime is truly democratic; judicial authorities only comply 
with the law with a public procedural regime and democracy. See also Nguyen Duy 
Quy (2007).  
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Thus, in fact there are two different perspectives on the rule of law among 
Vietnamese researchers:  
- Firstly, the viewpoint that the rule of law is a state model (a state); with 
this perspective, it is understandable that there is only one state model the 
rule of law in the world.  
- Secondly, the perspective that the rule of law is the common value, the 
expression of a democratic development level; with this view, it is claimed 
that there is a bourgeois rule of law and a socialist rule of law.  
Some Issues of a Socialist Rule of Law State in Vietnam  
Constitutional amendments in 2001 and then the Constitution of 2013 stipu-
late that the State of Vietnam is a socialist rule of law state of the people, by 
the people and for the people. This provision marks the process of the CPV’s 
innovative thinking about state politics. This is regarded as a theoretical 
achievement of innovation marking the transition in the perception of the 
ruling party “the rule of law is not something separated from capitalism. So-
cialism must practice the rule of law.38 
Through researching some concepts, perspectives and the reality of the rule 
of law, at a certain level the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law can 
be proposed as such: 1) the law holds supremacy in the state and society; 2) the 
people are the source of state power; 3) human rights, citizenship rights are 
confirmed and guaranteed; 4) there is a clear separation of powers among the 
legislative, executive and judicial; 5) the rule of law has capable most of coun-
tering the monopolistic trend of power and bureaucratic tendency of a power 
apparatus.39 
By the Constitution of 2013, the socialist rule of law state model in Vi-
etnam can be visualized based on the following fundamental features:  
- On the nature of the rule of law in Vietnam – a legitimate state socialism; 
the government of the People, by the People, for the People.  
                                                     
38 Communist Party of Vietnam (2005), 143. 
39It was also suggested that the rule of law has some typical features such as: 1) the 
supremacy of the constitution; 2) the objective of ensuring the freedom and equality 
of human beings, as opposed to state violence or an authoritarian state; 3)   a state 
against the abuse of power  and organized on the principle of decentralization. See 
also: Nguyen Dang Dung (2007), 63–67. 
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- Regarding the fundamental characteristic of the socialist rule of law – all 
State power belongs to the people; the foundation is the alliance between 
working class, the peasantry and intelligentsia. 
- Regarding the operational mechanisms of the bodies of state power – state 
power is unified with the assignment, coordination and control among state 
agencies in the implementation of the legislative, executive and judiciary 
rights. 
- Regarding the position of law in the state and society – the State of Vi-
etnam is organized and operating under the Constitution and law, social 
management by the Constitution and laws implement the principle of 
democratic concentration; theVietnam Fatherland Front and its member 
organizations and other civil society organizations operate in the framework 
of the Constitution and the law. 
- Human rights, and the rights of citizens in political, civil, economic, cul-
tural, social affairs are recognized, respected, protected and guaranteed by 
the Constitution and law; all persons are equal before the law.  
In comparison with the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law in gen-
eral, the socialist rule of law state in Vietnam has the following characteristics.  
In the Preamble, an important foundation for the construction of the Con-
stitution of 2013, is the “Institutionalization of the Programme for national 
construction in transition to socialism” and Article 4 of the Constitution in 
2013, stipulates that the CPV is the leading force of the State and society. 
Since then it is shown that the socialist rule of law in Vietnam is essentially 
characterized as the organization and operation under the leadership of the 
CPV. Therefore, the question is to scientifically determine the relationship 
between the leadership of the CPV and the socialist rule of law as to how to 
ensure the effective and efficient operation of the State of the socialist rule of 
law in Vietnam.  
One of the fundamental features of the rule of law is the clear separation of 
powers between the legislative, executive and judicial. The Constitution of 
2013, the provisions in the socialist rule of law state in Vietnam is that the 
National Assembly shall exercise the constitutional, legislative power (Article 
69); the Government implement executive powers (Article 94); People's courts 
implement judicial power (Article 102). The delimitation of such powers is 
quite clear, however, and Article 100 stipulates “The government, the Prime 
Minister, ministers, heads of ministerial-level agencies enact laws to imple-
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ment tasks and their powers, supervise the implementation of those documents 
and handle unlawful documents as prescribed by law.”40 Thus it is understand-
able that apart from Parliament, the “Government, Prime Minister, ministers; 
heads of ministerial-level agencies” are also empowered by people to “enact law 
documents”. Before, the Constitution of 1992 stipulated that “the National 
Assembly is the only body with constitutional and legislative rights (Article 
83).”41 
Summary 
In summary, and under a legal perspective, the socialist rule of law of Vietnam 
officially was initially enacted in the Constitution of the SRV in 1992 (already 
amended and supplemented by Resolution No. 51/2001/QH 10 dated 25 De-
cember 2001 of the National Assembly). In the Constitution of 2013, new 
provisions have been added “on the organization and operation of the state 
apparatus in accordance with the rule of law and the excellent organizing prin-
ciple of state power in Article 2 of the Constitution.”42 
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The State of Law and the Creation of a  
Human Rights Culture 
Hoang Thi Kim Que 
The Development of the State of Law as an Idea and a Doctrine 
The state of law as an idea, doctrine, theory and reality has been through a 
long process of creation and development in the history of mankind.1 Today, 
theories about the state of law have been adjusted, amended and improved to 
be more adaptable to the current political, legal and social reality of the world. 
In both theory and practice, the state of law is witnessing a development com-
bined with inheritance, addition and amendment. This all the more confirms 
the universal and particular values of the state of law on a global scale.  
In ancient times only the fundamental components of the state of law were 
discussed such as the supremacy of the law, the power of the law over individ-
uals, moral institutions and issues and to some extent even the separation of 
powers. In in early-modern times, the idea and doctrine of the state of law took 
a greater and further leap into the dialectics between the different elements of 
political systems, such as the state of law, civil society, human rights and legal 
measures to defend them, the separation of powers. Later, constitutionalism, 
legal procedures and legal systems are formed with the aim of protecting per-
sonal rights, freedom, and social security.  
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The theory as well as practice of the state of law in recent decades has been 
adjusted and become more and more extensive in terms of its contents, such as 
the state policies and responsibilities in protecting the security and safety of 
every individual in economic, political, social and cultural areas. A quick look 
at the constitutions throughout the history of mankind and especially at con-
temporary ones indicates this tendency, as coeval constitutions have extended 
their regulations on human rights and various socio-economic policies pursued 
by the nations. There are many similarities and differences between the ideas 
about the state of law from nation to nation and region and region, and this 
situation is best reflected in the reality of the state of law today. The realities of 
societies are introducing more issues to be studied and explained from the 
angle of state of law theory. There are more and more challenges to be coped 
with by nations, regions and the entire human race, such as human rights and 
national sovereignty, the role of civil society in developing policies and law; 
the interrelation between national and international laws; anti-terrorism; law 
and justice, morality, etc. These are emergent issues in reality but in theory 
they need further investigations.  
The origins of the state of law as an idea and doctrine date back to ancient 
history, and since then both have been constantly enhanced and improved. The 
state of law as a social value shows its relevance in ideas, theories and reality. 
When the democratic revolutions in capitalist countries break out, these im-
portant values, especially in the West, are inherited from ancient states of law 
and transformed into a doctrine of state of law. The state of law’s core elements 
are manifested in political and legal doctrines of various Westerns thinkers 
throughout history from antiquity to the modern period. Most notable among 
these doctrines are the ideas of separation and management of state power, 
human intrinsic rights and the relations between state of law and civil society. 
The doctrine of the state of law is diverse in its contents and applied at differ-
ent levels and scales in countries around the world, in which genuine doctrines 
are diverse. As mankind’s history is constantly on the move, social theories in 
general and state of law theories in particular have to be adjusted and re-
formed. Inheritance and improvement of previous versions are basic features of 
the idea, doctrine and reality of the state of law around the world.  
In terms of its ideological basis, the context that gives rise to the idea of the 
state of law in the West is different from that in the East, as Greek and Roman 
democracies are to some extent more sophisticated because they are based on 
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philosophical thinking and the pursuit of an objective and rational mindset, 
and are at relatively higher stages of development. Thus Western ideas are 
different from their Eastern counterparts, according to which the law is not 
only a ruling instrument but a social value which regulates social relations and 
a common principle to be adhered to by the state. Many fundamental issues of 
state of law are thoroughly dissected in the works of prominent ancient Greek 
and Roman thinkers, especially the ideas on innate human rights and the 
state’s responsibility to protect these. 
In Western ancient conceptions as a whole, the law has an important value 
and position and is the art of the good and the equitable “Jus est ars boni et 
aegui“. This idea also points to the connection between the law and morality, 
i.e. moral basis, functions and values of the law and, vice versa, the law as an 
instrument to protect and ensure social morality. In his Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel also considered legal issues in relation to moral and ethical issues.  
Ancient Western ideas on the state of law include such basic elements as 
the role of the law in protecting human intrinsic rights, settlement of civil 
disputes, supremacy of the law, adherence to the law as a responsibility of eve-
ry individual; the correlation between human law and natural law, ethics and 
justice; and the proper organization of a government that allows for the avoid-
ance of abuse and autocracy. Basic ideas on the state of law are articulated in 
such works of prominent and well-known thinkers as Aristotle, Plato, Solon, 
Socrates and Cicero. Most notable of which is the state of law idea of the great 
ancient thinker Aristotle that emphasizes the domination of the law and sepa-
ration of powers. According to Cicero, Socrates and Plato, it is necessary to 
legitimize the power of the law over individuals, even over the state, and to 
respect and observe the law is to respect rationality, justice and universal intel-
lect, without going astray.2 
Ancient ideas on the state of law are inherited and promoted by bourgeois 
thinkers. The introduction of the state of law doctrine is associated with the 
names of great thinkers such as John Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant and 
Hegel, etc. The bourgeois doctrine of the state of law include such basic com-
ponents as the protection of human rights and freedom by the law, the su-
premacy of the law as a general principle regulating state affairs, equality be-
                                                     
2 Le Doan Ta (1994), 55. 
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tween the state and individuals, civil sovereignty, and the separation and con-
trol of state power, etc. 
The renowned French thinker Montesquieu in his work “The Spirit of the 
Law” introduces the theory of separation and control of state power – one of 
the basic conditions to protect human intrinsic rights and freedom. In philo-
sophical terms, German thinkers have developed more profound ideas of the 
state of law and civil society. According to Immanuel Kant, the state consists 
of law-abiding and legally-conscious citizens, and the state itself has to abide 
by the law. Any slight departure from the separation of powers would lead to 
an authoritarian state. Hegel in his Philosophy of Right defines the structure 
of a state of law as composed by civil society and a state of law legal order. 
Components of a state of law are also indicated in Marxist-Leninist think-
ing on state and law. On freedom and the state’s role and duty in protecting 
and ensuring human liberty, Karl Marx writes: “the development of individual 
liberty precedes the development of communal liberty.”3 Marx wrote to Amer-
ican President Abraham Lincoln in which he highly appreciated the American 
Declaration of Independence, valorizing human rights and the role of republi-
can and democratic governments in protecting these rights.  
The question has arisen: is the state of law present in Eastern ideas, and 
what are the similarities and differences between Eastern and Western ideas 
and doctrines on the state of law? In recent decades when the human race has 
witnessed a more comprehensive understanding of the state of law and espe-
cially of its reality, a common assumption is being formed that the state of law 
also exists in various schools of thought, policies and legal systems of Eastern 
states. In particular, moral and humanistic values are among the core compo-
nents of Eastern states of law.  
Looking back at the Eastern political-legal thinking, the concept of the 
state of law exists for example in different viewpoints on the law, state and 
morality of ethical and legal principles. Basic as they are, elements of the state 
of law are manifested in the works of Chinese thinkers such as Confucius, Men-
cius, Xun Kuang, Han Fei and Vietnamese feudal politicians and thinkers such 
as Nguyen Trai and Le Thanh Tong. We also recognize many similarities in 
moral and legal conceptions of both Eastern and Western thinkers such as 
Confucius, Mencius, Han Fei, Aristotle, Montesquieu, Hegel and Kant.  
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Mutual recognition between Eastern and Western values and ideas in the 
construction of the state of law can also be regarded as one of the dynamics in 
the theory and practice of contemporary political and legal systems. Confucian 
ideas on morality, though still limited and far from being legal ethics if judged 
from the perspective of human rights and liberty, contain many values. Confu-
cian legal ideas are based on humanistic tenets and compassion. Similar ideas 
are prevalent in contemporary constitutional theory. Confucius’ anthropologi-
cal ideas on the law are clearly embedded in his doctrine of the people and 
doctrine of the mean, which reflects his humanistic principles.4  
A common juncture of all Eastern and Western schools of thought 
throughout history is the desire for an ideal and virtuous state and society in 
which everyone enjoys happiness and social stability and justice. Whether from 
a Western or Eastern perspective, the state of law has to cope with such legal 
and moral issues, especially in contemporary society, as capital punishment, 
the application of biological and medical technologies, and criminalization and 
decriminalization, etc. 
The individual plays an important role throughout Eastern ideas and doc-
trines but is viewed divergently depending on the human’s role in community, 
family, society and state. Therefore, the character of relations such as those 
between the individual and the state and the society are interpreted differently 
in Eastern and Western ideas during the ancient, medieval and early-modern 
periods. Today, in the context of globalization and the worldwide development 
towards a state of law and market economy, in legal and social theories and 
realities there have been fundamental changes in the relations between the 
state and individuals, the state and society, and between individuals and col-
lective institutions, including the sphere of family. The state of law has broad 
implications, but its core principles are the protection and promotion of hu-
man rights, freedom, interests and an all-rounded development based on moral 
and legal values. This is the main similarity between Eastern and Western 
ideas on the state of law.  
The similarity between Eastern and Western conceptions of an ideal state, 
commonly known as the “state of law”, is nothing but respect for people them-
selves and is agreed by politicians and scholars. Here I would like to cite the 
                                                     
4 Du Vinh Căn (2008), 335.  
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words of the British Secretary of State for Justice during his visit to our univer-
sity on September 11th 2008:  
“Let me quote one of the teachers from Asian ancient history. To the question, 'Is there 
one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?' Confucius replied, 'It is the 
word shu – reciprocity. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire (Doc-
trine of the Mean). Whether your tradition is eastern or western, ancient or modern, 
shu is an important principle for us all. The state of law can give effect to it and make 
it the foundation of a peaceful, prosperous and just society.”5 
In Vietnam, before long President Ho Chi Minh introduced the idea of the 
state of law, especially as a part of the constitution, which includes important 
components such as the spirit of the law, independent jurisdiction, and rela-
tions between law and morality, between law and democracy and social justice. 
His ideas were realized in the Declaration of Independence dated September 
2nd 1945, the first Constitution of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh adopted the ideas of 
human rights by citing the statement of Thomas Jefferson – a renowned 
statesman who participated in the American struggle for independence:  
“All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights; among them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." And he further 
added: “In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from 
birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.”6  
The 2013 Constitution inherits Ho Chi Minh’s basic points on the state of law, 
including the idea of human rights, civil sovereignty and state’s responsibili-
ties with respect to its people.  
Similarities and Differences, Universality and Particularity and the 
Current Development of the State of Law Around the World  
Conception of the State of Law  
This issue is no longer new but needs further discussions, as the ideas, theories 
and practical affairs of different nations and regions regarding the state of law 
                                                     
5 Speech by British Secretary of State of Justice Jack Straw at the Department of Law, 
Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2008. http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/sp-
120908a.htm 
6 Hồ Chí Minh (1995), 1.  
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share both similarities and differences, expressing both universal and particular 
aspects of the state of law. This is especially the case in state policies and legal 
regulations and in citizens’ awareness and behaviors. For example, the view-
points and policies on social security and state responsibilities vary quite regu-
larly from country to country in the world.  
On the Concept of the State of Law in the World 
The widely used term in the world is currently “state of law” or “Rechtsstaat”. 
The state of law has quite a long history but was officially introduced in the 
19th century and became an increasingly popular term in the second half of the 
20th and early 21st century.7 It originally came into being in Germany (Rechts-
staat) and later spread to France (État de droit) and other European countries 
and other continents and is now widely referred to in English as “state of law”. 
In my opinion, this issue needs further discussions as it is not merely a concept 
but reflects similar and different viewpoints on the state of law across nations 
and regions. 
In the German term “Rechtsstaat”. Recht means law while Staat means 
State. In French there is “État de droit” and English there is “state of law”. The 
United States used to retain a corresponding concept “due process of law” 
which was introduced by the 14th Amendment (1868). This term expanded to 
include not only the government’s responsibility to maintain procedural due 
process, such as organizing proper court cases, but also substantive due process.  
Today, the term “state of law” in English is generally favored. Sometimes, 
to adapt to other interpretations of nations of “state of law”, other usages have 
to be included such as “the state governed by the state of law” and “the law-
governed state”.8 Even in Vietnamese, nhà nước pháp quyền (state of law) is 
actually opted for instead of nhà nước pháp luật (legal state) and nhà nước 
pháp trị (state by law). An interesting point that can be drawn from this is that 
in another version of the Anglo-American interpretation, “the state of law” 
indicates “state of law” without referring to the word “state”, whereas in Euro-
pean and Russian terms the “state” is included. Despite different interpreta-
tions and angles pursued by these concepts, they share a common point of view 
that “state of law” implies the supremacy of the law by which the state has to 
                                                     
7 See Thai Vinh Thang (2009), 63–74.  
8 See Nguyen Si Dung (2004).  
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abide (i.e. state power is limited), as it is in charge of protecting human rights 
and freedom; and everyone is equal before the law. 
“The state of law” encompasses a broader meaning which goes beyond “the 
state”. Of course, what leads to the usage of “the state of law” instead of other 
German, French and Russian terms is not yet fully answered and results from 
the different social, cultural, political and moral systems of aforementioned 
countries in both the past and present. The state of law is necessarily associated 
with “the state of law” instead of “the rule by law”. This is one of the basic and 
important principles in the making and implementation of policies and laws 
and in interpersonal relations. This is especially true for countries witnessing a 
transition from a top-down management system to a more civilized system 
based on the principles of equality, justice, transparence and legal and consti-
tutional supremacy.  
The term “pháp quyền” in Vietnamese also has important and relevant as-
sociations with the humanistic nature of state of law. It is closely related to 
Western and human conceptions of “pháp luật” – “right” today. Pháp luật 
means “droit” in French, “right/law” in English, “Recht” in German, “dirito” 
in Italian and generally refers to the proper conduct, fairness, justice, impar-
tiality, precision, truth, appropriateness and also rights. The original term 
“jus” springs from “justitia” – judgments, jurisdiction, justice, as law is a sci-
ence and art of what is good and just and is always justice and goodness – the 
law is expected, rational and meaningful. Justice has long been considered an 
advanced legal aspect of human society as said by the ancient Latin maxim: Jus 
est ars boni aequi: law is the art of benevolence and justice.  
In Search of a Definition of State of Law  
The concept of the state of law contains a broad range of meanings and its 
components and basic features are qualitatively different from that of non-
states of law. Thus, there are various definitions of this term, which share both 
similarities and differences. What distinguishes these definitions from one 
another is that each tends to focus on its preferred and prioritized aspects of the 
state of law. Accordingly, while some relate state of law to human rights, oth-
ers concentrate on the separation and control of power and the limitation of 
state power; supremacy of the law, democracy, and independent jurisdiction, 
etc. Each definition is both relevant and important in the clarification of the 
state of law.  
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According to Roman Herzog, “state of law implies a state that does not in-
terfere with the affairs of individuals and only exists to benefit its citizens.”9 
Renowned English lawyer, A.V. Dicey, in his Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (1915) explicates the state of law by using three char-
acteristics: the law is supreme and the state is not allowed to abuse it in any 
case; everyone is equal before the law; and the state of law means constitutional 
law.10 German legal and political scholars in their monograph on the state of 
law evaluate and introduce this concept by elucidating its main features: the 
state of law is established and run on the basis of moral values, justice and 
integrity, and state power is limited by the law; the state of law ensures human 
rights; the core essence of a state of law is that the state functions to benefit its 
citizens, etc.11 By studying and referencing theoretical and practical examples, 
we attempt to define state of law as follows: 
State of law is a political system that is organized and maintained on the 
separation and control of state power, limiting state power by means of laws as 
the ultimate power according to justice, integrity and the assurance of human 
interests; the state is responsible for respecting and devising necessary legal 
measures to safeguard and defend human rights and freedom from any viola-
tion, and for democratizing social activities, and its relations with citizens are 
based on equality and mutual accountability. Regarding its basic and notable 
features (or principles), there are differences in the theorizing the state of law. 
These features also indicate the level of development of each state of law and 
civil society. Generally speaking, the state of law can be said to possess the 
following features/principles that also contribute to its identification. 
The state of law is responsible for ensuring the supreme position of the 
Constitution and law in social and state affairs. It is the law that dominates a 
state of law and not individuals. This is ensured by the fact that the power of 
the law is created, respected and followed. When the law is supreme, regula-
tions are legitimate, legally and constitutionally created. It is not only the state 
law that is supreme but also justice, because the law serves humanity and jus-
tice, revealing its moral aspects. According the German author Josef Thesing, 
                                                     
9 Thesing (1997), 36–47. 
10 See Dicey (1915), 120. 
11 Thesing (1997); and ibid essays of Robber, 48–85; Beson/Jasper, 180–200; Mar-
tin/Kriele, 223–250; Herzog/Thesing, 9–17.  
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the state of law has to base on “the supremacy of the law and ethical concepts 
of justice.”12 
The state of law is responsible for respecting, protecting and ensuring the 
rights and freedom of humans and citizens. By and large: “human rights imply 
the intrinsic, natural and objective demands and interests of humans which are 
recognized and inscribed in national laws and international legal treaties”.13 
Former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan once declared:  
“Human rights are common to every culture and a friend of every nation.”14  
Human and civil rights are the basis and purpose and also criteria for the eval-
uation of all state bodies and public servants. The state is charged with pro-
tecting and ensuring the rights and freedom of humans and citizens, identify-
ing and providing necessary conditions in political, economic, cultural, social 
and technological fields to maintain these rights in practice. The state is 
obliged to abide by constitutional principles on the rights and freedom of hu-
mans and citizens, and is prohibited from abusing and misusing the law to 
restrict, distort and manipulate the nature of these rights. 
The state is organized and maintained on the separation of state power be-
tween the legislative, executive and judicial branches which are clearly defined 
in the Constitution and law. Compliance with the law is required of all indi-
viduals and organizations, including the state. The state is responsible for 
compensating material and spiritual loss of its citizens and organizations 
caused by unconstitutional decisions and acts. Judiciary bodies have to be in-
dependent and capable of protecting the rights, freedom and legitimate inter-
ests of individuals and citizens, and have to decide on and resolve disputes 
according to the law, integrity and justice.  
Democracy, Civil Society and Sustainable Development 
The state of law is a democratic state, and all of its policies and operations are 
transparent and public so that citizens and social organizations can contribute 
their opinion and feedback. The state of law can only function and exist in 
conjunction with a well-developed civil society. In return, civil society and its 
                                                     
12 Thesing (1997), 55. 
13 Nguyen Dang Long/Vu Cong Giao/La Khanh Tung (2009), 209.  
14 Statement of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan on International Human rights day 
in 1977, paragraph 3.  
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members can only exist and function when a state of law is ensured. The law 
within a state of law must ensure such qualities as justice, humanity, equality, 
the protection of human freedom and interests, harmony of interest between 
individuals, state, community and society, and compatibility between national 
law and international law. What distinguishes contemporary conceptions of 
state of law is the increasing expansion of its contents instead of a mere focus 
on forms as in previous interpretations. In the past the state of law is primarily 
understood and explained in terms of its forms, i.e. compliance with the law, 
binding regulations towards the state, limited state power, and even power 
control, although they are its basic, prominent and innate characteristics. In 
contemporary society, the contents of state of law become more vital, namely 
the responsibility of states in protecting, ensuring and promoting human 
rights, freedom and interests, maintaining justice and democracy, and promot-
ing the economy, culture, social security and welfare and living conditions. 
The state of law has a new role as a social servant and its permanent responsi-
bility as a modern state is to “facilitate the authentic life of everyone as a hu-
man being.”15 
Creation of a Human Rights Culture and Human Rights Education.  
A Prerequisite for the Construction of a State of Law 
Human rights culture is one of the cultural forms in general and at the same 
time the foundation of every other cultural form in contemporary life. The 
category of culture has a broad range of meanings and is not easy to define.16 
Currently there are around 400–500 definitions of culture. This concept en-
compasses material and spiritual values formed and created by human activi-
ties, which are transferred back and forth between generations and communi-
ties, creating particular national identities along with universal elements.  
Legal culture is the system of material and spiritual values within the hemi-
sphere of the law and manifests in human consciousness, ideas, conventions, 
legal principles and behaviors. The most culturally relevant aspect of juridical 
acts is reflected in legitimate judgments that are based on prudence and justice 
                                                     
15 Ysumirrô/Takahara/Bikishimoto (1994), 30.  
16 See Central Committee for Ideology and Culture (2001), 222. 
242 
and the protection of human rights, freedom and legitimate interests.17 Hu-
manity is the core element of culture. Human rights culture refers to the un-
derstanding and respect, recognition, protection, assurance and promotion of 
human rights; human rights and freedom are the highest values protected and 
guaranteed by the system of social, political and legal institutions. Human 
rights culture is the center of political-legal-moral aspects of modern society. 
Human rights today have become universal values and are said to constitute 
part of human culture. Without human rights, it is impossible to make full 
evaluation of the complicated formulation of political, social, economic, legal 
and cultural relations.  
Authentic culture always takes humans as its purpose, objective and ulti-
mate aim. The state is thus responsible for acknowledging and respecting hu-
man rights and its citizens’ rights, freedom and legitimate interests. Humanity 
is served by the state and is never mechanically understood as just a tool. Cul-
ture goes hand in hand with sacred values of the spiritual life which together 
make up a human being. State of law is constitutional, legitimate, reasonable 
and effective, a state that is organized and maintained based on moral princi-
ples, a fair State with its ultimate aim to ensure safety and development for all.  
The creation of a human rights culture is prerequisite for the foundation of 
a state of law. Human rights culture is reflected in the policies and laws, in the 
operation of public organs and services and in interpersonal conduct. In partic-
ular, it is expressed in the collection and making of legal documents and law 
enforcement; in the system of protective measures to guard human rights. The 
most relevant manifestation of human rights culture is in the spirit and princi-
ples of a democratic constitution, in which the state of law is recognized, re-
spected, protected, ensured and cited by first of all public sectors and officials 
who are most likely to make unconstitutional acts.18 
Human rights culture is a multi-dimensional category and a complex for-
mulation consisting of different components, layers and degrees of manifesta-
tion. Overall, it is a combination of basic elements such as knowledge and 
understanding of human rights, protective measures for human rights, respect 
for human rights and recognition of moral norms and values; and skills in 
protecting human rights and the supremacy of law and constitution. The na-
                                                     
17 See Hoang Thi Kim Que/Ngo Huy Cuong (2011).  
18 Nguyen Dang Dung (2012), 5. 
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ture of human rights culture is marked by this formula: knowledge-respect-
practice (recognition, compliance, use) of human rights and freedom. This is 
especially true for public servants, who have a higher probability of violating 
the constitution compared to other individuals and citizens. The indicators of a 
developed human rights culture and a constitutional culture are acknowledg-
ment, admiration, protection and assurance of the rights and freedom of citi-
zens in both attitudes and behavior.  
Human Rights Education  
There are both long-term and immediate tasks to in order to create a human 
rights culture. First of all, it is necessary to establish effective human rights 
education for the entire society, especially for public staff who are making legal 
decisions that affect these rights. The human rights education is a common 
statement of this era:  
“the more a human is cognizant of his own rights, the more he respects the rights of 
others and further contributes to peaceful coexistence. Only when the people are edu-
cated about human rights can we hope to prevent their violation and reduce con-
flicts.”19 
The human rights education is aimed at providing everyone since his child-
hood with necessary knowledge on human rights according to national and 
international law and on important values such as democracy, equality, justice, 
freedom, responsibility, tolerance and accountability to oneself and to others. 
Compassion, lenience and care for others are traditional ethical values that need 
to be retained and given their right position in the new system of moral values.  
At the international level, since 1994 the United Nations has been propos-
ing the decade of human rights education on a global scale. The sacred mission 
and spirit of the Global Strategy on Human Rights Education are manifested 
in the acquisition of necessary knowledge and understanding of human rights 
so that each individual is aware of and practice their own rights while respect-
ing and protecting the rights of others. In this way human beings become 
closer and more tolerant towards each other regardless of any distance and are 
more likely to live in peaceful development. 
                                                     
19 Statement of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan on International Human rights day, 
December 10th 2000; UN Press release, 10 February 2000.  
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Human rights education is a purposeful and oriented task that aims to pro-
vide citizens and public officials with necessary know-how on human rights 
and defensive methods so that they can practice and protect their own rights 
while valuing others’ according to national and international laws on human 
rights.20  
Human and civil rights have become basic indicators of the development of 
each state in terms of its social system, respect for humanity, democracy and 
civilization. Human rights education needs to be widely applied. “Prioritized” 
targets of this activity are public staff and servants and especially law enforcers 
who are endowed with legal authority and at the same time responsibility to 
ensure the maintenance of human and civil rights.  
Humanity holds the highest values, and any discussion about humanity and 
human rights necessarily has to relate to a humanistic aspect, namely morality. 
Thus, human rights education can be only be efficient and genuine in combi-
nation with moral education. Moral education, human rights education and 
legal education have to be in line with economic and cultural education, and 
the training of living skills and law application. Without basic economic and 
cultural conditions and proper cultural conduct, it is impossible to maintain 
and protect human rights, except in mere slogans. Human rights education 
should constitute an important part in developing a just society in which basic 
human rights are valorized and respected.  
Human rights education and legal education not only prevent the violation 
of the law but also promote in everyone a sense of respect for human values, for 
the rights and freedom of oneself and everyone else. The teaching of human 
rights must take in account the dissection of basic human values and the im-
portance of respect for human rights; the awareness of human values, respect 
for others’ rights and interests, and understanding of justice, freedom and per-
sonal responsibility towards one’s community and society.  
The idea of human rights in connection with freedom and national inde-
pendence has been most vividly indicated and inscribed in Vietnam’s constitu-
tions up to now, especially the 2013 Constitution. Vietnam has made great 
achievements in the protection and assurance of human rights. The construc-
tion of a human rights culture and human rights education are especially im-
portant in realizing the 2013 Constitution by introducing constitutional prin-
                                                     
20 Hoang Thi Kim Que (2006).  
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ciples into daily life, in particular by actualizing regulations on human rights 
and the basic civil rights and duties.  
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The Development of the Civil Society and the  
Socialist Law-based State in Vietnam 
Duong Xuan Ngoc 
In the era of globalization and international integration, building the state of 
law has become an objective trend for every country. Vietnam, a democratic 
country, is not out of this general trajectory. However, from the perspective of 
theory and practice, the construction and perfecting of the socialist state of law 
in Vietnam are bringing many problems that need to be studied and resolved. 
This article does not intend to carry out a comprehensive study on the rule of 
law in Vietnam; instead, this paper tries to approach the issue from the per-
spective of the construction and development of civil society, an indispensable 
aspect reflecting the degree of completion of the state of law. It is time to be 
fully aware of the position and role of civil society in social development, in 
building and perfecting the socialist state of law.  
The concept of the state of law has a long history. Nevertheless, to date, 
different views on the definition of the state of law are still debated. At the 
Berlin International Conference (September 1991) in which over 40 countries 
participated, a general definition was given: “The state of law is a political 
regime in which the state and individual have to obey the law and everyone’s 
obligations are legally recognized and protected; all legal processes and rules 
are ensured by an independent court system. The state of law is obliged to 
respect the highest values of humanity and ensure that citizens have the ability 
and conditions to resist against the arbitrariness of law as well as the activities 
of the state apparatus. The state of law must ensure that citizens are not re-
quired to do what is out of constitution and regulations. Within the legal 
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system, the constitution is supreme and must be built on the basis of freedoms 
and rights of citizens.” 
In Vietnam, the awareness of the requirements of building the state of law 
was first officially launched by the communist party of Vietnam in the 7th 
National Party Congress:  
“The National Assembly should focus on the implementation of two basic tasks: First, 
building the state of law, the state has the capacity to establish a synchronous legal 
system meeting the new requirements of social economic development and control all 
aspects of a civilized society; that legal system is the basis to ensure that the guidelines 
and policies of the party and state will be implemented effectively and is a key factor in 
making social relations become stronger. Second: ensuring the real power and effec-
tiveness of the National Assembly guaranteed by the constitution.”1 
In so far, after more than 20 years, the Vietnam Communist Party has positive-
ly realized and resolved the requirements of building and perfecting the social-
ist state of law. This is shown as follows: 
- The objective necessity of the socialist state of law in Vietnam has been 
recognized and the requirements of building it have been gradually real-
ized. 
- The thinking about the socialist state of law has become deeper and 
changed from qualitative to quantitative. If the 7th National Party Congress 
only raised the awareness of the requirements of building the state of law in 
Vietnam, then the nature of the socialist state of law was developed in the 
8th National Party Congress; the 10th and the 11th National Party Congress, 
the essence of the socialist state of law in Vietnam had been confirmed, i.e., 
the state of the people, by the people and for the people. All state power be-
longs to the people. Naturally, the state has no rights but authorized by the 
people. The state was established, not to be served by the people, but to 
serve the people.  
- The operational mechanism of the state organs has gradually been realized, 
state power is unified with the assignment, coordination and control among 
state agencies in the implementation of the legislative, executive and judi-
ciary. The 10th National Party Congress confirms: “to build the operational 
mechanism of the socialist state of law and to ensure the principles of all 
state power belong to the people and state power is unified with the as-
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signment and coordination among the bodies in the implementation of the 
legislative, executive and judicial; to perfect the legal system, increase the 
concreteness and feasibility of the provisions in legal documents; to con-
struct, and complete checking mechanisms, monitor the constitutionality 
and legality of the activities and decisions of public authorities.”2 
- Missions and principles of organization and operation of the state have been 
recognized and realized, i.e., the state is organized and operated under the 
constitution and law, the state manages the society by the constitution and 
law, democratic centralism is applied. The state shall respect and protect 
human rights and civil rights; care for happiness, the free development of 
the individual. The rights and obligations of citizens are stipulated by the 
constitution and law. People perform state power through direct democracy 
and representative democracy via the National Assembly, People's Council 
and other state agencies. The state shall respect and fully implement the in-
ternational treaties in which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a mem-
ber. The state implements the foreign policy of openness, multilateralism 
and diversification of international relations; Vietnam has signed and joined 
many international treaties and become a member of many regional and in-
ternational organizations. 
- The enforcement of the party’s leadership of the state in the process of de-
veloping and perfecting the socialist state of law in Vietnam has been 
acknowledged and guaranteed. 
The achievements in the perception and realization of the demands and con-
tent of building the socialist state of law in Vietnam are not in doubt. But so 
far, particularly in terms of theory, there are still unclear questions that need to 
be answered: What are the nature and characteristics of the socialist state of 
law in Vietnam? Is Vietnam a socialist state of law or a socialist-oriented state 
of law? How to understand “state power is unified”? What are the acknowl-
edgments of assignment, coordination and control in executing state power? 
What are the relations between party and state within the mechanism of party 
leadership, state’s governance and the people’s mastery? What kind of mecha-
nism is in place to ensure control and supervision rights of the people, of the 
Fatherland Front, the political social organizations for the activities of the 
state? What is the legal thinking behind building and perfecting the legal 
                                                     
2 Communist Party of Vietnam (2006), 126. 
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system? In particular, what is the relationship between the state of law and 
civil society? These concerns not only require the work of scientists but also 
depend on the will, capacity and commitment of all levels of the entire society. 
In fact, in Vietnam, up to now, civil society has been still considered a sen-
sitive issue and has not been formally mentioned in the party’s documents. 
Nevertheless, from both a theoretical and a practical perspective, civil society 
has become a mirror and an effective measure of the degree of perfection of the 
socialist state of law in Vietnam. It has been a long time since the launch of 
the country’s fundamental reform and its shift to a socialist-oriented market 
economy, and civil society has become a real entity confirmed and promoted in 
the fields of economic development, social democratization and national de-
fense.  
The development of the socialist-oriented market economy (now seen as a 
modern socialist-oriented and internationally integration-oriented market 
economy) has created an environment and conditions for the economic devel-
opment of private sectors and democratization of social life. The economic 
actors are given more autonomy and self-responsibility as required by the mar-
ket economy and law.  
They are provided with more possibilities and conditions to improve their 
capacity to grasp development opportunities compared to the previous central-
ized, bureaucratic and state-subsidized economy. Thus, the socialist-oriented 
market economy not only creates a solid basis for the development of social 
organizations but also provides mechanisms to liberate resources including 
human resources. People are free to develop in accordance with the law and 
ethics and, as a result, this leads to the more active and self-confident involve-
ment of citizens in social organizations to meet the demands and interests of 
individuals and thecommunity as a whole. The socialist-oriented market econ-
omy also provides more conditions for the formation and development of the 
civil society, i.e., the material facilities and the freedom of liberated people.  
Naturally, accompanying the development of a socialist-oriented market 
economy is the process of building and perfecting the socialist state of law. 
There is a dialectical relationship between the development of a socialist-
oriented market economy and the building of the socialist state of law. With-
out the development of the socialist-oriented market economy, the requests for 
and the creation of material facilities to complete the socialist state of law will 
not be fulfilled. Vice versa, there will be no legal environment for the devel-
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opment of a socialist-oriented market economy without building and perfect-
ing the socialist state of law. Only when a socialist-oriented market economy 
and a socialist state of law are developed and promoted in reality, will human 
rights be respected and furthered, will the civil society be formed and devel-
oped on the basis of material facilities, law and social environment. In fact, 
there is no perfect socialist state of law without the development of the market 
economy and civil society.  
It can be assumed that the state of law and the civil society are two sides of 
the same coin. The formation and development of the state of law stem from 
social demands and vice versa, civil society is formed and developed on the 
basis of social demands and the requirements of perfecting the state of law. A 
socialist-oriented market economy and a socialist state of law, of the people, by 
the people and for the people in parallel with civil society constitute the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the construction and development of the 
democratic society in Vietnam. The 10th National Party Congress affirms: “to 
build a democratic society in which cadres, party members and civil servants 
should really be servants of the people; to identify the organizational forms and 
mechanisms for the people to exercise democratic rights in economic, political, 
cultural and social fields.”3 
In Vietnam, social organizations have been increasingly formed. Their ac-
tivities are based on the principles of self-determination, voluntariness, democ-
racy and autonomy in funding; those organizations are playing a vital role in 
implementing the millennium development goals: poverty reduction and so-
cial welfare. The members of civil society help each other to reduce poverty 
and hunger as well as participate in charitable activities and effectively fight 
against social evils. These organizations share responsibilities with the state 
and support the state in responding to the growing demands and diversity of 
the members of the society while the state cannot solve or can solve, but not 
efficiently. 
More importantly, civil organizations are also involved in monitoring and 
criticizing the state apparatus and the economic institutions and party organi-
zations. At the same time, civil organizations are forums which gather opin-
ions and demands of the people of the party and state; they also are bridges 
between people and party, people and the state, ensuring the democratic 
                                                     
3 Communist Party of Vietnam (2006), 125.  
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mechanisms of the society, e.g., “party’s leadership, state’s governance and the 
people’s mastery”. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to mention here that civil 
society is a sensitive issue; any sensitive issue may be abused and distorted 
which causes incalculable harm. There is no reason to avoid facing the civil 
society as it is an objective necessity and condition for building and perfecting 
the state of law as well as the socialist-oriented market economy. Therefore, 
simultaneously with the active construction and development of civil society, 
we need to struggle against the abuse and the so-called “administrative dis-
ease” in the organizations and operations of civil society.  
Additionally, creatively building and developing Vietnam’s civil society is 
seen as a revolutionary attitude that reflects an objective tendency on the one 
hand, and requirements of the society in creating a democratic environment for 
the renovation and development of the country on the other hand. Within the 
present context, to build and develop civil society in Vietnam to meet the 
requirements of an environment ensuring democratic freedoms for the people 
in economic development and democratic exercise, it is necessary to solve the 
following tasks. 
Positive attitudes toward civil society should be raised, particularly, it is 
necessary to see civil society is not a “restricted zone” because of its sensitive-
ness. The success of almost 30 years of innovation has led our country to enter 
a new development period: economic progress, political stability, physical and 
spiritual life of the people has been constantly improved; the position of Vi-
etnam on the international scene was confirmed. Therefore, to further develop 
the success of the innovation process requires us to bravely face all the prob-
lems posed both in terms of theory and practice whether they are still a sensi-
tive issue or not. Moreover, civil society has been existing as an entity already 
in our country, in the spirit of looking straight at the truth, we should have a 
scientific attitude towards civil society. Then, we should do research to get a 
better perception of civil society in terms of: its nature, characteristics, role, 
objective requirements and the “barrier” to building a civil society in Vietnam. 
Currently, the perception of a large number of Vietnamese people in general 
and civil servants in particular are basically limited; therefore, to raise aware-
ness in society about civil society is a necessary and objective requirement. 
The state should soon enact laws on association and other legal documents 
related to civil society in order to create a favorable environment for the social-
ist-oriented development of civil society. To build and develop civil society, 
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we need to actively create the institutional system of law and compatible relat-
ed systems followed by suitable mechanisms and policies for organizations and 
members of civil society to act in accordance with the law and that must be 
consistent with community interests. That means we should soon complete a 
legal environment for directing, managing, monitoring and adjusting the for-
mation and operation of civil society. Like it or not, in fact, many social organ-
izations have been created and are operating, many of which are performing 
very effectively and are recognized by society. However, some of them are act-
ing less successfully and even some organizations are being exploited, conse-
quently, the image of the civil society and the stability of the entire communi-
ty are also influenced. It is now the right time to take the initiative to create a 
legal environment for the development of civil society; it is also needed to 
manage and to limit the negative issues of civil society based on strong institu-
tions with the compatible legal system. Moreover, the promulgation of the law 
on associations will contribute to preventing the abuse of the sensitiveness of 
civil society to undermine the country’s political and social stability. 
It is necessary to diversify the forms of aggregation of funds for the perfor-
mance of the organizations of civil society. Unlike other political organizations 
serving the benefit of the ruling class and financially secured by it, civil society 
organizations are created by their members and financed by them, the civil 
society should diversify the forms of aggregation and mobilization of funds for 
the operation. This, on the one hand, creates the material conditions for the 
activities of civil society organizations, and contributes to preventing the ad-
ministration disease of political and social organizations on the other hand.  
Party and State should have plans to train specialized staff and professionals 
for civil society organizations. Staff had always played a decisive role in defin-
ing success or failure of the revolution. The formation process of social and 
career organizations in our country in past years has been mainly spontaneous 
and partial. As a matter of fact, the staff of these organizations has not been 
trained yet; therefore, the key task now is to foster professional qualifications 
in order to further improve the quality of the existing staff so that they really 
have the ability and enthusiasm to undertake key positions in associations and 
unions. In the long term, to promote the role of civil society organizations, 
party and state should offer basic and professional training plans for managers 
to assure that they could serve for the long term in social organizations. By 
doing so, the active role of civil society can be promoted, particularly in im-
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plementing democracy, and assure the close relations between the party and 
the people as well as between the state and the people. 
National strength must be promoted to continue pushing the renewal pro-
cess, political stability and sustainable development. During the revolution, 
especially in the renovation period, the party has firmly seen “people as the 
root”, “the masses who make history”; innovation must rely on the people and 
serve the interests of the people and be in accordance with the practice and 
always creative. Therefore, our party always focuses on building and strength-
ening the national unity bloc based on the alliance of the working class with 
the peasantry and the intelligentsia under the leadership of the party. Building 
and strengthening national unity is the revolutionary strategy of Vietnam; it is 
also the power source and the important factor promoting economic develop-
ment and maintaining the social and political stability of the country and en-
suring the success of the renewal process. 
After almost 30 years of conducting the renovation, it has been reaffirmed 
that building and promoting the strength of the nation is always a tremendous 
momentum of the innovation. However, in terms of socialist-oriented econom-
ic and international integration, the foundation to build and strengthen na-
tional unity is not only in the unified target including prosperous people, a 
strong country, social justice, democracy, and civilization. But more important 
is that the party and the state must implement a national policy with these 
principles: ensure a fair and equal society, bring practical and legal benefits to 
the people; harmonize individual, collective and social interests; exercise a 
democracy associated with maintaining social discipline and struggle against 
bureaucracy, corruption and waste; constantly nurture and enhance the spirit of 
patriotism, the sense of national independence and territorial integrity, and the 
spirit of self-reliance in building the country. 
In particular, it is necessary to strongly promote the role of state and gov-
ernment at all levels in performing the function of serving the people; con-
stantly improve the mechanism of both direct and representative democracy; 
continue to improve and implement the Ordinance on Grassroots Democracy 
to practice the motto “People know, people discuss, people do and people 
check” in all types of organizations and units based on all levels and sectors, 
including in the party, state, Fatherland Front and mass organizations; rectify 
all signs of democratic violations. The promotion of democracy must be en-
twined with upholding the law and other social disciplines. 
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The state should coordinate with the Fatherland Front and ensure necessary 
conditions for it and other mass organizations to have the true right to reflect 
thoughts and aspirations of the social strata; actively participate in developing 
guidelines, policies and laws; gather and mobilize people to successfully im-
plement these policies and tasks of the state; simultaneously, monitor effective-
ly the operations of state agencies, elected representatives, officials and civil 
servants in order to build and protect a clean and strong government. 
Of course, at the beginning of the innovation process, based on the practice 
of domestic and international situation, we identified the following principles: 
the maintaining of socio-political stability is considered a prerequisite for any 
change; innovation is the method and development is the goal. And, thanks to 
the proper awareness and creative practice of those principles, the socio-
political situation of the country has always been stable, the economy has de-
veloped, physical and spiritual life of the people have been significantly im-
proved, international integration has increasingly deepened. So, in order to 
build and develop civil society in Vietnam, in addition to overcoming the 
barriers of perception and the low level of economic development that limit 
personal liberation and prevent building favorable conditions for the construc-
tion and development of the civil society, we should apply synchronous solu-
tions among which a renewed perception of civil society can be seen as a key 
solution. More than ever before, we need to understand and act timely in the 
construction and development of civil society in Vietnam to pave the way for it 
to promote its inherent strength in the renewal period for socialism and for the 
happiness of the people; at the same time, we should draft strategic and specif-
ic plans for managing the activities of civil society organizations in accordance 
with the law in order to motivate and ensure the correct orientation for the 
construction and development of civil society in Vietnam. 
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Anti-Corruption from the Perspective of Ho Chi 
Minh’s Ideology: Towards a Vietnamese Rule of Law  
Lai Quoc Khanh/Nguyen Ngoc Anh 
According to the UN Convention against corruption in 2003, “corruption is 
the abuse of state power for personal interests.” Section 1 of Article 2 in the 
Vietnam anti-corruption law in 2005 states that: “Corruption is the behavior 
of an official who abuses his/her rights and position for personal gains.” The 
Dictionary of Law indicates:  
“Corruption is the exploitation of one’s position and rights to gain illegitimate inter-
ests, which causes damage to the properties of State, organization, individuals and 
infringes on the activities of public authorities.”1 
Despite its different interpretations, corruption is commonly understood on a 
global level as the abuse of one’s position and rights for personal interests 
through illegal behaviors, in other words, the dishonest use or appropriation of 
public power or collective resources. During feudalism in Vietnam, corruption 
was reflected in the custom of donating, bribing and giving presents to man-
darins and colonial officials. Through time, it became a social evil and a bad 
custom that denigrated the social structure to its core. 
Recognizing anti-corruption as an insidious and long-term problem of the 
country, since the August Revolution 1945, apart from encouraging diligence, 
frugality, integrity and righteousness (Cần, kiệm, liêm, chính) among party 
members and the people, party, state, government and President Ho Chi Minh 
were particularly concerned about the struggle against corruption, misappro-
priation and abuse of power. Corruption, misappropriation and abuse of power 
                                                     
1 General Vietnamese Dictionary (1998), 695. 
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have a broad range of meaning under the framework of Ho Chi Minh’s ideolo-
gy. In this paper we would like to shed light on the issue of corruption accord-
ing to Ho Chi Minh and relate it to the development of a Vietnamese socialist 
rule of law.  
Ho Chi Minh’s Ideas on Corruption and Anti-corruption 
Definition and Concept of Corruption under Ho Chi Minh’s Ideas 
Ho Chi Minh’s anti-corruption ideas constitute an important part of his ideol-
ogy. The main features and contents of his ideas on anti-corruption have been 
adopted by party, state and Vietnamese population as a whole in the battle 
against corruption today.  
President Ho Chi Minh is an excellent leader and warrior in Vietnam’s lib-
eration movements in the 20th century, and is also a pioneer and director in 
anti-corruption efforts – a global issue. Ho Chi Minh is one the few leaders 
who relentlessly and resolutely committed himself to battling corruption dur-
ing his revolutionary career. Ho Chi Minh continuously maintains a critical 
standpoint towards corruption in former colonial and imperial systems and also 
their new counterparts.  
His synchronicity between words and deeds through resolute anti-
corruption acts and being an example of “diligence, frugality, integrity and 
righteousness” constitute the exceptionality of Ho Chi Minh’s ideology and his 
ideas on anti-corruption in particular. Ho Chi Minh clarifies the role of miti-
gating corruption, misappropriation and abuse of power, considering it an 
important task for Party’s members and the people:  
“Corruption, misappropriation and abuse of power are social evils. They must be erased 
in the pursuit of diligence, frugality, integrity and righteousness, to encourage produc-
tion and an economical lifestyle, to lead our national salvation to victory and success, 
and to nourish ethical practices among the entire population. This is an important task 
of every one of us.”2 
  
                                                     
2 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 534. 
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The battle against corruption, misappropriation and abuse of power is a per-
manent and great concern of Ho Chi Minh, who considers them “most debas-
ing and appalling behaviors.”3 The nature of misappropriation is “To steal 
from the public, which is equivalent to deception and greed”, and is “no less 
than robbery”. President Ho Chi Minh produces a conceptualization of misap-
propriation:  
“Concerning public servants, misappropriation (tham ô) means to steal from the pub-
lic; to starve the people; to rob from the army. He who misappropriates secretly misus-
es public funds, and also appropriates the State’s properties to enrich his own division 
and local area. Concerning the people, misappropriation means to steal from the pub-
lic, to lie and avoid tax.”4 
Ho Chi Minh considers the nature of misappropriation as “to steal from the 
public” – i.e. to steal public properties contributed by the people not in order 
to fulfill collective tasks but to enrich oneself or even one’s inner circle. Any 
misuse of “public properties” as “private properties” is considered by Ho Chi 
Minh an act of misappropriation. This is its general meaning. In this sense, the 
parties involved in misappropriation include not only public servants, who 
hold certain power in the political system, but also ordinary citizens who “em-
bezzle, lie and avoid tax”. More importantly, Ho Chi Minh reveals a more 
subtle and sophisticated kind of misappropriation, namely indirect misappro-
priation. He provides an example of this practice:  
“any public official or citizen who receives a monthly wage yet is irresponsible, greedy, 
sluggish, and wasteful of the time of the Government and others.”5  
This is a special kind of misappropriation. Though not liable to cause serious 
damage as direct misappropriation, this kind happens on a regular, daily basis 
and proves to be devastating to the efficiency of public authorities and state 
management, which greatly threatens the national revolutionary project. Simi-
lar to misappropriation, extravagance is considered by Ho Chi Minh as mis-
conduct in the eyes of the population. Extravagance is caused by public serv-
ants, military servicemen, factories and citizens who irresponsibly waste or 
misuse time, wealth and labor. He makes clear:  
                                                     
3 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 110. 
4 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 488 
5 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 436. 
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“Some say that extravagance is not as bad a conduct as misappropriation. In fact, they 
are two different acts, but both deplete the resources of the Government and the peo-
ple.”6  
Ho Chi Minh even states that extravagance is more threatening than misap-
propriation, because “it is more common.” He indicates three kinds of extrava-
gance: “extravagance of labor”, “extravagance of time”, and “extravagance of 
wealth”. While each has its own forms and different manifestations, they all 
lead to consequences which “maybe even more serious than caused by misap-
propriation”, damaging the properties of Government, people and disrupting 
the national liberation and construction as a whole.  
Both misappropriation and extravagance are dangerous illnesses. To effec-
tively combat these, it is necessary to understand their causes and origins. Ho 
Chi Minh says: “Misappropriation and extravagance both result from the abuse 
of power.”7 He makes clear that abuse of power (quan liêu) directly leads to 
and accelerates the two former. He insists that whenever abuses of power show 
up, there are misappropriation and extravagance and vice versa. President Ho 
Chi Minh thoroughly analyzes the nature, causes and symptoms of abuse of 
power. According to him, it takes the form of  
“unnecessary bureaucratic rules and red tape, detachment from and mistreatment of 
the masses, and disobedience of the policies set out by the Party and Political Organi-
zations.”8  
Abuse of power can mean willful ignorance of one’s own tasks, failing to 
acknowledge general affairs, and providing insufficient and obscure instruc-
tions. It can also mean alienation towards the masses, lack of knowledge of 
subordinates’ performance, denial of feedback, and avoidance of criticism and 
self-criticism. The overall manner of an abuser of power is undemocratic and 
disrespectful of the principle of “collective leadership-individual duty” (lãnh 
đạo tập thể, phân công phụ trách). Ho Chi Minh characterizes it as  
“to focus on the formalities of every task without going into its substance, and to only 
report, instruct and inform on the surface without making thorough and sufficient 
investigations.”9 
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In performing his own duty or delegating tasks to subordinates, without prop-
er supervision, it is not possible for an official to instruct and oversee his sub-
ordinates; and by failing to make timely correction of wrongdoings, he causes 
the loss of wealth and resources of the state and people. Ho Chi Minh writes:  
“Abuse of power can mean that public authorities at different levels and sectors fail to 
oversee themselves, their subordinates and the masses. It is the seed of misappropria-
tion and extravagance. Therefore, to combat misappropriation and extravagance, we 
must prevent abuse of power. But this has to be done with enough preparation, plan-
ning and clear objectives. In every sector and every area, public officials, people and 
servicemen must be informed about these bad practices.”10 
According to Ho Chi Minh, public servants and authorities who abuse their 
power are so blind and numb that they fail to maintain overall regulations and 
self-discipline. As a result, they become wrongdoers who drown themselves in 
misappropriation and extravagance. This leads to a consequence in which not 
only these officials practice misappropriation and extravagance for their own 
interests, they fail to maintain overall management and administration and 
inspire corrupting behaviors among their own subordinates, causing loss and 
damage to the resources and time of the State and the people.  
Ho Chi Minh deems these bad practices “allies of the colonists and feudal-
ists”, and “enemies of the people, army and Government.”11 For these practices 
are disrupting. First and foremost, they drain public properties. Many officials 
are in charge of public properties donated by the State, the people and foreign 
partners, which are used to serve revolutionary efforts and improve living con-
ditions. Due to their egoism and desire for personal gains, these officials take 
from the public and misuse common possessions of the State, threatening the 
cause of national construction and diminishing overall living standards. By 
abusing power and neglecting responsibilities, they exhaust the wealth, time 
and resources of the State and people. While not directly leading to robbery 
and embezzlement, extravagance happens on a regular basis and in different 
forms and cause just as much damage as misappropriation.  
Misappropriation and extravagance debase and corrupt the moral con-
sciousness of an official and diminish his lucidity and enthusiasm, causing 
popular skepticism towards party and state. Ho Chi Minh affirms that most of 
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Vietnamese party members, union members, public servants and staff are clean 
and devoted, commit to the revolutionary spirit and practice diligence, frugali-
ty, integrity and righteousness. They are willing to endure hardship and sacri-
fice for revolutionary efforts and popular aspirations. However, among them 
there are still a number who practice misappropriation, abuse of power and 
extravagance for their own sake, thereby corrupting and alienating themselves 
from moral principles. This discourages the Party, spoils the reputation of 
party and state and threatens revolutionary efforts. Ho Chi Minh makes clear: 
“the battle against misappropriation, extravagance and abuse of power must 
rely on the masses to be successful.”12 The participation of the masses deter-
mines its accomplishment. The more they actively contribute to it, the more it 
is likely to succeed. Ho Chi Minh confirms that “the more people participate, 
the more its victory is complete and timely.”13 
The prevention of misappropriation and extravagance is extremely im-
portant and must be regularly addressed at all levels and by different sectors. 
Like in other areas, to be successful in the area of anti-misappropriation and 
anti-extravagance; we must be aware of the instructions that lead us in this 
struggle. Ho Chi Minh emphasizes: “it is necessary to be prepared by making 
plans, and thus leadership, organization and loyalty are needed.”14 
Causes, Origins and Conditions of Corruption  
At the objective level, Ho Chi Minh considers misappropriation and extrava-
gance “serious diseases” of any state. Whether in feudal, capitalist or socialist 
state, without thorough education and if state activities are conducted without 
the supervision and control of the people, it is not difficult for these two prac-
tices to occur: Those who hold authority, whether influential or not, are likely 
to be corrupt. Ho Chi Minh makes clear:  
“Those who work for public organs from Central level to grassroots level are more or 
less endowed with power, and thus are more likely to be wealthy through robbing the 
Government or stealing from the people. Without maintaining diligence, frugality, 
integrity and righteousness and impartiality, they are easily spoiled and become rob-
bers in the eyes of the people.”  
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At the subjective level, “appropriation is caused by the lack of moral con-
sciousness and egoism” among public servants and cadres. Ho Chi Minh 
writes: “Egoism is such an effective virus that causes various illnesses, for in-
stance sluggishness, cynicism, greed, opportunism, abuse of authority, misap-
propriation, debasement, wastefulness and extravagance. It also diminishes 
solidarity, self-discipline and ignites whimsicality, the defiance of State and 
Party’s policies, and inhibits revolutionary and popular efforts. By and large, 
egoism may lead to various frauds.” Ho Chi Minh says that abuse of power is 
the root of misappropriation and extravagance. All of these bad practices are 
the enemies of the people, army and Government. Insidious as they are, for 
they carry no weapons and yet penetrate our organizations to disrupt our tasks, 
dishearten and demoralize our men, and prevent them from practicing dili-
gence, frugality, integrity and righteousness. They are “internal invaders” and 
enemies within. Therefore, “the battle against misappropriation, extravagance 
and abuse of power is as important and volatile as military battles. This is a 
battle in ideological and political fields. 
These practices can also be caused by the lack of knowledge and education 
and generally the inadequate management of the state. Therefore, to combat 
them, it is necessary to improve both the moral quality of public servants and 
administration and organization of the state.  
Ho Chi Minh’s Viewpoints on Anti-Corruption Solutions 
Having been aware of the insidious nature as well as the causes of misappropri-
ation, extravagance and abuse of power, Ho Chi Minh proposes a set of solu-
tions to prevent these acts. 
In preventing these practices, Ho Chi Minh is particularly concerned about 
improving overall awareness among the masses. That is, “to make the masses 
aware of the danger of misappropriation, extravagance and abuse of power; to 
transform hundreds of vigilant eyes and ears into omnipresent supervisors who 
prevent the occurrence of these acts.”15 To prevent misappropriation, extrava-
gance and abuse of power, the masses supervise public servants by quickly 
identifying illegal behaviors and criticizing and denigrating their bad con-
ducts. Thorough supervision of the masses over public servants through differ-
ent methods is an efficient way to prevent these practices. In addition, timely 
                                                     
15 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 576. 
264 
comments and complaints made by the masses help relevant authorities to 
quickly discover bad behavior and produce appropriate penalties. Ho Chi Minh 
says that misappropriation and extravagance are caused by egoism and abuse of 
power. This literally means to focus on appropriating and self-indulgence 
without any concern for moral improvement and professional performance, to 
be ignorant of the aspirations and demands of subordinates and citizens, and a 
general avoidance of supervision and criticism. The prevention of egoism and 
abuse of power is most useful in combating misappropriation and extrava-
gance. Ho Chi Minh instructs that:  
“Our Party should do its best to educate its members about communist ideals, mis-
sions and policies and about their tasks and ethical requirements.”16  
A public official is supposed to be aware of his position as ‘servant’ of the peo-
ple and revolutionary goals, to put his own interests below that of the revolu-
tion, the Party and the people, be devoted and thorough in his tasks, be open 
to the masses, respect and promote people’s mastery and improve the collective 
spirit and self-discipline. He must continuously pursue personal growth and 
improve his knowledge through various ways from reading books to learning 
from his superiors, subordinates and the populace. 
According to Ho Chi Minh, a public servant must be a good example of 
dedication, purity, resilience and morality; and follow diligence, frugality, 
integrity and righteousness. Ho Chi Minh writes:  
“To maintain purity and stay away from corruption, it is necessary to practice the four 
virtues on a regular basis, namely diligence, frugality, integrity and righteousness.”17  
He further explains:  
“Diligence means to be productive in personal duties, whatever they are. Frugality 
means economical use of time. Integrity means to avoid misappropriation and protect 
public and common properties at all cost. Righteousness means to evade every bad 
practice and follow every good practice.”18  
He then requires and instructs public officials to practice these virtues and 
consider them must-have qualities of a revolutionary servant. Second, it is 
                                                     
16 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 439. 
17 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 347. 
18 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (2000), 392.  
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necessary to practice democracy and maximize the people’s mastery by leaning 
on them. Ho Chi Minh writes:  
“What is democracy? It means the people are masters. So what are the President, Min-
isters, Deputy Ministers and other public members? Servants! They are servants of the 
people and not revolutionary elite. The maintenance of democracy is the key to every 
difficulty”. 
He emphasizes that only when the entire population takes part in realizing and 
implementing the motto “the people know, the people discuss, the people 
perform, and the people check” can misappropriation, extravagance and abuse 
of power efficiency and actively be solved. President Ho Chi Minh asks the 
people to fulfill their mastery. He claims that “corruption among officials is 
caused by ignorance among people”, therefore, the people must be aware of 
their power and know how to supervise public servants in practicing their 
integrity. When a house is robbed, everyone will be informed and all village 
members go out to catch the robber. Likewise, when a public possession is lost, 
everyone is responsible for informing on the culprit and punishing him be-
cause everyone is charged with protecting public properties. State properties 
are infrangible and thus their misuses mean the violation of common interests 
and an enemy. Public officials must do their best to maintain integrity. They 
must practice collective criticism and self-criticism to clear themselves of any 
desire for misappropriation, extravagance and abuse of power. A nation that 
knows how to maintain frugality and integrity is rich in both material and 
spiritual aspects and deserves to be regarded as civilized. He continuously em-
phasizes: “persistent anti-misappropriation is a common mission of the Party 
and the people”. To this end, the Party launches the “Three pros and three 
cons”, in which “the improvement of enthusiasm, consolidation of financial 
management and technical reforms” are the pros and “misappropriation, ex-
travagance and abuse of power” are the cons (this campaign was launched in 
the 1960s).  
Third, it is necessary to make constant state reforms and train and improve 
professional skills of public servants. This is a basis to develop a cost-effective 
and efficient government that fulfills and represents the people’s power 
(through measures, policies and regulations) under their supervision; and also 
contributes to democratization and enhanced transparency. All during his 
presidency, Ho Chi Minh successfully trained ethical and capable public offi-
cials who were indeed “servants” of the people and devoted to the construction 
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of a state of the people, by the people and for the people. He himself is the best 
example of a morally-conscious person who practices “diligence, frugality, 
integrity, righteousness and impartiality” and combines words and deeds.  
While Ho Chi Minh has a “reservoir of affection” for the entire Party, peo-
ple and army, he stops at nothing to realize his resolute and unyielding anti-
corruption project. President Ho Chi Minh, having been through “sleepless” 
nights, decided to execute Colonel Tran Du Chau, a quartermaster general who 
misused a large amount of the army’s funds in trivial pursuits, while the entire 
population was struggling to expel the French colonists. This case is but a past 
event yet retains its value today.  
Ho Chi Minh’s Anti-Corruption Ideas in the Development of  
Vietnamese Rule of Law Today 
Thanks to the party-led renovation, Vietnam has gained important economic 
achievements. Socio-economic developments improve living standards while 
national security is ensured. Nevertheless, we are faced by serious challenges 
and difficulties. One of the obstacles to renovation is corruption. Corruption 
and extravagance are becoming more complicated and lasting, causing indig-
nation among the people and huge losses for the state, deflecting the integrity 
of party members and public officials and compromising social justice and 
equality.Being aware of this situation, party and state have released many reso-
lutions to reduce corruption and gained preliminary results. However, corrup-
tion has become more prevalent than before and appears to expand to every 
sector, industry and area. Clearly, a better understanding of the nature and 
causes of corruption is necessary in order to create better solutions. Among 
anti-corruption solutions, preventive measures are also important due to the 
following reasons: 
- First, if applied on a regular basis, these measures can produce a range of 
effects. By regularly and continually performing these measures, it is possi-
ble to attack corrupt behaviors at their root.  
- Second, preventive measures can reduce the consequences of otherwise irre-
versible corrupt acts. Prevention means proactive anti-corruption and can 
minimize possible damage. This includes not only economic loss, which is 
numerical, but also the degradation of morality and in a broader sense, in-
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fringement of the laws and social justice, which causes skepticism among 
the people towards s state and party and our project of renovation.  
- Third, the study and application of preventive measures contribute to the 
overall renewal and improvement of state management and governance in 
particular and socio-economic renovation in general.  
Regarding Party Members and Public Officials 
Every success in the national liberation and renovation in the past and present 
is attributed to the Communist Party’s leadership. Its strength is reflected in 
the individual strength of its members. More than anyone, party members are 
supposed to be the pioneers of anti-corruption, especially with respect to those 
who currently hold important positions in the state. Anti-corruption is a battle 
against the temptation of material gains which becomes even more influential 
and powerful under the impact of a market economy. The ethical, political and 
ideological education of party members should not merely stops at decisions 
and resolutions but has to become a regular and important task of the party’s 
organs and every conscious member.  
The party has to instruct and supervise each member in improving his mor-
al quality by fulfilling particular tasks and roles. Political education and moral 
improvement should not stop at slogans and have to include practical criteria 
based on which every party member can self-improve and party organs can 
evaluate its members plus provide necessary support.  
Promote the Supervision of Party Members 
This is especially important. What is needed is improved coordination be-
tween the party and state organs in managing public servants, as the party 
members account for most of the positions in the state, especially at senior 
level. The management of party members refers to an overall system of man-
agement, including recruitment, nomination, appointment and evaluation 
during their term. Mismanagement of party members easily enables possible 
opportunists to infiltrate the party and state and even claim the highest posi-
tions to pursue their personal gains. This is an especially complicated issue 
that requires a substantive understanding of the danger of irresponsible man-
agement and possible solutions in case there are errors.  
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Include Criticism and Self-criticism into Regular Party Activities 
Criticism and self-criticism are useful weapons of the party. “The Party should 
not seek to hide its mistakes or avoid criticism. The Party has to admit its 
mistakes and correct them to ameliorate and give example for public officials. 
It has to perform self-criticism and self-correction (…) The Party has to say no 
to self-indulgence, self-interests, arrogance and exaggeration.”19 Criticism and 
self-criticism have been overall underrated and in some cases even neglected 
and bypassed. Every party member has to be conscious of his responsibilities 
and of self-criticism as an instrument to improve his own moral conducts and a 
weapon to prevent bad practices and opportunistic ideas. Moreover, not a few 
public officials and party members are aware of their responsibility to make 
honest and sincere feedback and criticism to the party and their comrades as 
pioneers of the working class. In some cases, criticism is misused as a tool in 
power struggle and conflict of position. These are disgraceful acts that need to 
be corrected so that criticism and self-criticism can contribute to improving 
and consolidating the morale of the party and preventing corruption. 
Improving Public Awareness 
This is what currently concerns the entire society and tests the ability of party 
and state in maintaining confidence among the populace. It is impossible to 
ask for popular confidence if a lawbreaker, especially a party member who pro-
duces corrupt behaviors, remains unpunished despite repeated accusation 
against him. Furthermore, a legal system is no longer legal if it allows im-
portant figures in the party and state to escape their punishment for having 
spread corruption within their own sector. It is understandable that the party 
aims to sustain political stability, but this does not mean we should ignore or 
tolerate those who spoil the party’s image by disobeying the law and ignoring 
public interests. Public officials and servants, especially those higher-up, are 
put under the party’s leadership and management. Thus, the party itself is in 
charge of punishing dishonest acts or irresponsible behaviors that can lead to 
corruption. A strict posture towards flawed party members increases the confi-
dence in it and is also a useful preventive measure.  
  
                                                     
19 Collection of Ho Chi Minh works (1995), 267–268. 
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Regarding State Organs  
Adjusting and improving state policies and regulations, especially on economic 
and financial management and public asset management is an efficient way to 
prevent corruption. As mentioned above, corruption tends to develop in par-
ticular socio-economic conditions. Loopholes in policies are the best perpetra-
tor of corrupt behaviors. Thus, it is necessary to adjust and complete the sys-
tem of state’s policies, rules and regulations and to provide sufficient, clear and 
accessible regulations, first of all on economic, financial, land, public asset and 
service management. In addition, these policies and regulations have to be 
upheld and protected from being exploited by opportunists to acquire illegit-
imate rights and benefits.  
Other tools are: promotion of state reforms by delegating clear and proper 
tasks for public officials, improving administrative reforms, removing unneces-
sary red tape and bureaucratic rules for businesses and citizens and publicizing 
administrative procedures. These measures are well recognized but it takes a 
step-by-step process to produce favorable results. The state, especially its ad-
ministrative system, is gaining membership and becoming more and more 
complicated in terms of its functions and tasks due to objective reasons such as 
population growth and continuous expansion of socio-economic areas, thanks 
to technological advances. However, the fact remains that the quantity of ad-
ministrative officials is not matched by their performance. This is a thought-
provoking issue. The growing number of public organs as well as their func-
tions and missions is sometimes not in line with socio-economic requirements 
or not based on scientific forecasting, instead it results from subjective calcula-
tion or even from the parochial thinking of certain local authorities. Therefore, 
it is necessary to reform the state by simplifying its organizational structure 
and clarifying relevant responsibilities of each administrative officer. In addi-
tion, unnecessary and opaque bureaucratic rules make way for the development 
of authoritative and haughty behaviors to the point where they become natural 
and public. Despite our efforts and solutions to improve administrative proce-
dures as one of the strategic aspects of renovation, results are still limited. It is 
therefore necessary to further promote these reforms by regularly checking and 
removing unnecessary procedures that threaten public interests at every level 
and in every sector, especially the areas that most likely produce corruption. 
The wage system must be reformed along with the improvement of the 
livelihood of salaried employees. Other measures include the punishment of 
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corrupt behaviors and the improvement of political awareness, discipline and 
professional capacity among public officials and cadres. These are also im-
portant issues, because after all, any system or policy is created by human be-
ings and the first reason to enter the workforce is for one’s living, even for 
public servants. Justice is the first requirement of every public servant. But one 
cannot maintain justice if one is burdened with survival needs. It is unreasona-
ble for us to ask for heartfelt service from public officials if they do not earn 
enough for their living. Therefore, while regularly educating officials about 
their responsibility, we have to accelerate the reforms of the wage system. The 
wage reform policy is gaining popularity among the population and expected 
to become one of the useful measures to prevent corruption.  
The compliance with the regulations of party and state on the conduct of 
public officials is also an efficient anti-corruption solution. The state must 
make sure this requirement is followed by every public official and servant, 
and the managers of state organs must regularly enforce their subordinates to 
efficiently abide by these regulations. In addition, enumeration of assets (e.g. 
real estate, income sources, and valuables) must be maintained to effectively 
manage the income of each public official and quickly expose illegitimate in-
come sources. However, it has to be carefully carried out so as to avoid being 
exploited to cause divisions within State organs.  
Other important issues are: further promote supervision and inspection to 
spot and prevent corrupt behaviors, maintain constant control and inspection 
of government officials and public authorities, especially those who own a 
great deal of assets and human resources or have close links with businesses and 
citizens, to prevent bureaucratic and haughty behaviors, and to make timely 
correction to any loophole and weakness in administrative policies that can 
lead to corruption. Inspection, examination and supervision are among the 
most efficient and proactive anti-corruption solutions. President Ho Chi Minh 
once said: “Ninety percent of our governing mistakes results from inadequate 
inspection and examination. Proper supervision helps reduce possible mistakes 
in the future.”20 
Our current system of inspection and examination is still underdeveloped. 
There are far too many agencies, and their inspection and examination is un-
derperformed. These basic problems require effective solutions that are cur-
                                                     
20 Collection of Ho Chi Minh’s works (2000), 489. 
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rently under way while the Law of Inspection is being verified by the National 
Assembly. However, to improve the performance of inspection it is necessary 
to combine different methods in the overall system of supervision and inspec-
tion, which eventually would contribute to the efficiency of State management 
and promote the people’s mastery. An informed understanding of Ho Chi 
Minh’s ideas on the management of public officials and on the training and 
handling of Party members is also a preventive measure against corruption. Ho 
Chi Minh emphasizes:  
“Public officials are main actors of public administration and every success or failure 
depends on their quality.”21  
Corrupted officials violate moral principles and deserve to be regarded as in-
competent. Therefore, it is necessary for managers to understand their subordi-
nates so as to appoint them appropriate positions. If the appointment of offi-
cials is not based on professional skills or moral qualities but on personal affili-
ation, if it is not based on collective interests but on personal and “partisan” 
relations, then these officials will not only fail to accomplish their tasks, they 
will form parochial and inner circles by whatever means to take in personal 
gains and tread on collective interests. Therefore the selection of public offi-
cials has to be impartial, for it not only affects the officials in question but also 
the collective power represented by the Party and State. In reality there have 
been many cases in which by relying on petty tricks to acquire position, au-
thority, power and money, public officials propagate bad practices among their 
peers and facilitate the spreading of corruption.  
The nomination of public officials must be unbiased and objective and help 
expose those who take advantage of collective ideals to project their own inter-
ests, who only serve their own interest groups under the guise of common 
development while spreading corruption. We must base on rational criteria to 
appoint public officials who are not only devoted to their professional tasks but 
are brave enough to say no and even stand up against corruption. 
  
                                                     
21 Collection of Ho Chi Minh’s works (1995), 487. 
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Conclusion 
President Ho Chi Minh is a perfect example of a moral, diligent, frugal, right-
eous and impartial character. In light of the current diffusion of corruption, the 
usefulness and importance of Ho Chi Minh’s principles become even more 
apparent. To follow his anti-corruption ideas is the responsibility of every pub-
lic official, party member and citizen so that we can reduce as much dangerous 
threat to our national development as possible in this epoch of integration and 
development. The relentless combat against sectarianism and provincialism 
helps us to timely anticipate and handle misappropriation and corruption 
among public organs.  
Harmful practices such as misappropriation and corruption currently mani-
fest themselves under nuanced and sophisticated forms. Therefore, the party 
members must resolutely and determinedly avoid these practices and protect 
the common properties of the people, at the same time they should focus on 
productive and entrepreneurial efforts and contribute to socio-economic im-
provement. Misappropriation and corruption are contrary to revolutionary 
ethics, so the party members must consistently follow Ho Chi Minh’s ethical 
standards so that transparency and solidarity among the party, state and collec-
tive organizations are upheld, and the populace has full confidence in our 
common project of national renewal and development.  
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Rule of Law and Codes of Trust. Interdependencies 
between Legal and Social Institutions: A Case Study 
of China 
Michael Baurmann/Liu Mengyue  
Introduction 
Formal state institutions like the political and legal order consist of rules that 
are formally codified and enforced by organizations with coercive power, while 
informal social institutions refer to the unwritten norms which are enforced 
outside the officially sanctioned channels. The research on social capital and its 
impact on the working of a political and legal order focuses on the relations 
between these two types of institutions. It has one basic message: for a political 
and legal order to work well and sustainably it is not only dependent on a 
smartly crafted institutional design with a well-constructed system of incen-
tives, formal controls and coercive mechanisms; at least as important are the 
supporting social institutions and informal norms which motivate and encour-
age citizens to cooperate with each other individually and collectively and to 
contribute voluntarily to the thriving of their political order and its institu-
tions and organs.  
This research has provided evidence that well-functioning interpersonal re-
lations and widespread social networks in the private contexts of a vibrant civil 
society are necessary foundations for the development of essential social virtues 
such as the capacity to create new relationships (“sociability”), the readiness to 
participate actively in societal affairs, the commitment to support political and 
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legal institutions and to contribute one’s share to those public goods which 
cannot be provided by formal institutions.1 
“Trust” is a key factor in this context. Only if people trust each other will 
they be ready to cooperate with their fellow-citizens, to do business with them 
even when transactions involve risks or work together in a collective enterprise 
to create common goods in their mutual interest. Only if citizens trust their 
politicians and civil servants will they support them in their ruling and admin-
istrating duties and follow their orders and decisions willingly. And only if 
politicians and civil servants trust their citizens in turn will they be ready to 
rule by argument and persuasion rather than by control and sanctions.  
The lesson social capital theory teaches us is that the formation and distri-
bution of these different variants of trust are rooted in the informal social insti-
tutions and culture of a society and cannot be created artificially by political 
fiat. But we must be aware of the fact that the “codes of trust” in a society can 
vary greatly and that it makes a huge difference if people restrict their relation-
ships of trust to a well-defined group with a clear demarcation towards outsid-
ers or if they are also ready to place trust in people who are connected with 
them only by “weak ties”. 
We will start with a short recapitulation of the arguments in favour of the 
relevance of trust and social virtues for the working of a political and legal 
order and why the social capital of a society is a main factor in the production 
of such attitudes and virtues. We then explain why it is of central importance 
to distinguish between different variants of social capital and to be aware of a 
“black” and a “white list” of social capital. On the basis of a differentiated pic-
ture of the relation between formal state institutions and informal social insti-
tutions, we will discuss and illustrate the topic with the example of Chinese 
economic history over the last 40 years – and conclude with some general re-
marks. 
  
                                                     
1 See Banfield (1958); Putnam (1993); Putnam (2000); Putnam (2001); Baurmann 
(1999); Baurmann (2000); Baurmann (2002); Baurmann (2006); Baurmann (2008); 
Ostrom/Ahn (2003). 
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Economising on Virtue or Taking Virtue Seriously? 
Trustworthiness and virtuousness are valuable and possibly also scarce goods. 
It is therefore expedient to be sparing with them. This principle of “economis-
ing on virtue”2 not only applies to the relationship between single individuals 
but, as the Scottish moral philosophers have taught us, should also be a guide-
line for the creation of societal and political institutions. The market serves as a 
paradigmatic example of an arena where the participants’ virtues and morals 
are largely dispensable, and yet where the result of their actions serves every-
one’s interest and, thereby, the public welfare. Institutions of this kind relieve 
individuals of the burden of moral duties and reduce the need for social norms 
as well as for investments to enforce them. 
The classical authors of the Scottish Enlightenment were optimistic that 
this principle could also be transferred to political institutions. Even within 
the difficult realm of state power, it seemed possible to invent institutions 
through which an “invisible hand” would aggregate the general pursuit of 
individual interests to a common good.3 This prospect was particularly attrac-
tive as one could discard the – possibly futile – Platonic task of controlling the 
personal ambition of state rulers by instructing them in virtuousness and mo-
rality. If, instead, there were ways of shaping the institutional framework of 
political action so that it would be to the rulers’ own advantage to take care of 
their subjects and the common weal, then trust in politics would become in-
dependent of trust in the character of the politicians. 
The hope of being able to rely on the “morality” of the political institutions 
rather than on the morality of the politicians still plays a prominent role in 
modern political science and social theory and, moreover, in public opinion 
too. Especially the modern democratic state with its institutionalized possibil-
ity of voting politicians out of office, its protection of basic rights, and its in-
genious system of the separation of powers and “checks and balances” seems to 
be the perfect example of a system which by means of cleverly constructed 
mechanisms prevents state rulers from misusing their power for their own 
private aims. 
                                                     
2 See Brennan/Hamlin (1995). 
3 See Hirschman (2013). 
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In recent years, however, the insight has grown among social theorists that 
the principle of “economising on virtue” has its limits and that we cannot solve 
all the problems of social and political order by well-designed institutions and 
their incentives.4 The functioning of a well-ordered political and legal system 
is, to a large extent, not only dependent on the behaviour of politicians or civil 
servants acting directly under the rules of state institutions, but also on the 
attitudes and the spontaneous behaviour of the citizens outside formal institu-
tions. Many social scientists today believe that because of this a well-ordered 
society and its political institutions must be rooted in genuine social virtues 
and trustworthiness of its members which cannot be traced back to rational 
opportunistic behaviour under some artificially created extrinsic incentives.5  
However, there can be no doubt that formal state institutions and the in-
centives they create matter and that different institutions will produce differ-
ent outcomes. Institutional rules influence the behaviour of actors inside and 
outside the institutions. But the effects of institutional design are dependent 
not only on the properties of the formal institutions themselves. Every state 
institution is embedded in an environment of informal social institutions and 
the overall impact of a state institution is not the result of an endogenous equi-
librium produced only by the incentives of this institution and the given pref-
erences of the actors. This impact is always a result of an equilibrium which 
emerges from the characteristics of the formal institution and exogenous forces 
and conditions. So the same institutional system can have very different out-
comes depending on the social context in which it is implemented. The “rules 
of the game” always include more than deliberately created rules of formal 
institutions. “Design principles” for formal institutions are clearly relevant for 
institutional stability and performance – but their exact consequences are not 
context-independent.6 
Emphasizing that social virtues are important for making a political order 
work is therefore not tantamount to assuming that political and legal institu-
tions and their design are irrelevant. To some degree the opposite is true: social 
virtues do not make formal institutions superfluous, but can serve as a basis for 
                                                     
4 See Baurmann (2000). 
5 See Putnam (1993), (2000); Fukuyama (1995a); Pettit (1997); Brennan/Hamlin 
(2000); Dekker/Uslaner (2001). 
6 See Ostrom (1990), Ostrom (2005). 
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making these institutions even more successful. We can reach more efficient 
equilibria by institutional devices if we can rely on the trustworthiness and 
intrinsic motivation of the actors: it becomes easier to create and change formal 
institutions, the demand for hierarchy and control in institutions decreases, the 
tension between formal und social institutional processes diminishes, institu-
tional norms and rules are more readily followed and the commitment to col-
lective decisions under institutional rules increases. 
If the outlined thesis is right, the working of a well-ordered society de-
mands a stable equilibrium between proper institutional design and a suitable 
social environment in which supporting social virtues play a central role. Polit-
ical and legal institutions can bring about a lot of things – but whether they 
do so in a desirable way is greatly influenced by factors outside these institu-
tions themselves. The efficiency of state institutions, their stability, their legit-
imacy and conformity to their norms and rules can only be realized if they are 
properly implanted in their social soil. It is true that societies can be changed 
and shaped with the help of state institutions, but how successful this is and 
what kinds of institutions are necessary cannot be answered in general terms. 
We cannot simply replace the moral fabric of a society and its spontaneous 
forces by the incentives of a cleverly designed institutional framework. The 
working of a society cannot only be based on extrinsically motivated compli-
ance with formal rules but also requires an intrinsically entrenched commit-
ment to fundamental social norms: we have to take virtue seriously! 
Bowling Together: Making Democracy Work 
The view that social virtues are essential prerequisites of a good society and a 
legitimate political order has a long history. The same is true of a family of 
theories about the factors which promote the desired virtues of citizens. These 
theories, which go back to Aristotle, were ingeniously renewed in Tocque-
ville’s analysis of democracy in America and in our time have been put in the 
context of social philosophy by the communitarians.7 In the last twenty years, 
however, a new and promising variant of these theories has been developed by 
the political scientist Robert Putnam in his pioneering books Making Democ-
racy Work (1993) and Bowling Alone (2000) which initiated a large number 
                                                     
7 See MacIntyre (2007); Etzioni (1993). 
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of theoretical and empirical studies on the social and cultural fundaments of a 
well-functioning society. 
In a nutshell, these theories share the assumption that social virtues are the 
product of a particular sort of interpersonal relationship between the members 
of a society. According to this assumption these civic relationships outside the 
state domain constitute a special area of a “civil society” whose dynamics are 
rooted in the aspirations and values of the citizens as private actors. As partici-
pants in this kind of private relationship, people will develop capacities and 
behavioural dispositions which promote their general sociability and coopera-
tiveness and which are therefore beneficial to the society as a whole and will 
spill over into the public sphere.  
To Aristotle this function is fulfilled by friendships which motivate indi-
viduals to behave altruistically towards each other and to jointly promote the 
values of their community. Tocqueville extended Aristotle’s view to include all 
personal relationships which are part of a collective enterprise that people pri-
vately and voluntarily initiate to realize a common aim. From his observations 
he draws the conclusion that by taking part in such associational groups, indi-
viduals will overcome short-sighted egoism and will learn to cooperate, to 
contribute to collective goods, trust each other, and peacefully solve issues of 
common interest. For Tocqueville the concrete aims, sizes and structures of 
associational groups are secondary. Whether they are established to build a 
bridge for a village, to come together to pray or to collect money for a hospital, 
they will all have beneficial influences on the behaviour and character of their 
members by turning them into persons who feel responsible for their fellow-
citizens and the common welfare.  
Whereas the communitarians in some respect go back to Aristotle in em-
phasizing the importance of common values, uniform convictions and shared 
traditions as the basis of social virtues, the modern theories in the political and 
social sciences are more in the spirit of Tocqueville focussing as they do on the 
variety and diversity of associational activities. They have coined the term 
“social capital” to summarize the different forms of association which can be 
produced through the private initiative of the citizens. The exponents of social 
capital theory believe that there are manifold kinds of social relationships 
which – although maybe to different degrees – have the capacity to create 
those special bonds between their participants which promote the development 
of social virtues: from the weak ties of loose social networks in neighbour-
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hoods, from bowling and bird-watching, soccer-clubs and bible-circles to po-
litical parties, NGOs and spontaneous social movements.  
According to this view, well entrenched interpersonal relations and widely 
spread social networks are not only important to provide individuals with ac-
cess to different kinds of valuable resources.8 Being embedded in stable social 
institutions should also teach the virtues of sociability and the general capacity 
to create and maintain reciprocal and cooperative relationships, to participate 
in common tasks and adhere to the principles of fairness. Without being able 
to overcome the free-rider problem, to act successfully as a collective and feel 
committed to the rules of a group, most joint enterprises would not get off the 
ground. Acting in social networks should moreover foster friendly and altruis-
tic personal relationships and thus a general emotional commitment. The 
norms and rules in networks would honour and sanction personal trustworthi-
ness thereby laying the ground for mutual trust in a society.9  
The crucial premise of social capital theory is, however, that there is indeed 
a spill-over, a transfer from the context of the social institutions of privately 
organized associational life to the society as a whole. But if individuals in a 
small village learn to behave fairly towards other village members, if they feel 
an emotional commitment to them and prove themselves to be trustworthy 
neighbours, will they consequently also be fair, altruistic and trustworthy as 
citizens of a large society? The exact mechanisms by which membership in 
associations of civil society leads to a high level of general sociability and wide-
ly spread trust are not yet clearly understood. We must gain more insight into 
which forms and elements of private associations and networks promote the 
desirable transfer and which do not. Of course, there is undeniable empirical 
evidence that there are important differences between various forms of social 
capital in this respect and that not every joint activity is conducive to society 
and its institutions as a whole.  
  
                                                     
8 See Coleman (1988); Granovetter (1973), Granovetter (1985). 
9 See Gambetta (1988); Misztal (1996); Fukuyama (1995a). 
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Making Democracy Worse: the Dark Side of Social Capital  
Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing 
were members of a bowling league: they were not, unfortunately, “bowling 
alone”. Osama Bin Laden was not acting as an isolated mad man, but was firm-
ly embedded in a well-functioning network of internationally acting terrorists. 
The so-called Islamic State is not held together by its imitation of state insti-
tutions but is based on the unfortunately quite effective social institutions of a 
deviant community. These extreme examples make clear that successful coop-
eration to achieve a common aim, or solidarity in a group of like-minded peo-
ple who may also be emotionally committed and develop stable trust relation-
ships is not automatically desirable for people outside the group or the politi-
cal order of a society. The collective good for the group could be a public bad 
for the community. Even when we think of less dramatic possibilities than in 
the Oklahoma City bombing or in the case of Al Quaida, differential mobiliza-
tion of the population by ethnic, racial, religious, or other ascriptive criteria 
can lead to very particularistic demands and will undermine rather than sup-
port a society as a whole.10 A rich network of associational activities and stable 
social institutions alone are no guarantee of a flourishing society and stable 
state institutions. They can be both a source of trust and a source of distrust. 
Instead of promoting sociability and cooperative capacities, they can produce 
insurmountable conflicts by shaping and organizing antagonistic interests and 
locking them in an inextricable equilibrium of continuous power struggle and 
mutual hostility.  
Putnam claims as a central result of his studies in Italy that the malfunc-
tions of state institutions in Southern Italy were chiefly a consequence of a low 
level of social capital.11 To generalize this correlation would be misleading. It 
is not the case that poorly performing societies with defective state institutions 
always display a low level of social capital. The stability of autocratic and des-
potic regimes often has two faces: on the one side there may be a fragmented 
civil society in which more or less isolated individuals live within weak social 
networks and must endure an underdeveloped associational life – a situation 
which is often the intentional outcome of a political strategy of the rulers who 
                                                     
10 See Hardin (1995). 
11 See Putnam (1993). 
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want to prevent the emergence of a strong civil society. But on the other side 
the members of the ruling oligarchy themselves may be integrated in a social 
and political network which guarantees a sufficient degree of mutual trust and 
reciprocity inside the political elite to enable the efficient realization of their 
collective goods. On this basis the commitment among them can be strong 
enough to overcome short-term opportunistic and selfish behaviour and 
achieve beneficial cooperation – which does not exclude the fact that the aim of 
this cooperation is to suppress and exploit the rest of the society. This also 
applies to the notorious example of the Mafia: Mafia is a form of social capital 
as it embodies a highly efficient social network, creates strong norms of honour 
and reciprocity, and successfully overcomes collective action problems of all.12 
High levels of social capital can also be a difficult obstacle in the transition-
al phase from traditional societies to modern democracies. Afghanistan and 
Albania, for example, are not societies with an especially low level of social 
capital. In both societies there are at least partially well-functioning social 
networks, relations of emotional commitment, trust and reciprocity, and the 
capacity for collective action embodied in traditional structures of families, 
kinship, clans, and tribes – all of them embedded in a highly respected social 
and religious tradition which contains values and norms with a considerable 
degree of legitimacy. The problem here is clearly not a problem of lacking 
social capital – the problem is the lack of the right kind of social capital. Social 
capital of a traditional sort may be very efficient in promoting cooperation and 
trust in certain groups, but at the same time it can be also very efficient in 
preventing cooperation and trust outside these groups. It is a long-held and 
quite common opinion that China provides another example of a kind of social 
capital that bars the way to progress by privileging only closed and traditional 
communities and thereby preventing the development of a modern market 
economy. We will come back to this prejudice soon. 
We have to acknowledge that social capital can have a dark, even sinister 
side.13 Networks, reciprocity, trust, emotional commitment and altruistic 
behaviour are good only in the right context. Indeed, some of the communities 
that have been able to educate their members successfully to behave unselfishly 
                                                     
12 See Gambetta (1993). 
13 See Hardin (1995); Levi (1996); Portes/Landolt (1996); Adler/Kwon (2000). 
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and to sacrifice their individual interests to the common cause are responsible 
for the largest catastrophes in the history of mankind.  
But also less dramatic excesses prove that well-developed forms of social 
capital could make a political order and societal life worse instead of making it 
work. Nepotism, corruption, rent-seeking, or partisanship are all forms of 
behaviour which are detrimental and destructive to a society. And they are all 
forms of behaviour which are, as a rule, more successful if carried out in a 
group as a collective enterprise than as an individual effort (see Baurmann 
2005). Not surprisingly we find that empirically all manner of social capital is 
built around those activities – ranging from loose networks which bring a few 
people together for a short period of time, to small associations with horizontal 
relations between members connected by trust and reciprocity, up to large 
organisations with formal rules and a strict hierarchy. The more developed and 
the more efficient those forms of social capital are, the worse for outsiders and 
for society as a whole. 
The dark side of social capital is not always connected with obviously con-
demnable behaviour such as trying to bribe or seek rents at public expense. 
Negative externalities whereby social capital is used to facilitate collusion 
among a group can also be generated when particularistic demands are put 
forward which cannot always be judged as morally wrong at the outset. Mobi-
lization of people to realize their religious visions or to promote the interests of 
their race or ethnicity can be rooted in moral convictions and personal virtues 
and can create social capital in a paradigmatic form. Groups and associations 
like these will often embody dense social networks, high levels of personal 
trust, altruistically driven reciprocity and generosity, and a strong intrinsic 
motivation to make sacrifices for the common good.  
These forms of social capital will, nevertheless, more often subvert rather 
than strengthen a society. The reason for this is obvious: associations like these 
are not “bridging” and “outward-orientated”, but centred around people of the 
same kind or origin and promoting goods which are exclusively valuable to the 
members of the group. The more successful these associations are, the less their 
members will have the incentive to cooperate and bargain with other groups 
on a common basis, but will see the chance to enforce their particularistic in-
terests at the expense of others. Thus social capital in this variant erects barri-
ers of mistrust between people instead of uniting them and contributes to aims 
and goods which can very easily conflict with the aims and goods of the society 
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as a whole. Associational groups of this kind will trigger a vicious circle be-
cause they undermine shared interests in a society and thereby create incentives 
for other groups – who, by themselves, would have no genuine reason to devel-
op in this way – to concentrate exclusively on their members and their particu-
laristic interests as well. 
Social networks, emotional commitment and trust alone are therefore not 
sufficient for a desirable spill-over effect beyond group boundaries. Social capi-
tal can also have a dark side as it can embody networks which are not bridges 
bringing different kinds of people together to promote joint interests, but 
instruments of separation erecting borders and barriers, and providing an ex-
clusive resource to a special group. Instead of encouraging reciprocal and 
trustworthy behaviour beyond the confines of a group or association, social 
capital can contribute to a restriction of reciprocity and trust and lead to an 
increase in opportunism and distrust outside the respective groups. Social capi-
tal can lack positive spill-over effects because it only promotes commitment to 
the “club” good of a group rather than to the public good of the society as a 
whole.14 Emotional commitment internally to a group can be combined with 
antipathy towards outsiders and trust could remain particularistic and only 
encompass the members of one’s own group. Clusters of this kind will more 
likely embody “bonding” than “bridging“ social capital and be networks in 
which the internal strong ties are fostered by the homogeneity of their mem-
bers. From this “black”, negative list results a “white”, positive list with those 
attributes which prima facie can contribute to a spill-over of the social capital 
of specific groups and communities that is valuable to the society at large.15 
Thus it is decisive that social networks are not exclusive resources and instru-
ments of separation by which artificial borders are erected against goods and 
services. The different clusters must instead be embedded in a comprehensive 
network by which “bridges” are built between the different groups thereby 
unfolding a potential of inclusion.16  
We can conclude that the relation between the formal institutions of a po-
litical and legal order and the informal social institutions which create the 
social capital of a society is more complex and differentiated than it may ap-
                                                     
14 See Stolle (1998). 
15 See Stolle/Rochon (1998); Warren (2001); Paxton (2002). 
16 Baurmann (2006); (2008); Granovetter (1973). 
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pear at first sight: social institutions can support state institutions in motivat-
ing people to behave in ways that are conducive to the stability and flexibility 
of the formal institutions of a society – this was the main focus of early social 
capital theory. But social institutions can also erode state institutions in moti-
vating people to behave contrary to the rules and laws that are enacted by po-
litical and legal organs. Social institutions can compete with state institutions 
by creating social relationships and social norms as alternatives to the existing 
laws and institutions. And social institutions can substitute state institutions if 
state institutions are defective or too weak to enforce a political or legal order. 
We would like to discuss this more complicated picture by means of a con-
crete and highly interesting example: the example of China and its social, po-
litical and economic history over the last 40 years. 
Guanxi as the Chinese Social Capital  
After the Cultural Revolution the Chinese people found themselves in a dread-
ful situation and realized that they could not count on the Communist state for 
a better life. They then began to revive the resources of traditional social insti-
tutions in China which are based on personal networks and emotional bonds. 
Such relationships are defined as guanxi. The influential Chinese anthropolo-
gist, Fei Xiaotong, characterizes guanxi as a “differential mode of association” 
which he illustrates with the image of “concentric circles formed when a stone 
is thrown into a lake”.17 The closer persons are to the actor in the centre, the 
more easily the actor will trust them and treat them preferentially. But unlike 
familism or other particularistic relationships which are firmly embedded in 
kinship, affinity or geographical origin, guanxi is an open and flexible institu-
tion. Under market conditions it is a rule that the wider one’s social network 
is, the easier it is to get access to profitable economic transactions.  
For this reason the Chinese exploit every chance to extend guanxi in various 
ways: social occasions such as birthdays, weddings or funerals are taken as op-
portunities to enhance existing guanxi relations. Mutual friends function as 
“trust intermediaries” and form bridges to new guanxi partners. Simultaneous-
ly the Chinese nowadays are ready to turn away from persons who have earned 
                                                     
17 Fei (1992), 63. 
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a bad reputation even when they are genetically or geographically close. So it is 
still accurate to state that in the networks of guanxi people are treated particu-
laristically in regard to their position in “the differential mode of association”. 
But these networks can expand dynamically and the position of people in them 
can change depending on their compliance to the rules of guanxi. 
Some scholars consider guanxi as a kind of instrumental relationship which 
depends mainly on mutual material interests.18 But it is an essential feature of 
guanxi that its instrumental functionality is inseparably linked with its expres-
sive components, especially renqing (personal feeling) and mianzi (face).19 It is 
an efficient strategy in China to utilize the rules of renqing and mianzi as ways 
and means of influence and manipulation, especially when people with few 
economic and political resources try to fraternize with people of a higher social 
rank. This strategy is successful because no matter how economically wealthy 
or politically powerful certain persons are, they have to be responsive to the 
requests from their friends and partners in order to maintain renqing and mi-
anzi. The instrumental value of guanxi depends on the fact that Chinese people 
are willing to invest economic and political resources in the maintenance of 
guanxi not only for the material profit of long lasting cooperation, but also out 
of moral commitment and for nurturing a favorable personal reputation. 
Therefore, instead of being either an instrumental or an expressive social rela-
tion guanxi should be understood as a “mixed tie” of instrumentality and ex-
pressivity.  
It is widely accepted that in China guanxi is the most valuable social capi-
tal in everyday life.20 However, it is quite controversial which effect guanxi has 
at a wider societal level. According to Max Weber,21 the inward feature of 
Chinese social networks erects borders and barriers between groups rather than 
bridging them. And this is why a modern market economy could not be born 
in China. Contemporary social scientists such as Fukuyama hold the same 
                                                     
18 See Sun (1996). 
19 Reqing refers to the expressive feelings between interacting individuals, e.g. empa-
thy. Mianzi refers to personal dignity and reputation. One can lose mianzi by either 
refusing to do a favour for friends or being refused by friends. More information of 
renqing and mianzi see Hwang 1987. 
20 See Yang (1994). 
21 Weber (1968). 
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opinion. He argues that guanxi is responsible for the small scale of business 
and the widespread corruption in public sectors in China.22 From this perspec-
tive guanxi actually destroys the foundation of a well-functioning society and 
its institutions instead of promoting it.  
However, the development of China in the last 30 years tells a much more 
differentiated story. The Chinese economy has been growing at an average of 
almost 10 % since the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978 – three 
times the global average. It is hard to believe that a society with a serious 
shortage of mutual trust and limited skills of cooperation is capable of achiev-
ing such an astounding success. For this reason some scholars admit that guan-
xi actually contributes to the efficiency of economic transactions in China.23 
Moreover, the extremely adverse political and legal environment at the begin-
ning of the reforms24 suggests that the boom of the Chinese private economy in 
the 1980s is to a great extent to be attributed to social factors – more specifi-
cally, to the social institution of guanxi rather than to political and legal insti-
tutions of the state. 
Therefore, instead of assigning guanxi exclusively and statically to the 
“black” or “white” list of social capital, we will analyze its development as an 
adaptation to a dynamic social and institutional framework. Guanxi is not a 
static institution and its role as social capital has undergone significant chang-
es during the last decades of Chinese history. Especially its relation to the po-
litical and legal institutions has altered significantly and developed from an 
institution that promoted the establishment of an efficient market economy in 
confrontation with the political system to an institution that strengthens cor-
rupt relations between entrepreneurs and state officials and weakens economic 
productivity. This historical clue will help us to gain a better understanding of 
guanxi as social capital and its complex interdependencies with the political 
and legal institutions in China.  
                                                     
22 Fukuyama (1995a), Fukuyama (1995b). 
23 See Wong/Chan (1999); Wong/Leung (2001); Yeung/Tung (1996). 
24 In the 1980s there was not only no formal protection of private property rights, but 
the Communist Party of China (CCP) also imposed extensive restrictions on the pri-
vate sector. Any economic activity crossing these lines would be punished in the 
name of “speculation”. We will discuss this later in this paper. 
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Evolving the Chinese Market Economy 
According to theories in the tradition of institutional economics well-defined 
property rights are the prerequisite of a flourishing market economy. In a soci-
ety without an effective legal order and enforceable rules everybody is involved 
in “the war of all against all” and thus any form of efficient economic exchange 
is hampered. The exit option from such a “Hobbesian jungle” is to establish 
powerful state institutions that can guarantee a stable order of cooperation. 
Seen from this perspective, the economic performance of a society depends 
vitally on the efficacy of coercive instruments of the state in protecting private 
property and punishing those who disobey the laws. Douglass North conse-
quently assumes that the rise of the Western World would not have been pos-
sible without its efficient institutional protection of private property.25  
However, the growth of the Chinese private economy is quite different 
from its western counterparts. At the beginning of the economic reform in the 
1970s the CPC (Communist Party of China) decided to shift its focus from 
political campaign to centrally administered economic development. State-
owned enterprises were the main concern and as at that time the Party had no 
intention of encouraging private enterprises or a market economy in general. 
Consequently, during the 1970s and 1980s no laws were enacted in order to 
protect market contracts or private property. If Chinese citizens wanted to 
conduct private transactions at that time, they had to act in a “Hobbesian jun-
gle” where opportunist behaviour or the breach of contracts was not prevented 
or punished by formal institutions.  
But not only “predation” in the “Hobbesian jungle” threatened the first 
generation of Chinese entrepreneurs. There was also discrimination and perse-
cution by state organs – the “Leviathan”. Heavy tax was imposed on private 
enterprises and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures had to be followed. 
Private entrepreneurs were not allowed to employ more than seven employees 
before 1987 and, in addition, their economic activities were discreetly con-
trolled by the authority. Any private transactions not complying with these 
prescriptions would be punished as “crimes of speculation”, a kind of crime 
that was codified in 1979 and eliminated only in 1997. According to the study 
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by Xiaobo Wu26 around 30,000 people were convicted of the crime of specula-
tion in 1982, most of whom were successful private entrepreneurs. Obviously, 
the original purpose of the Party was to protect the state-owned and collective 
economy from competition in the market. The fact that the private economy 
finally grew “out of the plan” (see Naughton 1995) was unexpected and un-
wanted. 
Therefore, rebutting conventional wisdom, the legal institutionalization of 
private property followed the growth of the private economy in China, not the 
other way round.27 In order to understand the Chinese economic “miracle”, it 
is necessary to focus on the social institutions that made private economic ac-
tivity and the development of markets possible without legal authorization and 
a formal protection of property rights. 
The greatest challenge to the first generation of Chinese entrepreneurs was 
to protect private property from the threat of “Leviathan”, namely from the 
Communist state and its jurisdiction. Hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs 
were doing business “illegally” at risk of imprisonment. In view of this diffi-
cult situation, Chinese entrepreneurs came up with organizational innovations 
to feign collective ownership which could save them from prosecution by the 
state. The two most important innovations were shareholding corporatives and 
“red hat” enterprises. In a shareholding corporative several families joined to-
gether to run a business. All the family members were owners as well as the 
employees of the corporative. A “red hat” enterprise was a private enterprise 
that was registered as a collective one. Nominally these enterprises belonged to 
the local governments but were actually under the control and part of the “in-
formal” property of individuals. In both cases the enterprises founded by pri-
vate citizens were disguised as being in collective ownership. 
That does not mean that faked collective ownership was without dangers 
and risks. As a new form of economic organization, a shareholding corporative 
was not clearly defined as a collective enterprise by the central authority until 
1990. Thus its survival and development relied mainly on the local policies of 
the cadres on-site. In the same way “red hat” enterprises were neither clearly 
encouraged nor forbidden by the CPC, leaving the local governments plenty of 
room for dealing with this novel form of economic business at their own dis-
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cretion. As Donald Clarke remarks, local party officials and bureaucrats could 
easily regain the actual control over these enterprises by changing their poli-
cies. The private owners of the enterprises would be demoted “to mere em-
ployees with no right to a return on the capital that they had invested”.28 
However, local cadres normally did not exploit the situation for their private 
gains but instead protected and encouraged these institutional inventions in 
many areas from below. Because of this support from local governments, 
shareholding corporative and “red hat” enterprises became very successful and 
popular all over the country in the 1980s. More remarkably, they contributed a 
great part to the national economic growth although the policies of the central 
government in that period were extremely unstable and unpredictable.29  
Why were the local cadres in fact willing to help private entrepreneurs de-
spite their extremely dominant position in relation to these entrepreneurs? The 
crucial factor was their joint embeddedness in the social institution of guanxi 
and their subjection to the same social forces created by this institution. Un-
like economic or political power, the social power of guanxi is generated by 
personal interactions in everyday life. It is a binding social obligation for Chi-
nese to maintain affective and reliable relationships with their relatives, friends 
and partners via regular gift-giving and invitations to banquets. Through these 
frequent exchanges and their contribution to stable interpersonal ties and re-
ciprocal commitments an effective social power is created which can trump 
political and economic power. Especially in smaller towns and villages this 
power can be particularly strong because people are closely connected through 
kin, marriage and long-lasting personal acquaintance.  
Therefore, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution rural cadres found it 
more and more difficult to maintain and make use of their formal power. They 
were integrated in the social institutions of their communities and social pres-
sure caused them to accept bargains and compromises with villagers who were 
their relatives and friends. When state policies came into direct conflict with 
the interests of the communities, the cadres usually chose to protect the inter-
ests of local people by deceiving the state officials. Observing this phenomenon 
Yun-xiang Yan concludes: “the new pattern of political behavior among the 
rural cadres might create an informal mechanism to counterbalance and resist 
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state control of society and the negative effects of central policy”.30 Similarly, 
Yusheng Peng (2004) found a solid and positive correlation between the soli-
darity of kinship and the prosperity of private economy in Chinese villages: the 
more closely villagers are socially connected to each other, the more likely local 
cadres submit to the social norms of guanxi and the better the local economy 
develops. The fact that local cadres in rural areas are particularly committed to 
their fellow-citizens due to the strength of social networks in these areas can 
partly explain why in the early 1980s private entrepreneurship was developing 
most vibrantly in the poorest and most rural regions of China.31 
In dealing with local cadres Chinese entrepreneurs successfully utilized the 
norms and rules of guanxi. For example, instead of offering direct bribes, pri-
vate entrepreneurs tried to produce or intensify emotional bonds between the 
cadres and themselves via gift-giving and invitations to banquets, which gave 
rise to obligations and indebtedness. The skills and techniques of creating 
genuine guanxi relationships are known in China as guanxixue (guanxi studies) 
which refers to the capability of establishing and manipulating guanxi for 
one’s own purposes. With this capability private entrepreneurs could influence 
relevant cadres even when they had no relationship of blood and affinity. As 
Mayfair Yang observes: 
“Gift-giving creates a microcosmic world in which hierarchical relations are to a cer-
tain extent reversed. Donors become the moral superiors of recipients, who now owe 
favors to their donor. Symbolic capital compensates for the lack of material, office, or 
political capital. Thus face and the morality of reciprocity, obligation, and indebted-
ness become in a sense the ammunition of the weak. This mobilization of the forces of 
gift morality effects a subtle displacement of the potency by diversifying the state 
economy’s principle of classification and distribution by rank.”32 
From this point of view guanxi was the most powerful “weapon of the weak” 
(Scott 1985). Through a sophisticated use of this weapon officially discrimi-
nated private entrepreneurs successfully created a “microcosmos” in which they 
could counter the political power of the central authority as well as avoid the 
possible economic extortion by the local governments. Guanxi helped them to 
                                                     
30 Yan (1995), 230. 
31 In regard to the robust development of the private economy in the rural areas of 
China see Huang 2008. 
32 Yang (1994), 206. 
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create a small safe environment in an unfriendly political and legal institution-
al framework and to achieve a thriving private economy in China. 
In a similar way the “microcosmos” of guanxi also helped the first genera-
tion of Chinese entrepreneurs to deal with the second challenge they faced in 
the early years of the private economy in China, namley to secure their eco-
nomic transactions against fraud and deception by private parties without any 
legal protection. As already emphasized, if the Chinese wanted to conduct 
private transactions at this time, they had to act in a world where opportunist 
behaviour or the breach of contracts would hardly be punished by the formal 
institutions of a legal order. But the norms and rules of guanxi were not only 
strong social forces that integrated state officials in an efficient network of 
mutual trust and commitment, they also created social capital that provided a 
dense web of stable social relations in which economic exchange could success-
fully take place without the protective shield of institutionalized property 
rights and a reliable contract law. Stable interpersonal relations and reciprocal 
commitments which are created by guanxi produce binding obligations and 
affective ties between entrepreneurs and state officials but also between the 
private actors on the market in their economic transactions. 
Establishing the Chinese Market Economy 
In the 1980s the Chinese private entrepreneurs had achieved tremendous suc-
cess and changed the whole economic landscape of China. Realizing reluctantly 
that the bottom-up privatization had greatly stimulated the national economy 
despite its inconsistency with the Communist ideology, the central authority 
began to legalize the private firms and to gradually establish a market econo-
my from the end of the 1980s. For example, in 1987 the restriction of a maxi-
mum of seven employees in private firms was removed and in 1997 the crime 
of “speculation” was eliminated from criminal law. The property rights of 
private entrepreneurs were officially admitted and protected by the state au-
thority, thus rendering fake collective ownerships superfluous.33 Some scholars 
believed that guanxi would lose its importance once the formal protection of 
private property became available (Guthrie 1998). This prediction failed. De-
                                                     
33 See Kung (1999). 
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spite the dramatic changes in the formal institutional environment in China, 
guanxi still plays an important role in everyday life and economic contexts.34 
Still today foreign investors are advised to learn the rules of guanxi – namely 
the rules of mianzi and renqing – if they want to build trust relationships with 
their Chinese partners (Buckley/Clegg/Tan 2006). 
The persistence of guanxi results from two facts. Firstly, although the pro-
tection of private property rights was finally added in a constitutional amend-
ment in 2004, the enforcement of formal laws in China is still weak, costly and 
unreliable. To press a charge against a person for a criminal or civil offence and 
realize a conviction is time-consuming and incalculable, especially when gov-
ernment officials are involved.35 It is more efficient and less risky to resolve 
conflicts or problems via personal networks rather than through formal proce-
dures.  
The second reason is that even in a developed market economy guanxi can 
still contribute significantly to a well-functioning and sustainable order of 
economic cooperation. It has often been argued that guanxi as a social institu-
tion is incompatible with a modern market because guanxi mechanisms are 
restricted to local networks that divide markets into small segments. These 
restrictions would prevent the advantages of an efficient division of labour and 
large companies with economies of scale would not be feasible.36 However, as 
Yang suggests, guanxi should be recognized as “a multifaceted ever-changing 
set of practices”.37 On the one hand, market relationships are structured by 
guanxi, yet on the other hand, the dynamics of markets force guanxi to evolve. 
After the successful establishment of a market economy the main challenge of 
Chinese entrepreneurs is not the intensity of guanxi but its extensity: the larg-
er and wider social networks of persons become, the more chances they will 
have at the marketplace to establish profitable and stable economic relation-
ships. Under these conditions ties of kinship and affinity alone could no longer 
satisfy private entrepreneurs who wanted to expand their business and to seize 
the opportunities a growing market offers.  
                                                     
34 Su/Littlefield (2001); Yang (2002). 
35 Nee/Opper (2012), 7-8. 
36 Fukuyama (1995b); Weber (1968). 
37 Yang (2002), 459. 
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The most practical way to enlarge one’s networks is to use the social capital 
of an existing guanxi. For example, one can establish guanxi with a stranger 
via a mutual friend. A person will trust a stranger if a mutual friend forms a 
bridge and a bond between them: all persons in this new triangle have to re-
spect the mianzi of each other because humiliating the new acquaintance – e.g. 
by refusing a request – will also hurt the old friend and if one owes a renqing-
favor of his or her friend, he or she will usually feel responsible for the newly 
introduced stranger. In this way trust and commitment can be transferred by 
intermediaries from one relationship to another. Mianzi and renqing function 
as universal media which can flow from hand to hand thereby creating wide-
spread and inclusive social and economic networks.  
Therefore, even in a modern market economy guanxi as a social institution 
is effective in promoting the social virtues of cooperation and trustworthiness 
and thereby reducing the costs and risks of economic exchanges and promoting 
the overall functionality of a market. Some scholars thus assume that guanxi-
mediated market processes are to be seen as a genuine alternative to the west-
ern market system. Moreover, with regard to low transaction costs and strong 
commitment guanxi may be even more efficient than the western style market 
mechanisms.38  
Given the ongoing weakness of legal institutions and the high degree of 
adaptability of guanxi to the demands of modern markets it makes sense for 
Chinese entrepreneurs to stick to the traditional social institutions when look-
ing for security and protection of their interests. The more entrepreneurs try to 
solve problems via personal ties, the more refined their skills of guanxi be-
come. And the greater the resources of guanxi which are accumulated, the 
more reluctant they will be to resort to formal procedures. In this way the 
social institution guanxi has managed successfully to substitute suboptimal 
and defective formal institutions and fulfil functions that from a standard 
point of view are the exclusive responsibility of state organs. 
  
                                                     
38 See Lovett/Simmons/Kali (1999). 
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Undermining the Chinese Market Economy 
However, guanxi has also revealed dark sides as social capital. In supporting 
economic transactions it strengthens social virtues of cooperation, facilitates 
mutual trust between exchange partners and increases the level of sociability. 
But when political agents are involved, guanxi tends to establish patron-client 
relationships which jeopardize economic efficiency by distorting market mech-
anisms and favouring preferential intervention. Actually, pursuing political 
patronage via guanxi is not a new phenomenon concomitant with the market 
economy in China. This strategy was already widely utilized in socialist facto-
ries in Mao’s era when the workers tried to build affective personal ties with 
their leaders for the sake of political, material and career advantages.39 In the 
1980s, as already described above, Chinese peasant entrepreneurs successfully 
forced local cadres to provide a “political shelter” against the state with the 
help of personal connections in clan and kinship.40 But while in Mao’s era pa-
tron-client relationships actually supported the CPC in incorporating the soci-
ety into the communist system,41 and in the 1980s stimulated the economic 
growth of the whole country by establishing competing social institutions that 
promoted the emergence of markets, patron-client relationships based on the 
guanxi culture have now become negative factors that hinder the further polit-
ical and economic development of China.  
As the institutional environment changed, political favours that were for-
merly used for securing private property or protection against state control 
came to signify new messages for the market participants: the opportunity for 
additional personal advantages that could be gained through corruption in 
politicized markets. For example, on the stock and real estate markets which 
are strictly constrained by the government, market participants are tempted to 
establish reliable guanxi with relevant cadres in order to gain more profit 
through their special protection. With the help of cadres one can acquire a 
personal fortune by buying personal stocks with public funds or renting land 
at extremely low costs.42 The seductive prospects of realizing huge profits by 
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41 Walder (1986), 123. 
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the circumvention of market mechanisms motivate many Chinese entrepre-
neurs to invest in the competition for political power instead of in the compe-
tition for customers thereby destroying the most important foundation of the 
“wealth of nations”.  
Obviously, in this “power game”43 only a small fraction of the participants 
can win, while most of them will lose. But, as Chenting Su and James Little-
field observe, “even though power is quite scarce in today's China, the popu-
lace is still actively having a hand in carving up monopolized interests by 
means of their specific qinyou44 guanxi web”.45 Why are the Chinese still 
clinging to such ineffective competition even though the overall return from 
this form of guanxi is dramatically decreasing? The reason is the social embed-
dedness of corruption. Even though the purposes and consequences of patron-
client relationships in China have changed, renqing and mianzi are still the 
most important norms of these relations. Thus, political power in China is not 
arbitrarily abused but distributed according to the rules of guanxi. This means 
that the relation between entrepreneurs and cadres is not simply an exchange 
of money and favors. One famous example is Lai Changxin, the central figure 
in an enormous corruption scandal that exploded in the Chinese city of Xia-
men in 1998. Having started from a lower social class Lai successfully built 
guanxi connections with dozens of local cadres. With their help he quickly 
became the most powerful and wealthy man in Xiamen by smuggling luxury 
cars and entire tanker-loads of oil into China. Mark Granovetter, inspired by 
the story of Lai, comments:  
“Elaborate systems of gift giving, banquets, entertainment, and favors keyed to the 
highly particular needs of officials are developed. Whereas a cash payment to the offi-
cial would be considered an insult, the banquets and special favors can be thought of as 
a form of deference, which the higher-status person can imagine is owed to him.”46 
The social embeddedness of corruption has two effects. Firstly, the role of 
guanxi in patron-client relationships provides chances even for those people 
who come from lower classes. As the story of Lai tells, access to higher-ranking 
cadres is not exclusive to social elites. Anyone who acquires sufficient skills of 
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44 Qinyou is a Chinese word meaning relatives and friends. 
45 Su/Littlefield (2001), 205. 
46 Granovetter (2007), 158. 
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guanxi has the chance to improve his or her social status. Because of the wide 
range of social networks, most Chinese can establish guanxi even with high 
profile cadres via intermediaries. Secondly, guanxi restrains cadres from abus-
ing their political power ad libitum. Cadres do not only value financial returns 
but also their personal reputation in the relevant social networks. They like to 
think that they are not actually bribed but simply receive gifts from friends 
and returned favours. Because of these social and moral constraints, the behav-
iour of cadres in China is predictable and maneuverable which is different from 
the corruption in Africa where officials exploit their power arbitrarily and 
without scruples.47  
Therefore, even though most Chinese acknowledge the notorious deficiency 
of their political and legal institutions, they are quite confident that they have 
sufficient skills and capacities to utilize their guanxi resources and take ad-
vantage of the deficient political system to secure their personal interests (see 
Sun 1996, 30). In this way guanxi not only undermines the mechanisms of a 
market economy but also discourages people from demanding further institu-
tional development. This is one reason why, contradictory to the prognoses of 
many scholars,48 China has failed to evolve into a democratic society after its 
astounding economic achievements and instead become a “capitalism without 
democracy” (Tsai 2007). 
Interdependencies between Legal and Social Institutions 
The experience of China supports social capital theory in its central claim that 
political and legal institutions are not the only forces that affect the trajectory 
of societal development but that social institutions like guanxi have a strong 
impact on the dynamics of a society and the performance of the formal state 
institutions. However, the Chinese case also makes clear that the relation be-
tween the formal institutions of the state and the informal institutions of social 
capital are complex and diverse. As we have seen, social norms that are en-
forced by guanxi relationships in everyday life can neutralize the economic and 
political advantages of the ruling powers and provide ordinary citizens with 
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opportunities to initiate a progressive development of the economic system. 
However, the same social institution can in other contexts discourage the po-
tential challengers of a political order and undermine economic efficiency and 
progress. 
To achieve a more differentiated picture of the possible relations between 
formal state institutions and informal social institutions it is helpful to adapt a 
fourfold table proposed by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky.49 They sug-
gest using two dimensions: whether a social institution is convergent or diver-
gent in relation to state institutions which are, in turn, divided into effective 
and ineffective institutions with respect to their more or less successful en-
forcement: 
Table 4: Interdependencies between Legal and Social Institutions 
 Effective state institu-
tions 
Ineffective state insti-
tutions 
Convergent social in-
stitutions 
Supporting Substituting 
Divergent social insti-
tutions 
Eroding Competing 
Source: Helmke/Levitsky (2004), 728 (slightly changed) 
This typology can enhance our analysis of institutional development. We can 
recapitulate the institutional evolution in China with its ongoing changes 
between formal and informal institutions by using this table with the different 
outcomes it signifies. 
In Mao’s era (1949–1976) the most important formal institution in China 
was the Communist political system whose rules and norms were strictly en-
forced. Many Chinese people were convinced that the CPC would establish a 
wealthy communist society. Social institutions like universalistic comradeship 
were promoted and widely accepted for the purpose of the realization of a 
Communist society. In the spirit of comradeship study groups were established 
for studying and spreading Marxist-Leninist theory and the thoughts of Mao 
Zedong, and “revolution groups” were established for promoting the class 
campaigns. These social institutions were convergent with effective state insti-
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tutions and supported the CPC in reshaping China into a Communist state. 
They later developed into the radical political movement of the Cultural Revo-
lution. 
After the disastrous economic failure of the Communist system the Chinese 
became tired of political movements and sceptical about the economic pro-
spects of a centrally planned command economy. Chinese people started to 
revitalize traditional social institutions and developed the social capital of 
guanxi independent of the state. As mentioned above, on the basis of this so-
cial capital private entrepreneurs invented “shareholding cooperatives” and 
“red hat enterprises” in the 1980s in order to broaden their business and avoid 
being accused of the “crime of speculation”. These practices did not openly 
contradict the laws and on the surface were compatible with the legal order. 
But they violated the “spirit” of the laws and the original intention of the CPC 
which at the beginning of the reform tried to restrict the development of a 
private economy. Eventually the people managed to establish informal proper-
ty rights on the basis of a working social institution that successfully confront-
ed the state institutions. With the help of guanxi, divergent social institutions 
were established that started to undermine and erode the state control of the 
economy. 
After the market economy was finally introduced as the fundament of the 
national economy, laws were enacted for the protection of private property and 
the enforcement of contracts. However, guanxi was not completely replaced by 
formal rules and institutions because of their weak and uncertain enforcement. 
Chinese entrepreneurs therefore still use guanxi to ensure economic transac-
tions and create stable business relations. Guanxi is a convergent social institu-
tion in this case because it is compatible with formal rules and procedures but 
also a substitute for state institutions which are not effective enough to create a 
sufficiently stable environment for economic actions.  
What we see now, however, is the transformation of guanxi into a new form 
of divergent and competing social institution. In the 1980s guanxi relations 
with political cadres were used to gradually establish a market economy and 
thereby promote economic efficiency. Today guanxi networks in the political 
realm are used more and more as instruments for rent-seeking and receiving 
privileges, to circumvent market competition or evade legal prescriptions. This 
development endangers economic productivity and undermines the efficiency 
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of market mechanisms – just the contrary effect guanxi had in the era of the 
development of a market economy in China.  
Many social scientists acknowledge that a gradual process of reform is the 
secret of China’s success.50 At the beginning Chinese entrepreneurs tried to 
circumvent formal rules that restricted private economic activity. They revital-
ized and renewed the social institutions of guanxi for this purpose. These social 
institutions successfully eroded the Communist economic order and managed 
to compete directly with the political and legal institutions as the state’s power 
waned. Finally, the relevant laws were changed in acknowledgment of the 
factual developments. In this way the radical institutional changes in China 
were realized piece by piece through the institutional inventions from below 
and the official recognition from above. Thus, bottom-up initiative, experi-
mentation, learning, and adaptation form the core of the institutional changes 
in China.  
However, this is not the whole story and not the only lesson Chinese histo-
ry taught us about the relationship between formal state institutions and in-
formal social institutions. The chain of causes must be analysed not only from 
social capital to legal and political institutions but also vice versa. If our analy-
sis is correct and the dark side of guanxi as social capital is gaining momentum 
in China as an effective instrument of socially embedded corruption then this 
development must be combatted by enforcing an efficient rule of law.  
As we said at the outset, the overall state of a society is always an equilibri-
um between the forces of formal and informal institutions. But if a society is in 
the grip of the dark sides of social institutions, a new and improved equilibri-
um cannot be initiated without the intervention of the legal and political insti-
tutions of the state – which is especially challenging if these institutions are 
not supported by convergent social institutions: that is the message from social 
capital theory that remains valid. 
Insofar it is not surprising that China has failed to stimulate a new round of 
effective political and legal reforms up to now. Public authorities are often 
compromised via guanxi and most Chinese still believe that they can take ad-
vantage of the status quo using their guanxi skills and resources. Further insti-
tutional reforms will not happen before most Chinese realize that only a small 
amount of players can win in the “power game” but that all could benefit from 
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a firm rule of law. At this point one must hope that social capital will enter the 
stage once again in its heroic role and that Chinese citizens will create a social 
force to influence state policies to the better. Because of the strict control of 
the government, there are few civil organizations similar to such associations in 
Western democracies, but citizens in China are as always connected via person-
al ties and social networks in their guanxi relations. Maybe guanxi will again 
demonstrate its flexibility and adaptability and acquire a new meaning in 
shaping the social fabric of an independent civic realm in which the interests 
and preferences of citizens are formed and articulated. In this way a civil socie-
ty of its own kind may be realized in China, different in its foundation and 
profile from Western society but perhaps as powerful and beneficial as it was 
during the realization of a market economy in the face of counteracting politi-
cal forces. 
Conclusion 
We started our paper with a theoretical discussion of social capital. In order to 
gain a more complex and appropriate understanding of social capital and its 
dimensions and impacts, we referred to the Chinese experience of the last 40 
years. The tremendous success China has achieved as well as the huge challeng-
es it now faces could in great part be attributed to Chinese-style social capital: 
guanxi, which exerts both a positive and negative influence on the transition of 
Chinese society. We learn from this study that first, social capital cannot be 
viewed simply as an exclusively benign social resource, second, that the societal 
impact of social capital not only depends on its own features but also on its 
economic and political context, and, finally, that a promising and underex-
posed field of research lies in the dynamic interaction between formal institu-
tions such as the rule of law and social capital as a social institution: how they 
conflict, coexist and adapt to each other. Insight into this process may improve 
our understanding of institutional change and the determining factors of its 
notorious path dependency.  
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The Role of the Press in the Construction of a  
Legitimate State in Vietnam Today  
Nguyen Thi Thuy Hang/Phan Duy Anh 
Introduction 
The construction of state legitimacy has been for a long time now an inevitable 
trend in democratic politics in the modern world. Vietnam is not an exception 
to this general trend. In Vietnam’s revolutionary reality, especially since the 
beginning of the renovation process in 1986, the question of how to construct 
a socialist and legitimate state of the people, by the people and for the people 
has been a regular issue, simultaneously a political objective and an urgent 
requirement of societal practice. The Vietnamese Communist Party is theoreti-
cally aware of the necessity to develop legitimate state patterns. It has led and 
mobilized many resources to enhance state legitimacy, including the press in 
particular, because it is “a sharp tool in attitude and culture of Party and State, 
and social and political organizations; both a voice of the party, the state, or-
ganizations and the people’s forum.” 
An important characteristic of Vietnam’s political system is the existence of 
only one ruling party. Therefore the establishment and development of legiti-
macy are under the leadership of the Communist Party which deeply influ-
ences the Vietnamese state: the party determines the principles of the state’s 
organization and leads the entire governmental structure on a strategic level. 
The state at the same time is an agency of people's power which is led by the 
Party through basic principles for policies, but also by defining directives and 
conceptualizing laws. All these elements of the party’s policies, including the 
further development of a socialist legitimate state of the people, by the people 
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and for the people, are communicated to the Vietnamese population mainly 
through mass media, especially through media like the Party’s newspapers. In 
this article, we summarize the results of a survey we conducted on important 
official gazettes: People Newspaper, Communist Magazine, and Electronic 
Newspaper of the Vietnam Communist Party, from January to August2014. 
These eight months anteceded the XI Congress term, an important period of 
time during which the issue of socialist legitimate state construction was in-
tensively covered by the media. The first half of 2014 was also part of a so 
called “speeding- up- year” in order to achieve the goals of the Five-Year-Plan 
(2011–2015) and the first year to apply the Amended Constitution of 2013. 
Let us briefly characterize these official gazettes. People Newspaper is 
“a voice of the Party, the State; an honest voice of the Party and State within the coun-
try and in world opinion, etc.; simultaneously a people’s forum, reflecting thoughts, 
needs, proposals and initiatives and experiences of the people and organizations, etc.; a 
political and ideological flag of the Party in the press arena of the country, the daily 
communication bridge of the Party, State with the masses.”1  
Communist Magazine is a theoretical and political agency of the Center of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party. Electronic Newspaper of the Vietnam Com-
munist Party is  
“a voice of the Party, State and Vietnamese people on the internet; an electronic infor-
mation source of Center of Vietnamese Communist Party; a center integrating and 
exploiting information from the electronic information page of the Departments of 
Center Party, Center Office, Provincial committee of the Party, City committee of the 
Party, Party committee under Center; an information and communication portal be-
tween the Party and People.”2  
People Newspaper, Communist Magazine, and Electronic Newspaper of the 
Vietnam Communist Party belong to three different types of gazettes but they 
are significant for the Communist Party’s and Vietnam’s press agencies in gen-
eral. Both, official party documents and the Constitution, assure that the Viet-
namese State is a contract of its citizens as a socialist legitimate state of the 
people, by the people and for the people. In this state, all power belongs to the 
people. This means that democracy is the core of state-legitimacy in Vietnam. 
To develop it further a process is encouraged to institutionalize people’s power 
                                                     
1 Vietnamese Communist Party (2007), 398. 
2 http://dangcongsan.vn/cpv/Modules/News/gioi_thieu.aspx. 
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by laws in the state apparatus. The goal is to provide maximum benefits for 
the people. All activities of the state apparatus must abide by the Constitution 
and laws and must be guided by the spirit of the law. Every staff officer who is 
working in the state apparatus is required to be a man of “morals” and “talent” 
to meet the need of the task of socialist legitimate state construction. These 
issues are fundamental contents of articles writing about the legitimate state in 
Vietnam.  
The paper uses both qualitative methods and quantitative methods, such as 
the participant observation and statistical methods. We collected 766 articles 
writing about the construction of a legitimate state in Vietnam from People 
Newspaper, Communist Magazine and Electronic Newspaper of the Vietnam 
Communist Party from January to August 2014, then classified and analyzed 
three main roles of the press First, the press on extending democracy, promot-
ing the voice of the people; second, the press on the renovation and improve-
ment of the state apparatus; and third, the press on improvements of staff, 
cadres and civil servants. 
The Press on Extending Democracy, and Promoting the Voices  
of the People  
In a democracy power belongs to the people and is exercised by it. This power 
is expressed in various areas of which the possession and control of state power 
is a central one. Democracy and law are two parts of a whole, as democracy is 
under the provision of law and an integral part of the entire legal framework. 
Legitimate state power belongs to the people; its exercise is a way of democrat-
ic expression itself. Democracy is only possible under the legality and humani-
ty of a legitimate state. History has proven that “no legitimate state, no de-
mocracy”. Democracy is based on laws as a fundament of democracy and tools 
to further improve it. The process to expand and implement social democrati-
zation is a process of developing and perfecting laws. To improve the legitima-
cy of the state is therefore directly related to the process of democratization. 
In Vietnam, state power is delegated by the people, therefore, the nature of 
the relation between people’s and state’s power is the key issue of democratiza-
tion. Under the Vietnamese Constitution the people decides about areas, pur-
poses and ways of how state power is exercised. There are various ways of state 
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power control, depending on location, function and task of each governmental 
organization. The control of state power by the mass media plays a decisive 
role. On the one hand the Vietnamese population is constantly provided with 
information about the government, as the state must publicize its activities. 
The 4th President of the United States of America James Madison once said: “A 
popular government, without popular information, is but a prelude to a farce 
or tragedy, or perhaps both.”3 On the other hand, the mass media create fo-
rums for the people to express their demands and thoughts.  
Reporters and journalists with modern facilities are highly capable of de-
tecting and reflecting people’s expectations regarding state and society. Due to 
the starting process of further democratization in Vietnam, the above men-
tioned gazettes have begun to provide more information about governmental 
activities (reflected in the People's Daily newspaper by providing more infor-
mation about activities of the leaders of party and state). They have also pub-
lished/uploaded more articles than previously on democratic theory, and about 
opinions and expectations from the public. From January until August 2014, 
all three newspapers have posted a total of 162 articles on democratic theory 
and public opinion: People Newspaper has posted 96 articles (accounting for 
60.5 %), Communist Magazine with 6 articles (accounting for 3.7 %) and 
Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party with 58 articles (account-
ing for 35.8 %).  
On behalf of the Communist Party’s Theoretical Agency, Communist Mag-
azine has always published profound research by scientists and politicians on 
democratic theory in Vietnam, such as “The leadership of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam – the decisive factor for democracy in our country today” 
(February 2014), “Enhancing the Party’s leadership for the people to partici-
pate in building the Party, a clean and strong government” (April 2014). Peo-
ple Newspaper and Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party have 
also given special importance to post articles on democracy: for example “De-
mocracy” or “Anti-democracy” (People Newspaper, 10 June), or “Meditations 
on all Abnormal Phenomena” (Electronic Newspaper of the Vietnam Com-
munist Party, 19 August). As can be seen from these articles, in terms of per-
ception, the current cadres and civil servants and the different social classes 
have increasingly understood the relevance of the democratic issue, particularly 
                                                     
3 Tran Ngoc Duong (2011), 368. 
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expressed in expanding freedom of speech, and thought, thereby, improving 
the democratization process of the society.  
The press not only transmits theoretical information on democracy, but also 
is a public forum. Through the press, for example People Newspaper, the peo-
ple can raise their voices on diverse problems. From January to August 2014, 
People Newspaper has posted 94 articles containing opinions and messages of 
its readers. The articles’ contents reflect opinions about national policies re-
garding the state apparatus and its democratization: “Delayed enforcement, 
civilian damages” (14 August), “Government fails, people suffer” (1 August), 
“Ill management in medication” (5 July), “The people are thirsty for clean 
water beside the abandoned waterworks” (20 June), “Must choose officers for 
reception of citizens” (31 May). 
Electronic Newspaper of the Vietnam Communist Party is an e-paper and 
therefore another “young” newspaper in the system of Vietnam's revolutionary 
press. From January to August 2014, it posted 54 articles containing opinions 
and messages of the people: “Reception of citizens and ‘4-imploration’ story” 
(25 July), “A story about the mirror at ‘One-door Department” (24 April), 
“Clarifying the ‘allegations’ about bidding” (24 April). Published opinions 
about the implementation conditions, unreasonable aspects when making poli-
cies or shortcomings in the operation of state agencies play an important role. 
For management agencies this is a step forward to adjust and improve policies 
and activities of the state soundly and effectively.  
As can be seen from the press, democratic awareness of all social classes in 
Vietnam has been improved. The articles represent opinions of the people 
about all aspects of life, but especially in political life they introduce new val-
ues in political culture: further democratization by enhancing communication 
and behavioral skills in a democratic sense. The Vietnamese citizens have real-
ized that democracy today not only is expressed through methods of work 
itself, but also through a bilateral style and behavior: public officers and party 
members to citizens and vice versa.  
The growing relevance of the press as a common public forum has clearly 
demonstrated that there is an increase in political participation and democrati-
zation in Vietnam. The population nowadays is more aware of its rights and 
responsibilities as citizens under law. Simultaneously, it also indicates that the 
freedom of speech which is guaranteed by the constitution is increasingly exer-
cised in reality. This all proves that power increasingly belongs to the people. 
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The Press on Renovation and Improvement of the State Apparatus 
One basis of renovation policies is the improvement of the governmental struc-
ture, an issue which is connected with the implementation of legitimate ad-
ministrative procedures. The entire governmental structure and each of its 
measures must follow the Vietnamese Constitution and the laws. In this sense 
2014 was an important year, because the Amended Constitution of 2013 was 
put into effect. In this process the mass media played a key role, as they not 
only provided information about the Amended Constitution but also mirrored 
opinions about the reform process. The mass media can help to discuss and 
improve legal regulations and can enhance awareness of civic responsibility, 
and improve general knowledge about the renovated legal system. As a bridge 
between people, party and state, gazettes like People Newspaper, Communist 
Magazine and Electronic Newspaper of the Vietnam Communist Party dealt 
intensively with the Amended Constitution and its content. From January 
until August 2014, a total of 112 articles on legal topics were published in 
these newspapers: People Newspaper posted 36 articles (accounting for 
32.1 %), Communist Magazine 8 articles (accounting for 7.2 %) and Electron-
ic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party 68 articles (accounting for 
60.7 %).  
The gazettes predominantly published treatises which presented deeper 
analysis about the content of the Amended Constitution to improve common 
knowledge about the changes occurring, such as: “Continuously build and 
perfect the socialist legitimate state under the spirit and contents of the new 
constitution” (Communist Magazine, March 2014), “Congress on the Consti-
tution (Amended)” (People Newspaper 12 March), “Some new points of the 
Constitution (Amended) about Government” (People Newspaper 25 March), 
“Enforcement of human rights in the Constitution” (Electronic Newspaper of 
Vietnam Communist Party 28 March). Besides, the press focused on observing 
critically the activities to implement or reform specific state agencies, an im-
portant part of the entire reform process. In this way, the press played an im-
portant role to bring the Amended Constitution into real life.  
As information about the previously prevailing legal norms as well as the 
changes in the Amended Constitution, the gazettes created favorable condi-
tions and presented a platform for the readers to discuss the ongoing renova-
tion process including specific laws on Thrift Practice, Combat of Waste, Dis-
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aster Management, Land, Health Insurance etc. Besides, the press was also a 
channel for people to raise their voices about the inadequacies of the current 
legal system. For example, the article “Soon ‘remove’ the inadequacies in 
wrong compensation” (People Newspaper 12 February), dealt with large inad-
equacies in the Law on State Compensation Liability – persons claiming com-
pensation had to identify the officers responsible for the damage already at the 
beginning of the compensation request. Law enforcement in fact demonstrated 
that these regulations were a big obstacle to the implementation of the new 
liability law, especially for ordinary people. Another article “Breaking ‘barriers’ 
in administrative implementation of investment” (People Newspaper 26 Feb-
ruary) demonstrated the inadequacies in the implementation process of admin-
istrative procedures for investment projects which are stipulated by the Law on 
Investment. This is another example for the continuous efforts of state and 
party to improve law enforcement through publications by gazettes.  
Considering the different branches of state power, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, the Vietnamese press has always reported intensively about the 
holder of legislative power, the National Assembly News about the National 
Assembly is conducted regularly by the press. Due to the specific activities, 
members of the National Assembly mostly work concurrently; activities main-
ly take place when the National Assembly convenes, which is also the period of 
most of the press’ publications.  
During the sessions of the National Assembly, its Standing Committee and 
other Committees of the National Assembly, many press agencies and journal-
ists were mobilized to report. According to our survey, from January until 
August 2014, all three newspapers published 277 articles about activities of 
the National Assembly. In which, People Newspaper posted 90 articles (ac-
counting for 32.5 %); Electronic Newspaper of the Vietnam Communist Party 
has conducted 185 articles (accounting for 66.8 %) and Communist Magazine 
has posted 2 articles (accounting for 0.7 %). Therefore, reporting about the 
National Assembly is not the main content of the magazine. Its task is rather 
to provide the members of parliaments with information. Through transmit-
ting information the press agencies have drawn the attention of the public to 
the activities of the National Assembly. Especially, information published 
about the daily sessions of the National Assembly helped the people to under-
stand the ongoing political changes., and enabled the Vietnamese citizens to 
monitor these, and to ascertain opinions which were posted. During the sev-
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enth session of the National Assembly XIII (20 May to 24 June 2014), People 
Newspaper and Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party published 
35 typical comments of citizens about the content of the sessions. These com-
ments on the one hand created more public awareness of the National Assem-
bly’s activities, and helped to improve the law making process of the parlia-
ment on the other hand.  
The administrative function of state agencies covers nearly every area of the 
society. Therefore it is an urgent task to promote the reform of Vietnam’s ad-
ministration and of its administrative procedures in particular. The latter are 
currently given a lot of attention, as administrative procedures as well as any 
other legal provisions are not only implemented to manage the administration 
but must create conditions for citizens, and organizations to exercise their 
rights and obligations. Until now, for many reasons, administrative procedures 
have always been causing much inconvenience as cumbersome and complex 
regulation has been one of the reasons for corruption, and authoritarianism. 
Therefore, posting articles related to the reform of administrative procedures 
has always been emphasized by the press since the beginning of the reform 
process in Vietnam. From January until August, 2014, People Newspaper and 
Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party released 41 articles on 
this problem. Some striking ones are: “Remove difficulties in settling adminis-
trative procedures” (People Newspaper 3 January), “Publicize the whole pro-
cess of settling administrative procedures” (People Newspaper 8 February), 
“Administrative procedures, easier said than done” (Electronic Newspaper of 
the Vietnam Communist Party 20 February), “Enhance responsibilities of the 
head in controlling administrative procedures” (Electronic Newspaper of the 
Vietnam Communist Party 15 August). The articles highlighted the inadequa-
cies in enforcing the current administrative procedures, and proposed solutions 
for further reform such as reducing the number of administrative levels, im-
proving the cooperation between different state agencies, creating a more fa-
vorable environment for production and business and for the citizens to claim 
their legal rights.  
To defend justice, and to protect human rights, an objective requirement is 
to improve the judiciary in Vietnam. Judicial reform is necessary, as with the 
ongoing changes many new challenges for the Vietnamese court system have 
emerged, for example in the areas of market economy, international integra-
tion, and economic relations. Vietnam must undergo on the one hand a reform 
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process to ensure favorable legal environments for economic activities, for the 
protection of property rights, and business freedom, and generally for the legal 
interests of investors, business and citizens. In addition, on the other hand, law 
enforcement must be improved to fight crime and law violations more effec-
tively. Therefore, the press agencies have always focused on the publication of 
information on judicial reforms. From January to August, 2014, the gazettes 
published 27 articles on judicial reform, in which, People Newspaper posted 7 
articles, Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party posted 19 articles 
and Communist Magazine posted 1 article. The main contents throughout 
these articles were the objectives of the judicial reform to build a strong, dem-
ocratic, systematic and clean judiciary in order to protect justice and human 
rights.  
With a total of 457 articles published in the operational information on 
many aspects of the reform process from January to August 2014, People 
Newspaper, Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam Communist Party, Communist 
Magazine – the important press agencies of Vietnam's revolution press – pro-
vided information on the activities of the state to citizens. The press became a 
forum to transmit public opinion to the state, thereby contributing to promote 
innovative activities.  
The Press on Human Resources 
Human resources in the state apparatus have an important role in determining 
its effective and efficient operation. President Ho Chi Minh said:  
“Staff is persons who bring the policies of the government and its organizations to the 
people. If staff is bad, good policies can not be done”.4 “Staff is the line of the ma-
chine. If the line is not good, no matter how good the engine is running, even running 
the whole machine, it is still paralyzed.”5  
Human resource management plays a significant role in building a socialist 
legitimate state of the people, by the people and for the people. Therefore, staff 
and civil servants must meet the requirements associated with it, and possess 
professional capacities for their mission. They must be dedicated and hard-
                                                     
4 Ho Chi Minh (2011), 265. 
5 Ho Chi Minh (2011), 68. 
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working; responsible and possess a work ethic while performing duties in their 
assigned tasks; comply with the provisions of the law with self-awareness and 
strict discipline; have respect for citizens and their legal rights; be citizen-
centered; listen to opinions and aspirations of the people and learn from the 
people in a modest manner, etc. Creating human resources for the civil service 
is not only a task of the political system, but an outcome of their interaction 
with the masses. 
As a medium of information between party, state, and people, the press has 
always focused on reflecting activities of staff work, and have been a forum of 
expression of popular opinion about human resources of party and state. From 
January to August, 2014, People Newspaper, Communist Magazine and Elec-
tronic Newspaper of the Communist Party published 147 articles on staff and 
work-related issues. In which, People Newspaper posted 107 articles (account-
ing for 72.8 %), Electronic Newspaper of Communist Party posted 37 articles 
(accounting for 25.2 %), and Communist Magazine posted 3 articles (account-
ing for 2 %).  
First of all, we must affirm that the press plays a significant role in detect-
ing and posting information about positive examples of “Servants of the peo-
ple.” People Newspaper greatly emphasized this matter, and gave many exam-
ples of positive voices about good public officers. From January to August, 
2014, at the beginning, with the column “People’s servants” and then after 
“The jobs for the people”, it published articles about 28 typical examples of 
staff. Some outstanding articles namely “Take the good to remove the bad” 
(16th May) about the head of a small village – Nguyen Hoang Khanh at Phu 
Thanh, Mai Dam town, Chau Thanh District, Hau Giang Province – who is 
always at the forefront of building mass movements to protect national securi-
ty, “a staff who has always earned the people's trust.”6 The article: “The son of 
the mountain village” (12th June) about Le Hong Thanh, lieutenant-colonel, 
captain of the criminal police of Yen Chau district, who is a typical example of 
“a citizen-centered style, having the same food, the same house, and working 
and producing with compatriots”7 of a people’s police.  
We can conclude that that many arcticles mention the positive sides of 
cadres and civil servants. These human resources are well trained, and retrained 
                                                     
6 Thanh Phong (2014), 8. 
7 Duc Tuan (2014), 4, 8. 
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both in political theory and professional knowledge regarding policies and 
laws, they meet certain levels of assigned work. A part of the contemporary 
human resources in Vietnam’s administration quickly adapt to the new 
requirements and challenges in the process of the state reform. The articles 
describe the majority of human resources in public service as of high political 
quality, with good work-ethics, citizen-centered, and abiding by guidelines, 
policies and laws. 
However, in comparison with the requirements for human resources in the 
socialist legitimate state of the people, by the people and for the people, the 
cadres and civil servants today also revealed many weaknesses and 
inadequacies. Both are reflected in the mass media by the popular voice. From 
January to August 2014, People Newspaper published 27 articles which 
reflected people’s opinions about the shortcomings of cadres and civil servants 
in a special column: “troublesome jobs in the eyes of the people”. Some 
remarkable articles such as: “It is such a lack of responsibility to the people” 
(published 12th June) about the shirking of responsibilities by staff at General 
Hospital in Quang Nam area and Da Nang Eye Hospital where five patients 
suffered infections after eye surgeries. Article “Lack of responsibility towards 
the people” (4 July) about insensitivity, irresponsibility of some officials of 
Nam Hung commune, Nam Truc District, Nam Dinh Province in the 
treatment policy for people with meritorious services who fought in the 
country’s armed forces.  
Through the common reflections via forums of the press it can be seen that 
many weaknesses and shortcomings exist among the current cadres and civil 
servants: professional qualifications are still incommensurate to meet the job 
requirements; the initiative and sense of responsibility for assigned work is still 
low, lax discipline; limited management and operating skills. A number of 
cadres and civil servants are incapable, fraudulent, corrupt, harassed, lacking in 
impartiality and objectivity in handling affairs, irresponsible towards the 
people’s work; a number of key officials at the local level seem to be confused, 
embarrassed, passive with weak skills and spirit when problems arise. 
Besides posting assessments of public human resources, the press has also 
emphasized reporting about staff work in order to reflect existing 
disadvantages, but also to detect innovation in administration and its 
procedure, especially assessment of work on the local level and job rotation for 
officers. From January to August 2014, People Newspaer published 31 articles 
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on staff work, which mainly reflected innovation on the local level. However, 
many shortcomings of staff work are still existing in general. Typical articles 
are: “Identifying expressions of “Group’s Benefits” in staff organization work 
and solutions” (Communist Magazine, May 2014), “good and bad in staff 
rotation” (People Newspaper October 2014), “How to make personnel work 
reasonable/sensible” (People Newpaper 28 June), “The paradox in the manage-
ment and use of cadres and civil servants in Hanoi” (People Newspaper 30 
August), “Is it true that talents are like autumn leaves?” (Electronic News-
paper of the Communist Party 28 April).  
In these articles the shortcomings of local committees, branches and units 
are decribed: they do not really care for human resources, do not actively plan 
their development or if only in a perfunctory way, especially not for leaders and 
managers, do not properly consider job rotation from the central to local levels. 
Structures of the administrative service including the organization of personnel 
is often irrational. 
It can be seen from the chart that from January to August 2014, People 
Newspaper, Communist Magazine and Electronic Newspaper of the Com-
munist Party published a total of 766 articles on issues of the legitimate state 
in Vietnam today (People Newspaper with 358 articles, Communist Magazine 
20 and Electronic Newspaper of Communist Party 388 articles published). 
Electronic Newspaper of Communist Party has the highest number of articles 
because it is a daily online newspaper. Communist Magazine has the lowest 
number because it is a theoretical monthly magazine.  
The number of articles on human resources is the highest, expressing the 
importance of this issue, while the number of articles on extending democracy, 
promoting the voices of the people is at least comparable to other ones. It is 
not easy to write on theoretical issues in daily newspapers. The number of 
articles on renovation and improvement of the state apparatus is high, includ-
ing all typical divisions of power such as the legislature, executive and judici-
ary.  
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Conclusion 
It can be seen that there are three main roles of the press in the construction of 
a legitimate state in Vietnam today. First, the press gives information in order 
to help people understand the concept of the legitimate state, and especially 
the characteristics of the socialist and legitimate state of the people, by the 
people and for the people in Vietnam. Second, the press advocates the general 
line and policies of party and state, and mobilizes citizens to participate in 
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building the legitimate state. Third, the press is a forum for people to express 
their opinions, and to monitor the state apparatus as well as the staff and civil 
servants in the process of building the legitimate state in Vietnam. 
However in the entire reform process, the press in Vietnam has some limi-
tations. Firstly, information about the rule of law is plentiful today, but not 
really presenting the full picture. The difficulties and challenges in building 
the legitimate state has not been analyzed sufficiently. Besides, although the 
press has often been reflecting the negative sides of the state apparatus, it has 
not dared to speak out some problems. Moreover, the mistakes mentioned in 
the press mostly come from low-level officials, less from high-level ones. It is a 
requirement for the press to broach the issue of administrative reform more 
intensively, as well as to communicate more the values of the rule of law. The 
central goal is to mobilize citizens and to engage them in the construction of a 
socialist and legitimate state of the people, by the people and for the people in 
Vietnam. 
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On the Civil society and the State of Law  
in Vietnam 
Phan Xuan Son 
What is a Civil Society? 
“Civil society” is called “xã hội công dân” in Vietnamese, “Société civile” in 
French and “Zivilgesellschaft” in German. Among them, “civi”“, and “civile” 
are all adjectives that mean “belonging to the citizens, of the citizens’ affairs.” 
For example, civil law means “dân luật”, civil rights means “quyền công dân” 
and civic liberty means “tự do công dân” in Vietnamese.1 Society may mean 
“association”, “union”, “community”, “organization” and “company”. Its 
meaning is identical to that of “société” in French. Therefore, civil society is an 
assembly of citizens in the form of an “organization”, “community”, “compa-
ny”, “group”, “association”, “union” or “cooperative”.  
When translated into Vietnamese it can be understood as either “xã hội 
công dân” (society of citizens) or “xã hội dân sự” (society for civil affairs). Both 
terms have their equivalent meanings in English. In the former case, civil soci-
ety refers to the organizations, communities and networks of citizens. The 
latter term emphasizes that these organizations, communities and unions are 
related to the affairs of the citizens (civil affairs).  
However “dân sự” (công việc của dân) in Vietnamese can have multiple 
meanings. First of all, depending on the contexts, “dân” can mean “citizens”, 
“people” or “subject” [“ordinary person/people”, “ordinary subject/s”, which 
                                                     
1 Encyclopedia Publisher (2005): Từ điển Anh-Việt (English-Vietnamese Dictionary). 
Hanoi. 166. 
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refer to a person or a group of people that are not the state (e.g in feudal peri-
ods)]. “Sự” means affairs or matters. However when combining “sự” with 
“dân”, the resulting “dân sự” refers to the affairs of “dân” (which means people, 
citizens or subjects) which are different from and independent of those of the 
state. Meanwhile, the concept of “civil society” in the first place implies an 
organization and community of citizens who possess legal and political status 
in relation to the state. While “Dân sự” is sufficient to distinguish “civil af-
fairs” (việc dân) with those of the state, it fails to indicate what political and 
legal relations the citizens in question have with the state. In other words the 
concept of “xã hội công dân” (society of citizens) is created as soon as people in 
societies acquire their rights and obligations, and after the introduction of 
capitalist states of law. On the other hand, “xã hội dân sự” refers to a non-state 
and civil sector and does not specify the relations between this sector and the 
state. A comparison can be made between “Xã hội dân sự” and “Xã hội công 
dân” and “Kinh tế hàng hóa” (commodity economy) and “Kinh tế thị trường” 
(market economy) in economics, respectively. “Xã hội dân sự” denotes a gen-
eral non-state sector in society, while “xã hội công dân” refers to this sector but 
only after the introduction of the capitalist states of law (not heretofore). This 
difference is primarily caused by the Vietnamese language. In English, Rus-
sian, France and other languages there is no such a case and only the equivalent 
of “xã hội công dân” in Vietnamese exists.  
Thus while “xã hội dân sự” conveys a broader meaning, its political and le-
gal connotations are opaque. Its counterpart “Xã hội công dân” indicates the 
following main connotations:  
- It is a sector of citizens (e. g. a community or organization) in a society, 
which can be considered the first legal stratum. It means that without 
his/her civil rights and obligations and citizenship as regulated by the law 
of a nation, a person is not included in this concept. 
- The citizens organize themselves into a “society” (e. g. an association, un-
ion, or community) that operates under the state of law and is legitimate. 
This is the second legal stratum. As a result, illegal organizations do not 
belong to this concept.  
- Civil organizations and communities are multiple hence their relations have 
to be regulated by the law, which is the third legal stratum. These consti-
tute other indirect connotations of “civil society” such as civilization and 
urban dwellers.  
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Therefore, it is my recommendation that “xã hội công dân” should be used to 
connote “civil society” instead of “xã hội dân sự”.2  
Why is there a Civil Society? 
Looking at the ideological, theoretical and practical development of the state of 
law, it can be said that: The sovereignty of citizens over the state is an objec-
tive reality, as citizens decide the form and organization of a state by authoriz-
ing their power to a number of representatives who run it on their behalf. The 
sovereignty of citizens over the state is a prerequisite of the state of law.  
The sovereignty of citizens is manifested in economic, political and social 
terms as follows: 
- Citizens have their respective economic status, based on a particular owner-
ship of the means of production and possessions.  
- Citizens are permitted to organize and contribute to overall affairs of the 
state (which are read as the right to elect, self-nominate and participate in 
state management). 
- Citizens are allowed to supervise the activities of state authorities.  
- Citizens have the right to express their will and realize their interests or 
those of their community (political rights such as freedom of association 
and assembly, of demonstration and speech, freedom of religion and belief).  
- Although part of it is delegated to the organization of the state and fulfil-
ment of public functions, the power of citizens is fundamentally preserved 
and is supreme. 
- The evolution of mankind is simultaneously an ongoing struggle to claim 
civil sovereignty. While this struggle has gained significant achievements, 
civil sovereignty remains a critical issue to be solved along with social de-
velopment.  
To oppose and remove feudal authoritarianism and safeguard the liberal rights 
of people, thinkers influenced by Enlightenment insist on a civil society as a 
basis of the state of law. The concept of civil society as an independent entity 
in relations to the state is criticized zed in the history of Western ideas, and 
though it is defined in different ways by thinkers from France and Germany, 
                                                     
2 Hereafter referred to as “civil society”.   
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there is a common attempt to clarify the problematic and complicated rela-
tions between public and private sectors, individuals and society, social ethics 
and individual interests, and between personal desires and social concerns. 
Despite these varying trends, the idea of civil society appeals to many ideolo-
gists, who considered it to be a collection of the desires of both society at large 
and each individual. Civil society, therefore, includes a wide range of moral 
ideas on social order, or at the very least harmonizes the conflict between the 
personal needs and interests with those of the society at large. 
The concept of civil society stems from the theory of natural law, although 
its development is increasingly sophisticated, even present in certain aspects of 
medieval Christian ideology. The ideological history of civil society begins 
with philosophers from the Age of Enlightenment to Karl Marx and the sub-
sequent political and legal ideologists. The social need for civil society is the 
need to revert to manageable aspects of social life which emphasizes voluntary 
civil unions. Civil society in modern capitalist states is a part of the communal 
process of continuous struggle for freedom, equality and justice, avoiding be-
ing compromised by both the market and the state. 
Civil Society in Marxism  
According to Marx, the term civil society was introduced in the 18th century, 
when ownership relations had evolved beyond their communal form as in an-
cient and medieval times. Marx claimed that family and civil society were the 
prerequisites of the state:  
“Family and civil society are the bearers of the state (in the widest sense – PXS); they 
are the existence of will, they are the state’s mode of existence. Family and civil society 
form the state.”3 
Marx’s notion has a great significance in terms of methodology in thinking on 
the state and choosing a model for social development. According to Marx, 
civil society is not within the political realm, but all of its activities affect the 
state. Because of this, the institutions (organizations) of civil society bear cer-
tain political forms. As such, in building a civil society, it is necessary to rec-
ognize its independence and objective role for the state (i.e. assigning various 
fields of human activity) on the one hand, and recognize its political forms on 
the other hand. 
                                                     
3 Marx/Engels (1995), 314–315. 
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In terms of freedom, it transforms the society’s supreme bodies into its de-
pendents, and even nowadays whether a state is free or not depends on “the 
extent by which the state’s freedom is limited”4 by such forms. “It is the indi-
vidual as a member of civil society who, therefore, is the basis, the premise of a 
political state. The state acknowledges this accordingly in terms of human 
rights.”5 
Civil Society as a “Non-state” Area 
Marx held that, “political emancipation means freeing civil society from poli-
tics, even from the appearance of a certain universal content.”6 At that point, 
“man, as a member of civil society, the apolitical man must appear as a natural 
man.”7 Thus, the birth of civil society, the “political emancipation or turning 
of man into a member of civil society, an egoistic and independent individual 
on the one hand, and into a citizen of the state, a legal entity on the other 
hand”8 is major historical progress in medieval times, when social life is uni-
form to political life. 
On the Importance of Civil Society 
Karl Marx wrote, on the importance of civil society, that “civil society is the 
actual center, the actual arena of history in its entirety,”9 and that “political 
revolution is a revolution of civil society.”10 This shows that any modern polit-
ical party or a modern social force striving for victory must win the ultimate 
battle in civil society. Although Marx studied civil society in his contemporary 
historical context, the universal values of his standpoint remain in effect until 
today. When addressing civil society, Marx confirmed that it is the fruition of 
the capitalist development (in Marx’s time, capitalism is the highest socio-
                                                     
4 Marx/Engels (1995), 554.  
5 Marx/Engels (1995), 554. 
6 Marx/Engels (1995), 554. 
7 Marx/Engels (1995), 554. 
8 Mác/Ăngghen toàn tập, tập 1, CTQG, H, 1995, tr.557. 
9 C. Mác-Ph. Ăngghen, Tuyển tập, tập 1, Nxb Sự thật, Hà Nội, 1980, tr. 299. (Hệ tư 
tưởng Đức). 
10 Mác/Ăngghen toàn tập, tập 1, nxb CTQG, H, 1995, tr.554. 
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economic form), but he remained faithful to the term “in any era”; as long as 
the state exists, civil society will be its basis. Civil society, wrote Marx, “always 
refers to a social organization that stems directly from production and com-
merce and, in any era, is the basis of the state and of the ideological superstruc-
ture as well.”11 
Definition 
Civil society is a system of civil organizations, communities and their relations, 
operating within the national law in order to realize individuals and characters, 
connecting individuals to the social system, and strengthening and protecting 
communal interests. At the same time and through organizations and commu-
nities, civil society coordinates with the state, ensuring that the relations be-
tween the state and society remain balanced, stable, and optimal for sustaina-
ble development and social progress. 
The Structure of the Civil Society 
In terms of institutions (organizations), it includes all unions, associations, 
interest-based leagues (economic, political, cultural, professional, scientific, 
educational, entertaining, etc.). It would be insufficient, however, to refer to 
institutions without mentioning their interrelations, their coordinating mech-
anisms and other organizational and operational principles. 
The Position of the Civil Society in the Social System 
Civil society refers to the institutions that “stand next to” (in the words of Karl 
Marx) those of the state (e.g. parliament, government, president, the judicial 
body, local administrations, etc.). In other words, the institutions of civil socie-
ty are relatively independent; they do not depend on and are not state organi-
zations, nor are they manufacturers or businesses. 
The Characteristics of a Civil Society’s Activities 
Important factors to characterize institutions of the civil society are a common 
identity of the respective group or community, (financial) self-reliance, self-
management, voluntarism, and diversity in organizational forms. Depending 
                                                     
11 C.Mác/Ph.Ăngghen: Tuyển tập, tập IV, Nxb Sự thật, Hà Nội, 1984, tr. 362. 
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on the model of the political system, civil society’s organizations can be within 
or outside of the political system. 
Functions of Civil Society 
Some basic functions of the civil society are: 
- Socializing individuals, realizing personalities, connecting individuals to 
the social system, strengthening and protecting the communal interests. 
- Providing a basis for the state and coordinating with it, supplementing and 
replacing it (in certain areas, usually where the state cannot perform with 
higher efficiency than civil society), verifying, and perfecting the state ac-
tivities, thereby balancing and stabilizing state and social activities. 
Nowadays, the civil society is among the three most fundamental pillars of 
social development: If a market economy is the prerequisite for national devel-
opment, and a state of law is what directly determines development, then the 
civil society is a guarantee for development. The final goal of a modern civil 
society is the development and perfection of individuals, which is the condi-
tion for the development of community, society, and humanity. In terms of 
development, civil society is the place where a nation’s social capital is formed, 
accumulated and preserved. The development of civil society aims at humani-
ty’s common progressive values, while at the same time depends on the period-
ic characters and specific historical backgrounds of each nation; it depends also 
on the forms and types of state and on their political system. 
In summary, a civil society is a voluntary collective realm of activities 
whose purpose is to share common benefits, goals, and values. Theoretically, 
their organizational forms differ from those of the state, family, and the mar-
ket; although in reality, the frontiers between the state, civil society, family, 
and the market are often complicated, ambiguous, and reciprocal. The nature 
of civil society, as addressed above, is the relationship between individuals , 
between individual and community, and between individual and the state, in 
other words citizens in their forms of community. 
Models of Civil Society 
There is a wide range of models of civil societies, and they can be summarized 
into three major types: 
- The liberal model understands the civil society as opposition to the state, 
and is observable in countries like the US, or UK.  
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- The democratic socialist model sees the civil society as a unifier of state and 
society. Its proponents are modern democratic socialist parties, mainly from 
Scandinavia and Germany. This model is reflected in the definition of the 
“social state”. The state is concerned with all social groups, and builds in-
teractions and unity between itself and civil society. 
- Whether a specific Soviet civil society actually exists or not has long been a 
subject of debate between international and Soviet scholars. In general, 
most scholars recognize its existence, but due to a lack of official acknowl-
edgement and proper regulative legislations, Soviet civil society has suf-
fered from a number of derailments and weaknesses.  
Studying the issue of the civil society provides us with a methodological basis 
to study international socio-political entities in general and those in Vietnam 
in particular. 
Negative Manifestations of Civil Society 
Beginning with the development of production and division of labor, social 
structures diversified increasingly in terms of professions, interests, and value 
orientations. The formation of groups with different interests is hence inevita-
ble. However, it is not inevitable that a certain group is only pursuing its own 
interests and violating those of other groups and/or the state; this stems from 
egoistic goals. “Interest group” is a group that seeks to maximize its own in-
terests and, in the process, violates the common interests of society or those of 
other groups. Interest groups cause social fragmentation and corrupt social 
unity and consensus. Should all groups act in such a way, then the civil society 
“becomes a battlefield where everyone is against everyone” (Hegel). 
Due to limited resources and lax organization, many civil society organiza-
tions seek for sponsorship from business or foreign entities, thus creating fi-
nancial dependence. These organizations fail to achieve their intended goals on 
the one hand, and become dependent on, or are even used to accomplish the 
wicked purposes of economic or political forces on the other hand. 
Some domestic civil society organizations may be formed “unnaturally” as 
partners of foreign NGOs, which are also formed in order to realize the mali-
cious goals of certain forces. Without adequate legislation to prevent such 
organizations, social insecurity may ensue, especially in the context of global 
integration when the freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of as-
sembly are not only universal values but also binding requirements in interna-
333 
tional commitments. Even though a civil society may be considered a place 
“external to politics”, a number of groups have been shifting towards the polit-
ical realm for the sake of self-interest rather than the benefits of its members. 
These groups rely on sacred values and sentiments, such as national and ethnic 
bonds, religious beliefs, human rights and dignity etc. to promote hate, vio-
lence, and hostility against the state, with measures ranging from peaceful to 
radical that far exceed the scope of a civil society organization.  
Quite a large number of such groups have been prepared to act as “insiders” 
for foreign enemies. Some with economic influences may utilize money or 
other substances to seduce high-ranking political figures, manipulate the poli-
cy making process to serve their own interests, violating the principle of non-
profit. For organizations with state funding (several socio-political and other 
social organizations), they tend to foster superficiality, authoritativeness, and 
derailing from the nature of civil society. 
There are limitations and negativities to every realm and aspect of social 
life. In the case of a market economy, it is the willingness to sacrifice every-
thing for “maximum profit”, even if it means the compromise of national in-
terests, a widened rich-poor gap, foul play in business, and illegal competition. 
Even in a state of law, such plights as bureaucracy, corruption, policy exploita-
tion and manipulation, and abuse of power persist.  
These negativities (or shortcomings) of a market economy, of a state of law, 
or of a civil society as aforementioned are understandable and have yet to be 
eradicated. But they cannot derail the developmental orientation of the Viet-
namese people, and cannot eclipse the benefits of market economy, state of 
law, and civil society; and as a result, we should not be “afraid” of a market 
economy, state of law, and civil society. It is necessary for the state to intro-
duce a legislative system to regulate and manage civil society. Only after clear 
legislation is created can we limit or eradicate organizations that undermine 
state and society. 
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What are the Characteristics of the Vietnamese Civil Society? 
Universality and Particularity  
The theoretical issues discussed above on civil society and socio-political or-
ganizations will serve as a basis for us to examine the civil society in Vietnam. 
In Vietnam, the system of social and socio-political organizations, despite their 
being atypical, bear the trait of universality. It means that they are created and 
exist firstly because of the inherent needs of the civil society itself; even during 
the era of national liberation, participating in socio-political organizations was 
an urgent need of all societal classes. Moreover, historical areas notwithstand-
ing, the people’s need to assemble into groups is greatly diverse, especially in 
the modern era, and this requires a corresponding shift in the political think-
ing of the state, stemming from the needs, desires and benefits of the people. 
As such, it is reasonable to say there is in fact a civil society in Vietnam. In 
terms of organization, there are around 500 organizations (associations) operat-
ing nationwide; around 3.000 operating locally, and tens of thousands more on 
the district and grass root levels. They are structured as follows: 
- Socio-political: The Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) and other socio-
political organizations are within the political system and act as the core of 
Vietnamese civil society. The VFF is a socio-political organization with 
some 50 member groups and many prominent individuals, among these are 
five socio-political organizations that have been codified by the constitution 
and by law. 
- Economic: productive, business and service associations (professional associ-
ations) such as associations for steel, cement, construction, architecture, 
sugar cane, coffee and cocoa, rice export, etc. 
- Scientific and technological: union of scientific and technological associa-
tions, private research groups, etc. 
- Social: socio-professional organizations, groups concerning common inter-
ests, charity, humanitarian aid, hospitality, gender, etc. 
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Vietnam. 
Among these organizations are their coordinative relations, principles, and 
mechanisms. Of course, the criteria for classifying these organizations are only 
relative. In Vietnam, the creation of the socialist republic is closely related to a 
struggle for national independence and de colonization. The VFF and other 
socio-political organizations were formed under the mobilization and arrange-
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ment of the Communist Party of Vietnam, intertwined with it in that struggle 
and answering to its leadership. In other words, the sense of citizenship and 
political awareness had matured along with the struggle for national libera-
tion. In that process, the formation of social and socio-political organizations 
bore the trait of collectivism as Vietnamese people from all walks of life were 
mobilized against imperialism and feudalism, and the interests of all classes 
were first and foremost connected with the process of political struggle. Such 
positions and features strengthened when the CPV became the ruling party 
and are persisting until today. In the new context, although the VFF and other 
socio-political organizations retain their political functions, their social capaci-
ty is increasingly expanding and diversifying. This proves that the VFF and 
other socio-political organizations play a crucial role as core forces of Vietnam’s 
civil society. 
Challenges for the Civil Society 
When civil societies first exist as representatives of and protectors of the inter-
ests of a certain class or group in their relations with the political-
ly/economically dominant lords, or even with the state, they are not immedi-
ately recognized as legal. Because of certain interests, the state often prohibits 
the existence and activities of these organizations. Despite its prominence in 
the 18th and 19th century, the term “civil society” from time to time ceased to 
be widely used. At times, the major theories of Western thinkers focused only 
on the complex relationship between the state and the market. As such, “socie-
ty” was no longer under the spotlight. After the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern European socialist states, people began to doubt the “role” of civil 
society. However, in contrast to that skepticism, scholars found that the USSR 
and Eastern European states did not accept the civil society, that these states 
were highly centralized with a too feeble civil society, unlike Western states 
with the same level of development. Perhaps it was this that caused those 
states to collapse. 
However, studying the experiences with the respective civil society is ade-
quate not only for Eastern Europe but also for developing nations. The EU 
shows great interest in this matter. The “Civil Dialogue”, initiated with the 
1990 Commitment, was its first attempt to facilitate social institutions – so 
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that actors from governments and business lobbies are not the only audible 
agents in the policy making in Brussels. The EU has also commenced the regu-
lation of frequently conflicting interests among NGOs and other civilian 
groups. There has been a shift in the awareness in the EU, which now holds 
that state governments and international institutions should be more open 
toward civil society institutions. 
It is industrialization that encourages the assembly of groups, of organiza-
tions with large numbers of people and collectivism, privately at first but pub-
licly later on. These organizations are formed to counter the power of laissez-
faire ideologists and business owners, and consist of labor unions, farmer and 
consumer associations. The unions’ activities range from demanding higher 
wages, fewer working hours, benefits for laborers, job insurance, enterprise 
management, and production contracts. They consist of workers that are not 
insured, who are individually poorer and weaker than the entrepreneurs. 
Whether a union could stand firm depends on their unity.  
At first, unions were suspected of violating the scope of legal operation. 
Early 19th century English labor law only allowed workers to individually sign 
contracts with entrepreneurs, in which each party was considered an equivalent 
contractual party.. But in reality, since workers’ capacity to negotiate is smaller 
than that of business owners, employees tried to balance the deal by unifying 
into a coherent front to ask for better terms. The employers, in turn, asked for 
state intervention to prohibit such associations. The British Parliament re-
sponded with a series of new legislations and declared that any association 
founded as a way to achieve equal standing in a collective negotiation with 
business owners would be illegal. The situation was much more dire in France, 
where there was a time when the state imposed heavy punishment on the un-
ions which were considered rebellious. In the US, unions were also considered 
criminal organizations. 
But with the development of the industrial society, the state could no long-
er resist the pressure of labor unions and the struggle by members of the “mid-
dle class”. The existence of labor unions and of other civil society organizations 
was tolerated, accepted and then acknowledged. But Western democracies, 
even having accepted the legitimacy of these groups, still eradicated groups 
that are deemed “suspicious” or “disrupting to the social order”. The skepti-
cism of nations toward civil organizations was not demonstrated solely by ab-
solute prohibition. It also introduced rules and limitations to impinge or con-
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trol the operation of these organizations. Hence, civil organizations depended 
on many bindings: on their objectives and those of the state. They sometimes 
had to adapt to the established institutional and structural forms. In some 
countries, while socio-political organizations are not meant to be formed as 
opposition, the government’s policies and agendas put them in an oppositional 
stance with the state.  
In the West, socio-political organizations can freely be formed and operate 
within the law today as a result of long lasting political conflicts. In develop-
ing countries, where many incompetent governments exist, governments usu-
ally do not take interest groups seriously or are tired of them, because of the 
fact that they often have to listen to the comments, criticisms and condemna-
tions made by these groups about their incompetence. But their voices are the 
vein of society whose resonance can still be heard by governments. In a number 
of cases, governments must adjust their policies because of the criticisms by 
interest groups. The recommendations by environmental groups, for instance, 
initially irritated most countries’ leaders, but in time they gradually had to pay 
greater attention to ecological matters, which have become a global responsi-
bility. 
How Does the State of Law Manage the Civil Society in Vietnam? 
First of all, it is necessary to reaffirm that the civil society is an objective social 
structure rather than a political instrument that can be freely utilized or dis-
posed of. Past experiences have shown that state regimes which are “hostile” 
toward the existence of a civil society will eventually be toppled it.. In recent 
decades, the world witnessed various “color revolutions” which caused many 
regimes to topple, even resulting in the complete collapse of governmental 
order or entire states. Among the causes are weaknesses, or even a complete 
lack of a civil society in those countries. The inadequacy of civil society in 
those countries drives their state regimes toward authoritarianism (which in 
turn would further undermine civil society). This leads to the degradation of 
the state itself. The systems of government in those countries were sluggish, 
nepotistic, corrupted, dictatorial and authoritarian; their economic and socio-
cultural performances were bad, the country was internationally isolated; and 
its people discontent. Even a small number of groups can suffice to take ad-
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vantage of this discontent, and in coordination with external intervention they 
can mobilize the people to instigate protests or anti-state violent subversion, 
despite the great cost it would incur. If a civil society is strong enough, it may 
prevent the state from becoming so degraded that subversion becomes inevita-
ble, and it would also help to prevent and preclude domestic and foreign con-
spiracies driven by self-interest. 
The civil society is the source of human and social capital of Vietnam in 
general, and of the party and the state in particular. Loosening state manage-
ment over civil society will deprive us of the human resources and social capi-
tal needed for the construction of a state of law and to foster national develop-
ment as desired. 
In the past struggle for national independence, each particular action had to 
be in the service of the supreme interest of the nation. National independence 
was the precondition for any further achievement in the realm of interests of 
the diverse social classes and groups. But today, as the national independence 
of Vietnam is secured, the further development of Vietnam must take a step 
forward. Today the ultimate goal – national development – can only be 
achieved by realizing the interests of various social classes and groups. In the 
contemporary history of Vietnam we can observe two different trends with 
reverse priorities: In the past: “no country – no home”, and now “prosperous 
people – powerful nation”. Thus, the existence of civil society is first and fore-
most determined and promoted by the interests of its members (i.e. citizens, 
participants). 
Due to the complexity of socio-economic life and the diversity of needs and 
interests, the assemblage of civil society organizations must be correspondingly 
diversified, from the VFF and socio-political organizations to socio-professional 
organizations, clubs, NGOs, etc. As a result, diversifying the forms of civilian 
assemblage is a condition for the success of and also a guarantee of the party’s 
leadership in the future. 
The state manages civil society through legislations, policies, and other 
tools. At present, it has promulgated a number of laws regarding the civil 
society in Vietnam, but there is still a lack of adequate legislations, even the 
most basic ones, for the management of the civil society. This lack creates 
more difficulties for governance, especially for functional authorities, which 
due to having no relevant legislations to refer to, have problems and uncertain-
ties in how to deal with legal (registered) and illegal (unregistered) organiza-
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tions. The registration itself is difficult. Which organization can register, and 
which cannot? Why so? Currently, even those that can register have only regis-
tered in documents, by which they state their purposes and principles. But 
civil society is not a single organization and cannot be limited within purposes 
and principles; it has a much larger scope and is related to factors like govern-
ance, political and social system, other associations and the general provisions 
of civil rights. Since there is no association law yet, the state is unable to man-
age these affairs, and sanctions for the organizations’ wrongdoings cannot be 
imposed. In reality, state agencies were unable to determine whether protest-
ing against China’s placement of an oil rig on Vietnam’s continental shelf, or 
the declaration of a group to form an organization, is illegal or not (provided 
that their purposes and principles are not unconstitutional). 
Past experiences in economic development also showed that when we had 
no intention of building a market economy, there was no law on economic 
activities, and state authorities were unable to determine whether the conducts 
of Ba Thi, Kim Ngoc, or those who traded goods between provinces, were 
against the law. We can only imagine the challenge that the authorities had to 
face when pursuing and confiscating inter-provincial shipments back then, or 
when the confiscated goods from petty merchants or bought from state-owned 
shops were just resold on the street with a higher price (“con phe“, as it was 
called)! Not to mention issues related to tariff and penalties. The lack of legis-
lation is also what has been challenging Thailand’s authorities in the recent 
cases of surrogate pregnancy. But as soon as there are clear guidelines and leg-
islations, things become much easier.The same is true for state governance and 
civil society. Civil organizations or communities operating legally shall have 
permission to do whatever is not prohibited by the law, and those who violate 
the law must face legal punishment. This requires an imperative perfection of 
the legal system on civil society, in which association law holds a key role. 
The perfection of the legal system on civil society will not only reflect the 
fact that state governance capacity has met the demands of objective reality, 
helping authorities do their lawful assignments, but also guarantee civil rights, 
security, order, and promote social development. Currently, due to the lack of 
legislation, civil society organizations operate in a disorganized manner, in 
which some even take advantage of legal ambiguity to conduct anti-state activ-
ities, producing serious harm to national development. Authorities are faced 
with multiple difficulties when dealing with such groups; this unknowingly 
340 
casts upon them a sense of “allergy” or prejudice toward civil society. When 
legal clarity is present, these challenges will largely be overcome. It is foreseea-
ble, though, that after such legislations are enacted, many new civil society 
associations and organizations will be established, just like the mushrooming 
of enterprises after the introduction of the Law on Enterprises. Just as in the 
case of the market economy, legitimate and effective organizations that operate 
legally persist, while the rest go into “bankruptcy“. Only after such a period 
can we hope for a true civil society in Vietnam. 
It is also necessary to note that the legal system, especially association law, 
will concern a number of extra-governmental organizations that include politi-
cal parties, socio-political organizations, and other social organizations. There-
fore, we should have a clear definition and distinction between these forms of 
organization: 
- Political party refers to political entities whose purpose is to take over con-
trol of the government and exercise state power. Such great purpose usually 
impels parties to have a coherent organization, high level of discipline, and 
principles that are faithful to their ideals, guidelines, and strategies. 
- Socio-political organizations are groups that operate for the benefits of par-
ticular social groups and communities, through measures that can have in-
fluence on the government and political parties (without having a goal for 
taking over governmental control or participation). 
- Social organizations are groups of members who strive to achieve common 
purposes of the group, society, or the community without goals to have di-
rect influence, impact on the policy making process of the state or political 
parties (e.g. association for gardening, charity, poetry etc.). 
Of course, such distinction is also relative. When there are changes in the so-
cio-economic situation, social needs, or purposes and methods of operation in 
accordance with the national legal context, a social organization may turn into 
a socio-political one, and a socio-political organization may turn into a politi-
cal party. In Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, hundreds of 
political parties came into being. Most of them have ceased to exist, and some 
went on to become social organizations. This is a noteworthy issue in the gov-
ernance of Vietnam regarding its civil society. 
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Recommendations 
- Awareness: Conducting research, exchange between leaders, managers, 
scholars, and citizens in order to have an accurate and scientific awareness of 
civil society. 
- The demand for a civil society in Vietnam is great and objective. The 
Communist Party should advocate the construction, development, and 
guidance of the Vietnamese civil society. 
- The National Assembly should quickly embark on proper legislation re-
garding civil society, with priorities on association and demonstration law 
to provide a basis for state governance of the civil society. 
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The State of Law in Vietnam: Understandings,  
Prospects and Challenges 
Vu Cong Giao 
The Concept of the State of Law 
The idea of the state of law emerged long ago in human history. As early as in 
antiquity, philosophers like Socrates (469–399 B.C.), Aristotle (384–322 
B.C.), and Cicero (l06–43 B.C.) described the characteristics of a state ruled by 
law. For instance, in Plato’s Crito Socrates expresses that an individual must 
always adhere to the state and state law.1 Aristotle also affirms: “A state is 
stable only when men are equal to law,”2 meanwhile Cicero believes that: “we 
are in bondage to the law in order that we may be free”.3 Those ideas are rein-
forced by European and American thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–
1274), John Locke (1632–1704), Charles de Montesquieu (1698–1755), 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Thom-
as Jefferson (1743–1826), Thomas Paine (1737–1809), John Adams (1735–
1826), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) then becoming a legal 
theory, particularly in the period of Enlightenment. The idea of the rule of law 
was also regulated in a number of legal documents in some countries in medie-
val times. For example, the well-known Great Charter Magna Carta (1285) of 
England stipulated that: 
                                                     
1 Stephens (1985), 3–10. 
2 www.quotationspage.com/quote/28897.htm. 
3 quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote_blog/Marcus.Tullius.Cicero.Quote.7330. 
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“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or 
outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed with 
force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals 
or by the law of the land.”4  
As time went on, many definitions of the state of law have been proposed each 
of which defined some certain properties of the rule of law. For instance, An-
thony Kennedy, Chief Justice of the United States, has said: 
“When we talk about the rule of law, we assume that we are talking about a law that 
promotes freedom, that promotes justice, that promotes equality.”5 
The Oxford dictionary provides a shorter definition of the rule of law:  
“The restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by subordinating it to well-defined 
and established laws.”6  
Besides, there have been some more detailed definitions, for example, accord-
ing to the World Justice Project (WJP):  
“State of law is a framework of rights and rules that created the foundation of social 
justice and prosperity. This is a system in which no entity, including the government, 
can stand above the law; where laws protect fundamental rights; and where everyone 
has rights to access to justice.”7  
According to the Secretary General of the United Nations:  
“The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which 
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separa-
                                                     
4 Magna Carta, article 39, at: http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/magna_carta-tran-
script.htm. 
5 See also: ABA, What is rule of law, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf. 
6 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/rule%2Bof%2Blaw___1?q=-
rule+of+law. 
7 http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law. 
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tion of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrar-
iness and procedural and legal transparency.”8 
Although the content and the way of expression are somewhat different, how-
ever, to some extent, those above-mentioned definitions of the rule of law focus 
on the relationships between people and government. This is the core relation-
ship and the foundation of every society derived from nature and the demands 
of existence of human society. The nature of this relationship, as succinctly 
summed up by James Madison – one of the founders of the U.S. Constitution:  
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. In framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige 
it to control itself.”9  
Nevertheless, it is necessary to confirm that the state of law is not a kind of 
state but a way of organizing a state as well as managing the society based on a 
democratic platform. In that sense, the rule of law is attached to and placed on 
a foundation of democracy. Democracy, therefore, is both the result and the 
condition of the state of law. The latter cannot exist under a non-democratic 
regime. That explains why in mankind’s history, the idea of the rule of law 
emerged from ancient times, but not until the establishment of the capitalist 
state did it become a reality. As a way of managing the state on the foundation 
of democracy, the rule of law must be built and operated on the basis of demo-
cratic principles. According to WJP, those principles are:  
- The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and pri-
vate entities are accountable under the law.  
- The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and pro-
tect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.  
- The process under which laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is 
accessible, fair, and efficient.  
- Justice is delivered timely by competent court system.10  
                                                     
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Con-
flict and Post-Conflict Societies (S/2004/616), http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%-
20report.pdf. 
9 Madison (1788). 
10 http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law. 
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Also, World Justice Project determines the criteria for evaluating the rule of 
law which include:11 
- Limited Government Power: This criterion requires that powers and duties 
of the state bodies must be clearly defined in law and controlled by differ-
ent checks and balances mechanisms in order to prevent the abuse of power 
including the organization of state power in accordance with the principle 
of separation of powers. 
- Absence of Corruption: This criterion requires that the state does not accept 
and shall take all measures to combat corruption. 
- Order and Security: This criterion requires the state to protect the rights, 
freedom, life and property of the citizens by means of prevention of all 
forms of crime and violence and lead the state under these dimensions: ab-
sence of crime, absence of civil conflict including terrorism, and armed con-
flict, and absence of violence as a socially acceptable means to redress per-
sonal grievances. 
- Fundamental Rights: This criterion requires the state to respect, protect 
and ensure fundamental human rights embodied in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. 
- Open Government: This criterion requires the state to act on the principles 
of openness, transparency, accountability, promotion of contact, participa-
tion, cooperation and accessible possibility to the government of the people. 
- Regulatory Enforcement: This criterion requires law must be strictly and 
timely enforced without unreasonable delay or improper interference. The 
government must pay compensation if damage is caused during the appli-
cation of law. 
- Civil Justice: This criterion requires the state to ensure that people have the 
ability to peacefully and effectively resolve conflicts, conflicts within the 
community (civil conflict) through formal judicial authorities but not some 
kind of self-administered justice by means of violence. 
- Criminal Justice: This criterion requires the state to have an effective crim-
inal justice system to prevent crime, ensure the order and security of socie-
ty. This system must be independent from any external interference, but 
must ensure that human rights in criminal proceedings as well. 
                                                     
11 http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law. 
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- Informal Justice: This criterion requires the state to encourage the type of 
traditional justice (unofficially) as customary laws, local laws, reconciliation 
team to solve small conflicts within the community. However, unofficially 
justice must also comply with standards such as impartiality, efficiency and 
respect human rights. 
Understandings and Characteristics of the State of Law in Vietnam 
The idea of the rule of law was introduced to Vietnam in the early 20th centu-
ry through revolutionaries and patriots like Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc. For instance, in his writings and speeches, Phan Chu Trinh 
heightens the role of a constitution and sees it as a legal instrument to limit 
the military monopoly and other abuses of power by the Eastern autocratic 
monarchies. He says  
“Basing on the ideas of a person or a court to rule a country then that country is no 
more than a flock who are prosperous, happy or hungry all depending on the generosi-
ty of the shepherds. But a state built by the people means that people create by them-
selves constitution, laws, and institutions to serve the general concerns of people.”12  
For Nguyen Ai Quoc, the influence of Western ideas on the rule of law can be 
seen clearly in the document called “Claim of the people of Annam” (in 
French: Revendications du peuple annamite) which was sent to the Versailles 
Conference in 1919, the seventh demand of that document called for a re-
placement of the regime of arbitrary decrees by a regime of law. Following the 
success of the August Revolution, the Declaration of Independence of 1945 
and the 1946 Constitution more clearly showed Ho Chi Minh’s idea on the 
rule of law while confirming the natural equal rights of humans which set the 
foundation for the independence of the people (Declaration of Independence ) 
and helped to build a new Vietnam with a decentralized mechanism to control 
the power in a state characterized by the principle of the separation of powers, 
and a mechanism for the rights and obligations of citizens (1946 Constitution). 
Since its foundation in 1930, the Communist Party of Vietnam has stressed 
the goal of building a democratic state under the doctrine of Marxism-
Leninism, i.e. a state led by the proletariat class (workers, peasants) to exercise 
                                                     
12 Nguyễn Văn Dương (1995), 815–816. 
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a dictatorship of the proletariat over the exploiting classes (bourgeoisie, land-
lords)to enforce basic human rights. For example, in the Brief Political Pro-
gram published in 1930, the party defined its objectives:  
- to overthrow the French imperialism and feudalism, 
- to achieve full sovereignty of Vietnam, 
- to build up a government controlled by workers, peasants and militants, 
- to organize a workers and peasants army in order to ensure these aims, 
- To realize goals like the freedom of association, equal rights of men and 
women, mass education, and reforms in industry and agriculture.13 
The idea to build a proletariat state was then clearly pointed out in many party 
documents, especially in those of the 6th National Party Congress (1976) stat-
ing that:  
“the socialist state is the state of the proletariat, an organization performing the collec-
tive ownership of the working class and working people, an organization through 
which the party implements its leadership in the process of social development.” 
This idea was then embodied in the constitutions promulgated after 1946 with 
different levels and ways of expression, particularly in the 1980 constitution 
which states that: “The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the state of proletari-
at” (article 2), “In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the collective ownership is 
the working people including the working class, collective peasant class and 
socialist intelligentsia and other working people, among them the core alliance 
of workers and peasants is led by the working class” (article 3). 
Since the 6th Party Congress (1986), interpretation and viewpoints of the 
party on the proletariat state have been gradually changed. During the 6th 
National Party Congress, although the term “proletariat state” was still used 
and confirmed that it is a model of a transitional state:  
“Our state is the instrument of the socialist collective ownership in which the working 
class and working people organize organs of political power. In the transitional period, 
that is the proletariat state conducting the socialist democracy.”14  
However, the interpretation of the function and mission of the proletariat state 
was renewed:  
                                                     
13 Communist Party of Vietnam (1998), 2–3. 
14 National Political Publishing House (2000), 124.  
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“Under the leadership of the party, the state function is institutionalized by law, 
rights, benefits and obligations of working people and economy and society are ruled 
by law. The state at the same time must ensure the really democratic rights of working 
people, and firmly punish those who violate the people's right.”15  
In this case, the term “dictatorship” (to administer the state and society mainly 
based on guidelines, resolutions of the party) was eased and replaced by law. In 
addition, democratic rights were stressed more. This shows a positive move-
ment toward the advance of the state of law approved by its superiority and 
rational elements in the world. The process was then promoted in the follow-
ing party congresses. The 7th National Party Congress stressed the importance 
of democratic practices by defining socialist democracy as the quintessence of 
the renewal process. The strengthening of the political system became both an 
objective and a motivation of Doi Moi. To innovate and strengthen the politi-
cal system, the party advocates to continue promoting administrative reforms 
to reach the following aims: The state is of the people, by the people and for 
the people; the state put under the leadership of the party administers the 
society by law and is organized and operated according to the principle of 
democratic centralism; the state implements unified but decentralized power; 
the state structure is downsized and operated effectively.16  
The state of law became politically fundamental for the national renovation 
process in the transitional period to socialism. Since then the Communist Party 
has continued to outline innovations for governance, for example in the 6th and 
7th Party Congresses. They emphasized the role of the state in managing the 
society by law and created a general model for the organization of state power 
in Vietnam under which it is unified but assigned to three aspects: legislative, 
executive and judiciary.17  
Expressing these ideas in such important documents demonstrates signifi-
cant changes in the basic policy of the Communist Party when innovating the 
organization and operations of the state following the jurisdiction principle. 
This is considered premise for the Conference of the Central Party Committee 
(the 7th Party Congress), the term “the state of law” was officially introduced 
                                                     
15 National Political Publishing House (2000), 125. 
16 National Political Publishing House (2000), 297. 
17 National Political Publishing House (2000), 327. 
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and views, principles and content of building the state of law was firstly de-
fined in a more comprehensive way stating that the state of law of Vietnam is:  
“The state of the people, by the people and for the people; the state administers all 
fields of the society by law and leads the country to a socialism-oriented development. 
The rule of law in Vietnam is built on the basis of strengthening and expanding its 
national unity, the alliance of working class and peasant class is seen as the core foun-
dation and put under the leadership of the party.”18  
Thus, the conference defined the very basic denotation of the term “the social-
ist rule of law in Vietnam”. However, not until the 8th Conference of the Cen-
tral Party Committee in 1995 (the 7th Party Congress) guidelines, solutions of 
innovation and perfection of the state toward a state of law were specified. In 
this conference, five central views on building the socialist state of law were 
identified: 
- Building the socialist state of law of the people, by the people and for the 
people, the alliance of working, peasant class and intelligentsia is seen as 
the core foundation of Vietnam and put under the leadership of the Com-
munist Party. The state fully implements the people’s democratic rights, 
keeps the social order and exercises control over all acts violating the inter-
ests of the motherland and the people. 
- State power is unified with the assignment and close coordination between 
state agencies in implementing the three powers: legislative, executive and 
judiciary. 
- Putting into effect the principle of democratic centralism in the organiza-
tion and operation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
- Strengthening socialist legislation; building a state of law in Vietnam to 
control the society by law and improvements in education and socialist mo-
rality. 
- Securing the leading role of the party in the Vietnamese State. 
The above-mentioned views on building the socialist state of law were then 
confirmed and specified in the 8th (1996), 9th (2002) and 10th (2006) National 
Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Most recently, the 11th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has stated:  
“continue to promote and perfect socialist rule of law as well as ensure the state is 
really of the people, by the people and for the people and put under the leadership of 
                                                     
18 National Political Publishing House (2000), 329. 
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the party; the state implements effectively the economic and social management func-
tions, at the same time properly resolves the relationship between the state and other 
institutions within its political system, with the people and with the market.”  
The congress also identified one of the most important instruments to build 
and perfect the socialist state of law:  
“to research and to supplement specific institutional and mechanism operations to 
ensure the principle that all state power belongs to the people, and the principle of 
state power is unified with the assignment, coordination and control among agencies 
in the implementation of legislative, executive and judiciary; to enhance the role and 
effectiveness of economic management of the state in accordance with the requirements 
of economic development of the socialist-oriented market; to continue to improve the 
legal system, mechanisms and policies to effectively operate the economy and imple-
ment international commitments, protect national interests; to urgently study, modify 
the Constitution (1992) amended and supplemented in 2001 in order to be consistent 
with the new situation.”19 
In order to meet the demand of the changes in the party’s concept of the rule of 
law, article 2 of the Vietnamese Constitution , which was amended in the 
2001, states: “The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a socialist-law-governed 
state of the people, by the people and for the people. All state power belongs to 
the people; the foundation is the alliance of the working class with the peasant-
ry and the intelligentsia. State power is unified with the assignment and coor-
dination among agencies in the implementation of legislative, executive and 
judiciary”. This is the first time the term “the rule of law” as well as the nature 
of the socialist state of law in Vietnam was officially confirmed in the Consti-
tution of Vietnam. 
The 2013 constitution continued to reaffirm that statement of the 1992 
constitution, also in article 2, one important word was added i.e., “The Social-
ist Republic of Vietnam is a socialist-law-governed state of the people, by the 
people and for the people. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is owned by the 
people; all state power belongs to the people; the foundation is the alliance of 
the working class with the peasantry and the intelligentsia. State power is 
unified with the assignment, coordination and control among agencies in the 
implementation of legislative, executive and judiciary.” By adding the term 
“control”, the 2013 constitution marked a huge step in accepting reasonable 
elements of state power control under the separation of powers model (alt-
                                                     
19 National Political Publishing House (2011), 246–247. 
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hough this principle has not been accepted) that is commonly applied in many 
countries all over the world. 
Based on the above ideas, it can be seen that since the foundation of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, it has continually focused on building a model 
for a state and a law system which is compatible with the political goal of the 
party: to build a socialist government in Vietnam. The party’s interpretation, 
awareness, and policies on this matter have gradually changed over the past 
years during which the biggest changes have been recorded since its launch of 
Doi Moi (1986). So far, the views of party and state on a socialist state ruled by 
law or a socialist legal state have been clearly shaped, whereby the socialist 
state rule of law includes the following basic characteristics:20  
- The state is of the people, by the people, for the people; the people are the 
owner of the state.  
- The state is organized and operated on the basis of the constitution; the 
state respects and protects the constitution. 
- The state governs the society by law, and ensures the predominant position 
of law in social life. 
- The state respects and protects human and civil rights. 
- The state is organized on the basis of unified state power with the assign-
ment, coordination and control among agencies in the implementation of 
legislative, executive and judiciary in accordance with the inspection and 
supervision of the implementation of state power through social organiza-
tions. 
- The state is led by the only political party called the Communist Party of 
Vietnam. 
These characteristics point out that the party’s views and understandings of 
Vietnam have approached but not yet been completely updated with the 
common view on the rule of law of the international community. For instance, 
the first and the fourth characteristics are the most compatible meanwhile the 
fifth one only reaches the basic level of compatibility as according to the com-
mon agreement of the international community, one of the characteristics of a 
state of law is the principle of separation of powers which was not reflected in 
the 5th characteristic. 
                                                     
20 Nguyen Van Manh (2012), 17–21. 
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Nevertheless, the biggest gap is shown in the last characteristic. If the so-
cialist state of law in Vietnam is based on the leadership of one political party 
then a fundamental attribute of the rule of law, according to the common con-
ception in the world is pluralistic politics in which political freedom i.e., free-
dom of association is guaranteed and civil society is protected and encouraged 
to be active. 
Advantages and Challenges in Promoting the Rule of Law 
The Vietnamese Constitution of 2013 creates fundamental advantages to pro-
mote the building of the state of law in Vietnam. In this constitution, one 
chapter and twenty seven articles were cut, only seven former articles re-
mained, twelve articles were added, one hundred and one articles of the 1992 
Constitution were amended; the 2013 Constitution contains many new provi-
sions some of which are both direct and indirect prospects to promote the 
building of the state of law. However, in order to realize that vision it is re-
quired to overcome many challenges that can be generalized as follows. 
The goal of building a socialist state ruled by law has been identified in the 
2001 revision of the 1992 Constitution and embodied again in the 2013 Con-
stitution pointed out in article 2 (The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a so-
cialist law-governed state of the people, by the people and for the people. State 
power is unified with the assignment, coordination and control among agen-
cies in the implementation of the legislative, executive and judiciary); article 6 
(Organizations and members that belong to the party operate within the 
framework of the constitution and law); article 8 (The state is organized and 
operated by constitution and law, society is governed also by constitution and 
law); articles 94, and 96 (The government implements the execute power and 
is responsible for protecting human rights and civil rights); article 102 (The 
people’s court performs judicial authority and is responsible for the protection 
of justice as well as human rights); article 107 (The People’s Procuration is 
responsible for protection of human rights and civil rights). These regulations 
are still general, however, they require amending the related laws, and thereby 
the organizational structure and operation of the state to be changed in a way 
that comes closer to the principles of the rule of law.  
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However, to implement those above-stated innovations is not easy. As men-
tioned previously, the views, and perceptions of a socialist state of law in Vi-
etnam are still not fully compatible with the common view of the world. There 
is still a difference between the conception of a socialist state of law with the 
common perception of the rule of law in two important points: organizational 
centralization of state power and political institutions. Therefore, the first and 
the most important challenge in promoting the rule of law in Vietnam is to 
deeply understand their nature and attributes. 
More specific challenges relate to the implementation of the assignment, 
coordination and control between the legislature, executive and judiciary in 
the context that state power in Vietnam is considered to be unified and cen-
tralized in the National Assembly as well as ensured by a Communist Party of 
Vietnam which is on the one hand the sole head of state and society, and on 
the other hand is answerable to the people and subject to the supervision of the 
people (article 4 of 2013 constitution). These are also the issues that contain 
theoretically unclear, even contradictory factors, and in fact, they have not ever 
been implemented and regulated in our law system.  
By reaffirming and clarifying the people’s sovereignty (mentioned in the 
constitutions of 1959, 1980, 1992), the 2013 Constitution also creates great 
opportunities for the expansion of democracy – the basis of the rule of law in a 
number of regulations: It is stated in the preamble (people are the actors who 
build, implement and protect the constitution); in article 2 (people are the 
owners of the country, all state power belongs to the people); in article 4 (the 
party, party organizations and party members are subject to the supervision of 
the people and responsible for their decisions); in article 6 (the way the people 
implement state power is direct and representative democracy); in article 70 
(“The National Assembly is the only organ with constitutional power” no 
longer exists); in article 120 (regulates a referendum on the constitution). 
These new amendments together with the capitalized term “People” indicate 
that the role of people’s power is solemnly acknowledged in the 2013 Consti-
tution. They also show the shift in the main features of the state to the idea 
that the state is a social contract in which people are establishing subjects; 
people empower and work out mechanisms to control the operation of the 
government created by them. These changes promise to promote the expansion 
of democracy in our country in the coming years. 
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However, the expansion of democracy may encounter many challenges. 
Currently, in Vietnam, there is still no clear legal framework and effective 
implementation of democratic rights, in particular the absence of a series of 
legal foundations for a democratic society, including the law on political par-
ties, the law on association, protest law, law on referendum, and the law on 
access to information. The legal framework of a representative democracy (the 
law on election of deputies to the National Assembly and the law on election 
of deputies to the People's Council) exists but contains many obsolete provi-
sions and needs to be modified to be compatible with the new situation (e.g., 
regulations on candidates, nomination, negotiation of candidates). Although 
direct democracy was firstl introduced and emphasized in the 2013 Constitu-
tion, there is still not any specific law and the concept itself has not really been 
clarified in our country. 
The 2013 Constitution also creates opportunities for a state governance re-
form which is indeed related directly to the building of the state of law. Series 
of newly added or amended regulations express the efforts of law -makers in 
forming a new framework for the governance of the country e.g., article 2 (con-
trol function among agencies in the implementation of the legislative, execu-
tive and judiciary); article 55 and 112 (decentralization between central and 
local level under a development model allowing local government to have its 
own budget); article 117 and 118 (two independent constitutional authorities 
are established: the National Election Council and the State Audit); article 9 
(the role of criticism and supervision of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and its 
members is clarified). These new revisions promise to promote reforms toward 
building transparent governance, efficiency and accountability and meet the 
demands arising from the process of democratization, and international inte-
gration of Vietnam. 
Despite that, there are also challenges in the reformation of national gov-
ernance. Only criticism and monitoring issues of the Vietnam Fatherland 
Front and its members have been regulated,21 other significant issues that re-
flect a framework of national governance reform added in the 2013 Constitu-
tion i.e., a mechanism of mutual control between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary; separation of powers between the central and local level according to 
a development model; organization and operation of two independent constitu-
                                                     
21 See Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (2013).  
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tional bodies as the National Election Council and State Audit have not yet 
been specified in our country, as this requires the new promulgation and revi-
sion of many related laws.  
However, the biggest difficulty is not the legislative issue, because Viet-
namese law makers and legal experts are qualified to build a legal framework 
for transparent governance, efficiency and accountability, but the obstacles to 
the establishment and operation of institutional control and power monitoring. 
This is expressed in the regulation of the Constitutional Council – an inde-
pendent constitutional institution, upon which almost all Vietnamese legal 
experts agree, the role of which is as a strong agency to control power; howev-
er, it was removed from the 2013 Draft Constitution (amended version). An-
other example is the building of the Law on Criticism and Supervision of the 
Vietnam Fatherland Front and its member organizations (to codify the Regula-
tion on supervision and social criticism of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, mass 
organizations of the Politburo) has been delayed, despite of the fact that it has 
long been proposed by the Front itself. In short, the novelty and complexity of 
institutional controls, power supervision along with their potential conflicts 
with the closed mode of operation of the current state institutions show that 
the reform of the framework of governance under the 2013 Constitution of our 
country will not be easily and quickly completed. 
The 2013 Constitution creates an unprecedented opportunity to complete 
the constitutional framework of human, and civil rights – one of the factors 
and basic foundation of the rule of law. Human rights institutions and citizen 
rights are mostly amended and supplemented in the 2013 Constitution. The 
amendments and supplements represent a new approach closely associated with 
common human recognition as well as the standards of international law on 
human rights. That is shown as follows. 
In the former 1992 Constitution, chapter 5 called “Rights and responsibili-
ties of the citizen” is now changed to chapter 2 and renamed “Human rights, 
rights and responsibilities of citizen”. The former term “Rights and responsi-
bilities of citizen” does not completely encompass the content of the chapter, 
this change also confirms the important role of this institution within the 
constitution, at the same time being with compatible general trends in the 
world. 
Human and citizens’ rights are no longer seen equally (as shown in the 
1992 Constitution) but these two terms are used for institutional rights, e.g., 
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equality before the law; business freedom; private ownership of property and 
productive assets; rights in scientific research and technology, literary and 
artistic creation and to receive the benefits from such activities; the right to the 
protection, and health care; freedom of belief and religion; the right to inviola-
bility of the body, health, honor and dignity protected by law are stipulated in 
the 1992 Constitution only for citizens. However, the 2013 Constitution stip-
ulates that this applies to everyone. Therefore, not only Vietnamese citizens 
but foreigners living in Vietnamese territory are also protected. 
Three obligations of the state are acknowledged in accordance with interna-
tional human right law: respect, protect and guarantee human rights (in article 
3 and 14 of the 2013 constitution meanwhile, the obligation to respect was 
only referred to in article 50 of the 1992 Constitution). This change not only 
ensures the harmonization with international human rights law, but also forms 
the institutional basis that binds constitutional agencies to fully and seriously 
implement the obligation in human rights, citizen rights in reality, especially 
the dual obligation of protection and guarantee. 
The principle of limited power is defined for the first time (paragraph 2, ar-
ticle 16) which has been outlined in international human rights law and in the 
constitution of a number of countries. The constitutional principles have im-
portant implications, because: This clarifies the spirit of international human 
rights law, that means the state must respect, protect and guarantee human 
rights but also set and apply the limits for a number of rights in order to per-
form the functions of the state's social management, ensure the rights and 
interests of the community and the rights and legitimate interests of other 
individuals. It prevents the potential abuse of state power to violate human 
rights; this is done through the stipulation of strict conditions for the limita-
tion of rights. It prevents inordinateness in the extreme uses and actions in the 
enjoyment of rights.  
Adding some new rights which have not been addressed in the 1992 and 
previous Constitutions of Vietnam that include: right to life (article 21); cul-
tural rights (article 41); the right to determine ethnicity, native language, 
choose the language of communication (article 42); right to live in a healthy 
environment (article 43); citizens cannot be deported and handed over to other 
states (article 17 paragraph 2); the right to have legal residence (article 22); the 
right to social security (article 34). These new rights expand the scope of con-
stitutional protection for human rights, citizen rights in both civil and politi-
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cal fields (article 21, 17, 42) as well as in economic, social, cultural fields (Ar-
ticle 41, 42, 43, 22, 34) and meet the new demands on human rights emerg-
ing in the context of industrialization, modernization and international inte-
gration of our country. 
Most of the recognized articles in the 1992 Constitution are strengthened 
(specified or detailed in separate articles): 
- equality before the law (article 16),  
- prohibition of torture, violence, coercion, and corporal punishment (article 
20 paragraph 1), 
- privacy and residence (articles 21 and 22), 
- access to information (article 25), 
- participation in state governance and social affairs (article 28), 
- gender equality (article 26),  
- voting in a referendum (article 29), 
- procedural fairness (article 31), 
- private property (article 32), 
- labor and employment (article 35).  
The revised rules also contribute to enhancing the level of compatibility of the 
rule of human rights, civil rights in the 2013 Constitution which is compati-
ble with the contents of international treaties on human rights to which Vi-
etnam is a member and with provisions on human and civil rights in the con-
stitutions of democratic countries. 
However, there are still many challenges in the assurance of human and 
constitutional rights of citizens in the 2013 Constitution. The first obstacle is 
that the 2013 Constitution does not regulate the direct effect of constitutional 
rights. This means that many important rights, especially civil and political 
rights as freedom of association, meeting, demonstration, the right to vote in 
the referendum will have to wait for the National Assembly to enact laws and 
for the government to issue decrees to guide the implementation. 
The second obstacle is that there is still no clear legal and effective mecha-
nism for the protection of constitutional rights. As the Constitutional Council 
has not yet been established, there is no possibility to prevent and effectively 
deal with the documents and decisions that violate the constitutional rights 
(unconstitutional) of the legislature, executive and judiciary. Similarly, the 
proposal of a national human rights agency is ignored causing the elimination 
of people’s opportunity to be protected by an independent constitutional agen-
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cy. Currently, through the mechanism for resolving complaints and denuncia-
tions designed as “to be a judge of one’s own case” (complaints and denuncia-
tions are solved by the authorities which themselves create the complaints and 
denunciations in the first place or by their higher authorities) and through the 
judicial system that is lacking in independence, the ability to solve and com-
pensate properly the violation of human rights, citizen rights, especially civil 
rights, and politically sensitive rights is limited. 
The third major obstacle relates to unreasonable regulations applied to is-
sues of national security in order to restrict rights (article 14) including the 
broad and vague prohibition of the abuse of human and citizen rights to vio-
late national interests, legitimate rights and interests of others (article 15). In 
fact, these rules have been misused to violate constitutional rights. In the con-
text of the judicial system which is not acting in the defense of justice together 
with the lack of an independent institution in human rights protection namely 
the Constitutional Council and a national human rights body, the ability to 
stop the abuses described above will be very difficult.  
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